nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
tersec 2c623e5f92
don't try to fcU on pre-merge bellatrix blocks (#3773)
2022-06-18 13:39:21 +03:00
..
README.md update CL spec URLs (#3690) 2022-06-01 15:52:45 +00:00
batch_validation.nim Implement all sync committee duties in the validator client (#3583) 2022-05-10 10:03:40 +00:00
block_processor.nim don't try to fcU on pre-merge bellatrix blocks (#3773) 2022-06-18 13:39:21 +03:00
consensus_manager.nim kiln beacon node (#3540) 2022-03-25 11:40:10 +00:00
eth2_processor.nim separate non-zero exit code for doppelganger detection (#3728) 2022-06-10 14:53:19 +03:00
gossip_validation.nim update CL spec URLs (#3696) 2022-06-03 09:01:58 +00:00
light_client_processor.nim integrate light client into beacon node (#3557) 2022-06-07 19:01:11 +02:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
    • blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
  • a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
    • Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
    • Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations