123 lines
5.1 KiB
C
123 lines
5.1 KiB
C
/*************************************************************************
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* Written in 2020-2022 by Elichai Turkel *
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* To the extent possible under law, the author(s) have dedicated all *
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* copyright and related and neighboring rights to the software in this *
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* file to the public domain worldwide. This software is distributed *
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* without any warranty. For the CC0 Public Domain Dedication, see *
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* EXAMPLES_COPYING or https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0 *
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*************************************************************************/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <secp256k1.h>
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#include <secp256k1_ecdh.h>
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#include "examples_util.h"
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int main(void) {
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unsigned char seckey1[32];
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unsigned char seckey2[32];
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unsigned char compressed_pubkey1[33];
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unsigned char compressed_pubkey2[33];
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unsigned char shared_secret1[32];
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unsigned char shared_secret2[32];
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unsigned char randomize[32];
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int return_val;
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size_t len;
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secp256k1_pubkey pubkey1;
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secp256k1_pubkey pubkey2;
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/* Before we can call actual API functions, we need to create a "context". */
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secp256k1_context* ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
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if (!fill_random(randomize, sizeof(randomize))) {
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printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
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return 1;
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}
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/* Randomizing the context is recommended to protect against side-channel
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* leakage See `secp256k1_context_randomize` in secp256k1.h for more
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* information about it. This should never fail. */
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return_val = secp256k1_context_randomize(ctx, randomize);
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assert(return_val);
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/*** Key Generation ***/
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/* If the secret key is zero or out of range (bigger than secp256k1's
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* order), we try to sample a new key. Note that the probability of this
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* happening is negligible. */
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while (1) {
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if (!fill_random(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1)) || !fill_random(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2))) {
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printf("Failed to generate randomness\n");
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return 1;
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}
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if (secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey1) && secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, seckey2)) {
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break;
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}
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}
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/* Public key creation using a valid context with a verified secret key should never fail */
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return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey1, seckey1);
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assert(return_val);
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return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey2, seckey2);
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assert(return_val);
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/* Serialize pubkey1 in a compressed form (33 bytes), should always return 1 */
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len = sizeof(compressed_pubkey1);
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return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, compressed_pubkey1, &len, &pubkey1, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
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assert(return_val);
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/* Should be the same size as the size of the output, because we passed a 33 byte array. */
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assert(len == sizeof(compressed_pubkey1));
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/* Serialize pubkey2 in a compressed form (33 bytes) */
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len = sizeof(compressed_pubkey2);
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return_val = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(ctx, compressed_pubkey2, &len, &pubkey2, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
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assert(return_val);
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/* Should be the same size as the size of the output, because we passed a 33 byte array. */
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assert(len == sizeof(compressed_pubkey2));
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/*** Creating the shared secret ***/
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/* Perform ECDH with seckey1 and pubkey2. Should never fail with a verified
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* seckey and valid pubkey */
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return_val = secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, shared_secret1, &pubkey2, seckey1, NULL, NULL);
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assert(return_val);
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/* Perform ECDH with seckey2 and pubkey1. Should never fail with a verified
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* seckey and valid pubkey */
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return_val = secp256k1_ecdh(ctx, shared_secret2, &pubkey1, seckey2, NULL, NULL);
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assert(return_val);
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/* Both parties should end up with the same shared secret */
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return_val = memcmp(shared_secret1, shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret1));
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assert(return_val == 0);
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printf("Secret Key1: ");
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print_hex(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
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printf("Compressed Pubkey1: ");
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print_hex(compressed_pubkey1, sizeof(compressed_pubkey1));
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printf("\nSecret Key2: ");
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print_hex(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
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printf("Compressed Pubkey2: ");
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print_hex(compressed_pubkey2, sizeof(compressed_pubkey2));
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printf("\nShared Secret: ");
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print_hex(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
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/* This will clear everything from the context and free the memory */
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secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
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/* It's best practice to try to clear secrets from memory after using them.
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* This is done because some bugs can allow an attacker to leak memory, for
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* example through "out of bounds" array access (see Heartbleed), Or the OS
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* swapping them to disk. Hence, we overwrite the secret key buffer with zeros.
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*
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* Here we are preventing these writes from being optimized out, as any good compiler
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* will remove any writes that aren't used. */
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secure_erase(seckey1, sizeof(seckey1));
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secure_erase(seckey2, sizeof(seckey2));
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secure_erase(shared_secret1, sizeof(shared_secret1));
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secure_erase(shared_secret2, sizeof(shared_secret2));
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return 0;
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}
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