nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
Etan Kissling 3bc42994e4
update to latest LC test format (#3879)
The EF test format for the LC sync protocol is modified to verify checks
after each step: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/2938 -
The test runner is updated accordingly.
2022-07-23 05:54:01 +00:00
..
README.md update CL spec URLs (#3690) 2022-06-01 15:52:45 +00:00
batch_validation.nim bearssl: split abi (#3755) 2022-06-21 10:29:16 +02:00
block_processor.nim optimistic block gossip validation (#3876) 2022-07-21 21:39:43 +03:00
eth2_processor.nim Introduce message router (#3829) 2022-07-06 16:11:44 +00:00
gossip_validation.nim optimistic block gossip validation (#3876) 2022-07-21 21:39:43 +03:00
light_client_processor.nim update to latest LC test format (#3879) 2022-07-23 05:54:01 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
    • blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
  • a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
    • Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
    • Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations