status-im
/
nimbus-eth2
mirror of https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2.git
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity
nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing/gossip_validation.nim

654 lines
29 KiB
Nim
Raw Blame History

# beacon_chain
# Copyright (c) 2019-2021 Status Research & Development GmbH
# Licensed and distributed under either of
# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
{.push raises: [Defect].}
import
std/[sequtils, intsets, deques],
chronicles,
stew/results,
../spec/[
beaconstate, state_transition_block,
datatypes, crypto, digest, helpers, network, signatures],
../consensus_object_pools/[
spec_cache, blockchain_dag, block_quarantine, spec_cache,
attestation_pool, exit_pool
],
".."/[beacon_node_types, ssz, beacon_clock],
../validators/attestation_aggregation,
../extras
logScope:
topics = "gossip_checks"
func check_attestation_block(
pool: AttestationPool, attestationSlot: Slot, blck: BlockRef):
Result[void, (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
# The voted-for block must be a descendant of the finalized block, thus it
# must at least as new than the finalized checkpoint - in theory it could be
# equal, but then we're voting for an already-finalized block which is pretty
# useless - other blocks that are not rooted in the finalized chain will be
# pruned by the chain dag, and thus we can no longer get a BlockRef for them
if not (blck.slot > pool.chainDag.finalizedHead.slot):
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"Voting for already-finalized block")))
# The attestation shouldn't be voting for a block that didn't exist at the
# time - not in spec, but hard to reason about
if not (attestationSlot >= blck.slot):
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"Voting for block that didn't exist at the time")))
# We'll also cap it at 4 epochs which is somewhat arbitrary, but puts an
# upper bound on the processing done to validate the attestation
# TODO revisit with less arbitrary approach
if not ((attestationSlot - blck.slot) <= uint64(4 * SLOTS_PER_EPOCH)):
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring("Voting for very old block")))
ok()
func check_propagation_slot_range(
data: AttestationData, wallTime: BeaconTime):
Result[void, (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
let
futureSlot = (wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).toSlot()
if not futureSlot.afterGenesis or data.slot > futureSlot.slot:
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"Attestation slot in the future")))
let
pastSlot = (wallTime - MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).toSlot()
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#configuration
# The spec value of ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE is 32, but it can
# retransmit attestations on the cusp of being out of spec, and which by
# the time they reach their destination might be out of spec.
const ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE = 28
if pastSlot.afterGenesis and
data.slot + ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE < pastSlot.slot:
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"Attestation slot in the past")))
ok()
func check_beacon_and_target_block(
pool: var AttestationPool, data: AttestationData):
Result[BlockRef, (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
# The block being voted for (data.beacon_block_root) passes validation - by
# extension, the target block must at that point also pass validation.
# The target block is returned.
# We rely on the chain DAG to have been validated, so check for the existence
# of the block in the pool.
let blck = pool.chainDag.getRef(data.beacon_block_root)
if blck.isNil:
pool.quarantine.addMissing(data.beacon_block_root)
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring("Attestation block unknown")))
# Not in spec - check that rewinding to the state is sane
? check_attestation_block(pool, data.slot, blck)
# [REJECT] The attestation's target block is an ancestor of the block named
# in the LMD vote -- i.e. get_ancestor(store,
# attestation.data.beacon_block_root,
# compute_start_slot_at_epoch(attestation.data.target.epoch)) ==
# attestation.data.target.root
let
target = get_ancestor(
blck, compute_start_slot_at_epoch(data.target.epoch), SLOTS_PER_EPOCH.int)
if not (target.root == data.target.root):
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
"attestation's target block not an ancestor of LMD vote block")))
ok(target)
func check_aggregation_count(
attestation: Attestation, singular: bool):
Result[void, (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
var onesCount = 0
# TODO a cleverer algorithm, along the lines of countOnes() in nim-stew
# But that belongs in nim-stew, since it'd break abstraction layers, to
# use details of its representation from nimbus-eth2.
for aggregation_bit in attestation.aggregation_bits:
if not aggregation_bit:
continue
onesCount += 1
if singular: # More than one ok
if onesCount > 1:
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
"Attestation has too many aggregation bits")))
else:
break # Found the one we needed
if onesCount < 1:
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
"Attestation has too few aggregation bits")))
ok()
func check_attestation_subnet(
epochRef: EpochRef, attestation: Attestation,
topicCommitteeIndex: uint64): Result[void, (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
let
expectedSubnet =
compute_subnet_for_attestation(
get_committee_count_per_slot(epochRef),
attestation.data.slot, attestation.data.index.CommitteeIndex)
if expectedSubnet != topicCommitteeIndex:
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
"Attestation's committee index not for the correct subnet")))
ok()
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_attestation_subnet_id
proc validateAttestation*(
pool: var AttestationPool,
attestation: Attestation, wallTime: BeaconTime,
topicCommitteeIndex: uint64, checksExpensive: bool):
Result[seq[ValidatorIndex], (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
# Some of the checks below have been reordered compared to the spec, to
# perform the cheap checks first - in particular, we want to avoid loading
# an `EpochRef` and checking signatures. This reordering might lead to
# different IGNORE/REJECT results in turn affecting gossip scores.
# [REJECT] The attestation's epoch matches its target -- i.e.
# attestation.data.target.epoch ==
# compute_epoch_at_slot(attestation.data.slot)
block:
let v = check_attestation_slot_target(attestation.data)
if v.isErr():
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, v.error))
# attestation.data.slot is within the last ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE
# slots (within a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e.
# attestation.data.slot + ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE >= current_slot
# >= attestation.data.slot (a client MAY queue future attestations for
# processing at the appropriate slot).
? check_propagation_slot_range(attestation.data, wallTime) # [IGNORE]
# The attestation is unaggregated -- that is, it has exactly one
# participating validator (len([bit for bit in attestation.aggregation_bits
# if bit == 0b1]) == 1).
? check_aggregation_count(attestation, singular = true) # [REJECT]
# The block being voted for (attestation.data.beacon_block_root) has been seen
# (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue attestations for
# processing once block is retrieved).
# The block being voted for (attestation.data.beacon_block_root) passes
# validation.
# [IGNORE] if block is unseen so far and enqueue it in missing blocks
let target = ? check_beacon_and_target_block(pool, attestation.data) # [IGNORE/REJECT]
# The following rule follows implicitly from that we clear out any
# unviable blocks from the chain dag:
#
# The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of the block defined by
# attestation.data.beacon_block_root -- i.e. get_ancestor(store,
# attestation.data.beacon_block_root,
# compute_start_slot_at_epoch(store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)) ==
# store.finalized_checkpoint.root
let
epochRef = pool.chainDag.getEpochRef(target, attestation.data.target.epoch)
# [REJECT] The committee index is within the expected range -- i.e.
# data.index < get_committee_count_per_slot(state, data.target.epoch).
if not (attestation.data.index < get_committee_count_per_slot(epochRef)):
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
"validateAttestation: committee index not within expected range")))
# [REJECT] The attestation is for the correct subnet -- i.e.
# compute_subnet_for_attestation(committees_per_slot,
# attestation.data.slot, attestation.data.index) == subnet_id, where
# committees_per_slot = get_committee_count_per_slot(state,
# attestation.data.target.epoch), which may be pre-computed along with the
# committee information for the signature check.
? check_attestation_subnet(epochRef, attestation, topicCommitteeIndex)
# [REJECT] The number of aggregation bits matches the committee size -- i.e.
# len(attestation.aggregation_bits) == len(get_beacon_committee(state,
# data.slot, data.index)).
#
# This uses the same epochRef as data.target.epoch, because the attestation's
# epoch matches its target and attestation.data.target.root is an ancestor of
# attestation.data.beacon_block_root.
if not (attestation.aggregation_bits.lenu64 == get_beacon_committee_len(
epochRef, attestation.data.slot, attestation.data.index.CommitteeIndex)):
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
"validateAttestation: number of aggregation bits and committee size mismatch")))
let
fork = pool.chainDag.headState.data.data.fork
genesis_validators_root =
pool.chainDag.headState.data.data.genesis_validators_root
attesting_indices = get_attesting_indices(
epochRef, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bits)
# The number of aggregation bits matches the committee size, which ensures
# this condition holds.
doAssert attesting_indices.len == 1, "Per bits check above"
let validator_index = toSeq(attesting_indices)[0]
# There has been no other valid attestation seen on an attestation subnet
# that has an identical `attestation.data.target.epoch` and participating
# validator index.
# Slightly modified to allow only newer attestations than were previously
# seen (no point in propagating older votes)
if (pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 > validator_index.uint64) and
pool.nextAttestationEpoch[validator_index].subnet >
attestation.data.target.epoch:
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"Validator has already voted in epoch")))
if not checksExpensive:
return ok(attesting_indices)
# The signature of attestation is valid.
block:
let v = is_valid_indexed_attestation(
fork, genesis_validators_root, epochRef, attesting_indices,
attestation, {})
if v.isErr():
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, v.error))
# Only valid attestations go in the list, which keeps validator_index
# in range
if not (pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 > validator_index.uint64):
pool.nextAttestationEpoch.setLen(validator_index.int + 1)
pool.nextAttestationEpoch[validator_index].subnet =
attestation.data.target.epoch + 1
ok(attesting_indices)
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
proc validateAggregate*(
pool: var AttestationPool,
signedAggregateAndProof: SignedAggregateAndProof, wallTime: BeaconTime):
Result[seq[ValidatorIndex], (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
# Some of the checks below have been reordered compared to the spec, to
# perform the cheap checks first - in particular, we want to avoid loading
# an `EpochRef` and checking signatures. This reordering might lead to
# different IGNORE/REJECT results in turn affecting gossip scores.
template aggregate_and_proof: untyped = signedAggregateAndProof.message
template aggregate: untyped = aggregate_and_proof.aggregate
# [REJECT] The aggregate attestation's epoch matches its target -- i.e.
# `aggregate.data.target.epoch == compute_epoch_at_slot(aggregate.data.slot)`
block:
let v = check_attestation_slot_target(aggregate.data)
if v.isErr():
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, v.error))
# [IGNORE] aggregate.data.slot is within the last
# ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE slots (with a
# MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. aggregate.data.slot +
# ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE >= current_slot >= aggregate.data.slot
? check_propagation_slot_range(aggregate.data, wallTime) # [IGNORE]
# [IGNORE] The valid aggregate attestation defined by
# hash_tree_root(aggregate) has not already been seen (via aggregate gossip,
# within a verified block, or through the creation of an equivalent aggregate
# locally).
#
# This is [IGNORE] and already checked by attestation pool when aggregate is
# added.
# [IGNORE] The aggregate is the first valid aggregate received for the
# aggregator with index aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index for the epoch
# aggregate.data.target.epoch.
# Slightly modified to allow only newer attestations than were previously
# seen (no point in propagating older votes)
if (pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 >
aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index) and
pool.nextAttestationEpoch[
aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index].aggregate >
aggregate.data.target.epoch:
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"Validator has already aggregated in epoch")))
# [REJECT] The attestation has participants -- that is,
# len(get_attesting_indices(state, aggregate.data, aggregate.aggregation_bits)) >= 1.
#
# get_attesting_indices() is:
# committee = get_beacon_committee(state, data.slot, data.index)
# return set(index for i, index in enumerate(committee) if bits[i])
#
# the attestation doesn't have participants is iff either:
# (1) the aggregation bits are all 0; or
# (2) the non-zero aggregation bits don't overlap with extant committee
# members, i.e. they counts don't match.
# But (2) would reflect an invalid aggregation in other ways, so reject it
# either way.
? check_aggregation_count(aggregate, singular = false)
# [REJECT] The block being voted for (aggregate.data.beacon_block_root)
# passes validation.
# [IGNORE] if block is unseen so far and enqueue it in missing blocks
let target = ? check_beacon_and_target_block(pool, aggregate.data)
# [REJECT] aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof selects the validator as an
# aggregator for the slot -- i.e. is_aggregator(state, aggregate.data.slot,
# aggregate.data.index, aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof) returns True.
let
epochRef = pool.chainDag.getEpochRef(target, aggregate.data.target.epoch)
if not is_aggregator(
epochRef, aggregate.data.slot, aggregate.data.index.CommitteeIndex,
aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof):
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring("Incorrect aggregator")))
# [REJECT] The aggregator's validator index is within the committee -- i.e.
# aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index in get_beacon_committee(state,
# aggregate.data.slot, aggregate.data.index).
if aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index.ValidatorIndex notin
get_beacon_committee(
epochRef, aggregate.data.slot, aggregate.data.index.CommitteeIndex):
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
"Aggregator's validator index not in committee")))
# [REJECT] The aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof is a valid signature of the
# aggregate.data.slot by the validator with index
# aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index.
# get_slot_signature(state, aggregate.data.slot, privkey)
if aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index >= epochRef.validator_keys.lenu64:
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring("Invalid aggregator_index")))
let
fork = pool.chainDag.headState.data.data.fork
genesis_validators_root =
pool.chainDag.headState.data.data.genesis_validators_root
if not verify_slot_signature(
fork, genesis_validators_root, aggregate.data.slot,
epochRef.validator_keys[aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index],
aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof):
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
"Selection_proof signature verification failed")))
# [REJECT] The aggregator signature, signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
if not verify_aggregate_and_proof_signature(
fork, genesis_validators_root, aggregate_and_proof,
epochRef.validator_keys[aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index],
signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature):
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring(
"signed_aggregate_and_proof signature verification failed")))
let attesting_indices = get_attesting_indices(
epochRef, aggregate.data, aggregate.aggregation_bits)
# [REJECT] The signature of aggregate is valid.
block:
let v = is_valid_indexed_attestation(
fork, genesis_validators_root, epochRef, attesting_indices,
aggregate, {})
if v.isErr():
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, v.error))
# The following rule follows implicitly from that we clear out any
# unviable blocks from the chain dag:
#
# The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of the block defined by
# aggregate.data.beacon_block_root -- i.e. get_ancestor(store,
# aggregate.data.beacon_block_root,
# compute_start_slot_at_epoch(store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)) ==
# store.finalized_checkpoint.root
# Only valid aggregates go in the list
if pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 <= aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index:
pool.nextAttestationEpoch.setLen(
aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index.int + 1)
pool.nextAttestationEpoch[aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index].aggregate =
aggregate.data.target.epoch + 1
ok(attesting_indices)
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
proc isValidBeaconBlock*(
dag: ChainDAGRef, quarantine: var QuarantineRef,
signed_beacon_block: SignedBeaconBlock, wallTime: BeaconTime,
flags: UpdateFlags):
Result[void, (ValidationResult, BlockError)] =
logScope:
received_block = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.message)
blockRoot = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.root)
# In general, checks are ordered from cheap to expensive. Especially, crypto
# verification could be quite a bit more expensive than the rest. This is an
# externally easy-to-invoke function by tossing network packets at the node.
# [IGNORE] The block is not from a future slot (with a
# MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. validate that
# signed_beacon_block.message.slot <= current_slot (a client MAY queue future
# blocks for processing at the appropriate slot).
if not (signed_beacon_block.message.slot <=
(wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).slotOrZero):
debug "block is from a future slot",
wallSlot = wallTime.toSlot()
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, Invalid))
# [IGNORE] The block is from a slot greater than the latest finalized slot --
# i.e. validate that signed_beacon_block.message.slot >
# compute_start_slot_at_epoch(state.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)
if not (signed_beacon_block.message.slot > dag.finalizedHead.slot):
debug "block is not from a slot greater than the latest finalized slot"
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, Invalid))
# [IGNORE] The block is the first block with valid signature received for the
# proposer for the slot, signed_beacon_block.message.slot.
#
# While this condition is similar to the proposer slashing condition at
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/validator.md#proposer-slashing
# it's not identical, and this check does not address slashing:
#
# (1) The beacon blocks must be conflicting, i.e. different, for the same
# slot and proposer. This check also catches identical blocks.
#
# (2) By this point in the function, it's not been checked whether they're
# signed yet. As in general, expensive checks should be deferred, this
# would add complexity not directly relevant this function.
#
# (3) As evidenced by point (1), the similarity in the validation condition
# and slashing condition, while not coincidental, aren't similar enough
# to combine, as one or the other might drift.
#
# (4) Furthermore, this function, as much as possible, simply returns a yes
# or no answer, without modifying other state for p2p network interface
# validation. Complicating this interface, for the sake of sharing only
# couple lines of code, wouldn't be worthwhile.
#
# TODO might check unresolved/orphaned blocks too, and this might not see all
# blocks at a given slot (though, in theory, those get checked elsewhere), or
# adding metrics that count how often these conditions occur.
let
slotBlockRef = getBlockBySlot(dag, signed_beacon_block.message.slot)
if not slotBlockRef.isNil:
let blck = dag.get(slotBlockRef).data
if blck.message.proposer_index ==
signed_beacon_block.message.proposer_index and
blck.message.slot == signed_beacon_block.message.slot and
blck.signature.toRaw() != signed_beacon_block.signature.toRaw():
notice "block isn't first block with valid signature received for the proposer",
blckRef = slotBlockRef,
existing_block = shortLog(blck.message)
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, Invalid))
# [IGNORE] The block's parent (defined by block.parent_root) has been seen
# (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue blocks for
# processing once the parent block is retrieved).
#
# And implicitly:
# [REJECT] The block's parent (defined by block.parent_root) passes validation.
let parent_ref = dag.getRef(signed_beacon_block.message.parent_root)
if parent_ref.isNil:
# Pending dag gets checked via `ChainDAGRef.add(...)` later, and relevant
# checks are performed there. In usual paths beacon_node adds blocks via
# ChainDAGRef.add(...) directly, with no additional validity checks.
debug "parent unknown, putting block in quarantine",
current_slot = wallTime.toSlot()
if not quarantine.add(dag, signed_beacon_block):
debug "Block quarantine full"
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, MissingParent))
# [REJECT] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of block -- i.e.
# get_ancestor(store, block.parent_root,
# compute_start_slot_at_epoch(store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)) ==
# store.finalized_checkpoint.root
let
finalized_checkpoint = dag.headState.data.data.finalized_checkpoint
ancestor = get_ancestor(
parent_ref, compute_start_slot_at_epoch(finalized_checkpoint.epoch))
if ancestor.isNil:
debug "couldn't find ancestor block"
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, Invalid)) # might not've received block
if not (finalized_checkpoint.root in [ancestor.root, Eth2Digest()]):
debug "block not descendent of finalized block"
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, Invalid))
# [REJECT] The block is proposed by the expected proposer_index for the
# block's slot in the context of the current shuffling (defined by
# parent_root/slot). If the proposer_index cannot immediately be verified
# against the expected shuffling, the block MAY be queued for later
# processing while proposers for the block's branch are calculated -- in such
# a case do not REJECT, instead IGNORE this message.
let
proposer = getProposer(dag, parent_ref, signed_beacon_block.message.slot)
if proposer.isNone:
warn "cannot compute proposer for message"
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, Invalid)) # internal issue
if proposer.get()[0] !=
ValidatorIndex(signed_beacon_block.message.proposer_index):
notice "block had unexpected proposer",
expected_proposer = proposer.get()[0]
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, Invalid))
# [REJECT] The proposer signature, signed_beacon_block.signature, is valid
# with respect to the proposer_index pubkey.
if not verify_block_signature(
dag.headState.data.data.fork,
dag.headState.data.data.genesis_validators_root,
signed_beacon_block.message.slot,
signed_beacon_block.message,
proposer.get()[1],
signed_beacon_block.signature):
debug "block failed signature verification",
signature = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.signature)
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, Invalid))
ok()
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attester_slashing
proc validateAttesterSlashing*(
pool: var ExitPool, attester_slashing: AttesterSlashing):
Result[bool, (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
# [IGNORE] At least one index in the intersection of the attesting indices of
# each attestation has not yet been seen in any prior attester_slashing (i.e.
# attester_slashed_indices = set(attestation_1.attesting_indices).intersection(attestation_2.attesting_indices),
# verify if any(attester_slashed_indices.difference(prior_seen_attester_slashed_indices))).
# TODO sequtils2 should be able to make this more reasonable, from asSeq on
# down, and can sort and just find intersection that way
let
attestation_1_indices =
attester_slashing.attestation_1.attesting_indices.asSeq
attestation_2_indices =
attester_slashing.attestation_2.attesting_indices.asSeq
attester_slashed_indices =
toIntSet(attestation_1_indices) * toIntSet(attestation_2_indices)
if not disjoint(
attester_slashed_indices, pool.prior_seen_attester_slashed_indices):
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"validateAttesterSlashing: attester-slashed index already attester-slashed")))
# [REJECT] All of the conditions within process_attester_slashing pass
# validation.
let attester_slashing_validity =
check_attester_slashing(
pool.chainDag.headState.data.data, attester_slashing, {})
if attester_slashing_validity.isErr:
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, attester_slashing_validity.error))
pool.prior_seen_attester_slashed_indices.incl attester_slashed_indices
pool.attester_slashings.addExitMessage(
attester_slashing, ATTESTER_SLASHINGS_BOUND)
ok(true)
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#proposer_slashing
proc validateProposerSlashing*(
pool: var ExitPool, proposer_slashing: ProposerSlashing):
Result[bool, (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
# Not from spec; the rest of NBC wouldn't have correctly processed it either.
if proposer_slashing.signed_header_1.message.proposer_index > high(int).uint64:
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"validateProposerSlashing: proposer-slashed index too high")))
# [IGNORE] The proposer slashing is the first valid proposer slashing
# received for the proposer with index
# proposer_slashing.signed_header_1.message.proposer_index.
if proposer_slashing.signed_header_1.message.proposer_index.int in
pool.prior_seen_proposer_slashed_indices:
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"validateProposerSlashing: proposer-slashed index already proposer-slashed")))
# [REJECT] All of the conditions within process_proposer_slashing pass validation.
let proposer_slashing_validity =
check_proposer_slashing(
pool.chainDag.headState.data.data, proposer_slashing, {})
if proposer_slashing_validity.isErr:
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, proposer_slashing_validity.error))
pool.prior_seen_proposer_slashed_indices.incl(
proposer_slashing.signed_header_1.message.proposer_index.int)
pool.proposer_slashings.addExitMessage(
proposer_slashing, PROPOSER_SLASHINGS_BOUND)
ok(true)
# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#voluntary_exit
proc validateVoluntaryExit*(
pool: var ExitPool, signed_voluntary_exit: SignedVoluntaryExit):
Result[void, (ValidationResult, cstring)] =
# [IGNORE] The voluntary exit is the first valid voluntary exit received for
# the validator with index signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index.
if signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index >=
pool.chainDag.headState.data.data.validators.lenu64:
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"validateVoluntaryExit: validator index too high")))
# Since pool.chainDag.headState.data.data.validators is a seq, this means
# signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index.int is already valid, but
# check explicitly if one changes that data structure.
if signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index.int in
pool.prior_seen_voluntary_exit_indices:
return err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring(
"validateVoluntaryExit: validator index already voluntarily exited")))
# [REJECT] All of the conditions within process_voluntary_exit pass
# validation.
let voluntary_exit_validity =
check_voluntary_exit(
pool.chainDag.headState.data.data, signed_voluntary_exit, {})
if voluntary_exit_validity.isErr:
return err((ValidationResult.Reject, voluntary_exit_validity.error))
pool.prior_seen_voluntary_exit_indices.incl(
signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index.int)
pool.voluntary_exits.addExitMessage(
signed_voluntary_exit, VOLUNTARY_EXITS_BOUND)
ok()
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink