nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
tersec f537f263df
don't use empty execution payload when newPayload rejects it (#3999)
* don't use empty execution payload when newPayload rejects it

* disallow optimistic import except when accepted/syncing
2022-08-20 00:20:57 +03:00
..
README.md update spec ref URLs (#3979) 2022-08-17 11:33:19 +00:00
batch_validation.nim cache shuffling separately from other EpochRef data (fixes #2677) (#3990) 2022-08-18 21:07:01 +03:00
block_processor.nim don't use empty execution payload when newPayload rejects it (#3999) 2022-08-20 00:20:57 +03:00
eth2_processor.nim Doppelganger detection bug fix (#3997) 2022-08-19 13:34:08 +03:00
gossip_validation.nim cache shuffling separately from other EpochRef data (fixes #2677) (#3990) 2022-08-18 21:07:01 +03:00
light_client_processor.nim update LC spec references for v1.2.0-rc.2 (#3982) 2022-08-17 19:47:06 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
    • blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
  • a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
    • Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
    • Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations