d839b9d07e
Currently, we require genesis and a checkpoint block and state to start from an arbitrary slot - this PR relaxes this requirement so that we can start with a state alone. The current trusted-node-sync algorithm works by first downloading blocks until we find an epoch aligned non-empty slot, then downloads the state via slot. However, current [proposals](https://github.com/ethereum/beacon-APIs/pull/226) for checkpointing prefer finalized state as the main reference - this allows more simple access control and caching on the server side - in particular, this should help checkpoint-syncing from sources that have a fast `finalized` state download (like infura and teku) but are slow when accessing state via slot. Earlier versions of Nimbus will not be able to read databases created without a checkpoint block and genesis. In most cases, backfilling makes the database compatible except where genesis is also missing (custom networks). * backfill checkpoint block from libp2p instead of checkpoint source, when doing trusted node sync * allow starting the client without genesis / checkpoint block * perform epoch start slot lookahead when loading tail state, so as to deal with the case where the epoch start slot does not have a block * replace `--blockId` with `--state-id` in TNS command line * when replaying, also look at the parent of the last-known-block (even if we don't have the parent block data, we can still replay from a "parent" state) - in particular, this clears the way for implementing state pruning * deprecate `--finalized-checkpoint-block` option (no longer needed) |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| README.md | ||
| eth2_discovery.nim | ||
| eth2_network.nim | ||
| libp2p_json_serialization.nim | ||
| network_metadata.nim | ||
| peer_pool.nim | ||
| peer_scores.nim | ||
| topic_params.nim | ||
README.md
Networking
This folders hold a collection of modules to:
- configure the Eth2 P2P network
- discover, connect, and maintain quality Eth2 peers
Data received is handed other to the ../gossip_processing modules for validation.
Security concerns
- Collusion: part of the peer selection must be kept random. This avoids peers bringing all their friends and colluding against a beacon node.
- Denial-of-service: The beacon node must provide ways to handle burst of data that may come:
- from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
- from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations, forks