exhaustive tests: add recovery module
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@ -26,6 +26,11 @@
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#include "secp256k1.c"
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#include "secp256k1.c"
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#include "testrand_impl.h"
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#include "testrand_impl.h"
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
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#include "src/modules/recovery/main_impl.h"
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#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h"
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#endif
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/** stolen from tests.c */
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/** stolen from tests.c */
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void ge_equals_ge(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) {
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void ge_equals_ge(const secp256k1_ge *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) {
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CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity);
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CHECK(a->infinity == b->infinity);
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@ -282,6 +287,130 @@ void test_exhaustive_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *grou
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*/
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*/
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}
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}
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
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void test_exhaustive_recovery_sign(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) {
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int i, j, k;
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/* Loop */
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for (i = 1; i < order; i++) { /* message */
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for (j = 1; j < order; j++) { /* key */
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for (k = 1; k < order; k++) { /* nonce */
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const int starting_k = k;
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secp256k1_fe r_dot_y_normalized;
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig;
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
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secp256k1_scalar sk, msg, r, s, expected_r;
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unsigned char sk32[32], msg32[32];
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int expected_recid;
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int recid;
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secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg, i);
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secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk, j);
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secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sk32, &sk);
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secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg);
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secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(ctx, &rsig, msg32, sk32, secp256k1_nonce_function_smallint, &k);
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/* Check directly */
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &recid, &rsig);
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r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k);
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CHECK(r == expected_r);
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CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order ||
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(k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order);
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/* In computing the recid, there is an overflow condition that is disabled in
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* scalar_low_impl.h `secp256k1_scalar_set_b32` because almost every r.y value
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* will exceed the group order, and our signing code always holds out for r
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* values that don't overflow, so with a proper overflow check the tests would
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* loop indefinitely. */
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r_dot_y_normalized = group[k].y;
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secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r_dot_y_normalized);
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/* Also the recovery id is flipped depending if we hit the low-s branch */
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if ((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order) {
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expected_recid = secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r_dot_y_normalized) ? 1 : 0;
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} else {
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expected_recid = secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r_dot_y_normalized) ? 0 : 1;
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}
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CHECK(recid == expected_recid);
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/* Convert to a standard sig then check */
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &sig, &rsig);
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_load(ctx, &r, &s, &sig);
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/* Note that we compute expected_r *after* signing -- this is important
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* because our nonce-computing function function might change k during
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* signing. */
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r_from_k(&expected_r, group, k);
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CHECK(r == expected_r);
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CHECK((k * s) % order == (i + r * j) % order ||
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(k * (EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER - s)) % order == (i + r * j) % order);
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/* Overflow means we've tried every possible nonce */
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if (k < starting_k) {
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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void test_exhaustive_recovery_verify(const secp256k1_context *ctx, const secp256k1_ge *group, int order) {
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/* This is essentially a copy of test_exhaustive_verify, with recovery added */
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int s, r, msg, key;
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for (s = 1; s < order; s++) {
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for (r = 1; r < order; r++) {
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for (msg = 1; msg < order; msg++) {
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for (key = 1; key < order; key++) {
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secp256k1_ge nonconst_ge;
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig;
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
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secp256k1_pubkey pk;
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secp256k1_scalar sk_s, msg_s, r_s, s_s;
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secp256k1_scalar s_times_k_s, msg_plus_r_times_sk_s;
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int recid = 0;
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int k, should_verify;
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unsigned char msg32[32];
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secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_s, s);
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secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&r_s, r);
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secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&msg_s, msg);
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secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&sk_s, key);
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secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(msg32, &msg_s);
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/* Verify by hand */
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/* Run through every k value that gives us this r and check that *one* works.
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* Note there could be none, there could be multiple, ECDSA is weird. */
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should_verify = 0;
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for (k = 0; k < order; k++) {
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secp256k1_scalar check_x_s;
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r_from_k(&check_x_s, group, k);
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if (r_s == check_x_s) {
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secp256k1_scalar_set_int(&s_times_k_s, k);
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secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s_times_k_s, &s_times_k_s, &s_s);
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secp256k1_scalar_mul(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &r_s, &sk_s);
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secp256k1_scalar_add(&msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s, &msg_s);
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should_verify |= secp256k1_scalar_eq(&s_times_k_s, &msg_plus_r_times_sk_s);
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}
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}
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/* nb we have a "high s" rule */
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should_verify &= !secp256k1_scalar_is_high(&s_s);
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/* We would like to try recovering the pubkey and checking that it matches,
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* but pubkey recovery is impossible in the exhaustive tests (the reason
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* being that there are 12 nonzero r values, 12 nonzero points, and no
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* overlap between the sets, so there are no valid signatures). */
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/* Verify by converting to a standard signature and calling verify */
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_save(&rsig, &r_s, &s_s, recid);
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secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_convert(ctx, &sig, &rsig);
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memcpy(&nonconst_ge, &group[sk_s], sizeof(nonconst_ge));
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secp256k1_pubkey_save(&pk, &nonconst_ge);
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CHECK(should_verify ==
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secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(ctx, &sig, msg32, &pk));
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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#endif
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int main(void) {
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int main(void) {
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int i;
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int i;
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secp256k1_gej groupj[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER];
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secp256k1_gej groupj[EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER];
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@ -330,6 +459,12 @@ int main(void) {
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test_exhaustive_sign(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
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test_exhaustive_sign(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
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test_exhaustive_verify(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
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test_exhaustive_verify(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
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#ifdef ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
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test_exhaustive_recovery_sign(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
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test_exhaustive_recovery_verify(ctx, group, EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER);
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#endif
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secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx);
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return 0;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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