nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
tersec 2e868dc2ba
mass/mechanical update of 1.1.4 phase0 and altair spec URLs to 1.1.5 (#3067)
2021-11-09 07:40:41 +00:00
..
README.md mass/mechanical update of 1.1.4 phase0 and altair spec URLs to 1.1.5 (#3067) 2021-11-09 07:40:41 +00:00
batch_validation.nim import cleanup (#2997) 2021-10-19 16:09:26 +02:00
block_processor.nim Better REST/RPC error messages (#3046) 2021-11-05 17:39:47 +02:00
consensus_manager.nim disentangle eth2 types from the ssz library (#2785) 2021-08-18 20:57:58 +02:00
eth2_processor.nim Better REST/RPC error messages (#3046) 2021-11-05 17:39:47 +02:00
gossip_validation.nim Bugfix: Avoid the aggregation of duplicate signatures when creating sync committee contributions 2021-11-07 21:41:10 +02:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
    • blocksQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
  • a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
    • Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
    • Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations