nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
tersec fb6e6d9cf4
remove `newPayload` from block production flow (#4186)
* remove `newPayload` from block production flow

* refactor block_processor to run `newPayload` as part of `storeBlock`
2022-10-14 22:48:56 +03:00
..
README.md update consensus spec ref URLs to v1.2.0 (#4164) 2022-09-23 07:56:06 +00:00
batch_validation.nim cache shuffling separately from other EpochRef data (fixes #2677) (#3990) 2022-08-18 21:07:01 +03:00
block_processor.nim remove `newPayload` from block production flow (#4186) 2022-10-14 22:48:56 +03:00
eth2_processor.nim move LVH handling to tests/; increase maximum fork choice retries (#4205) 2022-10-03 13:10:08 +00:00
gossip_validation.nim a few more manual v1.2.0 consensus spec ref URL updates (#4165) 2022-09-23 12:00:17 +00:00
light_client_processor.nim move LVH handling to tests/; increase maximum fork choice retries (#4205) 2022-10-03 13:10:08 +00:00
optimistic_processor.nim rm optimistic candidate block check from LC (#4131) 2022-09-17 00:42:19 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
    • blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
  • a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
    • Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
    • Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations