nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
tersec 38ce948647
partial altair merge (#2735)
* partial altair merge

* exclude still-in-flux sync committee data structures from partial merge

* undo the remaining sync_committee mention
2021-07-26 09:51:14 +00:00
..
README.md Reorg (5/5) (#2377) 2021-03-05 14:12:00 +01:00
batch_validation.nim remove false OnBlockAdded dependency on phase0 HashedBeaconState (#2661) 2021-06-21 08:35:24 +00:00
block_processor.nim some whole-file copies from altair branch (#2728) 2021-07-19 11:58:30 +00:00
consensus_manager.nim singe validator key cache 2021-06-01 20:43:44 +03:00
eth2_processor.nim Syncv2 (#2723) 2021-07-15 21:01:07 +02:00
gossip_validation.nim partial altair merge (#2735) 2021-07-26 09:51:14 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folders hold a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting them (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pool

Validation

Gossip Validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are 2 consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • method validate(PubSub, message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim in the
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a xyzValidator message enqueues the validated object in one of the processing queue in eth2_processor
    • blocksQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry], (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • attestationsQueue: AsyncQueue[AttestationEntry]
    • aggregatesQueue: AsyncQueue[AggregateEntry]

Those queues are then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle burst of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations, forks