nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
tersec b81c06edab
rename Beacon{Block,State}Fork.Merge to Bellatrix; update copyright years (#3240)
2022-01-04 09:45:38 +00:00
..
README.md update from phase0/altair v1.1.6 URLs to v1.1.8 spec URLs (#3238) 2022-01-04 03:57:15 +00:00
batch_validation.nim Lazy aggregated batch verification (#3212) 2021-12-29 15:28:40 +01:00
block_processor.nim use BeaconTime instead of Slot in fork choice (#3138) 2021-12-21 18:56:08 +00:00
consensus_manager.nim use BeaconTime instead of Slot in fork choice (#3138) 2021-12-21 18:56:08 +00:00
eth2_processor.nim Assorted logging improvements (#3237) 2022-01-03 22:18:49 +01:00
gossip_validation.nim rename Beacon{Block,State}Fork.Merge to Bellatrix; update copyright years (#3240) 2022-01-04 09:45:38 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
    • blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
  • a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
    • Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
    • Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations