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https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2.git
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c5352cf89f
There can be situations where proposals need to be made on top of stale parent state. Because the distance to the wall slot is big, the proposal state (`getProposalState`) has to be computed incrementally to avoid lag spikes. Proposals have to be timely to have a chance to propagate on the network. Peak memory requirements don't change, but the proposal state needs to be allocated for a longer duration than usual.
2133 lines
90 KiB
Nim
2133 lines
90 KiB
Nim
# beacon_chain
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# Copyright (c) 2018-2024 Status Research & Development GmbH
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# Licensed and distributed under either of
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# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
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# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
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# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
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{.push raises: [].}
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# This module is responsible for handling beacon node validators, ie those that
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# that are running directly in the beacon node and not in a separate validator
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# client process - we name these "beacon validators" while those running
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# outside are "client validators".
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# This module also contains implementation logic for the REST validator API.
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import
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# Standard library
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std/[os, tables],
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# Nimble packages
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stew/[assign2, byteutils],
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chronos, metrics,
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chronicles, chronicles/timings,
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json_serialization/std/[options, sets, net],
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eth/db/kvstore,
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web3/primitives,
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kzg4844,
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# Local modules
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../spec/datatypes/[phase0, altair, bellatrix],
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../spec/[
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eth2_merkleization, forks, helpers, network, signatures, state_transition,
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validator],
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../consensus_object_pools/[
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spec_cache, blockchain_dag, block_clearance, attestation_pool,
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sync_committee_msg_pool, validator_change_pool, consensus_manager,
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common_tools],
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../el/el_manager,
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../networking/eth2_network,
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../sszdump, ../sync/sync_manager,
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../gossip_processing/block_processor,
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".."/[conf, beacon_clock, beacon_node],
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"."/[
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keystore_management, slashing_protection, validator_duties, validator_pool],
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".."/spec/mev/rest_deneb_mev_calls
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from std/sequtils import countIt, foldl, mapIt
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from eth/async_utils import awaitWithTimeout
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# Metrics for tracking attestation and beacon block loss
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declareCounter beacon_light_client_finality_updates_sent,
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"Number of LC finality updates sent by this peer"
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declareCounter beacon_light_client_optimistic_updates_sent,
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"Number of LC optimistic updates sent by this peer"
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declareCounter beacon_blocks_proposed,
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"Number of beacon chain blocks sent by this peer"
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declareCounter beacon_block_production_errors,
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"Number of times we failed to produce a block"
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# Metrics for tracking external block builder usage
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declareCounter beacon_block_builder_missed_with_fallback,
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"Number of beacon chain blocks where an attempt to use an external block builder failed with fallback"
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declareCounter beacon_block_builder_missed_without_fallback,
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"Number of beacon chain blocks where an attempt to use an external block builder failed without possible fallback"
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declareGauge(attached_validator_balance,
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"Validator balance at slot end of the first 64 validators, in Gwei",
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labels = ["pubkey"])
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declarePublicGauge(attached_validator_balance_total,
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"Validator balance of all attached validators, in Gwei")
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logScope: topics = "beacval"
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type
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EngineBid* = object
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blck*: ForkedBeaconBlock
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executionPayloadValue*: Wei
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consensusBlockValue*: UInt256
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blobsBundleOpt*: Opt[BlobsBundle]
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BuilderBid[SBBB] = object
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blindedBlckPart*: SBBB
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executionPayloadValue*: UInt256
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consensusBlockValue*: UInt256
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ForkedBlockResult =
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Result[EngineBid, string]
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BlindedBlockResult[SBBB] =
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Result[BuilderBid[SBBB], string]
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Bids[SBBB] = object
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engineBid: Opt[EngineBid]
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builderBid: Opt[BuilderBid[SBBB]]
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proc getValidator*(validators: auto,
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pubkey: ValidatorPubKey): Opt[ValidatorAndIndex] =
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let idx = validators.findIt(it.pubkey == pubkey)
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if idx == -1:
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# We allow adding a validator even if its key is not in the state registry:
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# it might be that the deposit for this validator has not yet been processed
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Opt.none ValidatorAndIndex
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else:
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Opt.some ValidatorAndIndex(index: ValidatorIndex(idx),
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validator: validators[idx])
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func blockConsensusValue(r: BlockRewards): UInt256 {.noinit.} =
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# Returns value of `block-consensus-value` in Wei units.
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u256(r.attestations + r.sync_aggregate +
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r.proposer_slashings + r.attester_slashings) * u256(1000000000)
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proc addValidatorsFromWeb3Signer(
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node: BeaconNode, web3signerUrl: Web3SignerUrl, epoch: Epoch)
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{.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
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let dynamicStores =
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# Error is already reported via log warning.
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(await queryValidatorsSource(web3signerUrl)).valueOr(
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default(seq[KeystoreData]))
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for keystore in dynamicStores:
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let
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data =
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withState(node.dag.headState):
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getValidator(forkyState.data.validators.asSeq(), keystore.pubkey)
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index =
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if data.isSome():
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Opt.some(data.get().index)
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else:
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Opt.none(ValidatorIndex)
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feeRecipient =
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node.consensusManager[].getFeeRecipient(keystore.pubkey, index, epoch)
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gasLimit = node.consensusManager[].getGasLimit(keystore.pubkey)
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v = node.attachedValidators[].addValidator(keystore, feeRecipient,
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gasLimit)
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v.updateValidator(data)
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proc addValidators*(node: BeaconNode) {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
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info "Loading validators", validatorsDir = node.config.validatorsDir(),
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keystore_cache_available = not(isNil(node.keystoreCache))
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let epoch = node.currentSlot().epoch
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for keystore in listLoadableKeystores(node.config, node.keystoreCache):
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let
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data = withState(node.dag.headState):
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getValidator(forkyState.data.validators.asSeq(), keystore.pubkey)
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index =
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if data.isSome():
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Opt.some(data.get().index)
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else:
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Opt.none(ValidatorIndex)
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feeRecipient = node.consensusManager[].getFeeRecipient(
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keystore.pubkey, index, epoch)
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gasLimit = node.consensusManager[].getGasLimit(keystore.pubkey)
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v = node.attachedValidators[].addValidator(keystore, feeRecipient,
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gasLimit)
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v.updateValidator(data)
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# We use `allFutures` because all failures are already reported as
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# user-visible warnings in `queryValidatorsSource`.
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# We don't consider them fatal because the Web3Signer may be experiencing
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# a temporary hiccup that will be resolved later.
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# TODO mapIt version fails at type deduction - figure out..
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var futs: seq[Future[void].Raising([CancelledError])]
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for it in node.config.web3SignerUrls:
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futs.add node.addValidatorsFromWeb3Signer(it, epoch)
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await allFutures(futs)
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proc pollForDynamicValidators*(node: BeaconNode,
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web3signerUrl: Web3SignerUrl,
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intervalInSeconds: int)
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{.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
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if intervalInSeconds == 0:
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return
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proc addValidatorProc(keystore: KeystoreData) =
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let
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epoch = node.currentSlot().epoch
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index = Opt.none(ValidatorIndex)
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feeRecipient =
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node.consensusManager[].getFeeRecipient(keystore.pubkey, index, epoch)
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gasLimit =
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node.consensusManager[].getGasLimit(keystore.pubkey)
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discard node.attachedValidators[].addValidator(keystore, feeRecipient,
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gasLimit)
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var
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timeout = seconds(intervalInSeconds)
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while true:
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await sleepAsync(timeout)
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timeout =
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block:
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let res = await queryValidatorsSource(web3signerUrl)
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if res.isOk():
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let keystores = res.get()
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debug "Validators source has been polled for validators",
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keystores_found = len(keystores),
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web3signer_url = web3signerUrl.url
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node.attachedValidators.updateDynamicValidators(web3signerUrl,
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keystores,
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addValidatorProc)
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seconds(intervalInSeconds)
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else:
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# In case of error we going to repeat our call with much smaller
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# interval.
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seconds(5)
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proc getValidator*(node: BeaconNode, idx: ValidatorIndex): Opt[AttachedValidator] =
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let key = ? node.dag.validatorKey(idx)
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node.attachedValidators[].getValidator(key.toPubKey())
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proc getValidatorForDuties*(
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node: BeaconNode, idx: ValidatorIndex, slot: Slot,
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slashingSafe = false): Opt[AttachedValidator] =
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let key = ? node.dag.validatorKey(idx)
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node.attachedValidators[].getValidatorForDuties(
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key.toPubKey(), slot, slashingSafe)
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proc getGraffitiBytes*(
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node: BeaconNode, validator: AttachedValidator): GraffitiBytes =
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getGraffiti(node.config.validatorsDir, node.config.defaultGraffitiBytes(),
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validator.pubkey)
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type ChainSyncStatus* {.pure.} = enum
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Syncing,
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Synced,
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Degraded
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proc syncStatus*(node: BeaconNode, head: BlockRef): ChainSyncStatus =
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## Generally, the problem is that slot time keeps advancing
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## even when there are no blocks being produced, so there's no way to
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## distinguish validators geniunely going missing from the node not being
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## well connected (during a network split or an internet outage for
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## example). It would generally be correct to simply keep running as if
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## we were the only legit node left alive, but then we run into issues:
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## with enough many empty slots, the validator pool is emptied leading
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## to empty committees and lots of empty slot processing that will be
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## thrown away as soon as we're synced again.
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let
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# The slot we should be at, according to the clock
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beaconTime = node.beaconClock.now()
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wallSlot = beaconTime.toSlot()
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if not wallSlot.afterGenesis or
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head.slot + node.config.syncHorizon >= wallSlot.slot:
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node.dag.resetChainProgressWatchdog()
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return ChainSyncStatus.Synced
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if not node.config.proposeStale:
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# Continue syncing and wait for someone else to propose the next block
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return ChainSyncStatus.Syncing
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let
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numPeers = len(node.network.peerPool)
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minPeers = max(node.config.maxPeers div 4, SyncWorkersCount * 2)
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if numPeers <= minPeers:
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# We may have poor connectivity, wait until more peers are available.
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# This could also be intermittent, as state replays while chain is degraded
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# may take significant amounts of time, during which many peers are lost
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return ChainSyncStatus.Syncing
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if node.dag.chainIsProgressing():
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# Chain is progressing, we are out of sync
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return ChainSyncStatus.Syncing
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let
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maxHeadSlot = node.dag.heads.foldl(max(a, b.slot), GENESIS_SLOT)
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numPeersWithHigherProgress = node.network.peerPool.peers
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.countIt(it != nil and it.getHeadSlot() > maxHeadSlot)
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significantNumPeers = node.config.maxPeers div 8
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if numPeersWithHigherProgress > significantNumPeers:
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# A peer indicates that they are on a later slot, wait for sync manager
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# to progress, or for it to kick the peer if they are faking the status
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warn "Chain appears to have stalled, but peers indicate higher progress",
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numPeersWithHigherProgress, numPeers, maxPeers = node.config.maxPeers,
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head, maxHeadSlot
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node.dag.resetChainProgressWatchdog()
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return ChainSyncStatus.Syncing
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# We are on the latest slot among all of our peers, and there has been no
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# chain progress for an extended period of time.
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if node.dag.incrementalState == nil:
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# The head state is too far in the past to timely perform validator duties
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return ChainSyncStatus.Degraded
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if node.dag.incrementalState[].latest_block_id != node.dag.head.bid:
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# The incremental state is not yet on the correct head (see `onSlotEnd`)
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return ChainSyncStatus.Degraded
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let incrementalSlot = getStateField(node.dag.incrementalState[], slot)
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if incrementalSlot + node.config.syncHorizon < wallSlot.slot:
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# The incremental state still needs to advance further (see `onSlotEnd`)
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return ChainSyncStatus.Degraded
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# It is reasonable safe to assume that the network has halted, resume duties
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ChainSyncStatus.Synced
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proc isSynced*(node: BeaconNode, head: BlockRef): bool =
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node.syncStatus(head) == ChainSyncStatus.Synced
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proc handleLightClientUpdates*(node: BeaconNode, slot: Slot)
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{.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
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template pool: untyped = node.lightClientPool[]
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static: doAssert lightClientFinalityUpdateSlotOffset ==
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lightClientOptimisticUpdateSlotOffset
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let sendTime = node.beaconClock.fromNow(
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slot.light_client_finality_update_time())
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if sendTime.inFuture:
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debug "Waiting to send LC updates", slot, delay = shortLog(sendTime.offset)
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await sleepAsync(sendTime.offset)
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withForkyFinalityUpdate(node.dag.lcDataStore.cache.latest):
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when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
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let signature_slot = forkyFinalityUpdate.signature_slot
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if slot != signature_slot:
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return
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let num_active_participants =
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forkyFinalityUpdate.sync_aggregate.num_active_participants
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if num_active_participants < MIN_SYNC_COMMITTEE_PARTICIPANTS:
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return
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let
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finalized_slot =
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forkyFinalityUpdate.finalized_header.beacon.slot
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has_supermajority =
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hasSupermajoritySyncParticipation(num_active_participants.uint64)
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newFinality =
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if finalized_slot > pool.latestForwardedFinalitySlot:
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true
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elif finalized_slot < pool.latestForwardedFinalitySlot:
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false
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elif pool.latestForwardedFinalityHasSupermajority:
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false
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else:
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has_supermajority
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if newFinality:
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template msg(): auto = forkyFinalityUpdate
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let sendResult =
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await node.network.broadcastLightClientFinalityUpdate(msg)
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# Optimization for message with ephemeral validity, whether sent or not
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pool.latestForwardedFinalitySlot = finalized_slot
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pool.latestForwardedFinalityHasSupermajority = has_supermajority
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if sendResult.isOk:
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beacon_light_client_finality_updates_sent.inc()
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notice "LC finality update sent", message = shortLog(msg)
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else:
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warn "LC finality update failed to send",
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error = sendResult.error()
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let attested_slot = forkyFinalityUpdate.attested_header.beacon.slot
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if attested_slot > pool.latestForwardedOptimisticSlot:
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let msg = forkyFinalityUpdate.toOptimistic
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let sendResult =
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await node.network.broadcastLightClientOptimisticUpdate(msg)
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# Optimization for message with ephemeral validity, whether sent or not
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pool.latestForwardedOptimisticSlot = attested_slot
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if sendResult.isOk:
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beacon_light_client_optimistic_updates_sent.inc()
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notice "LC optimistic update sent", message = shortLog(msg)
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else:
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warn "LC optimistic update failed to send",
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error = sendResult.error()
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proc createAndSendAttestation(node: BeaconNode,
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fork: Fork,
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genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
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registered: RegisteredAttestation,
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subnet_id: SubnetId)
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{.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
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let
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signature = block:
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let res = await registered.validator.getAttestationSignature(
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fork, genesis_validators_root, registered.data)
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if res.isErr():
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warn "Unable to sign attestation",
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validator = shortLog(registered.validator),
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attestationData = shortLog(registered.data),
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error_msg = res.error()
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return
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res.get()
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attestation = registered.toAttestation(signature)
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registered.validator.doppelgangerActivity(attestation.data.slot.epoch)
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# Logged in the router
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let res = await node.router.routeAttestation(
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attestation, subnet_id, checkSignature = false)
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if not res.isOk():
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return
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if node.config.dumpEnabled:
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dump(
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node.config.dumpDirOutgoing, attestation.data,
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registered.validator.pubkey)
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proc getBlockProposalEth1Data*(node: BeaconNode,
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state: ForkedHashedBeaconState):
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BlockProposalEth1Data =
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let finalizedEpochRef = node.dag.getFinalizedEpochRef()
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result = node.elManager.getBlockProposalData(
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state, finalizedEpochRef.eth1_data,
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finalizedEpochRef.eth1_deposit_index)
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proc getFeeRecipient(node: BeaconNode,
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pubkey: ValidatorPubKey,
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validatorIdx: ValidatorIndex,
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epoch: Epoch): Eth1Address =
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node.consensusManager[].getFeeRecipient(pubkey, Opt.some(validatorIdx), epoch)
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proc getGasLimit(node: BeaconNode,
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pubkey: ValidatorPubKey): uint64 =
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node.consensusManager[].getGasLimit(pubkey)
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from web3/engine_api_types import PayloadExecutionStatus
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from ../spec/datatypes/capella import BeaconBlock, ExecutionPayload
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from ../spec/datatypes/deneb import BeaconBlock, ExecutionPayload, shortLog
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from ../spec/beaconstate import get_expected_withdrawals
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proc getExecutionPayload(
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PayloadType: type ForkyExecutionPayloadForSigning,
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node: BeaconNode, head: BlockRef, proposalState: ref ForkedHashedBeaconState,
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validator_index: ValidatorIndex): Future[Opt[PayloadType]]
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{.async: (raises: [CancelledError], raw: true).} =
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# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/bellatrix/validator.md#executionpayload
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let
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epoch = withState(proposalState[]):
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forkyState.data.slot.epoch
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feeRecipient = block:
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let pubkey = node.dag.validatorKey(validator_index)
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if pubkey.isNone():
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warn "Cannot get proposer pubkey, bug?", validator_index
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default(Eth1Address)
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else:
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node.getFeeRecipient(pubkey.get().toPubKey(), validator_index, epoch)
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beaconHead = node.attestationPool[].getBeaconHead(head)
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executionHead = withState(proposalState[]):
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when consensusFork >= ConsensusFork.Bellatrix:
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forkyState.data.latest_execution_payload_header.block_hash
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else:
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(static(default(Eth2Digest)))
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latestSafe = beaconHead.safeExecutionBlockHash
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latestFinalized = beaconHead.finalizedExecutionBlockHash
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timestamp = withState(proposalState[]):
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compute_timestamp_at_slot(forkyState.data, forkyState.data.slot)
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random = withState(proposalState[]):
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get_randao_mix(forkyState.data, get_current_epoch(forkyState.data))
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withdrawals = withState(proposalState[]):
|
|
when consensusFork >= ConsensusFork.Capella:
|
|
get_expected_withdrawals(forkyState.data)
|
|
else:
|
|
@[]
|
|
|
|
info "Requesting engine payload",
|
|
beaconHead = shortLog(beaconHead.blck),
|
|
executionHead = shortLog(executionHead),
|
|
validatorIndex = validator_index,
|
|
feeRecipient = $feeRecipient
|
|
|
|
node.elManager.getPayload(
|
|
PayloadType, beaconHead.blck.bid.root, executionHead, latestSafe,
|
|
latestFinalized, timestamp, random, feeRecipient, withdrawals)
|
|
|
|
proc makeBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot*(
|
|
PayloadType: type ForkyExecutionPayloadForSigning,
|
|
node: BeaconNode, randao_reveal: ValidatorSig,
|
|
validator_index: ValidatorIndex, graffiti: GraffitiBytes, head: BlockRef,
|
|
slot: Slot,
|
|
|
|
# These parameters are for the builder API
|
|
execution_payload: Opt[PayloadType],
|
|
transactions_root: Opt[Eth2Digest],
|
|
execution_payload_root: Opt[Eth2Digest],
|
|
withdrawals_root: Opt[Eth2Digest],
|
|
kzg_commitments: Opt[KzgCommitments]):
|
|
Future[ForkedBlockResult] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
# Advance state to the slot that we're proposing for
|
|
var cache = StateCache()
|
|
|
|
let
|
|
# The clearance state already typically sits at the right slot per
|
|
# `advanceClearanceState`
|
|
|
|
# TODO can use `valueOr:`/`return err($error)` if/when
|
|
# https://github.com/status-im/nim-stew/issues/161 is addressed
|
|
maybeState = node.dag.getProposalState(head, slot, cache)
|
|
|
|
if maybeState.isErr:
|
|
beacon_block_production_errors.inc()
|
|
return err($maybeState.error)
|
|
|
|
let
|
|
state = maybeState.get
|
|
payloadFut =
|
|
if execution_payload.isSome:
|
|
# Builder API
|
|
|
|
# In Capella, only get withdrawals root from relay.
|
|
# The execution payload will be small enough to be safe to copy because
|
|
# it won't have transactions (it's blinded)
|
|
var modified_execution_payload = execution_payload
|
|
withState(state[]):
|
|
when consensusFork >= ConsensusFork.Capella and
|
|
PayloadType.kind >= ConsensusFork.Capella:
|
|
let withdrawals = List[Withdrawal, MAX_WITHDRAWALS_PER_PAYLOAD](
|
|
get_expected_withdrawals(forkyState.data))
|
|
if withdrawals_root.isNone or
|
|
hash_tree_root(withdrawals) != withdrawals_root.get:
|
|
# If engine API returned a block, will use that
|
|
return err("Builder relay provided incorrect withdrawals root")
|
|
# Otherwise, the state transition function notices that there are
|
|
# too few withdrawals.
|
|
assign(modified_execution_payload.get.executionPayload.withdrawals,
|
|
withdrawals)
|
|
|
|
let fut = Future[Opt[PayloadType]].Raising([CancelledError]).init(
|
|
"given-payload")
|
|
fut.complete(modified_execution_payload)
|
|
fut
|
|
elif slot.epoch < node.dag.cfg.BELLATRIX_FORK_EPOCH or
|
|
not state[].is_merge_transition_complete:
|
|
let fut = Future[Opt[PayloadType]].Raising([CancelledError]).init(
|
|
"empty-payload")
|
|
fut.complete(Opt.some(default(PayloadType)))
|
|
fut
|
|
else:
|
|
# Create execution payload while packing attestations
|
|
getExecutionPayload(PayloadType, node, head, state, validator_index)
|
|
|
|
eth1Proposal = node.getBlockProposalEth1Data(state[])
|
|
|
|
if eth1Proposal.hasMissingDeposits:
|
|
beacon_block_production_errors.inc()
|
|
warn "Eth1 deposits not available. Skipping block proposal", slot
|
|
return err("Eth1 deposits not available")
|
|
|
|
let
|
|
attestations =
|
|
node.attestationPool[].getAttestationsForBlock(state[], cache)
|
|
exits = withState(state[]):
|
|
node.validatorChangePool[].getBeaconBlockValidatorChanges(
|
|
node.dag.cfg, forkyState.data)
|
|
# TODO workaround for https://github.com/arnetheduck/nim-results/issues/34
|
|
payloadRes = await payloadFut
|
|
payload = payloadRes.valueOr:
|
|
beacon_block_production_errors.inc()
|
|
warn "Unable to get execution payload. Skipping block proposal",
|
|
slot, validator_index
|
|
return err("Unable to get execution payload")
|
|
|
|
let res = makeBeaconBlockWithRewards(
|
|
node.dag.cfg,
|
|
state[],
|
|
validator_index,
|
|
randao_reveal,
|
|
eth1Proposal.vote,
|
|
graffiti,
|
|
attestations,
|
|
eth1Proposal.deposits,
|
|
exits,
|
|
node.syncCommitteeMsgPool[].produceSyncAggregate(head.bid, slot),
|
|
payload,
|
|
noRollback, # Temporary state - no need for rollback
|
|
cache,
|
|
verificationFlags = {},
|
|
transactions_root = transactions_root,
|
|
execution_payload_root = execution_payload_root,
|
|
kzg_commitments = kzg_commitments).mapErr do (error: cstring) -> string:
|
|
# This is almost certainly a bug, but it's complex enough that there's a
|
|
# small risk it might happen even when most proposals succeed - thus we
|
|
# log instead of asserting
|
|
beacon_block_production_errors.inc()
|
|
warn "Cannot create block for proposal",
|
|
slot, head = shortLog(head), error
|
|
$error
|
|
|
|
var blobsBundleOpt = Opt.none(BlobsBundle)
|
|
when payload is deneb.ExecutionPayloadForSigning:
|
|
blobsBundleOpt = Opt.some(payload.blobsBundle)
|
|
|
|
if res.isOk:
|
|
ok(EngineBid(
|
|
blck: res.get().blck,
|
|
executionPayloadValue: payload.blockValue,
|
|
consensusBlockValue: res.get().rewards.blockConsensusValue(),
|
|
blobsBundleOpt: blobsBundleOpt
|
|
))
|
|
else:
|
|
err(res.error)
|
|
|
|
proc makeBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot*(
|
|
PayloadType: type ForkyExecutionPayloadForSigning, node: BeaconNode, randao_reveal: ValidatorSig,
|
|
validator_index: ValidatorIndex, graffiti: GraffitiBytes, head: BlockRef,
|
|
slot: Slot):
|
|
Future[ForkedBlockResult] =
|
|
return makeBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot(
|
|
PayloadType, node, randao_reveal, validator_index, graffiti, head, slot,
|
|
execution_payload = Opt.none(PayloadType),
|
|
transactions_root = Opt.none(Eth2Digest),
|
|
execution_payload_root = Opt.none(Eth2Digest),
|
|
withdrawals_root = Opt.none(Eth2Digest),
|
|
kzg_commitments = Opt.none(KzgCommitments))
|
|
|
|
proc getBlindedExecutionPayload[
|
|
EPH: deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle](
|
|
node: BeaconNode, payloadBuilderClient: RestClientRef, slot: Slot,
|
|
executionBlockHash: Eth2Digest, pubkey: ValidatorPubKey):
|
|
Future[BlindedBlockResult[EPH]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError, RestError]).} =
|
|
# Not ideal to use `when` where instead of splitting into separate functions,
|
|
# but Nim doesn't overload on generic EPH type parameter.
|
|
when EPH is deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle:
|
|
let
|
|
response = awaitWithTimeout(
|
|
payloadBuilderClient.getHeaderDeneb(
|
|
slot, executionBlockHash, pubkey),
|
|
BUILDER_PROPOSAL_DELAY_TOLERANCE):
|
|
return err "Timeout obtaining Deneb blinded header from builder"
|
|
|
|
res = decodeBytes(
|
|
GetHeaderResponseDeneb, response.data, response.contentType)
|
|
|
|
blindedHeader = res.valueOr:
|
|
return err(
|
|
"Unable to decode Deneb blinded header: " & $res.error &
|
|
" with HTTP status " & $response.status & ", Content-Type " &
|
|
$response.contentType & " and content " & $response.data)
|
|
else:
|
|
static: doAssert false
|
|
|
|
const httpOk = 200
|
|
if response.status != httpOk:
|
|
return err "getBlindedExecutionPayload: non-200 HTTP response"
|
|
else:
|
|
if not verify_builder_signature(
|
|
node.dag.cfg.genesisFork, blindedHeader.data.message,
|
|
blindedHeader.data.message.pubkey, blindedHeader.data.signature):
|
|
return err "getBlindedExecutionPayload: signature verification failed"
|
|
|
|
when EPH is deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle:
|
|
template builderBid: untyped = blindedHeader.data.message
|
|
return ok(BuilderBid[EPH](
|
|
blindedBlckPart: EPH(
|
|
execution_payload_header: builderBid.header,
|
|
blob_kzg_commitments: builderBid.blob_kzg_commitments),
|
|
executionPayloadValue: builderBid.value))
|
|
else:
|
|
static: doAssert false
|
|
|
|
from ./message_router_mev import
|
|
copyFields, getFieldNames, unblindAndRouteBlockMEV
|
|
|
|
proc constructSignableBlindedBlock[T: deneb_mev.SignedBlindedBeaconBlock](
|
|
blck: deneb.BeaconBlock,
|
|
blindedBundle: deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle): T =
|
|
# Leaves signature field default, to be filled in by caller
|
|
const
|
|
blckFields = getFieldNames(typeof(blck))
|
|
blckBodyFields = getFieldNames(typeof(blck.body))
|
|
|
|
var blindedBlock: T
|
|
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/builder-specs/blob/v0.4.0/specs/bellatrix/validator.md#block-proposal
|
|
copyFields(blindedBlock.message, blck, blckFields)
|
|
copyFields(blindedBlock.message.body, blck.body, blckBodyFields)
|
|
assign(
|
|
blindedBlock.message.body.execution_payload_header,
|
|
blindedBundle.execution_payload_header)
|
|
assign(
|
|
blindedBlock.message.body.blob_kzg_commitments,
|
|
blindedBundle.blob_kzg_commitments)
|
|
|
|
blindedBlock
|
|
|
|
func constructPlainBlindedBlock[T: deneb_mev.BlindedBeaconBlock](
|
|
blck: ForkyBeaconBlock,
|
|
blindedBundle: deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle): T =
|
|
# https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/23020 workaround
|
|
static: doAssert T is deneb_mev.BlindedBeaconBlock
|
|
|
|
const
|
|
blckFields = getFieldNames(typeof(blck))
|
|
blckBodyFields = getFieldNames(typeof(blck.body))
|
|
|
|
var blindedBlock: T
|
|
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/builder-specs/blob/v0.4.0/specs/bellatrix/validator.md#block-proposal
|
|
copyFields(blindedBlock, blck, blckFields)
|
|
copyFields(blindedBlock.body, blck.body, blckBodyFields)
|
|
assign(
|
|
blindedBlock.body.execution_payload_header,
|
|
blindedBundle.execution_payload_header)
|
|
assign(
|
|
blindedBlock.body.blob_kzg_commitments,
|
|
blindedBundle.blob_kzg_commitments)
|
|
|
|
blindedBlock
|
|
|
|
proc blindedBlockCheckSlashingAndSign[T: deneb_mev.SignedBlindedBeaconBlock](
|
|
node: BeaconNode, slot: Slot, validator: AttachedValidator,
|
|
validator_index: ValidatorIndex, nonsignedBlindedBlock: T):
|
|
Future[Result[T, string]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
# Check with slashing protection before submitBlindedBlock
|
|
let
|
|
fork = node.dag.forkAtEpoch(slot.epoch)
|
|
genesis_validators_root = node.dag.genesis_validators_root
|
|
blockRoot = hash_tree_root(nonsignedBlindedBlock.message)
|
|
signingRoot = compute_block_signing_root(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot, blockRoot)
|
|
notSlashable = node.attachedValidators
|
|
.slashingProtection
|
|
.registerBlock(validator_index, validator.pubkey, slot, signingRoot)
|
|
|
|
if notSlashable.isErr:
|
|
warn "Slashing protection activated for MEV block",
|
|
blockRoot = shortLog(blockRoot), blck = shortLog(nonsignedBlindedBlock),
|
|
signingRoot = shortLog(signingRoot), validator = validator.pubkey,
|
|
slot = slot, existingProposal = notSlashable.error
|
|
return err("MEV proposal would be slashable: " & $notSlashable.error)
|
|
|
|
var blindedBlock = nonsignedBlindedBlock
|
|
blindedBlock.signature = block:
|
|
let res = await validator.getBlockSignature(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot, blockRoot, blindedBlock.message)
|
|
if res.isErr():
|
|
return err("Unable to sign block: " & res.error())
|
|
res.get()
|
|
|
|
return ok blindedBlock
|
|
|
|
proc getUnsignedBlindedBeaconBlock[T: deneb_mev.SignedBlindedBeaconBlock](
|
|
node: BeaconNode, slot: Slot,
|
|
validator_index: ValidatorIndex, forkedBlock: ForkedBeaconBlock,
|
|
executionPayloadHeader: capella.ExecutionPayloadHeader |
|
|
deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle):
|
|
Result[T, string] =
|
|
withBlck(forkedBlock):
|
|
when consensusFork >= ConsensusFork.Deneb:
|
|
when not (
|
|
(T is deneb_mev.SignedBlindedBeaconBlock and
|
|
consensusFork == ConsensusFork.Deneb)):
|
|
return err("getUnsignedBlindedBeaconBlock: mismatched block/payload types")
|
|
else:
|
|
return ok constructSignableBlindedBlock[T](
|
|
forkyBlck, executionPayloadHeader)
|
|
else:
|
|
return err("getUnsignedBlindedBeaconBlock: attempt to construct pre-Deneb blinded block")
|
|
|
|
proc getBlindedBlockParts[
|
|
EPH: capella.ExecutionPayloadHeader |
|
|
deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle](
|
|
node: BeaconNode, payloadBuilderClient: RestClientRef, head: BlockRef,
|
|
pubkey: ValidatorPubKey, slot: Slot, randao: ValidatorSig,
|
|
validator_index: ValidatorIndex, graffiti: GraffitiBytes):
|
|
Future[Result[(EPH, UInt256, UInt256, ForkedBeaconBlock), string]]
|
|
{.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
let
|
|
executionBlockHash = node.dag.loadExecutionBlockHash(head).valueOr:
|
|
# With checkpoint sync, the checkpoint block may be unavailable,
|
|
# and it could already be the parent of the new block before backfill.
|
|
# Fallback to EL, hopefully the block is available on the local path.
|
|
warn "Failed to load parent execution block hash, skipping block builder",
|
|
slot, validator_index, head = shortLog(head)
|
|
return err("loadExecutionBlockHash failed")
|
|
|
|
executionPayloadHeader =
|
|
try:
|
|
awaitWithTimeout(
|
|
getBlindedExecutionPayload[EPH](
|
|
node, payloadBuilderClient, slot, executionBlockHash, pubkey),
|
|
BUILDER_PROPOSAL_DELAY_TOLERANCE):
|
|
BlindedBlockResult[EPH].err("getBlindedExecutionPayload timed out")
|
|
except RestDecodingError as exc:
|
|
BlindedBlockResult[EPH].err(
|
|
"getBlindedExecutionPayload REST decoding error: " & exc.msg)
|
|
except RestError as exc:
|
|
BlindedBlockResult[EPH].err(
|
|
"getBlindedExecutionPayload REST error: " & exc.msg)
|
|
|
|
if executionPayloadHeader.isErr:
|
|
warn "Could not obtain blinded execution payload header",
|
|
error = executionPayloadHeader.error, slot, validator_index,
|
|
head = shortLog(head)
|
|
# Haven't committed to the MEV block, so allow EL fallback.
|
|
return err(executionPayloadHeader.error)
|
|
|
|
# When creating this block, need to ensure it uses the MEV-provided execution
|
|
# payload, both to avoid repeated calls to network services and to ensure the
|
|
# consistency of this block (e.g., its state root being correct). Since block
|
|
# processing does not work directly using blinded blocks, fix up transactions
|
|
# root after running the state transition function on an otherwise equivalent
|
|
# non-blinded block without transactions.
|
|
#
|
|
# This doesn't have withdrawals, which each node has regardless of engine or
|
|
# builder API. makeBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot fills it in later.
|
|
when EPH is capella.ExecutionPayloadHeader:
|
|
type PayloadType = capella.ExecutionPayloadForSigning
|
|
template actualEPH: untyped = executionPayloadHeader.get.blindedBlckPart
|
|
let withdrawals_root =
|
|
Opt.some executionPayloadHeader.get.blindedBlckPart.withdrawals_root
|
|
const kzg_commitments = Opt.none KzgCommitments
|
|
|
|
var shimExecutionPayload: PayloadType
|
|
copyFields(
|
|
shimExecutionPayload.executionPayload,
|
|
executionPayloadHeader.get.blindedBlckPart, getFieldNames(EPH))
|
|
elif EPH is deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle:
|
|
type PayloadType = deneb.ExecutionPayloadForSigning
|
|
template actualEPH: untyped =
|
|
executionPayloadHeader.get.blindedBlckPart.execution_payload_header
|
|
let
|
|
withdrawals_root = Opt.some actualEPH.withdrawals_root
|
|
kzg_commitments = Opt.some(
|
|
executionPayloadHeader.get.blindedBlckPart.blob_kzg_commitments)
|
|
|
|
var shimExecutionPayload: PayloadType
|
|
type DenebEPH =
|
|
deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle.execution_payload_header
|
|
copyFields(
|
|
shimExecutionPayload.executionPayload, actualEPH, getFieldNames(DenebEPH))
|
|
else:
|
|
static: doAssert false
|
|
|
|
let newBlock = await makeBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot(
|
|
PayloadType, node, randao, validator_index, graffiti, head, slot,
|
|
execution_payload = Opt.some shimExecutionPayload,
|
|
transactions_root = Opt.some actualEPH.transactions_root,
|
|
execution_payload_root = Opt.some hash_tree_root(actualEPH),
|
|
withdrawals_root = withdrawals_root,
|
|
kzg_commitments = kzg_commitments)
|
|
|
|
if newBlock.isErr():
|
|
# Haven't committed to the MEV block, so allow EL fallback.
|
|
return err(newBlock.error) # already logged elsewhere!
|
|
|
|
let forkedBlck = newBlock.get()
|
|
|
|
return ok(
|
|
(executionPayloadHeader.get.blindedBlckPart,
|
|
executionPayloadHeader.get.executionPayloadValue,
|
|
forkedBlck.consensusBlockValue,
|
|
forkedBlck.blck))
|
|
|
|
proc getBuilderBid[SBBB: deneb_mev.SignedBlindedBeaconBlock](
|
|
node: BeaconNode, payloadBuilderClient: RestClientRef, head: BlockRef,
|
|
validator_pubkey: ValidatorPubKey, slot: Slot, randao: ValidatorSig,
|
|
graffitiBytes: GraffitiBytes, validator_index: ValidatorIndex):
|
|
Future[BlindedBlockResult[SBBB]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
## Returns the unsigned blinded block obtained from the Builder API.
|
|
## Used by the BN's own validators, but not the REST server
|
|
when SBBB is deneb_mev.SignedBlindedBeaconBlock:
|
|
type EPH = deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle
|
|
else:
|
|
static: doAssert false
|
|
|
|
let blindedBlockParts = await getBlindedBlockParts[EPH](
|
|
node, payloadBuilderClient, head, validator_pubkey, slot, randao,
|
|
validator_index, graffitiBytes)
|
|
if blindedBlockParts.isErr:
|
|
# Not signed yet, fine to try to fall back on EL
|
|
beacon_block_builder_missed_with_fallback.inc()
|
|
return err blindedBlockParts.error()
|
|
|
|
# These, together, get combined into the blinded block for signing and
|
|
# proposal through the relay network.
|
|
let (executionPayloadHeader, bidValue, consensusValue, forkedBlck) =
|
|
blindedBlockParts.get
|
|
|
|
let unsignedBlindedBlock = getUnsignedBlindedBeaconBlock[SBBB](
|
|
node, slot, validator_index, forkedBlck, executionPayloadHeader)
|
|
|
|
if unsignedBlindedBlock.isErr:
|
|
return err unsignedBlindedBlock.error()
|
|
|
|
ok(BuilderBid[SBBB](
|
|
blindedBlckPart: unsignedBlindedBlock.get,
|
|
executionPayloadValue: bidValue,
|
|
consensusBlockValue: consensusValue
|
|
))
|
|
|
|
proc proposeBlockMEV(
|
|
node: BeaconNode, payloadBuilderClient: RestClientRef,
|
|
blindedBlock: deneb_mev.SignedBlindedBeaconBlock):
|
|
Future[Result[BlockRef, string]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
let unblindedBlockRef = await node.unblindAndRouteBlockMEV(
|
|
payloadBuilderClient, blindedBlock)
|
|
return if unblindedBlockRef.isOk and unblindedBlockRef.get.isSome:
|
|
beacon_blocks_proposed.inc()
|
|
ok(unblindedBlockRef.get.get)
|
|
else:
|
|
# unblindedBlockRef.isOk and unblindedBlockRef.get.isNone indicates that
|
|
# the block failed to validate and integrate into the DAG, which for the
|
|
# purpose of this return value, is equivalent. It's used to drive Beacon
|
|
# REST API output.
|
|
#
|
|
# https://collective.flashbots.net/t/post-mortem-april-3rd-2023-mev-boost-relay-incident-and-related-timing-issue/1540
|
|
# has caused false positives, because
|
|
# "A potential mitigation to this attack is to introduce a cutoff timing
|
|
# into the proposer's slot whereafter this time (e.g. 3 seconds) the relay
|
|
# will no longer return a block to the proposer. Relays began to roll out
|
|
# this mitigation in the evening of April 3rd UTC time with a 2 second
|
|
# cutoff, and notified other relays to do the same. After receiving
|
|
# credible reports of honest validators missing their slots the suggested
|
|
# timing cutoff was increased to 3 seconds."
|
|
let errMsg =
|
|
if unblindedBlockRef.isErr:
|
|
unblindedBlockRef.error
|
|
else:
|
|
"Unblinded block not returned to proposer"
|
|
err errMsg
|
|
|
|
func isEFMainnet(cfg: RuntimeConfig): bool =
|
|
cfg.DEPOSIT_CHAIN_ID == 1 and cfg.DEPOSIT_NETWORK_ID == 1
|
|
|
|
proc makeBlindedBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot*[BBB: ForkyBlindedBeaconBlock](
|
|
node: BeaconNode, payloadBuilderClient: RestClientRef,
|
|
randao_reveal: ValidatorSig, validator_index: ValidatorIndex,
|
|
graffiti: GraffitiBytes, head: BlockRef, slot: Slot):
|
|
Future[BlindedBlockResult[BBB]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
## Requests a beacon node to produce a valid blinded block, which can then be
|
|
## signed by a validator. A blinded block is a block with only a transactions
|
|
## root, rather than a full transactions list.
|
|
##
|
|
## This function is used by the validator client, but not the beacon node for
|
|
## its own validators.
|
|
when BBB is deneb_mev.BlindedBeaconBlock:
|
|
type EPH = deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle
|
|
else:
|
|
static: doAssert false
|
|
|
|
let
|
|
pubkey =
|
|
# Relevant state for knowledge of validators
|
|
withState(node.dag.headState):
|
|
if node.dag.cfg.isEFMainnet and livenessFailsafeInEffect(
|
|
forkyState.data.block_roots.data, forkyState.data.slot):
|
|
# It's head block's slot which matters here, not proposal slot
|
|
return err("Builder API liveness failsafe in effect")
|
|
|
|
if distinctBase(validator_index) >= forkyState.data.validators.lenu64:
|
|
debug "makeBlindedBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot: invalid validator index",
|
|
head = shortLog(head),
|
|
validator_index,
|
|
validators_len = forkyState.data.validators.len
|
|
return err("Invalid validator index")
|
|
|
|
forkyState.data.validators.item(validator_index).pubkey
|
|
|
|
blindedBlockParts = await getBlindedBlockParts[EPH](
|
|
node, payloadBuilderClient, head, pubkey, slot, randao_reveal,
|
|
validator_index, graffiti)
|
|
if blindedBlockParts.isErr:
|
|
# Don't try EL fallback -- VC specifically requested a blinded block
|
|
return err("Unable to create blinded block")
|
|
|
|
let (executionPayloadHeader, bidValue, consensusValue, forkedBlck) =
|
|
blindedBlockParts.get
|
|
withBlck(forkedBlck):
|
|
when consensusFork >= ConsensusFork.Capella:
|
|
when ((consensusFork == ConsensusFork.Deneb and
|
|
EPH is deneb_mev.BlindedExecutionPayloadAndBlobsBundle) or
|
|
(consensusFork == ConsensusFork.Capella and
|
|
EPH is capella.ExecutionPayloadHeader)):
|
|
return ok(
|
|
BuilderBid[BBB](
|
|
blindedBlckPart:
|
|
constructPlainBlindedBlock[BBB](forkyBlck, executionPayloadHeader),
|
|
executionPayloadValue: bidValue,
|
|
consensusBlockValue: consensusValue))
|
|
else:
|
|
return err("makeBlindedBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot: mismatched block/payload types")
|
|
else:
|
|
return err("Attempt to create pre-Capella blinded block")
|
|
|
|
proc collectBids(
|
|
SBBB: typedesc, EPS: typedesc, node: BeaconNode,
|
|
payloadBuilderClient: RestClientRef, validator_pubkey: ValidatorPubKey,
|
|
validator_index: ValidatorIndex, graffitiBytes: GraffitiBytes,
|
|
head: BlockRef, slot: Slot,
|
|
randao: ValidatorSig): Future[Bids[SBBB]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
let usePayloadBuilder =
|
|
if not payloadBuilderClient.isNil:
|
|
withState(node.dag.headState):
|
|
# Head slot, not proposal slot, matters here
|
|
# TODO it might make some sense to allow use of builder API if local
|
|
# EL fails -- i.e. it would change priorities, so any block from the
|
|
# execution layer client would override builder API. But it seems an
|
|
# odd requirement to produce no block at all in those conditions.
|
|
(not node.dag.cfg.isEFMainnet) or (not livenessFailsafeInEffect(
|
|
forkyState.data.block_roots.data, forkyState.data.slot))
|
|
else:
|
|
false
|
|
|
|
let
|
|
payloadBuilderBidFut =
|
|
if usePayloadBuilder:
|
|
when not (EPS is bellatrix.ExecutionPayloadForSigning):
|
|
getBuilderBid[SBBB](node, payloadBuilderClient, head,
|
|
validator_pubkey, slot, randao, graffitiBytes,
|
|
validator_index)
|
|
else:
|
|
let fut = newFuture[BlindedBlockResult[SBBB]]("builder-bid")
|
|
fut.complete(BlindedBlockResult[SBBB].err(
|
|
"Bellatrix Builder API unsupported"))
|
|
fut
|
|
else:
|
|
let fut = newFuture[BlindedBlockResult[SBBB]]("builder-bid")
|
|
fut.complete(BlindedBlockResult[SBBB].err(
|
|
"either payload builder disabled or liveness failsafe active"))
|
|
fut
|
|
engineBlockFut = makeBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot(
|
|
EPS, node, randao, validator_index, graffitiBytes, head, slot)
|
|
|
|
# getBuilderBid times out after BUILDER_PROPOSAL_DELAY_TOLERANCE, with 1 more
|
|
# second for remote validators. makeBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot times out after
|
|
# 1 second.
|
|
await allFutures(payloadBuilderBidFut, engineBlockFut)
|
|
doAssert payloadBuilderBidFut.finished and engineBlockFut.finished
|
|
|
|
let builderBid =
|
|
if payloadBuilderBidFut.completed:
|
|
if payloadBuilderBidFut.value().isOk:
|
|
Opt.some(payloadBuilderBidFut.value().value())
|
|
elif usePayloadBuilder:
|
|
notice "Payload builder error",
|
|
slot, head = shortLog(head), validator = shortLog(validator_pubkey),
|
|
err = payloadBuilderBidFut.value().error()
|
|
Opt.none(BuilderBid[SBBB])
|
|
else:
|
|
# Effectively the same case, but without the log message
|
|
Opt.none(BuilderBid[SBBB])
|
|
else:
|
|
notice "Payload builder bid request failed",
|
|
slot, head = shortLog(head), validator = shortLog(validator_pubkey),
|
|
err = payloadBuilderBidFut.error.msg
|
|
Opt.none(BuilderBid[SBBB])
|
|
|
|
let engineBid =
|
|
if engineBlockFut.completed:
|
|
if engineBlockFut.value.isOk:
|
|
Opt.some(engineBlockFut.value().value())
|
|
else:
|
|
notice "Engine block building error",
|
|
slot, head = shortLog(head), validator = shortLog(validator_pubkey),
|
|
err = engineBlockFut.value.error()
|
|
Opt.none(EngineBid)
|
|
else:
|
|
notice "Engine block building failed",
|
|
slot, head = shortLog(head), validator = shortLog(validator_pubkey),
|
|
err = engineBlockFut.error.msg
|
|
Opt.none(EngineBid)
|
|
|
|
Bids[SBBB](
|
|
engineBid: engineBid,
|
|
builderBid: builderBid)
|
|
|
|
func builderBetterBid(
|
|
localBlockValueBoost: uint8, builderValue: UInt256, engineValue: Wei): bool =
|
|
# Scale down to ensure no overflows; if lower few bits would have been
|
|
# otherwise decisive, was close enough not to matter. Calibrate to let
|
|
# uint8-range percentages avoid overflowing.
|
|
const scalingBits = 10
|
|
static: doAssert 1 shl scalingBits >
|
|
high(typeof(localBlockValueBoost)).uint16 + 100
|
|
let
|
|
scaledBuilderValue = (builderValue shr scalingBits) * 100
|
|
scaledEngineValue = engineValue shr scalingBits
|
|
scaledBuilderValue >
|
|
scaledEngineValue * (localBlockValueBoost.uint16 + 100).u256
|
|
|
|
proc proposeBlockAux(
|
|
SBBB: typedesc, EPS: typedesc, node: BeaconNode,
|
|
validator: AttachedValidator, validator_index: ValidatorIndex,
|
|
head: BlockRef, slot: Slot, randao: ValidatorSig, fork: Fork,
|
|
genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
|
|
localBlockValueBoost: uint8): Future[BlockRef] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
let
|
|
graffitiBytes = node.getGraffitiBytes(validator)
|
|
payloadBuilderClient =
|
|
node.getPayloadBuilderClient(validator_index.distinctBase).valueOr(nil)
|
|
|
|
collectedBids = await collectBids(
|
|
SBBB, EPS, node, payloadBuilderClient, validator.pubkey, validator_index,
|
|
graffitiBytes, head, slot, randao)
|
|
|
|
useBuilderBlock =
|
|
if collectedBids.builderBid.isSome():
|
|
collectedBids.engineBid.isNone() or builderBetterBid(
|
|
localBlockValueBoost,
|
|
collectedBids.builderBid.value().executionPayloadValue,
|
|
collectedBids.engineBid.value().executionPayloadValue)
|
|
else:
|
|
if not collectedBids.engineBid.isSome():
|
|
return head # errors logged in router
|
|
false
|
|
|
|
# There should always be an engine bid, and if payloadBuilderClient exists,
|
|
# not getting a builder bid is also an error. Do not report lack of builder
|
|
# when that's intentional. Replicate some of the nested if statements here,
|
|
# because that avoids entangling logging with other functionality. The logs
|
|
# here are inteded to clarify that, for example, when the builder API relay
|
|
# URL is provided for this validator, it's reasonable for Nimbus not to use
|
|
# it for every block.
|
|
if collectedBids.engineBid.isSome():
|
|
# Three cases: builder bid expected and absent, builder bid expected and
|
|
# present, and builder bid not expected.
|
|
if collectedBids.builderBid.isSome():
|
|
info "Compared engine and builder block bids",
|
|
localBlockValueBoost,
|
|
useBuilderBlock,
|
|
builderBlockValue =
|
|
toString(collectedBids.builderBid.value().executionPayloadValue, 10),
|
|
engineBlockValue =
|
|
toString(collectedBids.engineBid.value().executionPayloadValue, 10)
|
|
elif payloadBuilderClient.isNil:
|
|
discard # builder API not configured for this block
|
|
else:
|
|
info "Did not receive expected builder bid; using engine block",
|
|
engineBlockValue = collectedBids.engineBid.value().executionPayloadValue
|
|
else:
|
|
# Similar three cases: builder bid expected and absent, builder bid
|
|
# expected and present, and builder bid not expected. However, only
|
|
# the second is worth logging, because the other two result in this
|
|
# block being missed altogether, and with details logged elsewhere.
|
|
if collectedBids.builderBid.isSome:
|
|
info "Did not receive expected engine bid; using builder block",
|
|
builderBlockValue =
|
|
collectedBids.builderBid.value().executionPayloadValue
|
|
|
|
if useBuilderBlock:
|
|
let
|
|
blindedBlock = (await blindedBlockCheckSlashingAndSign(
|
|
node, slot, validator, validator_index,
|
|
collectedBids.builderBid.value().blindedBlckPart)).valueOr:
|
|
return head
|
|
# Before proposeBlockMEV, can fall back to EL; after, cannot without
|
|
# risking slashing.
|
|
maybeUnblindedBlock = await proposeBlockMEV(
|
|
node, payloadBuilderClient, blindedBlock)
|
|
|
|
return maybeUnblindedBlock.valueOr:
|
|
warn "Blinded block proposal incomplete",
|
|
head = shortLog(head), slot, validator_index,
|
|
validator = shortLog(validator),
|
|
err = maybeUnblindedBlock.error,
|
|
blindedBlck = shortLog(blindedBlock)
|
|
beacon_block_builder_missed_without_fallback.inc()
|
|
return head
|
|
|
|
let engineBid = collectedBids.engineBid.value()
|
|
|
|
withBlck(engineBid.blck):
|
|
let
|
|
blockRoot = hash_tree_root(forkyBlck)
|
|
signingRoot = compute_block_signing_root(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot, blockRoot)
|
|
|
|
notSlashable = node.attachedValidators
|
|
.slashingProtection
|
|
.registerBlock(validator_index, validator.pubkey, slot, signingRoot)
|
|
|
|
if notSlashable.isErr:
|
|
warn "Slashing protection activated for block proposal",
|
|
blockRoot = shortLog(blockRoot), blck = shortLog(forkyBlck),
|
|
signingRoot = shortLog(signingRoot),
|
|
validator = validator.pubkey,
|
|
slot = slot,
|
|
existingProposal = notSlashable.error
|
|
return head
|
|
|
|
let
|
|
signature =
|
|
block:
|
|
let res = await validator.getBlockSignature(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot, blockRoot, engineBid.blck)
|
|
if res.isErr():
|
|
warn "Unable to sign block",
|
|
validator = shortLog(validator), error_msg = res.error()
|
|
return head
|
|
res.get()
|
|
signedBlock = consensusFork.SignedBeaconBlock(
|
|
message: forkyBlck, signature: signature, root: blockRoot)
|
|
blobsOpt =
|
|
when consensusFork >= ConsensusFork.Deneb:
|
|
template blobsBundle: untyped =
|
|
engineBid.blobsBundleOpt.get
|
|
Opt.some(signedBlock.create_blob_sidecars(
|
|
blobsBundle.proofs, blobsBundle.blobs))
|
|
else:
|
|
Opt.none(seq[BlobSidecar])
|
|
|
|
# BIG BUG SOURCE: The `let` below cannot be combined with the others above!
|
|
# If combined, there are sometimes `SIGSEGV` during `test_keymanager_api`.
|
|
# This has only been observed on macOS (aarch64) in Jenkins, not on GitHub.
|
|
#
|
|
# - macOS 14.2.1 (23C71)
|
|
# - Xcode 15.1 (15C65)
|
|
# - Nim v1.6.18 (a749a8b742bd0a4272c26a65517275db4720e58a)
|
|
#
|
|
# Issue has started occuring around 12 Jan 2024, in a CI run for PR #5731.
|
|
# The PR did not change anything related to this, suggesting an environment
|
|
# or hardware change. The issue is flaky; could have been introduced earlier
|
|
# before surfacing in the aforementioned PR. About 30% to hit bug.
|
|
#
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:21.011Z] Wrote test_keymanager_api/bootstrap_node.enr
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:29.294Z] Serialization/deserialization [Beacon Node] [Preset: mainnet] . (0.00s)
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:29.294Z] ListKeys requests [Beacon Node] [Preset: mainnet] .... (0.01s)
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] ImportKeystores requests [Beacon Node] [Preset: mainnet] Traceback (most recent call last, using override)
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-libp2p/libp2p/protocols/rendezvous.nim(1016) main
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-libp2p/libp2p/protocols/rendezvous.nim(1006) NimMain
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-libp2p/libp2p/protocols/rendezvous.nim(997) PreMain
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(1502) atmtest_keymanager_apidotnim_Init000
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(1475) main
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(378) futureContinue
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(1481) main
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(307) startBeaconNode
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] beacon_chain/nimbus_beacon_node.nim(1900) start
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] beacon_chain/nimbus_beacon_node.nim(1847) run
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncengine.nim(150) poll
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(378) futureContinue
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(1465) delayedTests
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(392) runTests
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(378) futureContinue
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-unittest2/unittest2.nim(1147) runTests
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-unittest2/unittest2.nim(1086) runDirect
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-testutils/testutils/unittests.nim(16) runTestX60gensym2933
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(656) waitFor
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(631) pollFor
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncengine.nim(150) poll
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(378) futureContinue
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] beacon_chain/validators/beacon_validators.nim(82) proposeBlockAux
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] vendor/nimbus-build-system/vendor/Nim/lib/system/excpt.nim(631) signalHandler
|
|
# [2024-01-12T11:54:34.870Z] SIGSEGV: Illegal storage access. (Attempt to read from nil?)
|
|
#
|
|
# This appeared again around 25 Feb 2024, in a CI run for PR #5959,
|
|
# despite the extra `let` having been applied -- once more observed on
|
|
# macOS (aarch64) in Jenkins, and much rarer than before.
|
|
#
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:24.533Z] Wrote test_keymanager_api/bootstrap_node.enr
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:32.756Z] Serialization/deserialization [Beacon Node] [Preset: mainnet] . (0.00s)
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:32.756Z] ListKeys requests [Beacon Node] [Preset: mainnet] .... (0.01s)
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] ImportKeystores requests [Beacon Node] [Preset: mainnet] Traceback (most recent call last, using override)
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-libp2p/libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim(1068) main
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-libp2p/libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim(1058) NimMain
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-libp2p/libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim(1049) PreMain
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(1501) atmtest_keymanager_apidotnim_Init000
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(1474) main
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(382) futureContinue
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(1480) main
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(307) startBeaconNode
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] beacon_chain/nimbus_beacon_node.nim(1916) start
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] beacon_chain/nimbus_beacon_node.nim(1863) run
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncengine.nim(150) poll
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(382) futureContinue
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(1464) delayedTests
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] tests/test_keymanager_api.nim(391) runTests
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(382) futureContinue
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-unittest2/unittest2.nim(1151) runTests
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-unittest2/unittest2.nim(1086) runDirect
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-testutils/testutils/unittests.nim(16) runTestX60gensym3188
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(660) waitFor
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(635) pollFor
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncengine.nim(150) poll
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncfutures.nim(382) futureContinue
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] vendor/nim-chronicles/chronicles.nim(251) proposeBlockAux
|
|
# [2024-02-25T23:21:37.219Z] SIGSEGV: Illegal storage access. (Attempt to read from nil?)
|
|
#
|
|
# One theory is that PR #5946 may increase the frequency, as there were
|
|
# times where the Jenkins CI failed almost every time using a shorter trace.
|
|
# However, the problem was once more flaky, with some passes in-between.
|
|
# For now, PR #5946 was reverted (low priority), and the problem is gone,
|
|
# whether related or not.
|
|
#
|
|
# [2024-02-23T23:11:47.700Z] Wrote test_keymanager_api/bootstrap_node.enr
|
|
# [2024-02-23T23:11:54.728Z] Serialization/deserialization [Beacon Node] [Preset: mainnet] . (0.00s)
|
|
# [2024-02-23T23:11:54.728Z] ListKeys requests [Beacon Node] [Preset: mainnet] .... (0.01s)
|
|
# [2024-02-23T23:11:59.523Z] ImportKeystores requests [Beacon Node] [Preset: mainnet] Traceback (most recent call last, using override)
|
|
# [2024-02-23T23:11:59.523Z] vendor/nim-libp2p/libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim(1067) main
|
|
# [2024-02-23T23:11:59.523Z] vendor/nim-libp2p/libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim(1057) NimMain
|
|
# [2024-02-23T23:11:59.523Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncengine.nim(150) poll
|
|
# [2024-02-23T23:11:59.523Z] vendor/nim-chronos/chronos/internal/asyncengine.nim(150) poll
|
|
# [2024-02-23T23:11:59.523Z] SIGSEGV: Illegal storage access. (Attempt to read from nil?)
|
|
#
|
|
# The generated `nimcache` differs slightly if the `let` are separated from
|
|
# a single block; separation introduces an additional state in closure iter.
|
|
# This change, maybe combined with some macOS specific compiler specifics,
|
|
# could this trigger the `SIGSEGV`? Maybe the extra state adds just enough
|
|
# complexity to the function to disable certain problematic optimizations?
|
|
# The change in size of the environment changes a number of things such as
|
|
# alignment and which parts of an environment contain pointers and so on,
|
|
# which in turn may have surprising behavioural effects, ie most likely this
|
|
# extra state masks some underlying issue. Furthermore, the combination of
|
|
# `(await xyz).valueOr: return` is not very commonly used with other `await`
|
|
# in the same `let` block, which could explain this not being more common.
|
|
#
|
|
# Note that when compiling for Wasm, there are similar bugs with `results`
|
|
# when inlining unwraps, e.g., in `eth2_rest_serialization.nim`.
|
|
# These have not been investigated thoroughly so far as that project uses
|
|
# Nim 2.0 with --mm:orc and is just a prototype for Wasm, no production use.
|
|
# But maybe there is something weird going on with `results` related to the
|
|
# random `SIGSEGV` that we are now observing here, related to doing too much
|
|
# inline logic without defining intermediate isolated `let` statements.
|
|
#
|
|
# if mediaType == ApplicationJsonMediaType:
|
|
# try:
|
|
# - ok RestJson.decode(value, T,
|
|
# - requireAllFields = true,
|
|
# - allowUnknownFields = true)
|
|
# + let r = RestJson.decode(value, T,
|
|
# + requireAllFields = true,
|
|
# + allowUnknownFields = true)
|
|
# + ok r
|
|
# except SerializationError as exc:
|
|
# debug "Failed to deserialize REST JSON data",
|
|
# err = exc.formatMsg("<data>"),
|
|
#
|
|
# At this time we can only speculate about the trigger of these issues.
|
|
# Until a shared pattern can be identified, it is better to apply
|
|
# workarounds that at least avoid the known to be reachable triggers.
|
|
# The solution is hacky and far from desirable; it is what it is.
|
|
let
|
|
newBlockRef = (
|
|
await node.router.routeSignedBeaconBlock(signedBlock, blobsOpt)
|
|
).valueOr:
|
|
return head # Errors logged in router
|
|
|
|
if newBlockRef.isNone():
|
|
return head # Validation errors logged in router
|
|
|
|
notice "Block proposed",
|
|
blockRoot = shortLog(blockRoot), blck = shortLog(forkyBlck),
|
|
signature = shortLog(signature), validator = shortLog(validator)
|
|
|
|
beacon_blocks_proposed.inc()
|
|
|
|
return newBlockRef.get()
|
|
|
|
proc proposeBlock(node: BeaconNode,
|
|
validator: AttachedValidator,
|
|
validator_index: ValidatorIndex,
|
|
head: BlockRef,
|
|
slot: Slot): Future[BlockRef] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
if head.slot >= slot:
|
|
# We should normally not have a head newer than the slot we're proposing for
|
|
# but this can happen if block proposal is delayed
|
|
warn "Skipping proposal, have newer head already",
|
|
headSlot = shortLog(head.slot),
|
|
headBlockRoot = shortLog(head.root),
|
|
slot = shortLog(slot)
|
|
return head
|
|
|
|
let
|
|
fork = node.dag.forkAtEpoch(slot.epoch)
|
|
genesis_validators_root = node.dag.genesis_validators_root
|
|
randao = block:
|
|
let res = await validator.getEpochSignature(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot.epoch)
|
|
if res.isErr():
|
|
warn "Unable to generate randao reveal",
|
|
validator = shortLog(validator), error_msg = res.error()
|
|
return head
|
|
res.get()
|
|
|
|
template proposeBlockContinuation(type1, type2: untyped): auto =
|
|
await proposeBlockAux(
|
|
type1, type2, node, validator, validator_index, head, slot, randao, fork,
|
|
genesis_validators_root, node.config.localBlockValueBoost)
|
|
|
|
return withConsensusFork(node.dag.cfg.consensusForkAtEpoch(slot.epoch)):
|
|
when consensusFork >= ConsensusFork.Deneb:
|
|
proposeBlockContinuation(
|
|
consensusFork.SignedBlindedBeaconBlock,
|
|
consensusFork.ExecutionPayloadForSigning)
|
|
else:
|
|
# Pre-Deneb MEV is not supported; this signals that, because it triggers
|
|
# intentional SignedBlindedBeaconBlock/ExecutionPayload mismatches.
|
|
proposeBlockContinuation(
|
|
deneb_mev.SignedBlindedBeaconBlock,
|
|
max(ConsensusFork.Bellatrix, consensusFork).ExecutionPayloadForSigning)
|
|
|
|
proc sendAttestations(node: BeaconNode, head: BlockRef, slot: Slot) =
|
|
## Perform all attestations that the validators attached to this node should
|
|
## perform during the given slot
|
|
if slot + SLOTS_PER_EPOCH < head.slot:
|
|
# The latest block we know about is a lot newer than the slot we're being
|
|
# asked to attest to - this makes it unlikely that it will be included
|
|
# at all.
|
|
# TODO the oldest attestations allowed are those that are older than the
|
|
# finalized epoch.. also, it seems that posting very old attestations
|
|
# is risky from a slashing perspective. More work is needed here.
|
|
warn "Skipping attestation, head is too recent",
|
|
head = shortLog(head),
|
|
slot = shortLog(slot)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
if slot < node.dag.finalizedHead.slot:
|
|
# During checkpoint sync, we implicitly finalize the given slot even if the
|
|
# state transition does not yet consider it final - this is a sanity check
|
|
# mostly to ensure the `atSlot` below works as expected
|
|
warn "Skipping attestation - slot already finalized",
|
|
head = shortLog(head),
|
|
slot = shortLog(slot),
|
|
finalized = shortLog(node.dag.finalizedHead)
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
let attestationHead = head.atSlot(slot)
|
|
if head != attestationHead.blck:
|
|
# In rare cases, such as when we're busy syncing or just slow, we'll be
|
|
# attesting to a past state - we must then recreate the world as it looked
|
|
# like back then
|
|
notice "Attesting to a state in the past, falling behind?",
|
|
attestationHead = shortLog(attestationHead),
|
|
head = shortLog(head)
|
|
|
|
trace "Checking attestations",
|
|
attestationHead = shortLog(attestationHead),
|
|
head = shortLog(head)
|
|
|
|
# We need to run attestations exactly for the slot that we're attesting to.
|
|
# In case blocks went missing, this means advancing past the latest block
|
|
# using empty slots as fillers.
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/phase0/validator.md#validator-assignments
|
|
let
|
|
epochRef = node.dag.getEpochRef(
|
|
attestationHead.blck, slot.epoch, false).valueOr:
|
|
warn "Cannot construct EpochRef for attestation head, report bug",
|
|
attestationHead = shortLog(attestationHead), slot, error
|
|
return
|
|
committees_per_slot = get_committee_count_per_slot(epochRef.shufflingRef)
|
|
fork = node.dag.forkAtEpoch(slot.epoch)
|
|
genesis_validators_root = node.dag.genesis_validators_root
|
|
registeredRes = node.attachedValidators.slashingProtection.withContext:
|
|
var tmp: seq[(RegisteredAttestation, SubnetId)]
|
|
|
|
for committee_index in get_committee_indices(committees_per_slot):
|
|
let
|
|
committee = get_beacon_committee(
|
|
epochRef.shufflingRef, slot, committee_index)
|
|
subnet_id = compute_subnet_for_attestation(
|
|
committees_per_slot, slot, committee_index)
|
|
|
|
for index_in_committee, validator_index in committee:
|
|
let
|
|
validator = node.getValidatorForDuties(validator_index, slot).valueOr:
|
|
continue
|
|
data = makeAttestationData(epochRef, attestationHead, committee_index)
|
|
# TODO signing_root is recomputed in produceAndSignAttestation/signAttestation just after
|
|
signingRoot = compute_attestation_signing_root(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, data)
|
|
registered = registerAttestationInContext(
|
|
validator_index, validator.pubkey, data.source.epoch,
|
|
data.target.epoch, signingRoot)
|
|
if registered.isErr():
|
|
warn "Slashing protection activated for attestation",
|
|
attestationData = shortLog(data),
|
|
signingRoot = shortLog(signingRoot),
|
|
validator_index,
|
|
validator = shortLog(validator),
|
|
badVoteDetails = $registered.error()
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
tmp.add((RegisteredAttestation(
|
|
validator: validator,
|
|
index_in_committee: uint64 index_in_committee,
|
|
committee_len: committee.len(), data: data), subnet_id
|
|
))
|
|
tmp
|
|
|
|
if registeredRes.isErr():
|
|
warn "Could not update slashing database, skipping attestation duties",
|
|
error = registeredRes.error()
|
|
else:
|
|
for attestation in registeredRes[]:
|
|
asyncSpawn createAndSendAttestation(
|
|
node, fork, genesis_validators_root, attestation[0], attestation[1])
|
|
|
|
proc createAndSendSyncCommitteeMessage(node: BeaconNode,
|
|
validator: AttachedValidator,
|
|
slot: Slot,
|
|
subcommitteeIdx: SyncSubcommitteeIndex,
|
|
head: BlockRef)
|
|
{.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
let
|
|
fork = node.dag.forkAtEpoch(slot.epoch)
|
|
genesis_validators_root = node.dag.genesis_validators_root
|
|
msg =
|
|
block:
|
|
let res = await validator.getSyncCommitteeMessage(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot, head.root)
|
|
if res.isErr():
|
|
warn "Unable to sign committee message",
|
|
validator = shortLog(validator), slot = slot,
|
|
block_root = shortLog(head.root)
|
|
return
|
|
res.get()
|
|
|
|
# Logged in the router
|
|
let res = await node.router.routeSyncCommitteeMessage(
|
|
msg, subcommitteeIdx, checkSignature = false)
|
|
|
|
if not res.isOk():
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
if node.config.dumpEnabled:
|
|
dump(node.config.dumpDirOutgoing, msg, validator.pubkey)
|
|
|
|
proc sendSyncCommitteeMessages(node: BeaconNode, head: BlockRef, slot: Slot) =
|
|
let
|
|
syncCommittee = node.dag.syncCommitteeParticipants(slot + 1)
|
|
|
|
for subcommitteeIdx in SyncSubcommitteeIndex:
|
|
for valIdx in syncSubcommittee(syncCommittee, subcommitteeIdx):
|
|
let validator = node.getValidatorForDuties(
|
|
valIdx, slot, slashingSafe = true).valueOr:
|
|
continue
|
|
asyncSpawn createAndSendSyncCommitteeMessage(node, validator, slot,
|
|
subcommitteeIdx, head)
|
|
|
|
proc signAndSendContribution(node: BeaconNode,
|
|
validator: AttachedValidator,
|
|
subcommitteeIdx: SyncSubcommitteeIndex,
|
|
head: BlockRef,
|
|
slot: Slot) {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
let
|
|
fork = node.dag.forkAtEpoch(slot.epoch)
|
|
genesis_validators_root = node.dag.genesis_validators_root
|
|
selectionProof = block:
|
|
let res = await validator.getSyncCommitteeSelectionProof(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot, subcommitteeIdx)
|
|
if res.isErr():
|
|
warn "Unable to generate committee selection proof",
|
|
validator = shortLog(validator), slot,
|
|
subnet_id = subcommitteeIdx, error = res.error()
|
|
return
|
|
res.get()
|
|
|
|
if not is_sync_committee_aggregator(selectionProof):
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
var
|
|
msg = SignedContributionAndProof(
|
|
message: ContributionAndProof(
|
|
aggregator_index: uint64 validator.index.get,
|
|
selection_proof: selectionProof))
|
|
|
|
if not node.syncCommitteeMsgPool[].produceContribution(
|
|
slot,
|
|
head.bid,
|
|
subcommitteeIdx,
|
|
msg.message.contribution):
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
msg.signature = block:
|
|
let res = await validator.getContributionAndProofSignature(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, msg.message)
|
|
|
|
if res.isErr():
|
|
warn "Unable to sign sync committee contribution",
|
|
validator = shortLog(validator), message = shortLog(msg.message),
|
|
error_msg = res.error()
|
|
return
|
|
res.get()
|
|
|
|
# Logged in the router
|
|
discard await node.router.routeSignedContributionAndProof(msg, false)
|
|
|
|
proc sendSyncCommitteeContributions(
|
|
node: BeaconNode, head: BlockRef, slot: Slot) =
|
|
let syncCommittee = node.dag.syncCommitteeParticipants(slot + 1)
|
|
|
|
for subcommitteeIdx in SyncSubcommitteeIndex:
|
|
for valIdx in syncSubcommittee(syncCommittee, subcommitteeIdx):
|
|
let validator = node.getValidatorForDuties(
|
|
valIdx, slot, slashingSafe = true).valueOr:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
asyncSpawn signAndSendContribution(
|
|
node, validator, subcommitteeIdx, head, slot)
|
|
|
|
proc handleProposal(node: BeaconNode, head: BlockRef, slot: Slot):
|
|
Future[BlockRef] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
## Perform the proposal for the given slot, iff we have a validator attached
|
|
## that is supposed to do so, given the shuffling at that slot for the given
|
|
## head - to compute the proposer, we need to advance a state to the given
|
|
## slot
|
|
let
|
|
proposer = node.dag.getProposer(head, slot).valueOr:
|
|
return head
|
|
proposerKey = node.dag.validatorKey(proposer).get().toPubKey
|
|
validator = node.getValidatorForDuties(proposer, slot).valueOr:
|
|
debug "Expecting block proposal", headRoot = shortLog(head.root),
|
|
slot = shortLog(slot),
|
|
proposer_index = proposer,
|
|
proposer = shortLog(proposerKey)
|
|
return head
|
|
|
|
return await proposeBlock(node, validator, proposer, head, slot)
|
|
|
|
proc signAndSendAggregate(
|
|
node: BeaconNode, validator: AttachedValidator, shufflingRef: ShufflingRef,
|
|
slot: Slot, committee_index: CommitteeIndex) {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
let
|
|
fork = node.dag.forkAtEpoch(slot.epoch)
|
|
genesis_validators_root = node.dag.genesis_validators_root
|
|
validator_index = validator.index.get()
|
|
selectionProof = block:
|
|
let res = await validator.getSlotSignature(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot)
|
|
if res.isErr():
|
|
warn "Unable to create slot signature",
|
|
validator = shortLog(validator),
|
|
slot, error = res.error()
|
|
return
|
|
res.get()
|
|
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/phase0/validator.md#aggregation-selection
|
|
if not is_aggregator(
|
|
shufflingRef, slot, committee_index, selectionProof):
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/phase0/validator.md#construct-aggregate
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/phase0/validator.md#aggregateandproof
|
|
var
|
|
msg = SignedAggregateAndProof(
|
|
message: AggregateAndProof(
|
|
aggregator_index: uint64 validator_index,
|
|
selection_proof: selectionProof))
|
|
|
|
msg.message.aggregate = node.attestationPool[].getAggregatedAttestation(
|
|
slot, committee_index).valueOr:
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
msg.signature = block:
|
|
let res = await validator.getAggregateAndProofSignature(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, msg.message)
|
|
|
|
if res.isErr():
|
|
warn "Unable to sign aggregate",
|
|
validator = shortLog(validator), error_msg = res.error()
|
|
return
|
|
res.get()
|
|
|
|
validator.doppelgangerActivity(msg.message.aggregate.data.slot.epoch)
|
|
|
|
# Logged in the router
|
|
discard await node.router.routeSignedAggregateAndProof(
|
|
msg, checkSignature = false)
|
|
|
|
proc sendAggregatedAttestations(
|
|
node: BeaconNode, head: BlockRef, slot: Slot) =
|
|
# Aggregated attestations must be sent by members of the beacon committees for
|
|
# the given slot, for which `is_aggregator` returns `true`.
|
|
|
|
let
|
|
shufflingRef = node.dag.getShufflingRef(head, slot.epoch, false).valueOr:
|
|
warn "Cannot construct EpochRef for head, report bug",
|
|
head = shortLog(head), slot
|
|
return
|
|
committees_per_slot = get_committee_count_per_slot(shufflingRef)
|
|
|
|
for committee_index in get_committee_indices(committees_per_slot):
|
|
for _, validator_index in
|
|
get_beacon_committee(shufflingRef, slot, committee_index):
|
|
let validator = node.getValidatorForDuties(validator_index, slot).valueOr:
|
|
continue
|
|
asyncSpawn signAndSendAggregate(node, validator, shufflingRef, slot,
|
|
committee_index)
|
|
|
|
proc updateValidatorMetrics*(node: BeaconNode) =
|
|
# Technically, this only needs to be done on epoch transitions and if there's
|
|
# a reorg that spans an epoch transition, but it's easier to implement this
|
|
# way for now.
|
|
|
|
# We'll limit labelled metrics to the first 64, so that we don't overload
|
|
# Prometheus.
|
|
|
|
var total: Gwei
|
|
var i = 0
|
|
for _, v in node.attachedValidators[].validators:
|
|
let balance =
|
|
if v.index.isNone():
|
|
0.Gwei
|
|
elif v.index.get().uint64 >=
|
|
getStateField(node.dag.headState, balances).lenu64:
|
|
debug "Cannot get validator balance, index out of bounds",
|
|
pubkey = shortLog(v.pubkey), index = v.index.get(),
|
|
balances = getStateField(node.dag.headState, balances).len,
|
|
stateRoot = getStateRoot(node.dag.headState)
|
|
0.Gwei
|
|
else:
|
|
getStateField(node.dag.headState, balances).item(v.index.get())
|
|
|
|
if i < 64:
|
|
attached_validator_balance.set(
|
|
balance.toGaugeValue, labelValues = [shortLog(v.pubkey)])
|
|
|
|
inc i
|
|
total += balance
|
|
|
|
node.attachedValidatorBalanceTotal = total
|
|
attached_validator_balance_total.set(total.toGaugeValue)
|
|
|
|
from std/times import epochTime
|
|
|
|
proc getValidatorRegistration(
|
|
node: BeaconNode, validator: AttachedValidator, epoch: Epoch):
|
|
Future[Result[SignedValidatorRegistrationV1, string]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
let validatorIdx = validator.index.valueOr:
|
|
# The validator index will be missing when the validator was not
|
|
# activated for duties yet. We can safely skip the registration then.
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
let feeRecipient = node.getFeeRecipient(validator.pubkey, validatorIdx, epoch)
|
|
let gasLimit = node.getGasLimit(validator.pubkey)
|
|
var validatorRegistration = SignedValidatorRegistrationV1(
|
|
message: ValidatorRegistrationV1(
|
|
fee_recipient: ExecutionAddress(data: distinctBase(feeRecipient)),
|
|
gas_limit: gasLimit,
|
|
timestamp: epochTime().uint64,
|
|
pubkey: validator.pubkey))
|
|
|
|
let signature = await validator.getBuilderSignature(
|
|
node.dag.cfg.genesisFork, validatorRegistration.message)
|
|
|
|
debug "getValidatorRegistration: registering",
|
|
validatorRegistration
|
|
|
|
if signature.isErr:
|
|
return err signature.error
|
|
|
|
validatorRegistration.signature = signature.get
|
|
|
|
return ok validatorRegistration
|
|
|
|
proc registerValidatorsPerBuilder(
|
|
node: BeaconNode, payloadBuilderAddress: string, epoch: Epoch,
|
|
attachedValidatorPubkeys: seq[ValidatorPubKey]) {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
const
|
|
HttpOk = 200
|
|
BUILDER_VALIDATOR_REGISTRATION_DELAY_TOLERANCE = 6.seconds
|
|
|
|
let payloadBuilderClient =
|
|
RestClientRef.new(payloadBuilderAddress).valueOr:
|
|
debug "Unable to initialize payload builder client while registering validators",
|
|
payloadBuilderAddress, epoch,
|
|
err = error
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
if payloadBuilderClient.isNil:
|
|
debug "registerValidatorsPerBuilder: got nil payload builder REST client reference",
|
|
payloadBuilderAddress, epoch
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
const emptyNestedSeq = @[newSeq[SignedValidatorRegistrationV1](0)]
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/builder-specs/blob/v0.4.0/specs/bellatrix/validator.md#validator-registration
|
|
# Seed with single empty inner list to avoid special cases
|
|
var validatorRegistrations = emptyNestedSeq
|
|
|
|
# Some relay networks disallow large request bodies, so split requests
|
|
template addValidatorRegistration(
|
|
validatorRegistration: SignedValidatorRegistrationV1) =
|
|
const registrationValidatorChunkSize = 500
|
|
|
|
if validatorRegistrations[^1].len < registrationValidatorChunkSize:
|
|
validatorRegistrations[^1].add validatorRegistration
|
|
else:
|
|
validatorRegistrations.add @[validatorRegistration]
|
|
|
|
# First, check for VC-added keys; cheaper because provided pre-signed
|
|
# See issue #5599: currently VC have no way to provide BN with per-validator builders per the specs, so we have to
|
|
# resort to use the BN fallback default (--payload-builder-url value, obtained by calling getPayloadBuilderAddress)
|
|
var nonExitedVcPubkeys: HashSet[ValidatorPubKey]
|
|
if node.externalBuilderRegistrations.len > 0 and
|
|
payloadBuilderAddress == node.config.getPayloadBuilderAddress.value:
|
|
withState(node.dag.headState):
|
|
let currentEpoch = node.currentSlot().epoch
|
|
for i in 0 ..< forkyState.data.validators.len:
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/beacon-APIs/blob/v2.4.0/apis/validator/register_validator.yaml
|
|
# "Note that only registrations for active or pending validators must
|
|
# be sent to the builder network. Registrations for unknown or exited
|
|
# validators must be filtered out and not sent to the builder
|
|
# network."
|
|
if forkyState.data.validators.item(i).exit_epoch > currentEpoch:
|
|
let pubkey = forkyState.data.validators.item(i).pubkey
|
|
node.externalBuilderRegistrations.withValue(
|
|
pubkey, signedValidatorRegistration):
|
|
nonExitedVcPubkeys.incl signedValidatorRegistration[].message.pubkey
|
|
addValidatorRegistration signedValidatorRegistration[]
|
|
|
|
for key in attachedValidatorPubkeys:
|
|
# Already included from VC
|
|
if key in nonExitedVcPubkeys:
|
|
warn "registerValidators: same validator registered by beacon node and validator client",
|
|
pubkey = shortLog(key)
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
# Time passed during awaits; REST keymanager API might have removed it
|
|
if key notin node.attachedValidators[].validators:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
let validator =
|
|
try:
|
|
node.attachedValidators[].validators[key]
|
|
except KeyError:
|
|
raiseAssert "just checked"
|
|
|
|
if validator.index.isNone:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/builder-specs/blob/v0.4.0/specs/bellatrix/builder.md#is_eligible_for_registration
|
|
# Validators should be active or pending
|
|
withState(node.dag.headState):
|
|
if distinctBase(validator.index.get) >=
|
|
forkyState.data.validators.lenu64:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
if node.currentSlot().epoch >=
|
|
forkyState.data.validators.item(validator.index.get).exit_epoch:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
if validator.externalBuilderRegistration.isSome:
|
|
addValidatorRegistration validator.externalBuilderRegistration.get
|
|
else:
|
|
let validatorRegistration =
|
|
await node.getValidatorRegistration(validator, epoch)
|
|
if validatorRegistration.isErr:
|
|
error "registerValidators: validatorRegistration failed",
|
|
validatorRegistration
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
# Time passed during await; REST keymanager API might have removed it
|
|
if key notin node.attachedValidators[].validators:
|
|
continue
|
|
let validator = try:
|
|
node.attachedValidators[].validators[key]
|
|
except KeyError:
|
|
raiseAssert "just checked"
|
|
|
|
validator.externalBuilderRegistration = Opt.some validatorRegistration.get
|
|
addValidatorRegistration validatorRegistration.get
|
|
|
|
if validatorRegistrations == emptyNestedSeq:
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
# TODO if there are too many chunks, could trigger DoS protections, so
|
|
# might randomize order to accumulate cumulative coverage
|
|
for chunkIdx in 0 ..< validatorRegistrations.len:
|
|
let registerValidatorResult =
|
|
try:
|
|
awaitWithTimeout(
|
|
payloadBuilderClient.registerValidator(
|
|
validatorRegistrations[chunkIdx]),
|
|
BUILDER_VALIDATOR_REGISTRATION_DELAY_TOLERANCE):
|
|
error "Timeout when registering validator with builder"
|
|
continue # Try next batch regardless
|
|
except RestError as exc:
|
|
warn "Error when registering validator(s) with builder", err = exc.msg
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
if HttpOk != registerValidatorResult.status:
|
|
warn "registerValidators: Couldn't register validator with MEV builder",
|
|
registerValidatorResult
|
|
|
|
proc registerValidators*(node: BeaconNode, epoch: Epoch) {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
if not node.config.payloadBuilderEnable: return
|
|
|
|
var builderKeys: Table[string, seq[ValidatorPubKey]]
|
|
|
|
# Ensure VC validators are still registered if we have no attached validators
|
|
let externalPayloadBuilderAddress = node.config.getPayloadBuilderAddress
|
|
if externalPayloadBuilderAddress.isSome:
|
|
builderKeys[externalPayloadBuilderAddress.value] = newSeq[ValidatorPubKey](0)
|
|
|
|
for pubkey in node.attachedValidators[].validators.keys:
|
|
let payloadBuilderAddress = node.getPayloadBuilderAddress(pubkey).valueOr:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
builderKeys.mgetOrPut(
|
|
payloadBuilderAddress, default(seq[ValidatorPubKey])).add pubkey
|
|
|
|
for payloadBuilderAddress, keys in builderKeys:
|
|
await node.registerValidatorsPerBuilder(payloadBuilderAddress, epoch, keys)
|
|
|
|
proc updateValidators(
|
|
node: BeaconNode, validators: openArray[Validator]) =
|
|
# Since validator indicies are stable, we only check the "updated" range -
|
|
# checking all validators would significantly slow down this loop when there
|
|
# are many inactive keys
|
|
for i in node.dutyValidatorCount..validators.high:
|
|
let
|
|
v = node.attachedValidators[].getValidator(validators[i].pubkey).valueOr:
|
|
continue
|
|
v.index = Opt.some ValidatorIndex(i)
|
|
|
|
node.dutyValidatorCount = validators.len
|
|
|
|
for validator in node.attachedValidators[]:
|
|
# Check if any validators have been activated
|
|
if validator.needsUpdate and validator.index.isSome():
|
|
# Activation epoch can change after index is assigned..
|
|
let index = validator.index.get()
|
|
if index < validators.lenu64:
|
|
validator.updateValidator(
|
|
Opt.some(ValidatorAndIndex(
|
|
index: index, validator: validators[int index]
|
|
)))
|
|
|
|
proc handleFallbackAttestations(node: BeaconNode, lastSlot, slot: Slot) =
|
|
# Neither block proposal nor sync committee duties can be done in this
|
|
# situation.
|
|
let attestationHead = node.lastValidAttestedBlock.valueOr:
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
if attestationHead.slot + SLOTS_PER_EPOCH < slot:
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
sendAttestations(node, attestationHead.blck, slot)
|
|
|
|
proc handleValidatorDuties*(node: BeaconNode, lastSlot, slot: Slot) {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
## Perform validator duties - create blocks, vote and aggregate existing votes
|
|
if node.attachedValidators[].count == 0:
|
|
# Nothing to do because we have no validator attached
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
# The dag head might be updated by sync while we're working due to the
|
|
# await calls, thus we use a local variable to keep the logic straight here
|
|
var head = node.dag.head
|
|
if not node.isSynced(head):
|
|
info "Beacon node not in sync; skipping validator duties for now",
|
|
slot, headSlot = head.slot
|
|
|
|
# Rewards will be growing though, as we sync..
|
|
updateValidatorMetrics(node)
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
elif not head.executionValid:
|
|
info "Execution client not in sync; skipping validator duties for now",
|
|
slot, headSlot = head.slot
|
|
|
|
handleFallbackAttestations(node, lastSlot, slot)
|
|
|
|
# Rewards will be growing though, as we sync..
|
|
updateValidatorMetrics(node)
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
else:
|
|
discard # keep going
|
|
|
|
node.lastValidAttestedBlock = Opt.some head.atSlot()
|
|
|
|
withState(node.dag.headState):
|
|
node.updateValidators(forkyState.data.validators.asSeq())
|
|
|
|
let newHead = await handleProposal(node, head, slot)
|
|
head = newHead
|
|
|
|
let
|
|
# The latest point in time when we'll be sending out attestations
|
|
attestationCutoff = node.beaconClock.fromNow(slot.attestation_deadline())
|
|
|
|
if attestationCutoff.inFuture:
|
|
debug "Waiting to send attestations",
|
|
head = shortLog(head),
|
|
attestationCutoff = shortLog(attestationCutoff.offset)
|
|
|
|
# Wait either for the block or the attestation cutoff time to arrive
|
|
if await node.consensusManager[].expectBlock(slot)
|
|
.withTimeout(attestationCutoff.offset):
|
|
await waitAfterBlockCutoff(node.beaconClock, slot, Opt.some(head))
|
|
|
|
# Time passed - we might need to select a new head in that case
|
|
node.consensusManager[].updateHead(slot)
|
|
head = node.dag.head
|
|
|
|
static: doAssert attestationSlotOffset == syncCommitteeMessageSlotOffset
|
|
|
|
sendAttestations(node, head, slot)
|
|
sendSyncCommitteeMessages(node, head, slot)
|
|
|
|
updateValidatorMetrics(node) # the important stuff is done, update the vanity numbers
|
|
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/phase0/validator.md#broadcast-aggregate
|
|
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/altair/validator.md#broadcast-sync-committee-contribution
|
|
# Wait 2 / 3 of the slot time to allow messages to propagate, then collect
|
|
# the result in aggregates
|
|
static:
|
|
doAssert aggregateSlotOffset == syncContributionSlotOffset, "Timing change?"
|
|
let
|
|
aggregateCutoff = node.beaconClock.fromNow(slot.aggregate_deadline())
|
|
if aggregateCutoff.inFuture:
|
|
debug "Waiting to send aggregate attestations",
|
|
aggregateCutoff = shortLog(aggregateCutoff.offset)
|
|
await sleepAsync(aggregateCutoff.offset)
|
|
|
|
sendAggregatedAttestations(node, head, slot)
|
|
sendSyncCommitteeContributions(node, head, slot)
|
|
|
|
proc registerDuties*(node: BeaconNode, wallSlot: Slot) {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
## Register upcoming duties of attached validators with the duty tracker
|
|
|
|
if node.attachedValidators[].count() == 0 or
|
|
not node.isSynced(node.dag.head) or not node.dag.head.executionValid:
|
|
# Nothing to do because we have no validator attached
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
let
|
|
genesis_validators_root = node.dag.genesis_validators_root
|
|
head = node.dag.head
|
|
|
|
# Getting the slot signature is expensive but cached - in "normal" cases we'll
|
|
# be getting the duties one slot at a time
|
|
for slot in wallSlot ..< wallSlot + SUBNET_SUBSCRIPTION_LEAD_TIME_SLOTS:
|
|
let
|
|
shufflingRef = node.dag.getShufflingRef(head, slot.epoch, false).valueOr:
|
|
warn "Cannot construct EpochRef for duties - report bug",
|
|
head = shortLog(head), slot
|
|
return
|
|
let
|
|
fork = node.dag.forkAtEpoch(slot.epoch)
|
|
committees_per_slot = get_committee_count_per_slot(shufflingRef)
|
|
|
|
for committee_index in get_committee_indices(committees_per_slot):
|
|
let committee = get_beacon_committee(shufflingRef, slot, committee_index)
|
|
|
|
for index_in_committee, validator_index in committee:
|
|
let
|
|
validator = node.getValidator(validator_index).valueOr:
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
subnet_id = compute_subnet_for_attestation(
|
|
committees_per_slot, slot, committee_index)
|
|
slotSigRes = await validator.getSlotSignature(
|
|
fork, genesis_validators_root, slot)
|
|
if slotSigRes.isErr():
|
|
error "Unable to create slot signature",
|
|
validator = shortLog(validator),
|
|
error_msg = slotSigRes.error()
|
|
continue
|
|
let isAggregator = is_aggregator(committee.lenu64, slotSigRes.get())
|
|
|
|
node.consensusManager[].actionTracker.registerDuty(
|
|
slot, subnet_id, validator_index, isAggregator)
|
|
|
|
proc makeMaybeBlindedBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlotImpl[ResultType](
|
|
node: BeaconNode, consensusFork: static ConsensusFork,
|
|
randao_reveal: ValidatorSig, graffiti: GraffitiBytes,
|
|
head: BlockRef, slot: Slot): Future[ResultType] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
|
|
let
|
|
proposer = node.dag.getProposer(head, slot).valueOr:
|
|
return ResultType.err(
|
|
"Unable to get proposer for specific head and slot")
|
|
proposerKey = node.dag.validatorKey(proposer).get().toPubKey()
|
|
|
|
payloadBuilderClient =
|
|
node.getPayloadBuilderClient(proposer.distinctBase).valueOr(nil)
|
|
localBlockValueBoost = node.config.localBlockValueBoost
|
|
|
|
collectedBids =
|
|
await collectBids(consensusFork.SignedBlindedBeaconBlock,
|
|
consensusFork.ExecutionPayloadForSigning,
|
|
node,
|
|
payloadBuilderClient, proposerKey,
|
|
proposer, graffiti, head, slot,
|
|
randao_reveal)
|
|
useBuilderBlock =
|
|
if collectedBids.builderBid.isSome():
|
|
collectedBids.engineBid.isNone() or builderBetterBid(
|
|
localBlockValueBoost,
|
|
collectedBids.builderBid.value().executionPayloadValue,
|
|
collectedBids.engineBid.value().executionPayloadValue)
|
|
else:
|
|
if not(collectedBids.engineBid.isSome):
|
|
return ResultType.err("Engine bid is not available")
|
|
false
|
|
|
|
engineBid = block:
|
|
if useBuilderBlock:
|
|
let blindedBid = collectedBids.builderBid.value()
|
|
return ResultType.ok((
|
|
blck:
|
|
consensusFork.MaybeBlindedBeaconBlock(
|
|
isBlinded: true,
|
|
blindedData: blindedBid.blindedBlckPart.message),
|
|
executionValue: Opt.some(blindedBid.executionPayloadValue),
|
|
consensusValue: Opt.some(blindedBid.consensusBlockValue)))
|
|
|
|
collectedBids.engineBid.value()
|
|
|
|
doAssert engineBid.blck.kind == consensusFork
|
|
template forkyBlck: untyped = engineBid.blck.forky(consensusFork)
|
|
when consensusFork >= ConsensusFork.Deneb:
|
|
let blobsBundle = engineBid.blobsBundleOpt.get()
|
|
doAssert blobsBundle.commitments == forkyBlck.body.blob_kzg_commitments
|
|
ResultType.ok((
|
|
blck: consensusFork.MaybeBlindedBeaconBlock(
|
|
isBlinded: false,
|
|
data: deneb.BlockContents(
|
|
`block`: forkyBlck,
|
|
kzg_proofs: blobsBundle.proofs,
|
|
blobs: blobsBundle.blobs)),
|
|
executionValue: Opt.some(engineBid.executionPayloadValue),
|
|
consensusValue: Opt.some(engineBid.consensusBlockValue)))
|
|
else:
|
|
ResultType.ok((
|
|
blck: consensusFork.MaybeBlindedBeaconBlock(
|
|
isBlinded: false,
|
|
data: forkyBlck),
|
|
executionValue: Opt.some(engineBid.executionPayloadValue),
|
|
consensusValue: Opt.some(engineBid.consensusBlockValue)))
|
|
|
|
proc makeMaybeBlindedBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlot*(
|
|
node: BeaconNode, consensusFork: static ConsensusFork,
|
|
randao_reveal: ValidatorSig, graffiti: GraffitiBytes,
|
|
head: BlockRef, slot: Slot): auto =
|
|
type ResultType = Result[tuple[
|
|
blck: consensusFork.MaybeBlindedBeaconBlock,
|
|
executionValue: Opt[UInt256],
|
|
consensusValue: Opt[UInt256]], string]
|
|
|
|
makeMaybeBlindedBeaconBlockForHeadAndSlotImpl[ResultType](
|
|
node, consensusFork, randao_reveal, graffiti, head, slot)
|