nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
tersec 2fcc01f516
modify newPayload failure logging (#4930)
2023-05-11 13:58:25 +03:00
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README.md automatic update of v1.3.0-rc.5 consensus spec URLs to v1.3.0 (#4848) 2023-04-21 18:52:43 +00:00
batch_validation.nim refactor batch validation not to require genesis_validators_root each time (#4640) 2023-02-20 09:26:22 +01:00
block_processor.nim modify newPayload failure logging (#4930) 2023-05-11 13:58:25 +03:00
eth2_processor.nim bump gossip validation refs to 1.3.0 spec (#4895) 2023-05-05 22:48:33 +02:00
gossip_validation.nim `checkedReject` > `errReject` for CI failure (#4909) 2023-05-09 09:44:24 +00:00
light_client_processor.nim bump gossip validation refs to 1.3.0 spec (#4895) 2023-05-05 22:48:33 +02:00
optimistic_processor.nim remove Nim 1.2-compatible `push raise`s and update copyright notice years (#4528) 2023-01-20 14:14:37 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
    • blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
  • a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
    • Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
    • Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations