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nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing/batch_validation.nim

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# beacon_chain
# Copyright (c) 2019-2024 Status Research & Development GmbH
# Licensed and distributed under either of
# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
{.push raises: [].}
import
std/[atomics, deques, sequtils],
stew/ptrops,
metrics,
# Status
chronicles, chronos, chronos/threadsync,
../spec/signatures_batch,
../consensus_object_pools/[blockchain_dag, spec_cache]
export signatures_batch, blockchain_dag
logScope:
topics = "batch_validation"
declareCounter batch_verification_batches,
"Total number of batches processed"
declareCounter batch_verification_signatures,
"Total number of verified signatures before aggregation"
declareCounter batch_verification_aggregates,
"Total number of verified signatures after aggregation"
declareCounter batch_verification_batches_skipped,
"Total number of batches skipped"
# Batched gossip validation
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
# Batching in the context of BLS means collecting the signatures of several
# messages and verifying them all at once - this can be done more efficiently
# than verifying each message one by one, but the downside is that we get an
# all-or-nothing response - in case of an invalid signature, we must re-check
# each message separately.
#
# In addition to batching, we also perform lazy aggregation:
#
# * batching speeds up the verification of multiple signatures over different
# messages, by a decent amount
# * lazy aggregation speeds up the verification of multiple signatures over the
# same message, by a lot
#
# Due to the nature of gossip validation in eth2, it is common for messages
# to arrive in bursts - because most traffic on the network is valid (honest
# nodes don't re-broadcast invalid traffic and dishonest nodes quickly get
# disconnected), valid messages by far make up the bulk of traffic.
#
# Further, traffic is divided into topics - on a single topic it will be
# highly likely that the same message appears over and over again, but with
# different signatures, as most validators have the same view of the network -
# at least 2/3 or we're in deep trouble :)
const
BatchAttAccumTime = 10.milliseconds
## Amount of time spent accumulating signatures from the network before
## performing verification
BatchedCryptoSize = 72
## Threshold for immediate trigger of batch verification.
## A balance between throughput and worst case latency.
## At least 6 so that the constant factors
## (RNG for blinding and Final Exponentiation)
## are amortized, but not too big as we need to redo checks one-by-one if
## one failed.
## The current value is based on experiments, where 72 gives an average
## batch size of ~30 signatures per batch, or 2.5 signatures per aggregate
## (meaning an average of 12 verifications per batch which on a raspberry
## should be doable in less than 30ms). In the same experiment, a value of
## 36 resulted in 17-18 signatures per batch and 1.7-1.9 signatures per
## aggregate - this node was running on mainnet with
## `--subscribe-all-subnets` turned on - typical nodes will see smaller
## batches.
InflightVerifications = 2
## Maximum number of concurrent in-flight verifications
type
BatchResult* {.pure.} = enum
Invalid # Invalid by default
Valid
Timeout
FutureBatchResult = Future[BatchResult].Raising([CancelledError])
Eager = proc(): bool {.gcsafe, raises: [].}
## Callback that returns true if eager processing should be done to lower
## latency at the expense of spending more cycles validating things,
## creating a crude timesharing priority mechanism.
BatchItem* = object
sigset: SignatureSet
fut: FutureBatchResult
Batch* = object
## A batch represents up to BatchedCryptoSize non-aggregated signatures
created: Moment
sigsets: seq[SignatureSet]
items: seq[BatchItem]
VerifierItem = object
verifier: ref BatchVerifier
signal: ThreadSignalPtr
inflight: Future[void].Raising([CancelledError])
BatchCrypto* = object
batches: Deque[ref Batch]
eager: Eager
## Eager is used to enable eager processing of attestations when it's
## prudent to do so (instead of leaving the CPU for other, presumably more
## important work like block processing)
taskpool: Taskpool
rng: ref HmacDrbgContext
verifiers: array[InflightVerifications, VerifierItem]
## Each batch verification reqires a separate verifier
verifier: int
pruneTime: Moment ## last time we had to prune something
counts: tuple[signatures, batches, aggregates: int64]
# `nim-metrics` library is a bit too slow to update on every batch, so
# we accumulate here instead
genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest
# Most scheduled checks require this immutable value, so don't require it
# to be provided separately each time
processor: Future[void].Raising([CancelledError])
BatchTask = object
ok: Atomic[bool]
setsPtr: ptr UncheckedArray[SignatureSet]
numSets: int
secureRandomBytes: array[32, byte]
taskpool: Taskpool
cache: ptr BatchedBLSVerifierCache
signal: ThreadSignalPtr
proc new*(
T: type BatchCrypto, rng: ref HmacDrbgContext,
eager: Eager, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest, taskpool: TaskPoolPtr):
Result[ref BatchCrypto, string] =
let res = (ref BatchCrypto)(
rng: rng, taskpool: taskpool,
eager: eager,
genesis_validators_root: genesis_validators_root,
pruneTime: Moment.now())
for i in 0..<res.verifiers.len:
res.verifiers[i] = VerifierItem(
verifier: BatchVerifier.new(rng, taskpool),
signal: block:
let sig = ThreadSignalPtr.new()
sig.valueOr:
for j in 0..<i:
discard res.verifiers[j].signal.close()
return err(sig.error())
)
ok res
func full(batch: Batch): bool =
batch.items.len() >= BatchedCryptoSize
func half(batch: Batch): bool =
batch.items.len() >= (BatchedCryptoSize div 2)
proc complete(batchItem: var BatchItem, v: BatchResult) =
batchItem.fut.complete(v)
batchItem.fut = nil
proc complete(batchItem: var BatchItem, ok: bool) =
batchItem.fut.complete(if ok: BatchResult.Valid else: BatchResult.Invalid)
proc skip(batch: var Batch) =
for res in batch.items.mitems():
res.complete(BatchResult.Timeout)
proc complete(batchCrypto: var BatchCrypto, batch: var Batch, ok: bool) =
if ok:
for res in batch.items.mitems():
res.complete(BatchResult.Valid)
else:
# Batched verification failed meaning that some of the signature checks
# failed, but we don't know which ones - check each signature separately
# instead
debug "batch crypto - failure, falling back",
items = batch.items.len()
for item in batch.items.mitems():
item.complete(blsVerify item.sigset)
batchCrypto.counts.batches += 1
batchCrypto.counts.signatures += batch.items.len()
batchCrypto.counts.aggregates += batch.sigsets.len()
if batchCrypto.counts.batches >= 256:
# Not too often, so as not to overwhelm our metrics
batch_verification_batches.inc(batchCrypto.counts.batches)
batch_verification_signatures.inc(batchCrypto.counts.signatures)
batch_verification_aggregates.inc(batchCrypto.counts.aggregates)
reset(batchCrypto.counts)
func combine(a: var Signature, b: Signature) =
var tmp = AggregateSignature.init(CookedSig(a))
tmp.aggregate(b)
a = Signature(tmp.finish())
func combine(a: var PublicKey, b: PublicKey) =
var tmp = AggregatePublicKey.init(CookedPubKey(a))
tmp.aggregate(b)
a = PublicKey(tmp.finish())
proc batchVerifyTask(task: ptr BatchTask) {.nimcall.} =
# Task suitable for running in taskpools - look, no GC!
let
tp = task[].taskpool
ok = tp.spawn batchVerify(
tp, task[].cache, task[].setsPtr, task[].numSets,
addr task[].secureRandomBytes)
task[].ok.store(sync ok)
discard task[].signal.fireSync()
proc spawnBatchVerifyTask(tp: Taskpool, task: ptr BatchTask) =
# Inlining this `proc` leads to compilation problems on Nim 2.0
# - Error: cannot generate destructor for generic type: Isolated
# Workaround: Ensure that `tp.spawn` is not used within an `{.async.}` proc
# Possibly related to: https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/22305
tp.spawn batchVerifyTask(task)
proc batchVerifyAsync*(
verifier: ref BatchVerifier, signal: ThreadSignalPtr,
batch: ref Batch): Future[bool] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
var task = BatchTask(
setsPtr: makeUncheckedArray(baseAddr batch[].sigsets),
numSets: batch[].sigsets.len,
taskpool: verifier[].taskpool,
cache: addr verifier[].sigVerifCache,
signal: signal,
)
verifier[].rng[].generate(task.secureRandomBytes)
# task will stay allocated in the async environment at least until the signal
# has fired at which point it's safe to release it
let taskPtr = addr task
doAssert verifier[].taskpool.numThreads > 1,
"Must have at least one separate thread or signal will never be fired"
verifier[].taskpool.spawnBatchVerifyTask(taskPtr)
try:
await signal.wait()
except AsyncError as exc:
warn "Batch verification verification failed - report bug", err = exc.msg
return false
task.ok.load()
proc processBatch(
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto, batch: ref Batch,
verifier: ref BatchVerifier, signal: ThreadSignalPtr) {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
let
numSets = batch[].sigsets.len()
if numSets == 0:
# Nothing to do in this batch, can happen when a batch is created without
# there being any signatures successfully added to it
return
let
startTick = Moment.now()
# If the hardware is too slow to keep up or an event caused a temporary
# buildup of signature verification tasks, the batch will be dropped so as to
# recover and not cause even further buildup - this puts an (elastic) upper
# bound on the amount of queued-up work
if batch[].created + SECONDS_PER_SLOT.int64.seconds < startTick:
if batchCrypto.pruneTime + SECONDS_PER_SLOT.int64.seconds < startTick:
notice "Batch queue pruned, skipping attestation validation",
batches = batchCrypto.batches.len()
batchCrypto.pruneTime = startTick
batch[].skip()
batch_verification_batches_skipped.inc()
return
trace "batch crypto - starting", numSets, items = batch[].items.len
let ok =
# Depending on how many signatures there are in the batch, it may or
# may not be beneficial to use batch verification:
# https://github.com/status-im/nim-blscurve/blob/3956f63dd0ed5d7939f6195ee09e4c5c1ace9001/blscurve/bls_batch_verifier.nim#L390
if numSets == 1:
blsVerify(batch[].sigsets[0])
elif batchCrypto[].taskpool.numThreads > 1 and numSets > 3:
await batchVerifyAsync(verifier, signal, batch)
else:
let secureRandomBytes = verifier[].rng[].generate(array[32, byte])
batchVerifySerial(
verifier[].sigVerifCache, batch.sigsets, secureRandomBytes)
trace "batch crypto - finished",
numSets, items = batch[].items.len(), ok,
batchDur = Moment.now() - startTick
batchCrypto[].complete(batch[], ok)
proc processLoop(batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto) {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
## Process pending crypto check after some time has passed - the time is
## chosen such that there's time to fill the batch but not so long that
## latency across the network is negatively affected
while batchCrypto[].batches.len() > 0:
# When eager processing is enabled, we can start processing the next batch
# as soon as it's full - otherwise, wait for more signatures to accumulate
if not batchCrypto[].batches.peekFirst()[].full() or
not batchCrypto[].eager():
await sleepAsync(BatchAttAccumTime)
# We still haven't filled even half the batch - wait a bit more (and give
# chonos time to work its task queue)
if not batchCrypto[].batches.peekFirst()[].half():
await sleepAsync(BatchAttAccumTime div 2)
# Pick the "next" verifier
let verifier = (batchCrypto[].verifier + 1) mod batchCrypto.verifiers.len
batchCrypto[].verifier = verifier
# BatchVerifier:s may not be shared, so make sure the previous round
# using this verifier is finished
if batchCrypto[].verifiers[verifier].inflight != nil and
not batchCrypto[].verifiers[verifier].inflight.finished():
await batchCrypto[].verifiers[verifier].inflight
batchCrypto[].verifiers[verifier].inflight = batchCrypto.processBatch(
batchCrypto[].batches.popFirst(),
batchCrypto[].verifiers[verifier].verifier,
batchCrypto[].verifiers[verifier].signal)
proc getBatch(batchCrypto: var BatchCrypto): ref Batch =
if batchCrypto.batches.len() == 0 or
batchCrypto.batches.peekLast[].full():
let batch = (ref Batch)(created: Moment.now())
batchCrypto.batches.addLast(batch)
batch
else:
batchCrypto.batches.peekLast()
proc scheduleProcessor(batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto) =
if batchCrypto.processor == nil or batchCrypto.processor.finished():
batchCrypto.processor = batchCrypto.processLoop()
proc verifySoon(
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto, name: static string,
sigset: SignatureSet): Future[BatchResult]{.async: (raises: [CancelledError], raw: true).} =
let
batch = batchCrypto[].getBatch()
fut = newFuture[BatchResult](name)
var found = false
# Find existing signature sets with the same message - if we can verify an
# aggregate instead of several signatures, that is _much_ faster
for item in batch[].sigsets.mitems():
if item.message == sigset.message:
item.signature.combine(sigset.signature)
item.pubkey.combine(sigset.pubkey)
found = true
break
if not found:
batch[].sigsets.add sigset
# We need to keep the "original" sigset to allow verifying each signature
# one by one in the case the combined operation fails
batch[].items.add(BatchItem(sigset: sigset, fut: fut))
batchCrypto.scheduleProcessor()
fut
# See also verify_attestation_signature
proc scheduleAttestationCheck*(
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto, fork: Fork,
attestationData: AttestationData, pubkey: CookedPubKey,
signature: ValidatorSig
): Result[tuple[fut: FutureBatchResult, sig: CookedSig], cstring] =
## Schedule crypto verification of an attestation
##
## The buffer is processed:
## - when eager processing is enabled and the batch is full
## - otherwise after 10ms (BatchAttAccumTime)
##
## This returns an error if crypto sanity checks failed
## and a future with the deferred attestation check otherwise.
##
let
sig = signature.load().valueOr:
return err("attestation: cannot load signature")
fut = batchCrypto.verifySoon("batch_validation.scheduleAttestationCheck"):
attestation_signature_set(
fork, batchCrypto[].genesis_validators_root, attestationData, pubkey,
sig)
ok((fut, sig))
proc scheduleAggregateChecks*(
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto, fork: Fork,
signedAggregateAndProof: phase0.SignedAggregateAndProof, dag: ChainDAGRef,
attesting_indices: openArray[ValidatorIndex]
): Result[tuple[
aggregatorFut, slotFut, aggregateFut: FutureBatchResult,
sig: CookedSig], cstring] =
## Schedule crypto verification of an aggregate
##
## This involves 3 checks:
## - verify_slot_signature
## - verify_aggregate_and_proof_signature
## - is_valid_indexed_attestation
##
## The buffer is processed:
## - when eager processing is enabled and the batch is full
## - otherwise after 10ms (BatchAttAccumTime)
##
## This returns None if the signatures could not be loaded.
## and 3 futures with the deferred aggregate checks otherwise.
template aggregate_and_proof: untyped = signedAggregateAndProof.message
template aggregate: untyped = aggregate_and_proof.aggregate
# Do the eager steps first to avoid polluting batches with needlessly
let
aggregatorKey =
dag.validatorKey(aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index).valueOr:
return err("SignedAggregateAndProof: invalid aggregator index")
aggregatorSig = signedAggregateAndProof.signature.load().valueOr:
return err("aggregateAndProof: invalid proof signature")
slotSig = aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof.load().valueOr:
return err("aggregateAndProof: invalid selection signature")
aggregateKey = ? aggregateAll(dag, attesting_indices)
aggregateSig = aggregate.signature.load().valueOr:
return err("aggregateAndProof: invalid aggregate signature")
let
aggregatorFut = batchCrypto.verifySoon("scheduleAggregateChecks.aggregator"):
aggregate_and_proof_signature_set(
fork, batchCrypto[].genesis_validators_root, aggregate_and_proof,
aggregatorKey, aggregatorSig)
slotFut = batchCrypto.verifySoon("scheduleAggregateChecks.selection_proof"):
slot_signature_set(
fork, batchCrypto[].genesis_validators_root, aggregate.data.slot,
aggregatorKey, slotSig)
aggregateFut = batchCrypto.verifySoon("scheduleAggregateChecks.aggregate"):
attestation_signature_set(
fork, batchCrypto[].genesis_validators_root, aggregate.data,
aggregateKey, aggregateSig)
ok((aggregatorFut, slotFut, aggregateFut, aggregateSig))
proc scheduleSyncCommitteeMessageCheck*(
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto, fork: Fork, slot: Slot,
beacon_block_root: Eth2Digest, pubkey: CookedPubKey,
signature: ValidatorSig
): Result[tuple[fut: FutureBatchResult, sig: CookedSig], cstring] =
## Schedule crypto verification of an attestation
##
## The buffer is processed:
## - when eager processing is enabled and the batch is full
## - otherwise after 10ms (BatchAttAccumTime)
##
## This returns an error if crypto sanity checks failed
## and a future with the deferred attestation check otherwise.
##
let
sig = signature.load().valueOr:
return err("SyncCommitteMessage: cannot load signature")
fut = batchCrypto.verifySoon("scheduleSyncCommitteeMessageCheck"):
sync_committee_message_signature_set(
fork, batchCrypto[].genesis_validators_root, slot, beacon_block_root,
pubkey, sig)
ok((fut, sig))
proc scheduleContributionChecks*(
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
fork: Fork, signedContributionAndProof: SignedContributionAndProof,
subcommitteeIdx: SyncSubcommitteeIndex, dag: ChainDAGRef): Result[tuple[
aggregatorFut, proofFut, contributionFut: FutureBatchResult,
sig: CookedSig], cstring] =
## Schedule crypto verification of all signatures in a
## SignedContributionAndProof message
##
## The buffer is processed:
## - when eager processing is enabled and the batch is full
## - otherwise after 10ms (BatchAttAccumTime)
##
## This returns an error if crypto sanity checks failed
## and a future with the deferred check otherwise.
##
template contribution_and_proof: untyped = signedContributionAndProof.message
template contribution: untyped = contribution_and_proof.contribution
# Do the eager steps first to avoid polluting batches with needlessly
let
aggregatorKey =
dag.validatorKey(contribution_and_proof.aggregator_index).valueOr:
return err("SignedAggregateAndProof: invalid contributor index")
aggregatorSig = signedContributionAndProof.signature.load().valueOr:
return err("SignedContributionAndProof: invalid proof signature")
proofSig = contribution_and_proof.selection_proof.load().valueOr:
return err("SignedContributionAndProof: invalid selection signature")
contributionSig = contribution.signature.load().valueOr:
return err("SignedContributionAndProof: invalid contribution signature")
contributionKey = ? aggregateAll(
dag, dag.syncCommitteeParticipants(contribution.slot + 1, subcommitteeIdx),
contribution.aggregation_bits)
let
aggregatorFut = batchCrypto.verifySoon("scheduleContributionAndProofChecks.aggregator"):
contribution_and_proof_signature_set(
fork, batchCrypto[].genesis_validators_root, contribution_and_proof,
aggregatorKey, aggregatorSig)
proofFut = batchCrypto.verifySoon("scheduleContributionAndProofChecks.selection_proof"):
sync_committee_selection_proof_set(
fork, batchCrypto[].genesis_validators_root, contribution.slot,
subcommitteeIdx, aggregatorKey, proofSig)
contributionFut = batchCrypto.verifySoon("scheduleContributionAndProofChecks.contribution"):
sync_committee_message_signature_set(
fork, batchCrypto[].genesis_validators_root, contribution.slot,
contribution.beacon_block_root, contributionKey, contributionSig)
ok((aggregatorFut, proofFut, contributionFut, contributionSig))
proc scheduleBlsToExecutionChangeCheck*(
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
genesis_fork: Fork, signedBLSToExecutionChange: SignedBLSToExecutionChange):
Result[tuple[fut: FutureBatchResult, sig: CookedSig], cstring] =
## Schedule crypto verification of all signatures in a
## SignedBLSToExecutionChange message
##
## The buffer is processed:
## - when eager processing is enabled and the batch is full
## - otherwise after 10ms (BatchAttAccumTime)
##
## This returns an error if crypto sanity checks failed
## and a future with the deferred check otherwise.
# Must be genesis fork
doAssert genesis_fork.previous_version == genesis_fork.current_version
let
# Only called when matching already-known withdrawal credentials, so it's
# resistant to allowing loadWithCache DoSing
pubkey =
signedBLSToExecutionChange.message.from_bls_pubkey.loadWithCache.valueOr:
return err("scheduleBlsToExecutionChangeCheck: cannot load BLS to execution change pubkey")
sig = signedBLSToExecutionChange.signature.load().valueOr:
return err("scheduleBlsToExecutionChangeCheck: invalid validator change signature")
fut = batchCrypto.verifySoon("scheduleContributionAndProofChecks.contribution"):
bls_to_execution_change_signature_set(
genesis_fork, batchCrypto[].genesis_validators_root,
signedBLSToExecutionChange.message,
pubkey, sig)
ok((fut, sig))
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