Updated security doc

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---
title: Extensions - security/privacy
revealOptions:
transition: 'fade'
---
# Extensions
## security/privacy
---
## Context
- Extend status features natively, permissionless
- Data based
- Simple primitives: hooks, queries, events, views
---
# A simple language
- No user defined logic (for now?)
- Non turing complete language (only loop on finite set)
- Can be analysed
---
# What can go wrong?
- Crashes
- Unauthorized actions
- Data leaks
- Replicate sensitive UI (chat messages/wallet)
---
# Crashes
- Static analysis to detect incorrect syntax
- Lightweight sandbox (React [error boundaries](https://reactjs.org/docs/error-boundaries.html), exception catching)
---
# Privacy
What (*capabilities*) accessed by whom (*scope*) after which action (*trigger*).
---
# Capability-based security
- An extension defines a set of capabilities and can only access those
- Enhanced for decentralized world
Note:
- http://habitatchronicles.com/2017/05/what-are-capabilities/
- https://agoric.com/about/
- https://github.com/NuxiNL/cloudabi#capability-based-security
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security
- https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/capsicum/
- https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/fuchsia/+/master/docs/the-book/sandboxing.md
- https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-overview.md#capability-oriented
- https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-capabilities.md
- https://webassembly.org/docs/security/
- https://developers.google.com/caja/
- https://github.com/fastly/lucet/blob/master/SECURITY.md
- https://sandstorm.io/how-it-works#capabilities
- https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/ethereum-object-capabilities/3035
- http://www.erights.org/elib/distrib/captp/index.html
- http://www.erights.org/elib/capability/ode/index.html
- http://zesty.ca/capmyths/usenix.pdf
- https://github.com/danfinlay/capnode/tree/eip-712
- https://w3c-ccg.github.io/ocap-ld/
- https://medium.com/capabul/minimum-viable-consensus-algorithms-with-object-capabilities-6059f926ab88
Simple security model, no [same-origin policy](https://www.w3.org/Security/wiki/Same_Origin_Policy)
---
# Leveraging data
- Capabilities fully inferred per hook
- Surfaced to user for validation
---
# Example #1
```clojure
{views/hello
[text "Hello"]
hooks/wallet.settings.hello
{:label "Test wallet settings"
:view [hello]}}
```
Note:
No capabilities required
---
# Example #2
```clojure
{views/hello
[gallery] ;; or input
hooks/wallet.settings.hello
{:label "Test wallet settings"
:view [hello]}}
```
Note:
Some capability required, extension scope
---
# Example #3
```clojure
{views/hello
[image {:url "http://..."}]
hooks/wallet.settings.hello
{:label "Test wallet settings"
:view [hello]}}
```
Note:
Scope remote
Depends on the URL
---
# Example #4
```clojure
{views/hello
[image {:url "..."}]
hooks/wallet.settings.hello
{:label "Test wallet settings"
:view [hello]}}
```
Note:
No scope issue
---
# Example #5
```clojure
{views/hello
(let [url [store/get {:value "KEY"}]]
[image {:url url}])
hooks/wallet.settings.hello
{:label "Test wallet settings"
:view [hello]
:on-open [http/get {...}]}}
```
Note:
Send image issue: have all participants in a chat hit some HTTP endpoint with ethereum address and IPs
Runtime check? User select scope, if doesn't match => fails
---
# Scope
What can be done with data accessed
- hook
- extension
- local
- remote (HTTP, IPFS)
---
# Trigger
What flow can lead to data leaks
- user controlled (e.g. on button click)
- extension controlled (on extension installation)
Note:
Scenario: on extension installation, access user address and send it using HTTP
---
# Runtime
- necessary capabilities inferred
- surfaced to end user
- end user can *reduce* those
- extension can be run with insufficient capabilities, some features won't work (sandboxing)
---
# Potential attack #1
An extension uses OCR to read the seed from one of stored image
- no such event currently
- not clear how it could be prevented with 3rd party events
- constrained by scope
---
# Potential attack #2
An extension periodically makes screenshot of the whole screen
- no such event currently
- not clear how it could be prevented with 3rd party events
- constrained by scope
- trigger could include status state information (e.g. only activate after seed is backuped)
---
# Potential attack #3
An extension replicates the whole status UI
- constrained by scope
- 3 words can't be accessed by extensions
---
# UX is a challenge
- Security profile to only surface selected capabilities
- JIT user validation?
- Problematic events? (e.g. send a message on behalf of user)
---
# Risk level
- Extracted from capabilities/scopes
- Simplify user validation process
---
# Security profile
- A set of capabilities/scopes a user is confortable with
- Once enabled, matching extensions can be installed w/o user validation
---
# Open Questions
- Mobile level permission is all or nothing
- How to handle primitives created by 3rd parties? (future)

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---
title: Extensions - security/privacy
revealOptions:
transition: 'fade'
---
# Extensions
## security/privacy
---
## Context
- Extend status features natively, permissionless
- Data based
- Simple primitives: hooks, queries, events, views
---
# A simple language
- No user defined logic (for now?)
- Non turing complete language (only loop on finite set)
- Can be analysed
---
Extensions are 3rd party chunk of data that can dynamically and permissionlessly modify Status behavior.
How do we ensure Status security is preserved and no unauthorized data access is performed?
# What can go wrong?
@ -32,60 +8,68 @@ revealOptions:
- Data leaks
- Replicate sensitive UI (chat messages/wallet)
---
## Crashes
# Crashes
Static analysis is performed to detect incorrect syntax. Then a lightweight sandbox (React [error boundaries](https://reactjs.org/docs/error-boundaries.html), exception catching) act as safe guard.
- Static analysis to detect incorrect syntax
- Lightweight sandbox (React [error boundaries](https://reactjs.org/docs/error-boundaries.html), exception catching)
## Status hijacking
---
Any screen (including the wallet) can be recreated as an extension. Only Status has access to the 3 words, preventing users to be tricked into signing forged transactions.
# Privacy
## Privacy / Security
What (*capabilities*) accessed by whom (*scope*) after which action (*trigger*).
Status contains a number of private data and can potential trigger actions with consequences (signing a transaction).
A user must be made aware of what an extension can do during its installation. The set of what can be done can be restricted by the user.
---
# Capability based security
# Capability-based security
The proposed solution to address security and privacy risks is to rely on [Capacity based security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security) tailored for decentralized architecture.
This model is used by a number of modern stacks ([Fuchsia](https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/fuchsia/+/master/docs/the-book/sandboxing.md), [WASI](https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-capabilities.md) or even [Agoric](https://agoric.com/about/)).
A good introduction to this model can be found [here](http://habitatchronicles.com/2017/05/what-are-capabilities/).
- An extension defines a set of capabilities and can only access those
- Enhanced for decentralized world
Essentially each extension would run in an isolated sandbox with only pre-granted accesses. Extension then run under those capabilities and cannot access anything not provided.
This is in contrast to hold user/permision model.
Note:
Extensions extend this model by puting emphasis on the localisation of the data (`scope`)
- http://habitatchronicles.com/2017/05/what-are-capabilities/
- https://agoric.com/about/
- https://github.com/NuxiNL/cloudabi#capability-based-security
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security
- https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/capsicum/
- https://fuchsia.googlesource.com/fuchsia/+/master/docs/the-book/sandboxing.md
- https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-overview.md#capability-oriented
- https://github.com/CraneStation/wasmtime/blob/master/docs/WASI-capabilities.md
- https://webassembly.org/docs/security/
- https://developers.google.com/caja/
- https://github.com/fastly/lucet/blob/master/SECURITY.md
- https://sandstorm.io/how-it-works#capabilities
## Scope
- https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/ethereum-object-capabilities/3035
- http://www.erights.org/elib/distrib/captp/index.html
- http://www.erights.org/elib/capability/ode/index.html
- http://zesty.ca/capmyths/usenix.pdf
- https://github.com/danfinlay/capnode/tree/eip-712
- https://w3c-ccg.github.io/ocap-ld/
- https://medium.com/capabul/minimum-viable-consensus-algorithms-with-object-capabilities-6059f926ab88
Scope encompass what can be done with an identified piece of data. A data accessed but kept in the extension sandbox doesn't pose the same threat that the same send to arbitrary remote server.
Simple security model, no [same-origin policy](https://www.w3.org/Security/wiki/Same_Origin_Policy)
---
Scope can be:
# Leveraging data
- hook
- extension
- local
- remote (HTTP, IPFS)
- Capabilities fully inferred per hook
- Surfaced to user for validation
## Trigger
---
What flow can lead to data leaks. A user controlled leak (e.g. button click) has not the same meaning than an extension controlled one (e.g. triggered during extension activation).
# Example #1
## Runtime
The capability required for an extension can be fully inferred dynamically by Status (due to their data nature).
This set of capabilities is then exposed to end user. Users are free to restrict this set and grant them to the extension.
An extension can always run with no capabilities, in a degraded sandboxed mode (e.g. some UI elements inactive, some events filtered).
# UX is a challenge
How to simply surface those informations and ensure end users make an informed decision?
We want to prevent users clicking through those screens and accepting anything.
## Risk level
A level (e.g. a note - A, B .. E-) is extracted from capabnilities and scopes required. It aggregates all associated risks.
## Security profile
Users define a set of capabilities/scopes they are confortable with. Once enabled, matching extensions can be installed w/o validation.
# Examples
```clojure
{views/hello
@ -96,13 +80,7 @@ Simple security model, no [same-origin policy](https://www.w3.org/Security/wiki/
:view [hello]}}
```
Note:
No capabilities required
---
# Example #2
No specific capabilities required. No data is accessed
```clojure
{views/hello
@ -113,13 +91,7 @@ No capabilities required
:view [hello]}}
```
Note:
Some capability required, extension scope
---
# Example #3
Some capability required as `gallery` might leak user photo. No way to have them exported through this extension.
```clojure
{views/hello
@ -130,31 +102,7 @@ Some capability required, extension scope
:view [hello]}}
```
Note:
Scope remote
Depends on the URL
---
# Example #4
```clojure
{views/hello
[image {:url "..."}]
hooks/wallet.settings.hello
{:label "Test wallet settings"
:view [hello]}}
```
Note:
No scope issue
---
# Example #5
Depending on the URL (e.g. `http` yes, `...` no) private data can be leaked.
```clojure
{views/hello
@ -167,99 +115,4 @@ No scope issue
:on-open [http/get {...}]}}
```
Note:
Send image issue: have all participants in a chat hit some HTTP endpoint with ethereum address and IPs
Runtime check? User select scope, if doesn't match => fails
---
# Scope
What can be done with data accessed
- hook
- extension
- local
- remote (HTTP, IPFS)
---
# Trigger
What flow can lead to data leaks
- user controlled (e.g. on button click)
- extension controlled (on extension installation)
Note:
Scenario: on extension installation, access user address and send it using HTTP
---
# Runtime
- necessary capabilities inferred
- surfaced to end user
- end user can *reduce* those
- extension can be run with insufficient capabilities, some features won't work (sandboxing)
---
# Potential attack #1
An extension uses OCR to read the seed from one of stored image
- no such event currently
- not clear how it could be prevented with 3rd party events
- constrained by scope
---
# Potential attack #2
An extension periodically makes screenshot of the whole screen
- no such event currently
- not clear how it could be prevented with 3rd party events
- constrained by scope
- trigger could include status state information (e.g. only activate after seed is backuped)
---
# Potential attack #3
An extension replicates the whole status UI
- constrained by scope
- 3 words can't be accessed by extensions
---
# UX is a challenge
- Security profile to only surface selected capabilities
- JIT user validation?
- Problematic events? (e.g. send a message on behalf of user)
---
# Risk level
- Extracted from capabilities/scopes
- Simplify user validation process
---
# Security profile
- A set of capabilities/scopes a user is confortable with
- Once enabled, matching extensions can be installed w/o user validation
---
# Open Questions
- Mobile level permission is all or nothing
- How to handle primitives created by 3rd parties? (future)
Some examples cannot be fully analyzed (e.g. depends on runtime data).