diff --git a/casper/README.md b/casper/README.md
index c83343b..23026ac 100644
--- a/casper/README.md
+++ b/casper/README.md
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 The general idea of this implementation of Casper is as follows:
 
 1. There exists a deterministic algorithm which determines a single proposer for each block. Here, the algorithm is simple: every validator is assigned an ID in the range `0 <= i < NUM_VALIDATORS`, and validator `i` proposes all blocks `NUM_VALIDATORS * k + i` for all `k ϵ Z`.
-2. Validators perform a binary repeated betting procedure on every height, where they bet a value `0 < p < 1` for the probability that they think that a block at that height will be finalized. The bets are incentivized via logarithmic scoring rule, and the result of the bets themselves determines finalization (ie. if 2/3 of all validators bet `p > 0.9999`, the block is considered finalized, and if 2/3 of all validators bet `p < 0.0001`, then the state of no block existing at that height is considered finalized); hence, the betting process is self-referential.
+2. Validators perform a binary repeated betting procedure on every height, where they bet a value `0 < p < 1` for the probability that they think that a block at that height will be finalized. The bets are incentivized via logarithmic scoring rule, and the result of the bets themselves determines finalization (ie. if 2/3 of all validators bet `p > 0.9999`, the block is considered finalized, and if 2/3 of all validators bet `p < 0.0001`, then it is agreed/finalized that _no_ block exists at that height, and the post-state of that height is equal to the post-state of the previous height); hence, the betting process is self-referential.
 3. From an incentive standpoint, each validator's optimal strategy is to bet the way they expect everyone else to be betting; hence, it is like a schellingcoin game in certain respects. Convergence in either direction is incentivized. As `p` approaches 0 or 1, the reward for betting correctly increases, but the penalty for betting incorrectly increases hyperbolically, so one only has the incentive to bet `p > 0.9999` or `p < 0.0001` if they are _really_ sure that their bet is correct.
 4. If a validator's vote exceeds `p = 0.9`, they also need to supply the hash of the block header. Proposing two blocks at a given height is punishable by total deposit slashing.
 5. From a BFT theory standpoint, this algorithm can be combined with a default strategy where bets are recorded in log odds (ie. `q = ln(p/(1-p))`), if 2/3 of voters vote `q = k` or higher for `k >= 1`, you vote `q = k+1`, and if 2/3 of voters vote `q = k` or lower for `k <= -1`, you vote `q = k-1`; this is similar to a highly protracted ten-round version of Tendermint (log odds of p = 0.9999 ~= 9.21).
diff --git a/mining/compute_probabilities_of_finality.py b/mining/compute_probabilities_of_finality.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6e31c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mining/compute_probabilities_of_finality.py
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import math
+BLKTIME = 17
+X = 0.28
+
+faclog = [1]
+for i in range(5000):
+    faclog.append(faclog[-1] * len(faclog))
+
+def fac(x):
+    return faclog[x]
+
+def poisson(expected, actual):
+    if expected == 0:
+        return 1 if actual == 0 else 0
+    return 2.718281828 ** (-expected + actual * math.log(expected) - math.log(fac(actual)))
+
+def p_we_win(k, x):
+    return 1 - (x / (1.0 - x)) ** k
+
+def p_we_win_after(s):
+    p = 0
+    for i in range(4000):
+        p += poisson(s * 1.0 / BLKTIME, i) * p_we_win(i, X)
+    return p
+
+for i in range(0, 7200, 12):
+    print i, p_we_win_after(i)
diff --git a/mining/finality_probability_sim.py b/mining/finality_probability_sim.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..470d8f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mining/finality_probability_sim.py
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+import random
+BLKTIME = 600
+LATENCY = 10
+TEST_MAX = 1200
+TEST_INTERVAL = 6
+
+class Block():
+    def __init__(self, parent, txstate):
+        self.parent = parent
+        self.score = 1 if parent is None else parent.score + 1
+        if parent is None or parent.txstate is None:
+            self.txstate = txstate
+        else:
+            self.txstate = parent.txstate
+
+
+results = {}
+
+
+for double_spend_delay in range(0, TEST_MAX, TEST_INTERVAL):
+    results[double_spend_delay] = 0
+    for _ in range(1000):
+        a_head = None
+        b_head = None
+        recvqueue = {}
+        for time_elapsed in range(5000):
+            txstate = 1 if time_elapsed < double_spend_delay else 2
+            # Miner A mines and sends (has 50% network share)
+            if random.random() * BLKTIME < 0.5:
+                a_head = Block(a_head, txstate)
+                if time_elapsed + LATENCY not in recvqueue:
+                    recvqueue[time_elapsed + LATENCY] = []
+                recvqueue[time_elapsed + LATENCY].append(a_head)
+            # Miner B mines and sends (has 50% network share)
+            if random.random() * BLKTIME < 0.5:
+                b_head = Block(b_head, txstate)
+                if time_elapsed + LATENCY not in recvqueue:
+                    recvqueue[time_elapsed + LATENCY] = []
+                recvqueue[time_elapsed + LATENCY].append(b_head)
+            # Receive blocks
+            if time_elapsed in recvqueue:
+                for b in recvqueue[time_elapsed]:
+                    if not a_head or b.score > a_head.score or (b.score == a_head.score and random.random() < 0.5):
+                        a_head = b
+                    if not b_head or b.score > b_head.score or (b.score == b_head.score and random.random() < 0.5):
+                        b_head = b
+        # Check which transaction "made it"
+        if a_head and a_head.txstate == 1:
+            results[double_spend_delay] += 0.001
+    print (double_spend_delay, results[double_spend_delay])
+
+print(results)