nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
Mamy Ratsimbazafy 2adf54e44a
Fix #2595 - recompute wallSlot across async calls (#2650)
2021-06-17 16:38:25 +02:00
..
README.md Reorg (5/5) (#2377) 2021-03-05 14:12:00 +01:00
batch_validation.nim write uncompressed validator keys to database (#2639) 2021-06-10 10:37:02 +03:00
block_processor.nim singe validator key cache 2021-06-01 20:43:44 +03:00
consensus_manager.nim singe validator key cache 2021-06-01 20:43:44 +03:00
eth2_processor.nim Fix #2595 - recompute wallSlot across async calls (#2650) 2021-06-17 16:38:25 +02:00
gossip_validation.nim use ForkedHashedBeaconState in StateData (#2634) 2021-06-11 20:51:46 +03:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folders hold a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting them (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pool

Validation

Gossip Validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are 2 consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • method validate(PubSub, message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim in the
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a xyzValidator message enqueues the validated object in one of the processing queue in eth2_processor
    • blocksQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry], (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • attestationsQueue: AsyncQueue[AttestationEntry]
    • aggregatesQueue: AsyncQueue[AggregateEntry]

Those queues are then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle burst of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations, forks