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nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/spec/keystore.nim

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# beacon_chain
# Copyright (c) 2018-2023 Status Research & Development GmbH
# Licensed and distributed under either of
# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
{.push raises: [].}
import
# Standard library
std/[algorithm, math, parseutils, strformat, strutils, typetraits, unicode,
uri, hashes],
# Third-party libraries
normalize,
# Status libraries
stew/[results, bitops2, base10, io2, endians2], stew/shims/macros,
eth/keyfile/uuid, blscurve,
json_serialization, json_serialization/std/options,
chronos/timer,
nimcrypto/[sha2, rijndael, pbkdf2, bcmode, hash, scrypt],
# Local modules
libp2p/crypto/crypto as lcrypto,
./datatypes/base, ./signatures
export base, uri, io2, options
# We use `ncrutils` for constant-time hexadecimal encoding/decoding procedures.
import nimcrypto/utils as ncrutils
export
results, burnMem, writeValue, readValue
{.localPassC: "-fno-lto".} # no LTO for crypto
type
KeystoreMode* = enum
Secure, Fast
ChecksumFunctionKind* = enum
sha256Checksum = "sha256"
Sha256Params* = object
Sha256Digest* = MDigest[256]
ChecksumBytes* = distinct seq[byte]
Checksum* = object
case function*: ChecksumFunctionKind
of sha256Checksum:
params*: Sha256Params
message*: Sha256Digest
Aes128CtrIv* = distinct seq[byte]
Aes128CtrParams* = object
iv*: Aes128CtrIv
CipherFunctionKind* = enum
aes128CtrCipher = "aes-128-ctr"
CipherBytes* = distinct seq[byte]
Cipher* = object
case function*: CipherFunctionKind
of aes128CtrCipher:
params*: Aes128CtrParams
message*: CipherBytes
KdfKind* = enum
kdfPbkdf2 = "pbkdf2"
kdfScrypt = "scrypt"
ScryptSalt* = distinct seq[byte]
ScryptParams* = object
dklen*: uint64
n*, p*, r*: int
salt*: ScryptSalt
Pbkdf2Salt* = distinct seq[byte]
PrfKind* = enum # Pseudo-random-function Kind
HmacSha256 = "hmac-sha256"
Pbkdf2Params* = object
dklen*: uint64
c*: uint64
prf*: PrfKind
salt*: Pbkdf2Salt
DecryptionStatus* = enum
Success = "Success"
InvalidPassword = "Invalid password"
InvalidKeystore = "Invalid keystore"
# https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/4494da0966afa7318ec0157948821b19c4248805/EIPS/eip-2386.md#specification
Wallet* = object
uuid*: UUID
name*: WalletName
version*: uint
walletType* {.serializedFieldName: "type"}: string
# TODO: The use of `JsonString` can be removed once we
# solve the serialization problem for `Crypto[T]`
crypto*: Crypto
nextAccount* {.serializedFieldName: "nextaccount".}: Natural
Kdf* = object
case function*: KdfKind
of kdfPbkdf2:
pbkdf2Params* {.serializedFieldName: "params".}: Pbkdf2Params
of kdfScrypt:
scryptParams* {.serializedFieldName: "params".}: ScryptParams
message*: string
Crypto* = object
kdf*: Kdf
checksum*: Checksum
cipher*: Cipher
Keystore* = object
crypto*: Crypto
description*: Option[string]
pubkey*: ValidatorPubKey
path*: KeyPath
uuid*: string
version*: int
KeystoreKind* = enum
Local, Remote
RemoteKeystoreFlag* {.pure.} = enum
IgnoreSSLVerification
HttpHostUri* = distinct Uri
RemoteSignerInfo* = object
url*: HttpHostUri
id*: uint32
pubkey*: ValidatorPubKey
FileLockHandle* = ref object
ioHandle*: IoLockHandle
opened*: bool
RemoteSignerType* {.pure.} = enum
Web3Signer, VerifyingWeb3Signer
ProvenProperty* = object
path*: string
description*: Option[string]
phase0Index*: Option[GeneralizedIndex]
altairIndex*: Option[GeneralizedIndex]
bellatrixIndex*: Option[GeneralizedIndex]
capellaIndex*: Option[GeneralizedIndex]
denebIndex*: Option[GeneralizedIndex]
KeystoreData* = object
version*: uint64
pubkey*: ValidatorPubKey
description*: Option[string]
handle*: FileLockHandle
case kind*: KeystoreKind
of KeystoreKind.Local:
privateKey*: ValidatorPrivKey
path*: KeyPath
uuid*: string
of KeystoreKind.Remote:
flags*: set[RemoteKeystoreFlag]
remotes*: seq[RemoteSignerInfo]
threshold*: uint32
case remoteType*: RemoteSignerType
of RemoteSignerType.Web3Signer:
discard
of RemoteSignerType.VerifyingWeb3Signer:
provenBlockProperties*: seq[ProvenProperty]
NetKeystore* = object
crypto*: Crypto
description*: Option[string]
pubkey*: lcrypto.PublicKey
uuid*: string
version*: int
RemoteKeystore* = object
version*: uint64
description*: Option[string]
case remoteType*: RemoteSignerType
of RemoteSignerType.Web3Signer:
discard
of RemoteSignerType.VerifyingWeb3Signer:
provenBlockProperties*: seq[ProvenProperty]
pubkey*: ValidatorPubKey
flags*: set[RemoteKeystoreFlag]
remotes*: seq[RemoteSignerInfo]
threshold*: uint32
KsResult*[T] = Result[T, string]
Eth2KeyKind* = enum
signingKeyKind # Also known as voting key
withdrawalKeyKind
UUID* = distinct string
WalletName* = distinct string
Mnemonic* = distinct string
KeyPath* = distinct string
KeySeed* = distinct seq[byte]
KeystorePass* = object
str*: string
Credentials* = object
mnemonic*: Mnemonic
keystore*: Keystore
signingKey*: ValidatorPrivKey
withdrawalKey*: ValidatorPrivKey
SimpleHexEncodedTypes* = ScryptSalt|ChecksumBytes|CipherBytes
CacheItemFlag {.pure.} = enum
Missing, Present
KeystoreCacheItem = object
flag: CacheItemFlag
kdf: Kdf
cipher: Cipher
decryptionKey: seq[byte]
timestamp: Moment
KdfSaltKey* = distinct array[32, byte]
KeystoreCache* = object
expireTime*: Duration
table*: Table[KdfSaltKey, KeystoreCacheItem]
KeystoreCacheRef* = ref KeystoreCache
const
keyLen = 32
scryptParams = ScryptParams(
dklen: uint64 keyLen,
n: 2^18,
p: 1,
r: 8
)
pbkdf2Params = Pbkdf2Params(
dklen: uint64 keyLen,
c: uint64(2^18),
prf: HmacSha256
)
# https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2334
eth2KeyPurpose = 12381
eth2CoinType* = 3600
baseKeyPath* = [Natural eth2KeyPurpose, eth2CoinType]
# https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039/bip-0039-wordlists.md
wordListLen = 2048
maxWordLen = 16
KeystoreCachePruningTime* = 5.minutes
UUID.serializesAsBaseIn Json
KeyPath.serializesAsBaseIn Json
WalletName.serializesAsBaseIn Json
ChecksumFunctionKind.serializesAsTextInJson
CipherFunctionKind.serializesAsTextInJson
PrfKind.serializesAsTextInJson
KdfKind.serializesAsTextInJson
template `$`*(u: HttpHostUri): string =
`$`(Uri(u))
template `==`*(lhs, rhs: HttpHostUri): bool =
Uri(lhs) == Uri(rhs)
template `<`*(lhs, rhs: HttpHostUri): bool =
$Uri(lhs) < $Uri(rhs)
template `$`*(m: Mnemonic): string =
string(m)
template `==`*(lhs, rhs: WalletName): bool =
string(lhs) == string(rhs)
template `$`*(x: WalletName): string =
string(x)
# TODO: `burnMem` in nimcrypto could use distinctBase
# to make its usage less error-prone.
template burnMem*(m: var (Mnemonic|string)) =
ncrutils.burnMem(string m)
template burnMem*(m: var KeySeed) =
ncrutils.burnMem(distinctBase m)
template burnMem*(m: var KeystorePass) =
ncrutils.burnMem(m.str)
func longName*(wallet: Wallet): string =
if wallet.name.string == wallet.uuid.string:
wallet.name.string
else:
wallet.name.string & " (" & wallet.uuid.string & ")"
macro wordListArray*(filename: static string,
maxWords: static int = 0,
minWordLen: static int = 0,
maxWordLen: static int = high(int)): untyped =
result = newTree(nnkBracket)
let words = slurp(filename.replace('\\', '/')).splitLines()
for word in words:
if word.len >= minWordLen and word.len <= maxWordLen:
result.add newCall("cstring", newLit(word))
if maxWords > 0 and result.len >= maxWords:
return
const
englishWords = wordListArray("english_word_list.txt",
maxWords = wordListLen,
maxWordLen = maxWordLen)
englishWordsDigest =
"AD90BF3BEB7B0EB7E5ACD74727DC0DA96E0A280A258354E7293FB7E211AC03DB".toDigest
proc checkEnglishWords(): bool =
if len(englishWords) != wordListLen:
false
else:
var ctx: sha256
ctx.init()
for item in englishWords:
ctx.update($item)
ctx.finish() == englishWordsDigest
static:
doAssert(checkEnglishWords(), "English words array is corrupted!")
func validateKeyPath*(path: string): Result[KeyPath, cstring] =
var digitCount: int
var number: BiggestUInt
try:
for elem in path.string.split("/"):
# TODO: doesn't "m" have to be the first character and is it the only
# place where it is valid?
if elem == "m":
continue
# parseBiggestUInt can raise if overflow
digitCount = elem.parseBiggestUInt(number)
if digitCount == 0:
return err("Invalid derivation path")
except ValueError:
return err("KeyPath contains invalid number(s)")
return ok(KeyPath path)
iterator pathNodes(path: KeyPath): Natural =
# TODO: we have exceptions there
# and this iterator is used to derive secret keys
# if we fail we want to scrub secrets from memory
try:
for elem in path.string.split("/"):
if elem == "m": continue
yield parseBiggestUInt(elem)
except ValueError:
doAssert false, "Make sure you've validated the key path with `validateKeyPath`"
func makeKeyPath*(validatorIdx: Natural,
keyType: Eth2KeyKind): KeyPath =
# https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2334
let use = case keyType
of withdrawalKeyKind: "0"
of signingKeyKind: "0/0"
try:
KeyPath &"m/{eth2KeyPurpose}/{eth2CoinType}/{validatorIdx}/{use}"
except ValueError:
raiseAssert "All values above can be converted successfully to strings"
func isControlRune(r: Rune): bool =
let r = int r
(r >= 0 and r < 0x20) or (r >= 0x7F and r < 0xA0)
proc init*(T: type KeystorePass, input: string): T =
for rune in toNFKD(input):
if not isControlRune(rune):
result.str.add rune
func getSeed*(mnemonic: Mnemonic, password: KeystorePass): KeySeed =
# https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki#from-mnemonic-to-seed
let salt = toNFKD("mnemonic" & password.str)
KeySeed sha512.pbkdf2(mnemonic.string, salt, 2048, 64)
template add(m: var Mnemonic, s: cstring) =
m.string.add s
proc generateMnemonic*(
rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
words: openArray[cstring] = englishWords,
entropyParam: openArray[byte] = @[]): Mnemonic =
## Generates a valid BIP-0039 mnenomic:
## https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki#generating-the-mnemonic
var entropy =
if entropyParam.len == 0:
rng.generateBytes(32)
else:
doAssert entropyParam.len >= 128 and
entropyParam.len <= 256 and
entropyParam.len mod 32 == 0
@entropyParam
let
checksumBits = entropy.len div 4 # ranges from 4 to 8
mnemonicWordCount = 12 + (checksumBits - 4) * 3
checksum = sha256.digest(entropy)
entropy.add byte(checksum.data.getBitsBE(0 ..< checksumBits))
# Make sure the string won't be reallocated as this may
# leave partial copies of the mnemonic in memory:
result = Mnemonic newStringOfCap(mnemonicWordCount * maxWordLen)
result.add words[entropy.getBitsBE(0..10)]
for i in 1 ..< mnemonicWordCount:
let
firstBit = i*11
lastBit = firstBit + 10
result.add " "
result.add words[entropy.getBitsBE(firstBit..lastBit)]
proc cmpIgnoreCase(lhs: cstring, rhs: string): int =
# TODO: This is a bit silly.
# Nim should have a `cmp` function for C strings.
cmpIgnoreCase($lhs, rhs)
proc validateMnemonic*(inputWords: string,
outputMnemonic: var Mnemonic): bool =
## Accept a case-insensitive input string and returns `true`
## if it represents a valid mnenomic. The `outputMnemonic`
## value will be populated with a normalized lower-case
## version of the mnemonic using a single space separator.
##
## The `outputMnemonic` value may be populated partially
## with sensitive data even in case of validator failure.
## Make sure to burn the received data after usage.
# TODO consider using a SecretString type for inputWords
let words = strutils.strip(inputWords.string.toNFKD).split(Whitespace)
if words.len < 12 or words.len > 24 or words.len mod 3 != 0:
return false
# Make sure the string won't be re-allocated as this may
# leave partial copies of the mnemonic in memory:
outputMnemonic = Mnemonic newStringOfCap(words.len * maxWordLen)
for word in words:
let foundIdx = binarySearch(englishWords, word, cmpIgnoreCase)
if foundIdx == -1:
return false
if outputMnemonic.string.len > 0:
outputMnemonic.add " "
outputMnemonic.add englishWords[foundIdx]
return true
proc deriveChildKey*(parentKey: ValidatorPrivKey,
index: Natural): ValidatorPrivKey =
let success = derive_child_secretKey(SecretKey result,
SecretKey parentKey,
uint32 index)
# TODO `derive_child_secretKey` is reporting pre-condition
# failures with return values. We should turn the checks
# into asserts inside the function.
doAssert success
proc deriveMasterKey*(seed: KeySeed): ValidatorPrivKey =
let success = derive_master_secretKey(SecretKey result,
seq[byte] seed)
# TODO `derive_master_secretKey` is reporting pre-condition
# failures with return values. We should turn the checks
# into asserts inside the function.
doAssert success
proc deriveMasterKey*(mnemonic: Mnemonic,
password: KeystorePass): ValidatorPrivKey =
deriveMasterKey(getSeed(mnemonic, password))
proc deriveChildKey*(masterKey: ValidatorPrivKey,
path: KeyPath): ValidatorPrivKey =
result = masterKey
for idx in pathNodes(path):
result = deriveChildKey(result, idx)
proc deriveChildKey*(masterKey: ValidatorPrivKey,
path: openArray[Natural]): ValidatorPrivKey =
result = masterKey
for idx in path:
# TODO: we have exceptions in pathNodes unless `validateKeyPath`
# was called,
# and this iterator is used to derive secret keys
# if we fail we want to scrub secrets from memory
result = deriveChildKey(result, idx)
proc keyFromPath*(mnemonic: Mnemonic,
password: KeystorePass,
path: KeyPath): ValidatorPrivKey =
deriveChildKey(deriveMasterKey(mnemonic, password), path)
proc shaChecksum(key, cipher: openArray[byte]): Sha256Digest =
var ctx: sha256
ctx.init()
ctx.update(key)
ctx.update(cipher)
result = ctx.finish()
ctx.clear()
proc writeJsonHexString(s: OutputStream, data: openArray[byte])
{.raises: [IOError, Defect].} =
s.write '"'
s.write ncrutils.toHex(data, {HexFlags.LowerCase})
s.write '"'
proc readValue*(r: var JsonReader, value: var Pbkdf2Salt)
{.raises: [SerializationError, IOError, Defect].} =
let s = r.readValue(string)
if s.len == 0 or s.len mod 16 != 0:
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The Pbkdf2Salt salt must have a non-zero length divisible by 16")
value = Pbkdf2Salt ncrutils.fromHex(s)
let length = len(seq[byte](value))
if length == 0 or (length mod 8) != 0:
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The Pbkdf2Salt must be a valid hex string")
proc readValue*(r: var JsonReader, value: var Aes128CtrIv)
{.raises: [SerializationError, IOError, Defect].} =
let s = r.readValue(string)
if s.len != 32:
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The aes-128-ctr IV must be a string of length 32")
value = Aes128CtrIv ncrutils.fromHex(s)
if len(seq[byte](value)) != 16:
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The aes-128-ctr IV must be a valid hex string")
proc readValue*[T: SimpleHexEncodedTypes](r: var JsonReader, value: var T) {.
raises: [SerializationError, IOError, Defect].} =
value = T ncrutils.fromHex(r.readValue(string))
if len(seq[byte](value)) == 0:
r.raiseUnexpectedValue("Valid hex string expected")
template readValueImpl(r: var JsonReader, value: var Checksum) =
var
functionSpecified = false
paramsSpecified = false
messageSpecified = false
for fieldName in readObjectFields(r):
case fieldName
of "function":
value = Checksum(function: r.readValue(ChecksumFunctionKind))
functionSpecified = true
of "params":
if functionSpecified:
case value.function
of sha256Checksum:
r.readValue(value.params)
else:
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The 'params' field must be specified after the 'function' field")
paramsSpecified = true
of "message":
if functionSpecified:
case value.function
of sha256Checksum:
r.readValue(value.message)
else:
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The 'message' field must be specified after the 'function' field")
messageSpecified = true
else:
r.raiseUnexpectedField(fieldName, "Checksum")
if not (functionSpecified and paramsSpecified and messageSpecified):
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The Checksum value should have sub-fields named " &
"'function', 'params', and 'message'")
{.push warning[ProveField]:off.} # https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/22060
proc readValue*(r: var JsonReader[DefaultFlavor], value: var Checksum)
{.raises: [SerializationError, IOError].} =
readValueImpl(r, value)
{.pop.}
template readValueImpl(r: var JsonReader, value: var Cipher) =
var
functionSpecified = false
paramsSpecified = false
messageSpecified = false
for fieldName in readObjectFields(r):
case fieldName
of "function":
value = Cipher(
function: r.readValue(CipherFunctionKind), message: value.message)
functionSpecified = true
of "params":
if functionSpecified:
case value.function
of aes128CtrCipher:
r.readValue(value.params)
else:
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The 'params' field must be specified after the 'function' field")
paramsSpecified = true
of "message":
r.readValue(value.message)
messageSpecified = true
else:
r.raiseUnexpectedField(fieldName, "Cipher")
if not (functionSpecified and paramsSpecified and messageSpecified):
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The Cipher value should have sub-fields named " &
"'function', 'params', and 'message'")
{.push warning[ProveField]:off.} # https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/22060
proc readValue*(r: var JsonReader[DefaultFlavor], value: var Cipher)
{.raises: [SerializationError, IOError].} =
readValueImpl(r, value)
{.pop.}
template readValueImpl(r: var JsonReader, value: var Kdf) =
var
functionSpecified = false
paramsSpecified = false
for fieldName in readObjectFields(r):
case fieldName
of "function":
value = Kdf(function: r.readValue(KdfKind), message: value.message)
functionSpecified = true
of "params":
if functionSpecified:
case value.function
of kdfPbkdf2:
r.readValue(value.pbkdf2Params)
of kdfScrypt:
r.readValue(value.scryptParams)
else:
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The 'params' field must be specified after the 'function' field")
paramsSpecified = true
of "message":
r.readValue(value.message)
else:
r.raiseUnexpectedField(fieldName, "Kdf")
if not (functionSpecified and paramsSpecified):
r.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"The Kdf value should have sub-fields named 'function' and 'params'")
{.push warning[ProveField]:off.} # https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/22060
proc readValue*(r: var JsonReader[DefaultFlavor], value: var Kdf)
{.raises: [SerializationError, IOError].} =
readValueImpl(r, value)
{.pop.}
proc readValue*(r: var JsonReader, value: var (Checksum|Cipher|Kdf)) =
static: raiseAssert "Unknown flavor `JsonReader[" & $typeof(r).Flavor &
"]` for `readValue` of `" & $typeof(value) & "`"
# HttpHostUri
proc readValue*(reader: var JsonReader, value: var HttpHostUri) {.
raises: [IOError, SerializationError, Defect].} =
let svalue = reader.readValue(string)
let res = parseUri(svalue)
if res.scheme != "http" and res.scheme != "https":
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("Incorrect URL scheme")
if len(res.hostname) == 0:
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("Missing URL hostname")
value = HttpHostUri(res)
proc writeValue*(
writer: var JsonWriter, value: HttpHostUri) {.raises: [IOError].} =
writer.writeValue($distinctBase(value))
# RemoteKeystore
proc writeValue*(
writer: var JsonWriter, value: RemoteKeystore) {.raises: [IOError].} =
writer.beginRecord()
writer.writeField("version", value.version)
writer.writeField("pubkey", "0x" & value.pubkey.toHex())
writer.writeField("remotes", value.remotes)
writer.writeField("threshold", value.threshold)
case value.remoteType
of RemoteSignerType.Web3Signer:
writer.writeField("type", "web3signer")
of RemoteSignerType.VerifyingWeb3Signer:
writer.writeField("type", "verifying-web3signer")
writer.writeField("proven_block_properties", value.provenBlockProperties)
if value.description.isSome():
writer.writeField("description", value.description.get())
if RemoteKeystoreFlag.IgnoreSSLVerification in value.flags:
writer.writeField("ignore_ssl_verification", true)
writer.endRecord()
template writeValue*(w: var JsonWriter,
value: Pbkdf2Salt|SimpleHexEncodedTypes|Aes128CtrIv) =
writeJsonHexString(w.stream, distinctBase value)
proc readValue*(reader: var JsonReader, value: var RemoteKeystore)
{.raises: [SerializationError, IOError, Defect].} =
var
version: Option[uint64]
description: Option[string]
remote: Option[HttpHostUri]
remotes: Option[seq[RemoteSignerInfo]]
remoteType: Option[RemoteSignerType]
provenBlockProperties: Option[seq[ProvenProperty]]
ignoreSslVerification: Option[bool]
pubkey: Option[ValidatorPubKey]
threshold: Option[uint32]
# TODO: implementing deserializers for versioned objects
# manually is extremely error-prone. This should use
# the auto-generated deserializer from nim-json-serialization
for fieldName in readObjectFields(reader):
case fieldName:
of "pubkey":
if pubkey.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("Multiple `pubkey` fields found",
"RemoteKeystore")
pubkey = some(reader.readValue(ValidatorPubKey))
of "remote":
if remote.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("Multiple `remote` fields found",
"RemoteKeystore")
if remotes.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("The `remote` field cannot be specified together with `remotes`",
"RemoteKeystore")
remote = some(reader.readValue(HttpHostUri))
of "remotes":
if remotes.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("Multiple `remote` fields found",
"RemoteKeystore")
if remote.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("The `remotes` field cannot be specified together with `remote`",
"RemoteKeystore")
if version.isNone:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField(
"The `remotes` field should be specified after the `version` field of the keystore",
"RemoteKeystore")
if version.get < 2:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField(
"The `remotes` field is valid only past version 2 of the remote keystore format",
"RemoteKeystore")
remotes = some(reader.readValue(seq[RemoteSignerInfo]))
of "version":
if version.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("Multiple `version` fields found",
"RemoteKeystore")
version = some(reader.readValue(uint64))
if version.get > 3'u64:
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue(
"Remote keystore version " & $version.get &
" requires a more recent version of Nimbus")
of "description":
if description.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("Multiple `description` fields found",
"RemoteKeystore")
description = some(reader.readValue(string))
of "ignore_ssl_verification":
if ignoreSslVerification.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("Multiple conflicting options found",
"RemoteKeystore")
ignoreSslVerification = some(reader.readValue(bool))
of "type":
if remoteType.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("Multiple `type` fields found",
"RemoteKeystore")
let remoteTypeValue = case reader.readValue(string).toLowerAscii()
of "web3signer":
RemoteSignerType.Web3Signer
of "verifying-web3signer":
RemoteSignerType.VerifyingWeb3Signer
else:
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("Unsupported remote signer `type` value")
remoteType = some remoteTypeValue
of "proven_block_properties":
if provenBlockProperties.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("Multiple `proven_block_properties` fields found",
"RemoteKeystore")
if version.isNone:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField(
"The `proven_block_properties` field should be specified after the `version` field of the keystore",
"RemoteKeystore")
if version.get < 3:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField(
"The `proven_block_properties` field is valid only past version 3 of the remote keystore format",
"RemoteKeystore")
if remoteType.isNone:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField(
"The `proven_block_properties` field should be specified after the `type` field of the keystore",
"RemoteKeystore")
if remoteType.get != RemoteSignerType.VerifyingWeb3Signer:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField(
"The `proven_block_properties` field can be specified only when the remote signer type is 'verifying-web3signer'",
"RemoteKeystore")
var provenProperties = reader.readValue(seq[ProvenProperty])
for prop in provenProperties.mitems:
if prop.path == ".execution_payload.fee_recipient":
prop.bellatrixIndex = some GeneralizedIndex(401)
prop.capellaIndex = some GeneralizedIndex(401)
prop.denebIndex = some GeneralizedIndex(801)
elif prop.path == ".graffiti":
prop.bellatrixIndex = some GeneralizedIndex(18)
prop.capellaIndex = some GeneralizedIndex(18)
prop.denebIndex = some GeneralizedIndex(18)
else:
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("Keystores with proven properties different than " &
"`.execution_payload.fee_recipient` and `.graffiti` " &
"require a more recent version of Nimbus")
provenBlockProperties = some provenProperties
of "threshold":
if threshold.isSome:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField("Multiple `threshold` fields found",
"RemoteKeystore")
if version.isNone:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField(
"The `threshold` field should be specified after the `version` field of the keystore",
"RemoteKeystore")
if version.get < 2:
reader.raiseUnexpectedField(
"The `threshold` field is valid only past version 2 of the remote keystore format",
"RemoteKeystore")
threshold = some(reader.readValue(uint32))
else:
# Ignore unknown field names.
discard
if version.isNone():
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("The required field `version` is missing")
if remotes.isNone():
if remote.isSome and pubkey.isSome:
remotes = some @[RemoteSignerInfo(
pubkey: pubkey.get,
id: 0,
url: remote.get
)]
else:
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("The required field `remotes` is missing")
if threshold.isNone:
if remotes.get.len > 1:
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("The `threshold` field must be specified when using distributed keystores")
else:
if threshold.get.uint64 > remotes.get.lenu64:
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("The specified `threshold` must be lower than the number of remote signers")
if pubkey.isNone():
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("Field `pubkey` is missing")
if version.get >= 3:
if remoteType.isNone:
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("The required field `type` is missing")
case remoteType.get
of RemoteSignerType.Web3Signer:
discard
of RemoteSignerType.VerifyingWeb3Signer:
if provenBlockProperties.isNone:
reader.raiseUnexpectedValue("The required field `proven_block_properties` is missing")
value = case remoteType.get(RemoteSignerType.Web3Signer)
of RemoteSignerType.Web3Signer:
RemoteKeystore(
version: 2'u64,
pubkey: pubkey.get,
description: description,
remoteType: RemoteSignerType.Web3Signer,
remotes: remotes.get,
threshold: threshold.get(1))
of RemoteSignerType.VerifyingWeb3Signer:
RemoteKeystore(
version: 2'u64,
pubkey: pubkey.get,
description: description,
remoteType: RemoteSignerType.VerifyingWeb3Signer,
provenBlockProperties: provenBlockProperties.get,
remotes: remotes.get,
threshold: threshold.get(1))
template bytes(value: Pbkdf2Salt|SimpleHexEncodedTypes|Aes128CtrIv): seq[byte] =
distinctBase value
func scrypt(password: openArray[char], salt: openArray[byte],
N, r, p: int; keyLen: static[int]): array[keyLen, byte] =
let (xyvLen, bLen) = scryptCalc(N, r, p)
var xyv = newSeq[uint32](xyvLen)
var b = newSeq[byte](bLen)
discard scrypt(password, salt, N, r, p, xyv, b, result)
func areValid(params: Pbkdf2Params): bool =
if params.c == 0 or params.dklen < 32 or params.salt.bytes.len == 0:
return false
# https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt
let hLen = case params.prf
of HmacSha256: 256 / 8
params.dklen <= high(uint32).uint64 * hLen.uint64
func areValid(params: ScryptParams): bool =
static: doAssert scryptParams.dklen >= 32
params.dklen == scryptParams.dklen and
params.n == scryptParams.n and
params.r == scryptParams.r and
params.p == scryptParams.p and
params.salt.bytes.len > 0
proc decryptCryptoField*(crypto: Crypto, decKey: openArray[byte],
outSecret: var seq[byte]): DecryptionStatus =
if crypto.cipher.message.bytes.len == 0:
return DecryptionStatus.InvalidKeystore
if len(decKey) < keyLen:
return DecryptionStatus.InvalidKeystore
let valid =
case crypto.checksum.function
of sha256Checksum:
template params: auto {.used.} = crypto.checksum.params
template message: auto = crypto.checksum.message
message == shaChecksum(decKey.toOpenArray(16, 31),
crypto.cipher.message.bytes)
if not valid:
return DecryptionStatus.InvalidPassword
case crypto.cipher.function
of aes128CtrCipher:
template params: auto = crypto.cipher.params
var aesCipher: CTR[aes128]
outSecret.setLen(crypto.cipher.message.bytes.len)
aesCipher.init(decKey.toOpenArray(0, 15), params.iv.bytes)
aesCipher.decrypt(crypto.cipher.message.bytes, outSecret)
aesCipher.clear()
DecryptionStatus.Success
proc getDecryptionKey*(crypto: Crypto, password: KeystorePass,
decKey: var seq[byte]): DecryptionStatus =
let res =
case crypto.kdf.function
of kdfPbkdf2:
template params: auto = crypto.kdf.pbkdf2Params
if not params.areValid or params.c > high(int).uint64:
return DecryptionStatus.InvalidKeystore
Eth2DigestCtx.pbkdf2(password.str, params.salt.bytes, int(params.c),
int(params.dklen))
of kdfScrypt:
template params: auto = crypto.kdf.scryptParams
if not params.areValid:
return DecryptionStatus.InvalidKeystore
@(scrypt(password.str, params.salt.bytes, scryptParams.n,
scryptParams.r, scryptParams.p, int(scryptParams.dklen)))
decKey = res
DecryptionStatus.Success
proc decryptCryptoField*(crypto: Crypto,
password: KeystorePass,
outSecret: var seq[byte]): DecryptionStatus =
# https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Web3-Secret-Storage-Definition
var decKey: seq[byte]
if crypto.cipher.message.bytes.len == 0:
return InvalidKeystore
let res = getDecryptionKey(crypto, password, decKey)
if res != DecryptionStatus.Success:
return res
decryptCryptoField(crypto, decKey, outSecret)
func cstringToStr(v: cstring): string = $v
template parseKeystore*(jsonContent: string): Keystore =
Json.decode(jsonContent, Keystore,
requireAllFields = true,
allowUnknownFields = true)
template parseNetKeystore*(jsonContent: string): NetKeystore =
Json.decode(jsonContent, NetKeystore,
requireAllFields = true,
allowUnknownFields = true)
template parseRemoteKeystore*(jsonContent: string): RemoteKeystore =
Json.decode(jsonContent, RemoteKeystore,
requireAllFields = false,
allowUnknownFields = true)
proc getSaltKey(keystore: Keystore, password: KeystorePass): KdfSaltKey =
let digest =
case keystore.crypto.kdf.function
of kdfPbkdf2:
template params: auto = keystore.crypto.kdf.pbkdf2Params
withEth2Hash:
h.update(seq[byte](params.salt))
h.update(password.str.toOpenArrayByte(0, len(password.str) - 1))
h.update(toBytesLE(params.dklen))
h.update(toBytesLE(params.c))
let prf = $params.prf
h.update(prf.toOpenArrayByte(0, len(prf) - 1))
of kdfScrypt:
template params: auto = keystore.crypto.kdf.scryptParams
withEth2Hash:
h.update(seq[byte](params.salt))
h.update(password.str.toOpenArrayByte(0, len(password.str) - 1))
h.update(toBytesLE(params.dklen))
h.update(toBytesLE(uint64(params.n)))
h.update(toBytesLE(uint64(params.p)))
h.update(toBytesLE(uint64(params.r)))
KdfSaltKey(digest.data)
proc `==`*(a, b: KdfSaltKey): bool {.borrow.}
proc hash*(salt: KdfSaltKey): Hash {.borrow.}
{.push warning[ProveField]:off.}
func `==`*(a, b: Kdf): bool =
# We do not care about `message` field.
if a.function != b.function:
return false
case a.function
of kdfPbkdf2:
template aparams: auto = a.pbkdf2Params
template bparams: auto = b.pbkdf2Params
(aparams.dklen == bparams.dklen) and (aparams.c == bparams.c) and
(aparams.prf == bparams.prf) and (len(seq[byte](aparams.salt)) > 0) and
(seq[byte](aparams.salt) == seq[byte](bparams.salt))
of kdfScrypt:
template aparams: auto = a.scryptParams
template bparams: auto = b.scryptParams
(aparams.dklen == bparams.dklen) and (aparams.n == bparams.n) and
(aparams.p == bparams.p) and (aparams.r == bparams.r) and
(len(seq[byte](aparams.salt)) > 0) and
(seq[byte](aparams.salt) == seq[byte](bparams.salt))
{.pop.}
func `==`*(a, b: Cipher): bool =
# We do not care about `params` and `message` fields.
a.function == b.function
func `==`*(a, b: KeystoreCacheItem): bool =
(a.kdf == b.kdf) and (a.cipher == b.cipher) and
(a.decryptionKey == b.decryptionKey)
func init*(t: typedesc[KeystoreCacheRef],
expireTime = KeystoreCachePruningTime): KeystoreCacheRef =
KeystoreCacheRef(
table: initTable[KdfSaltKey, KeystoreCacheItem](),
expireTime: expireTime
)
proc clear*(cache: KeystoreCacheRef) =
cache.table.clear()
proc pruneExpiredKeys*(cache: KeystoreCacheRef) =
if cache.expireTime == InfiniteDuration:
return
let currentTime = Moment.now()
var keys: seq[KdfSaltKey]
for key, value in cache.table.mpairs():
if currentTime - value.timestamp >= cache.expireTime:
keys.add(key)
burnMem(value.decryptionKey)
for item in keys:
cache.table.del(item)
proc init*(t: typedesc[KeystoreCacheItem], keystore: Keystore,
key: openArray[byte]): KeystoreCacheItem =
KeystoreCacheItem(flag: CacheItemFlag.Present, kdf: keystore.crypto.kdf,
cipher: keystore.crypto.cipher, decryptionKey: @key,
timestamp: Moment.now())
proc getCachedKey*(cache: KeystoreCacheRef,
keystore: Keystore, password: KeystorePass): Opt[seq[byte]] =
if isNil(cache): return Opt.none(seq[byte])
let
saltKey = keystore.getSaltKey(password)
item = cache.table.getOrDefault(saltKey)
case item.flag
of CacheItemFlag.Present:
if (item.kdf == keystore.crypto.kdf) and
(item.cipher == keystore.crypto.cipher):
Opt.some(item.decryptionKey)
else:
Opt.none(seq[byte])
else:
Opt.none(seq[byte])
proc setCachedKey*(cache: KeystoreCacheRef, keystore: Keystore,
password: KeystorePass, key: openArray[byte]) =
if isNil(cache): return
let saltKey = keystore.getSaltKey(password)
cache.table[saltKey] = KeystoreCacheItem.init(keystore, key)
proc destroyCacheKey*(cache: KeystoreCacheRef,
keystore: Keystore, password: KeystorePass) =
if isNil(cache): return
let saltKey = keystore.getSaltKey(password)
cache.table.withValue(saltKey, item):
burnMem(item[].decryptionKey)
cache.table.del(saltKey)
proc decryptKeystore*(keystore: Keystore,
password: KeystorePass,
cache: KeystoreCacheRef): KsResult[ValidatorPrivKey] =
var secret: seq[byte]
defer: burnMem(secret)
while true:
let res = cache.getCachedKey(keystore, password)
if res.isNone():
var decKey: seq[byte]
defer: burnMem(decKey)
let kres = getDecryptionKey(keystore.crypto, password, decKey)
if kres != DecryptionStatus.Success:
return err($kres)
let dres = decryptCryptoField(keystore.crypto, decKey, secret)
if dres != DecryptionStatus.Success:
return err($dres)
cache.setCachedKey(keystore, password, decKey)
break
else:
var decKey = res.get()
defer: burnMem(decKey)
let dres = decryptCryptoField(keystore.crypto, decKey, secret)
if dres == DecryptionStatus.Success:
break
cache.destroyCacheKey(keystore, password)
ValidatorPrivKey.fromRaw(secret).mapErr(cstringToStr)
proc decryptKeystore*(keystore: JsonString,
password: KeystorePass,
cache: KeystoreCacheRef): KsResult[ValidatorPrivKey] =
let keystore =
try:
parseKeystore(string(keystore))
except SerializationError as e:
return err(e.formatMsg("<keystore>"))
decryptKeystore(keystore, password, cache)
proc decryptKeystore*(keystore: Keystore,
password: KeystorePass): KsResult[ValidatorPrivKey] =
decryptKeystore(keystore, password, nil)
proc decryptKeystore*(keystore: JsonString,
password: KeystorePass): KsResult[ValidatorPrivKey] =
decryptKeystore(keystore, password, nil)
proc writeValue*(
writer: var JsonWriter, value: lcrypto.PublicKey
) {.inline, raises: [IOError].} =
writer.writeValue(ncrutils.toHex(value.getBytes().get(),
{HexFlags.LowerCase}))
proc readValue*(reader: var JsonReader, value: var lcrypto.PublicKey) {.
raises: [SerializationError, IOError, Defect].} =
let res = init(lcrypto.PublicKey, reader.readValue(string))
if res.isOk():
value = res.get()
else:
# TODO: Can we provide better diagnostic?
raiseUnexpectedValue(reader, "Valid hex-encoded public key expected")
proc decryptNetKeystore*(nkeystore: NetKeystore,
password: KeystorePass): KsResult[lcrypto.PrivateKey] =
var secret: seq[byte]
defer: burnMem(secret)
let status = decryptCryptoField(nkeystore.crypto, password, secret)
case status
of Success:
let res = lcrypto.PrivateKey.init(secret)
if res.isOk:
ok res.get
else:
err "Invalid key"
else:
err $status
proc decryptNetKeystore*(nkeystore: JsonString,
password: KeystorePass): KsResult[lcrypto.PrivateKey] =
try:
let keystore = parseNetKeystore(string nkeystore)
return decryptNetKeystore(keystore, password)
except SerializationError as exc:
return err(exc.formatMsg("<keystore>"))
proc generateKeystoreSalt*(rng: var HmacDrbgContext): seq[byte] =
rng.generateBytes(keyLen)
proc createCryptoField(kdfKind: KdfKind,
rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
secret: openArray[byte],
password = KeystorePass.init "",
salt: openArray[byte] = @[],
iv: openArray[byte] = @[],
mode = Secure): Crypto =
type AES = aes128
let kdfSalt =
if salt.len > 0:
doAssert salt.len == keyLen
@salt
else:
rng.generateBytes(keyLen)
let aesIv = if iv.len > 0:
doAssert iv.len == AES.sizeBlock
@iv
else:
rng.generateBytes(AES.sizeBlock)
var decKey: seq[byte]
let kdf = case kdfKind
of kdfPbkdf2:
var params = pbkdf2Params
params.salt = Pbkdf2Salt kdfSalt
if mode == Fast: params.c = 1
decKey = sha256.pbkdf2(password.str,
kdfSalt,
int params.c,
int params.dklen)
Kdf(function: kdfPbkdf2, pbkdf2Params: params, message: "")
of kdfScrypt:
var params = scryptParams
params.salt = ScryptSalt kdfSalt
if mode == Fast: params.n = 1
decKey = @(scrypt(password.str, kdfSalt,
params.n, params.r, params.p, keyLen))
Kdf(function: kdfScrypt, scryptParams: params, message: "")
var
aesCipher: CTR[AES]
cipherMsg = newSeq[byte](secret.len)
aesCipher.init(decKey.toOpenArray(0, 15), aesIv)
aesCipher.encrypt(secret, cipherMsg)
aesCipher.clear()
let sum = shaChecksum(decKey.toOpenArray(16, 31), cipherMsg)
Crypto(
kdf: kdf,
checksum: Checksum(
function: sha256Checksum,
message: sum),
cipher: Cipher(
function: aes128CtrCipher,
params: Aes128CtrParams(iv: Aes128CtrIv aesIv),
message: CipherBytes cipherMsg))
proc createNetKeystore*(kdfKind: KdfKind,
rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
privKey: lcrypto.PrivateKey,
password = KeystorePass.init "",
description = "",
salt: openArray[byte] = @[],
iv: openArray[byte] = @[]): NetKeystore =
let
secret = privKey.getBytes().get()
cryptoField = createCryptoField(kdfKind, rng, secret, password, salt, iv)
pubkey = privKey.getPublicKey().get()
uuid = uuidGenerate().expect("Random bytes should be available")
NetKeystore(
crypto: cryptoField,
pubkey: pubkey,
description: if len(description) > 0: some(description)
else: none[string](),
uuid: $uuid,
version: 1
)
proc createKeystore*(kdfKind: KdfKind,
rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
privKey: ValidatorPrivKey,
password = KeystorePass.init "",
path = KeyPath "",
description = "",
salt: openArray[byte] = @[],
iv: openArray[byte] = @[],
mode = Secure): Keystore =
let
secret = privKey.toRaw[^32..^1]
cryptoField = createCryptoField(kdfKind, rng, secret, password, salt, iv, mode)
pubkey = privKey.toPubKey()
uuid = uuidGenerate().expect("Random bytes should be available")
Keystore(
crypto: cryptoField,
pubkey: pubkey.toPubKey(),
path: path,
description: if len(description) > 0: some(description)
else: none[string](),
uuid: $uuid,
version: 4)
proc createRemoteKeystore*(pubKey: ValidatorPubKey, remoteUri: HttpHostUri,
version = 1'u64, description = "",
remoteType = RemoteSignerType.Web3Signer,
flags: set[RemoteKeystoreFlag] = {}): RemoteKeystore =
let signerInfo = RemoteSignerInfo(
url: remoteUri,
pubkey: pubKey,
id: 0
)
RemoteKeystore(
version: version,
description: if len(description) > 0: some(description)
else: none[string](),
remoteType: remoteType,
pubkey: pubKey,
remotes: @[signerInfo],
flags: flags
)
proc createWallet*(kdfKind: KdfKind,
rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
seed: KeySeed,
name = WalletName "",
salt: openArray[byte] = @[],
iv: openArray[byte] = @[],
password = KeystorePass.init "",
nextAccount = none(Natural),
pretty = true): Wallet =
let
uuid = UUID $(uuidGenerate().expect("Random bytes should be available"))
crypto = createCryptoField(kdfKind, rng, distinctBase seed,
password, salt, iv)
Wallet(
uuid: uuid,
name: if name.string.len > 0: name
else: WalletName(uuid),
version: 1,
walletType: "hierarchical deterministic",
crypto: crypto,
nextAccount: nextAccount.get(0))
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/phase0/validator.md#bls_withdrawal_prefix
func makeWithdrawalCredentials*(k: ValidatorPubKey): Eth2Digest =
var bytes = eth2digest(k.toRaw())
bytes.data[0] = BLS_WITHDRAWAL_PREFIX.uint8
bytes
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/phase0/deposit-contract.md#withdrawal-credentials
proc makeWithdrawalCredentials*(k: CookedPubKey): Eth2Digest =
makeWithdrawalCredentials(k.toPubKey())
proc prepareDeposit*(cfg: RuntimeConfig,
withdrawalPubKey: CookedPubKey,
signingKey: ValidatorPrivKey, signingPubKey: CookedPubKey,
amount = MAX_EFFECTIVE_BALANCE.Gwei): DepositData =
var res = DepositData(
amount: amount,
pubkey: signingPubKey.toPubKey(),
withdrawal_credentials: makeWithdrawalCredentials(withdrawalPubKey))
res.signature = get_deposit_signature(cfg, res, signingKey).toValidatorSig()
return res
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