1491 lines
51 KiB
Nim
1491 lines
51 KiB
Nim
# beacon_chain
|
||
# Copyright (c) 2018-2023 Status Research & Development GmbH
|
||
# Licensed and distributed under either of
|
||
# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
|
||
# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
|
||
# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
|
||
|
||
{.push raises: [].}
|
||
|
||
import
|
||
# Standard library
|
||
std/[os, options, typetraits, decls, tables],
|
||
# Status
|
||
stew/byteutils,
|
||
eth/db/[kvstore, kvstore_sqlite3],
|
||
chronicles,
|
||
sqlite3_abi,
|
||
# Internal
|
||
../spec/datatypes/base,
|
||
../spec/helpers,
|
||
./slashing_protection_common
|
||
|
||
# Requirements
|
||
# --------------------------------------------
|
||
#
|
||
# Overview of slashing and how it ties in with the rest of Eth2.0
|
||
#
|
||
# EIP 3076:
|
||
# https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3076
|
||
# https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-3076-validator-client-interchange-format-slashing-protection/
|
||
#
|
||
# Phase 0 for humans - Validator responsibilities:
|
||
# - https://notes.ethereum.org/@djrtwo/Bkn3zpwxB#Validator-responsibilities
|
||
#
|
||
# Phase 0 spec - Honest Validator - how to avoid slashing
|
||
# - https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/phase0/validator.md#how-to-avoid-slashing
|
||
#
|
||
# In-depth reading on slashing conditions
|
||
#
|
||
# - Detecting slashing conditions https://hackmd.io/@n0ble/By897a5sH
|
||
# - Open issue on writing a slashing detector https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-pm/issues/63
|
||
# - Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget, Vitalik Buterin and Virgil Griffith
|
||
# https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.09437.pdf
|
||
# Figure 2
|
||
# An individual validator ν MUST NOT publish two distinct votes,
|
||
# 〈ν,s1,t1,h(s1),h(t1) AND〈ν,s2,t2,h(s2),h(t2)〉,
|
||
# such that either:
|
||
# I. h(t1) = h(t2).
|
||
# Equivalently, a validator MUST NOT publish two distinct votes for the same target height.
|
||
# OR
|
||
# II. h(s1) < h(s2) < h(t2) < h(t1).
|
||
# Equivalently, a validator MUST NOT vote within the span of its other votes.
|
||
# - Vitalik's annotated spec: https://github.com/ethereum/annotated-spec/blob/d8c51af84f9f309d91c37379c1fcb0810bc5f10a/phase0/beacon-chain.md#proposerslashing
|
||
# 1. A proposer can get slashed for signing two distinct headers at the same slot.
|
||
# 2. An attester can get slashed for signing
|
||
# two attestations that together violate
|
||
# the Casper FFG slashing conditions.
|
||
# - https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/phase0/validator.md#ffg-vote
|
||
# The "source" is the current_justified_epoch
|
||
# The "target" is the current_epoch
|
||
#
|
||
# Reading on weak subjectivity
|
||
# - https://notes.ethereum.org/@adiasg/weak-subjectvity-eth2
|
||
# - https://www.symphonious.net/2019/11/27/exploring-ethereum-2-weak-subjectivity-period/
|
||
# - https://ethresear.ch/t/weak-subjectivity-under-the-exit-queue-model/5187
|
||
#
|
||
# Reading of interop serialization format
|
||
# - Import/export format: https://hackmd.io/@sproul/Bk0Y0qdGD
|
||
# - Tests: https://github.com/eth2-clients/slashing-protection-interchange-tests
|
||
#
|
||
# Relaxation for Nimbus
|
||
#
|
||
# We are not building a slashing detector but only protecting
|
||
# attached validator from slashing, hence we make the following assumptions
|
||
#
|
||
# 1. We only need to store specific validators signed blocks and attestations
|
||
# 2. We assume that our node is synced past
|
||
# the last finalized epoch
|
||
# hence we only need to keep track of blocks and attestations
|
||
# since the last finalized epoch and we don't need to care
|
||
# about the weak subjectivity period.
|
||
# i.e. if `Node.isSynced()` returns false
|
||
# a node skips its validator duties and doesn't invoke slashing protection.
|
||
# and `isSynced` syncs at least up to the blockchain last finalized epoch.
|
||
#
|
||
# Hence the database or key-value store should support
|
||
#
|
||
# Queries
|
||
# 1. db.signedBlockExistsFor(validator, slot) -> bool
|
||
# 2. db.attestationExistsFor(validator, target_epoch) -> bool
|
||
# 3. db.attestationSurrounding(validator, source_epoch, target_epoch)
|
||
# 4. db.attestationSurrounded(validator, source_epoch, target_epoch)
|
||
#
|
||
# Update
|
||
# 1. db.registerBlock(validator, slot, block_root)
|
||
# 2. db.registerAttestation(validator, source_epoch, target_epoch, attestation_root)
|
||
#
|
||
# Maintenance
|
||
# 1. db.prune(finalized_epoch)
|
||
#
|
||
# Interop
|
||
# 1. db.import(json)
|
||
# 2. db.export(json)
|
||
# 3. db.export(json, validator)
|
||
# 4. db.export(json, seq[validator])
|
||
#
|
||
# Additionally after EIP3067 slashing protection requires
|
||
# a "low watermark" protection that can be used
|
||
# instead of keeping track of the whole history (and allows pruning)
|
||
# In that case we need the following queries
|
||
#
|
||
# 1. db.signedBlockMinimalSlot (EIP3067 condition 2)
|
||
# 2. db.signedAttMinimalSourceEpoch (EIP3067 condition 4)
|
||
# 3. db.signedAttMinimalTargetEpoch (EIP3067 condition 5)
|
||
|
||
# Technical Discussion
|
||
# --------------------------------------------
|
||
#
|
||
# TODO: Merge with BeaconChainDB?
|
||
# - https://stackoverflow.com/questions/21844479/multiple-databases-vs-single-database-with-logically-partitioned-data
|
||
#
|
||
# Reasons for merging
|
||
# - Single database
|
||
#
|
||
# Reasons for not merging
|
||
# - BeaconChainDB is about the beacon node itself
|
||
# while slashing protection is about validators
|
||
# - BeaconChainDB is append-only
|
||
# while slashing protection will be pruned
|
||
# at each finalization.
|
||
# Hence we might want different backend in the future
|
||
# - In a VC/BN split configuration the slashing protection
|
||
# may be better attached to the VC. (VC: Validator Client, BN: Beacon Node)
|
||
# - The slashing protection DB only held cryptographic hashes
|
||
# and epoch/slot integers which are uncompressible
|
||
# while BeaconChainDB is snappy-compressed.
|
||
|
||
# SQLite primitives
|
||
# --------------------------------------------
|
||
# For now we choose to enforce the SQLite backend as a DB (and not a KV-Store)
|
||
#
|
||
# Cons
|
||
# 1. Harder to switch away from a DB than from a KV-Store
|
||
#
|
||
# Pros
|
||
# 1. No need for adhoc per-validator range queries implementation using LinkedList
|
||
# with high potential of bug (as found in audit)
|
||
# 2. uses robust and fuzzed SQLite codepath
|
||
# 3. Straightforward pruning
|
||
# 4. Can be maintained and inspected with standard tooling
|
||
#
|
||
# In particular the following query leads to complex code with a KV store
|
||
#
|
||
# Select 1 from attestations
|
||
# where validator = '0x1234ABCDEF'
|
||
# AND (
|
||
# -- Don't publish distinct vote for the same target
|
||
# (target_epoch = candidate_target_epoch)
|
||
# -- surrounded vote
|
||
# OR
|
||
# (source_epoch < candidate_source_epoch and candidate_target_epoch < target_epoch)
|
||
# -- surrounding vote
|
||
# OR
|
||
# (candidate_source_epoch < source_epoch and target_epoch < candidate_target_epoch)
|
||
# )
|
||
#
|
||
# Note, with SQLite splitting into multiple small queries is also efficient
|
||
# as it is embedded in the application: https://www.sqlite.org/np1queryprob.html
|
||
|
||
# Future optimizations
|
||
# --------------------------------------------
|
||
# To limit disk IO we might want to keep a data-structure in memory.
|
||
# Surround voting detection is very similar to:
|
||
# - Collision detection in games
|
||
# - point of interest localisation in geographical DBs or maps
|
||
#
|
||
# A reasonable acceleration structure would be:
|
||
# - O(log n) for adding new attestations
|
||
# - O(log n) to check for surround voting.
|
||
# - O(n) space usage
|
||
#
|
||
# Suitable inspirations may be:
|
||
# - Bounding Volume Hierarchy and Axis-ligned Bounding Boxes from collision detection
|
||
# - R-Trees from geospatial data processing and maps
|
||
# - Kd-Trees from both
|
||
# - less common structures like quadtrees and octrees
|
||
#
|
||
# See also optimizing a slashing detector for the whole chain
|
||
# - https://github.com/protolambda/eth2-surround
|
||
# - Detecting slashing conditions https://hackmd.io/@n0ble/By897a5sH
|
||
# - Open issue on writing a slashing detector https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-pm/issues/63
|
||
|
||
type
|
||
SlashingProtectionDB_v2* = ref object
|
||
## Database storing the blocks attested
|
||
## by validators attached to a beacon node
|
||
## or validator client.
|
||
# For now we commit to using SqLite
|
||
# Splitting attestations queries
|
||
# into small queries is fine with SqLite
|
||
# https://www.sqlite.org/np1queryprob.html
|
||
backend: SqStoreRef
|
||
# Cached queries - write
|
||
sqlInsertValidator: SqliteStmt[PubKeyBytes, void]
|
||
sqlInsertAtt: SqliteStmt[(ValidatorInternalID, int64, int64, Hash32), void]
|
||
sqlInsertBlock: SqliteStmt[(ValidatorInternalID, int64, Hash32), void]
|
||
sqlPruneValidatorBlocks: SqliteStmt[(ValidatorInternalID, int64), void]
|
||
sqlPruneValidatorAttestations: SqliteStmt[(ValidatorInternalID, int64, int64), void]
|
||
sqlPruneAfterFinalizationBlocks: SqliteStmt[int64, void]
|
||
sqlPruneAfterFinalizationAttestations: SqliteStmt[(int64, int64), void]
|
||
# Synthetic attestations
|
||
sqlBeginTransaction: SqliteStmt[NoParams, void]
|
||
sqlDeleteValidatorAtt: SqliteStmt[ValidatorInternalID, void]
|
||
sqlCommitTransaction: SqliteStmt[NoParams, void]
|
||
# Cached queries - read
|
||
sqlGetValidatorInternalID: SqliteStmt[PubKeyBytes, ValidatorInternalID]
|
||
sqlAttForSameTargetEpoch: SqliteStmt[(ValidatorInternalID, int64), Hash32]
|
||
sqlAttSurrounds: SqliteStmt[(ValidatorInternalID, int64, int64, int64, int64), (int64, int64, Hash32)]
|
||
sqlAttMinSourceTargetEpochs: SqliteStmt[ValidatorInternalID, (int64, int64)]
|
||
sqlBlockForSameSlot: SqliteStmt[(ValidatorInternalID, int64), Hash32]
|
||
sqlBlockMinSlot: SqliteStmt[ValidatorInternalID, int64]
|
||
sqlMaxBlockAtt: SqliteStmt[ValidatorInternalID, (int64, int64, int64)]
|
||
|
||
internalIds: Table[ValidatorIndex, ValidatorInternalID]
|
||
|
||
ValidatorInternalID = int64
|
||
## Validator internal ID in the DB
|
||
## This is cached to cost querying cost
|
||
|
||
Hash32 = array[32, byte]
|
||
|
||
func version*(_: type SlashingProtectionDB_v2): static int =
|
||
# version history:
|
||
# 1 -> https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2/pull/1643, based on KV-store
|
||
2
|
||
|
||
# Internal
|
||
# -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
{.push raises: [].}
|
||
logScope:
|
||
topics = "antislash"
|
||
|
||
template dispose(sqlStmt: SqliteStmt) =
|
||
discard sqlite3_finalize((ptr sqlite3_stmt) sqlStmt)
|
||
|
||
proc setupDB(db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2, genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest) =
|
||
## Initial setup of the DB
|
||
|
||
# TODO - the Metadata table is a remnant from the v1 of the DB and should be removed
|
||
block: # Metadata
|
||
db.backend.exec("""
|
||
CREATE TABLE metadata(
|
||
slashing_db_version INTEGER,
|
||
genesis_validators_root BLOB NOT NULL
|
||
);
|
||
""").expect("DB should be working and \"metadata\" should not exist")
|
||
|
||
# TODO: db.backend.exec does not take parameters
|
||
var rootTuple: tuple[bytes: Hash32]
|
||
rootTuple[0] = genesis_validators_root.data
|
||
db.backend.exec("""
|
||
INSERT INTO
|
||
metadata(slashing_db_version, genesis_validators_root)
|
||
VALUES
|
||
(""" & $db.typeof().version() & """, ?);
|
||
""", rootTuple
|
||
).expect("Metadata initialized in the DB")
|
||
|
||
block: # Tables
|
||
db.backend.exec("""
|
||
CREATE TABLE validators(
|
||
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
|
||
public_key BLOB NOT NULL UNIQUE
|
||
);
|
||
""").expect("DB should be working and \"validators\" should not exist")
|
||
|
||
# signing_root can be non-unique, as signing_root is not mandatory
|
||
# and we can use a default value.
|
||
db.backend.exec("""
|
||
CREATE TABLE signed_blocks(
|
||
validator_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||
slot INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||
signing_root BLOB NOT NULL,
|
||
FOREIGN KEY(validator_id) REFERENCES validators(id)
|
||
UNIQUE (validator_id, slot)
|
||
);
|
||
""").expect("DB should be working and \"blocks\" should not exist")
|
||
|
||
# signing_root can be non-unique, as signing_root is not mandatory
|
||
# and we can use a default value.
|
||
db.backend.exec("""
|
||
CREATE TABLE signed_attestations(
|
||
validator_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||
source_epoch INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||
target_epoch INTEGER NOT NULL,
|
||
signing_root BLOB NOT NULL,
|
||
FOREIGN KEY(validator_id) REFERENCES validators(id)
|
||
UNIQUE (validator_id, target_epoch)
|
||
);
|
||
""").expect("DB should be working and \"attestations\" should not exist")
|
||
|
||
proc checkDB(db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest): Result[void, string] =
|
||
## Check the metadata of the DB
|
||
let selectStmt = db.backend.prepareStmt(
|
||
"SELECT * FROM metadata;",
|
||
NoParams, (int64, Hash32),
|
||
managed = false # manual memory management
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
var version: int64
|
||
var root: Eth2Digest
|
||
let status = selectStmt.exec do (res: (int64, Hash32)):
|
||
version = res[0]
|
||
root.data = res[1]
|
||
|
||
selectStmt.dispose()
|
||
|
||
if status.isErr:
|
||
return err "Unable to read DB metadata"
|
||
if version != db.typeof().version():
|
||
return err "Incorrect database version: " & $version & " " &
|
||
"but expected: " & $db.typeof().version()
|
||
if root != genesis_validators_root:
|
||
return err "Invalid database genesis validator root: " & root.data.toHex() & " " &
|
||
"but expected: " & genesis_validators_root.data.toHex()
|
||
|
||
ok()
|
||
|
||
proc setupCachedQueries(db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2) =
|
||
## Create prepared queries for reuse
|
||
|
||
# Note: assuming pruning every finalized epochs
|
||
# we keep at most 64 attestations per validators
|
||
# an index would likely be overkill.
|
||
|
||
# Insertions
|
||
# --------------------------------------------------------
|
||
db.sqlInsertValidator = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
INSERT INTO
|
||
validators(public_key)
|
||
VALUES
|
||
(?);
|
||
""", PubKeyBytes, void).get()
|
||
|
||
db.sqlInsertAtt = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
INSERT INTO signed_attestations(
|
||
validator_id,
|
||
source_epoch,
|
||
target_epoch,
|
||
signing_root)
|
||
VALUES
|
||
(?,?,?,?);
|
||
""", (ValidatorInternalID, int64, int64, Hash32), void).get()
|
||
|
||
db.sqlInsertBlock = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
INSERT INTO signed_blocks(
|
||
validator_id,
|
||
slot,
|
||
signing_root)
|
||
VALUES
|
||
(?,?,?);
|
||
""", (ValidatorInternalID, int64, Hash32), void
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
# Read internal validator ID
|
||
# --------------------------------------------------------
|
||
db.sqlGetValidatorInternalID = db.backend.prepareStmt(
|
||
"SELECT id from validators WHERE public_key = ?;",
|
||
PubKeyBytes, ValidatorInternalID
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
# Inspect attestations
|
||
# --------------------------------------------------------
|
||
db.sqlAttForSameTargetEpoch = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
SELECT
|
||
signing_root
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_attestations
|
||
WHERE 1=1
|
||
and validator_id = ?
|
||
and target_epoch = ?
|
||
""", (ValidatorInternalID, int64), Hash32
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
db.sqlAttSurrounds = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
SELECT
|
||
source_epoch, target_epoch, signing_root
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_attestations
|
||
WHERE 1=1
|
||
and validator_id = ?
|
||
and ((source_epoch < ? and ? < target_epoch) OR
|
||
(? < source_epoch and target_epoch < ?))
|
||
LIMIT 1
|
||
""", (ValidatorInternalID, int64, int64, int64, int64), (int64, int64, Hash32)
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
# By default an aggregate always return a value
|
||
# which can be NULL in SQLite.
|
||
# However this is translated to 0 by the backend.
|
||
# It is better to drop NULL and returns no result
|
||
# if there is actually no result since we always
|
||
# check SQLite status.The "GROUP BY NULL" clause drops NULL
|
||
db.sqlAttMinSourceTargetEpochs = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
SELECT
|
||
MIN(source_epoch), MIN(target_epoch)
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_attestations
|
||
WHERE
|
||
validator_id = ?
|
||
GROUP BY
|
||
NULL
|
||
""", ValidatorInternalID, (int64, int64)
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
# Inspect blocks
|
||
# --------------------------------------------------------
|
||
db.sqlBlockForSameSlot = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
SELECT
|
||
signing_root
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_blocks
|
||
WHERE 1=1
|
||
and validator_id = ?
|
||
and slot = ?
|
||
""", (ValidatorInternalID, int64), Hash32
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
# The "GROUP BY NULL" clause drops NULL
|
||
# which makes aggregate queries more robust.
|
||
db.sqlBlockMinSlot = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
SELECT
|
||
MIN(slot)
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_blocks
|
||
WHERE 1=1
|
||
and validator_id = ?
|
||
GROUP BY
|
||
NULL
|
||
""", ValidatorInternalID, int64
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
# Pruning
|
||
# --------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
db.sqlPruneValidatorBlocks = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
DELETE
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_blocks AS sb1
|
||
WHERE 1=1
|
||
and sb1.validator_id = ?
|
||
and sb1.slot < ?
|
||
-- Keep the most recent slot per validator
|
||
-- even if we make a mistake and call a slot too far in the future
|
||
and sb1.slot <> (
|
||
SELECT MAX(sb2.slot)
|
||
FROM signed_blocks AS sb2
|
||
WHERE sb2.validator_id = sb1.validator_id
|
||
)
|
||
""", (ValidatorInternalID, int64), void
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
db.sqlPruneValidatorAttestations = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
DELETE
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_attestations AS sa1
|
||
WHERE 1=1
|
||
and sa1.validator_id = ?
|
||
and sa1.source_epoch < ?
|
||
and sa1.target_epoch < ?
|
||
-- Keep the most recent source_epoch per validator
|
||
and sa1.source_epoch <> (
|
||
SELECT MAX(sas.source_epoch)
|
||
FROM signed_attestations AS sas
|
||
WHERE sa1.validator_id = sas.validator_id
|
||
)
|
||
-- And the most recent target_epoch per validator
|
||
-- even if we make a mistake and call an epoch too far in the future
|
||
and sa1.target_epoch <> (
|
||
SELECT MAX(sat.target_epoch)
|
||
FROM signed_attestations AS sat
|
||
WHERE sa1.validator_id = sat.validator_id
|
||
)
|
||
""", (ValidatorInternalID, int64, int64), void
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
# Important:
|
||
# The query plan MUST NOT involve correlated subqueries for speed concerns on 2000+ validators.
|
||
# use temporary tables or views instead
|
||
|
||
db.sqlPruneAfterFinalizationBlocks = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
WITH max_proposer_slot AS (
|
||
SELECT
|
||
validator_id,
|
||
MAX(slot) AS max_slot
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_blocks
|
||
GROUP BY
|
||
validator_id
|
||
ORDER BY
|
||
validator_id
|
||
)
|
||
DELETE
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_blocks
|
||
-- Delete everything except ...
|
||
WHERE ROWID NOT IN (
|
||
SELECT sb.ROWID
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_blocks sb
|
||
LEFT JOIN
|
||
max_proposer_slot on max_proposer_slot.validator_id = sb.validator_id
|
||
WHERE
|
||
-- last finalized slot or later
|
||
sb.slot >= ?
|
||
-- also keep the most recent slot per validator
|
||
or sb.slot = max_proposer_slot.max_slot
|
||
)
|
||
""", int64, void
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
db.sqlPruneAfterFinalizationAttestations = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
WITH
|
||
max_source AS (
|
||
SELECT
|
||
validator_id,
|
||
MAX(source_epoch) AS max_source_epoch
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_attestations
|
||
GROUP BY
|
||
validator_id
|
||
ORDER BY
|
||
validator_id
|
||
),
|
||
max_target AS (
|
||
SELECT
|
||
validator_id,
|
||
MAX(target_epoch) AS max_target_epoch
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_attestations
|
||
GROUP BY
|
||
validator_id
|
||
ORDER BY
|
||
validator_id
|
||
)
|
||
DELETE
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_attestations
|
||
-- Delete everything except ...
|
||
WHERE ROWID NOT IN (
|
||
SELECT sa.ROWID
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_attestations sa
|
||
LEFT JOIN
|
||
max_source on max_source.validator_id = sa.validator_id
|
||
LEFT JOIN
|
||
max_target on max_target.validator_id = sa.validator_id
|
||
WHERE
|
||
-- last finalized epochs or later
|
||
source_epoch >= ?
|
||
or target_epoch >= ?
|
||
-- Keep the most recent source_epoch per validator
|
||
or sa.source_epoch = max_source.max_source_epoch
|
||
-- And the most recent target_epoch per validator
|
||
or sa.target_epoch = max_target.max_target_epoch
|
||
)
|
||
""", (int64, int64), void
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
# Synthetic attestation
|
||
# --------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
# Assuming pruning, we can:
|
||
# - keep 1 attestation
|
||
# - 2 attestations, with max source epoch and different target epoch
|
||
# for example 10->15 and 10->20 (unique constraint on target but not source epoch)
|
||
# - many attestations post-finalization epochs
|
||
# Creating or updating a source/target epoch synthetic attestation
|
||
# might introduce duplicates or run afoul of slashing conditions
|
||
# so it's easier to cleanup and introduce a max source/target epoch synthetic attestation
|
||
db.sqlBeginTransaction = db.backend.prepareStmt("""BEGIN TRANSACTION;""", NoParams, void).get()
|
||
db.sqlDeleteValidatorAtt = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
DELETE FROM signed_attestations
|
||
where validator_id = ?;
|
||
""", ValidatorInternalID, void).get()
|
||
db.sqlCommitTransaction = db.backend.prepareStmt("""COMMIT TRANSACTION;""", NoParams, void).get()
|
||
|
||
db.sqlMaxBlockAtt = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
SELECT
|
||
MAX(slot), MAX(source_epoch), MAX(target_epoch)
|
||
FROM
|
||
validators v
|
||
LEFT JOIN
|
||
signed_blocks b on v.id = b.validator_id
|
||
LEFT JOIN
|
||
signed_attestations a on v.id = a.validator_id
|
||
WHERE
|
||
id = ?
|
||
GROUP BY
|
||
NULL
|
||
""", ValidatorInternalID, (int64, int64, int64)).get()
|
||
|
||
# DB Multiversioning
|
||
# -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
func getRawDBHandle*(db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2): SqStoreRef =
|
||
## Get the underlying raw DB handle
|
||
db.backend
|
||
|
||
proc getMetadataTable_DbV2*(db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2): Option[Eth2Digest] =
|
||
## Check if the DB has v2 metadata
|
||
## and get its genesis root
|
||
let existenceStmt = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
SELECT 1
|
||
FROM sqlite_master
|
||
WHERE 1=1
|
||
and type='table'
|
||
and name='metadata'
|
||
""", NoParams, int64,
|
||
managed = false # manual memory management
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
var hasV2: int64
|
||
let v2exists = existenceStmt.exec do (res: int64):
|
||
hasV2 = res
|
||
|
||
existenceStmt.dispose()
|
||
|
||
|
||
if v2exists.isErr():
|
||
return none(Eth2Digest)
|
||
elif hasV2 == 0:
|
||
return none(Eth2Digest)
|
||
|
||
let selectStmt = db.backend.prepareStmt(
|
||
"SELECT * FROM metadata;",
|
||
NoParams, (int64, Hash32),
|
||
managed = false # manual memory management
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
var version: int64
|
||
var root: Eth2Digest
|
||
let status = selectStmt.exec do (res: (int64, Hash32)):
|
||
version = res[0]
|
||
root.data = res[1]
|
||
|
||
selectStmt.dispose()
|
||
|
||
if status.isOk():
|
||
# Privacy, don't display the user private path
|
||
if version != db.typeof.version():
|
||
fatal "Incorrect DB version",
|
||
found = version,
|
||
expected = db.typeof.version()
|
||
quit 1
|
||
return some(root)
|
||
else:
|
||
return none(Eth2Digest)
|
||
|
||
proc initCompatV1*(
|
||
T: type SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
|
||
databasePath: string,
|
||
databaseName: string
|
||
): tuple[db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2, requiresMigration: bool] =
|
||
## Initialize a new slashing protection database
|
||
## or load an existing one with matching genesis root
|
||
## `databaseName` MUST not be ending with .sqlite3
|
||
logScope:
|
||
databasePath
|
||
databaseName
|
||
|
||
let
|
||
alreadyExists = fileExists(databasePath / databaseName & ".sqlite3")
|
||
backend = SqStoreRef.init(databasePath, databaseName).valueOr:
|
||
fatal "Failed to open slashing protection database"
|
||
quit 1
|
||
|
||
result.db = T(backend: backend)
|
||
if alreadyExists and result.db.getMetadataTable_DbV2().isSome():
|
||
let status = result.db.checkDB(genesis_validators_root)
|
||
if status.isErr:
|
||
fatal "Incompatible slashing protection database",
|
||
reason = status.error
|
||
quit 1
|
||
result.requiresMigration = false
|
||
elif alreadyExists:
|
||
result.db.setupDB(genesis_validators_root)
|
||
result.requiresMigration = true
|
||
else:
|
||
result.db.setupDB(genesis_validators_root)
|
||
result.requiresMigration = false
|
||
|
||
# Cached queries
|
||
result.db.setupCachedQueries()
|
||
|
||
debug "Loaded slashing protection (v2)",
|
||
genesis_validators_root = shortLog(genesis_validators_root),
|
||
requiresMigration = result.requiresMigration
|
||
|
||
# Resource Management
|
||
# -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
proc init*(T: type SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
genesis_validators_root: Eth2Digest,
|
||
databasePath: string,
|
||
databaseName: string): T =
|
||
## Initialize a new slashing protection database
|
||
## or load an existing one with matching genesis root
|
||
## `dbname` MUST not be ending with .sqlite3
|
||
logScope:
|
||
databasePath
|
||
databaseName
|
||
|
||
let
|
||
alreadyExists = fileExists(databasePath / databaseName & ".sqlite3")
|
||
backend = SqStoreRef.init(databasePath, databaseName,
|
||
keyspaces = []).valueOr:
|
||
fatal "Failed to open slashing protection database"
|
||
quit 1
|
||
|
||
result = T(backend: backend)
|
||
if alreadyExists:
|
||
let status = result.checkDB(genesis_validators_root)
|
||
if status.isErr:
|
||
fatal "Slashing protection database check error",
|
||
reason = status.error
|
||
quit 1
|
||
else:
|
||
result.setupDB(genesis_validators_root)
|
||
|
||
# Cached queries
|
||
result.setupCachedQueries()
|
||
|
||
proc loadUnchecked*(
|
||
T: type SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
basePath, dbname: string, readOnly: bool
|
||
): SlashingProtectionDB_v2 {.raises:[Defect, IOError].}=
|
||
## Load a slashing protection DB
|
||
## Note: This is for conversion usage in ncli_slashing
|
||
## this doesn't check the genesis validator root
|
||
##
|
||
## Privacy: This leaks user folder hierarchy in case the file does not exist
|
||
let path = basePath/dbname&".sqlite3"
|
||
let alreadyExists = fileExists(path)
|
||
if not alreadyExists:
|
||
raise newException(IOError, "DB '" & path & "' does not exist.")
|
||
result = T(backend: SqStoreRef.init(basePath, dbname, readOnly = readOnly).get())
|
||
|
||
# Cached queries
|
||
result.setupCachedQueries()
|
||
|
||
proc close*(db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2) =
|
||
## Close a slashing protection database
|
||
db.backend.close()
|
||
|
||
# DB Queries
|
||
# -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
proc foundAnyResult(status: KvResult[bool]): bool {.inline.}=
|
||
## Checks a DB query status for errors
|
||
## Then returns true if any result was found
|
||
## and false otherwise.
|
||
## There are 2 layers to a DB result
|
||
## 1. Did the query result in error.
|
||
## This is a logic bug and crashes NBC in this proc.
|
||
## 2. Did the query return any line.
|
||
status.expect("DB is not corrupted and query is working")
|
||
|
||
proc getValidatorInternalID(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
index: Option[ValidatorIndex],
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey): Option[ValidatorInternalID] =
|
||
## Retrieve a validator internal ID
|
||
if index.isSome():
|
||
# Validator keys are mapped to internal id:s instead of using the
|
||
# validator index - this allows importing keys without knowing the
|
||
# state but has the unfortunate consequence of introducing an indirection
|
||
# that must be kept updated at some cost. In a future version of the
|
||
# database, one could consider a simplified design that directly uses the
|
||
# validator index. In the meantime, this cache avoids some of the
|
||
# unnecessary read traffic when checking and registering entries.
|
||
db.internalIds.withValue(index.get(), internal) do:
|
||
return some(internal[])
|
||
|
||
let serializedPubkey = validator.toRaw() # Miracl/BLST to bytes
|
||
var valID: ValidatorInternalID
|
||
let status = db.sqlGetValidatorInternalID.exec(serializedPubkey) do (res: ValidatorInternalID):
|
||
valID = res
|
||
|
||
# Note: we enforce at the DB level that if the pubkey exists it is unique.
|
||
if status.foundAnyResult():
|
||
if index.isSome():
|
||
db.internalIds[index.get()] = valID
|
||
some(valID)
|
||
else:
|
||
none(ValidatorInternalID)
|
||
|
||
proc checkSlashableBlockProposalOther(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
valID: ValidatorInternalID,
|
||
slot: Slot
|
||
): Result[void, BadProposal] =
|
||
## Returns an error if the specified validator
|
||
## already proposed a block for the specified slot.
|
||
## This would lead to slashing.
|
||
## The error contains the blockroot that was already proposed
|
||
##
|
||
## Returns success otherwise
|
||
# TODO distinct type for the result block root
|
||
|
||
# EIP-3067 - Low-watermark
|
||
# Detect h(t1) <= h(t2)
|
||
# ---------------------------------
|
||
block:
|
||
# Condition 2 at https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3076
|
||
# Low-watermark. This is not in the Eth2 official spec
|
||
# but a client standard.
|
||
#
|
||
# > Refuse to sign any block with
|
||
# > slot <= min(b.slot for b in data.signed_blocks if b.pubkey == proposer_pubkey),
|
||
# > except if it is a repeat signing as determined by the signing_root.
|
||
|
||
var minSlot: int64
|
||
let status = db.sqlBlockMinSlot.exec(valID) do (res: int64):
|
||
minSlot = res
|
||
if status.foundAnyResult():
|
||
# 6 second (minimal preset) slots => overflow at ~1.75 trillion years
|
||
# under minimal preset, and twice that under mainnet preset
|
||
doAssert slot <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
|
||
if int64(slot) <= minSlot:
|
||
return err(BadProposal(
|
||
kind: MinSlotViolation,
|
||
minSlot: Slot minSlot,
|
||
candidateSlot: slot
|
||
))
|
||
|
||
ok()
|
||
|
||
proc checkSlashableBlockProposalDoubleProposal(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
valID: ValidatorInternalID,
|
||
slot: Slot
|
||
): Result[void, BadProposal] =
|
||
## Returns an error if the specified validator
|
||
## already proposed a block for the specified slot.
|
||
## This would lead to slashing.
|
||
## The error contains the blockroot that was already proposed
|
||
##
|
||
## Returns success otherwise
|
||
# TODO distinct type for the result block root
|
||
|
||
# Casper FFG 1st slashing condition
|
||
# Detect h(t1) = h(t2)
|
||
# ---------------------------------
|
||
block:
|
||
# Condition 1 at https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3076
|
||
var root: Eth2Digest
|
||
let status = db.sqlBlockForSameSlot.exec(
|
||
(valID, int64 slot)
|
||
) do (res: Hash32):
|
||
root.data = res
|
||
|
||
# Note: we enforce at the DB level that if (pubkey, slot) exists it maps to a unique block root.
|
||
#
|
||
# It's possible to allow republishing an already signed block here (Lighthouse does it)
|
||
# AFAIK repeat signing only happens if the node crashes after saving to the DB and
|
||
# there is still time to redo the validator work but:
|
||
# - will the validator have reconstructed the same state in memory?
|
||
# for example if the validator has different attestations
|
||
# it can't reconstruct the previous signed block anyway.
|
||
# - it is useful if the validator couldn't gossip.
|
||
# Rather than adding Result "Ok" and Result "OkRepeatSigning"
|
||
# and an extra Eth2Digest comparison for that case, we just refuse repeat signing.
|
||
if status.foundAnyResult():
|
||
# Conflicting block exist
|
||
return err(BadProposal(
|
||
kind: DoubleProposal,
|
||
existing_block: root))
|
||
|
||
ok()
|
||
|
||
proc checkSlashableBlockProposal*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
index: Option[ValidatorIndex],
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||
slot: Slot
|
||
): Result[void, BadProposal] =
|
||
## Returns an error if the specified validator
|
||
## already proposed a block for the specified slot.
|
||
## This would lead to slashing.
|
||
## The error contains the blockroot that was already proposed
|
||
##
|
||
## Returns success otherwise
|
||
# TODO distinct type for the result block root
|
||
|
||
let valID = block:
|
||
let id = db.getValidatorInternalID(index, validator)
|
||
if id.isNone():
|
||
notice "No slashing protection data - first block proposal?",
|
||
validator = validator,
|
||
slot = slot
|
||
return ok()
|
||
else:
|
||
id.unsafeGet()
|
||
|
||
? checkSlashableBlockProposalDoubleProposal(db, valID, slot)
|
||
? checkSlashableBlockProposalOther(db, valID, slot)
|
||
|
||
ok()
|
||
|
||
proc checkSlashableAttestationDoubleVote(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
valID: ValidatorInternalID,
|
||
source: Epoch,
|
||
target: Epoch): Result[void, BadVote] =
|
||
# Sanity
|
||
# ---------------------------------
|
||
if source > target:
|
||
return err(BadVote(kind: TargetPrecedesSource))
|
||
|
||
# Casper FFG 1st slashing condition
|
||
# Detect h(t1) = h(t2)
|
||
# ---------------------------------
|
||
block:
|
||
# Condition 3 part 1/3 at https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3076
|
||
var root: Eth2Digest
|
||
|
||
# Overflows in 14 trillion years (minimal) or 112 trillion years (mainnet)
|
||
doAssert target <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
|
||
let status = db.sqlAttForSameTargetEpoch.exec(
|
||
(valID, int64 target)
|
||
) do (res: Hash32):
|
||
root.data = res
|
||
|
||
# Note: we enforce at the DB level that if (pubkey, target) exists it maps to a unique block root.
|
||
if status.foundAnyResult():
|
||
# Conflicting attestation exist, log by caller
|
||
return err(BadVote(
|
||
kind: DoubleVote,
|
||
existingAttestation: root
|
||
))
|
||
|
||
ok()
|
||
|
||
proc checkSlashableAttestationOther(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
valID: ValidatorInternalID,
|
||
source: Epoch,
|
||
target: Epoch): Result[void, BadVote] =
|
||
# Simple double votes are protected by the unique index on the database table
|
||
# - this function checks everything else!
|
||
|
||
## Returns an error if the specified validator
|
||
## already voted for the specified slot
|
||
## or would vote in a contradiction to previous votes
|
||
## (surrounding vote or surrounded vote).
|
||
##
|
||
## Returns success otherwise
|
||
# TODO distinct type for the result attestation root
|
||
|
||
# Sanity
|
||
# ---------------------------------
|
||
if source > target:
|
||
return err(BadVote(kind: TargetPrecedesSource))
|
||
|
||
# Casper FFG 2nd slashing condition
|
||
# -> Surrounded vote
|
||
# Detect h(s1) < h(s2) < h(t2) < h(t1)
|
||
# -> Surrounding vote
|
||
# Detect h(s2) < h(s1) < h(t1) < h(t2)
|
||
# ---------------------------------
|
||
block:
|
||
# Condition 3 part 2/3 at https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3076
|
||
# Condition 3 part 3/3 at https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3076
|
||
var root: Eth2Digest
|
||
var db_source, db_target: Epoch
|
||
|
||
# Overflows in 14 trillion years (minimal) or 112 trillion years (mainnet)
|
||
doAssert source <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
doAssert target <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
|
||
let status = db.sqlAttSurrounds.exec(
|
||
(valID, int64 source, int64 target, int64 source, int64 target)
|
||
) do (res: tuple[source, target: int64, root: Hash32]):
|
||
db_source = Epoch res.source
|
||
db_target = Epoch res.target
|
||
root.data = res.root
|
||
|
||
# Note: we enforce at the DB level that if (pubkey, target) exists it maps to a unique block root.
|
||
if status.foundAnyResult():
|
||
# Conflicting attestation exist, log by caller
|
||
# s1 < s2 < t2 < t1
|
||
return err(BadVote(
|
||
kind: SurroundVote,
|
||
existingAttestationRoot: root,
|
||
sourceExisting: db_source,
|
||
targetExisting: db_target,
|
||
sourceSlashable: source,
|
||
targetSlashable: target
|
||
))
|
||
|
||
# EIP-3067 - Low-watermark
|
||
# Detect h(s1) < h(s2), h(t1) <= h(t2)
|
||
# ---------------------------------
|
||
# Source check is strict inequality
|
||
block:
|
||
# Conditions 4 and 5 at https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-3076
|
||
# Low-watermark. This is not in the Eth2 official spec
|
||
# but a client standard.
|
||
#
|
||
# > Refuse to sign any attestation with source epoch less than the minimum source epoch present in that signer’s attestations
|
||
# > Refuse to sign any attestation with target epoch less than or equal to the minimum target epoch present in that signer’s attestations
|
||
var minSourceEpoch, minTargetEpoch: int64
|
||
let status = db.sqlAttMinSourceTargetEpochs.exec(
|
||
valID
|
||
) do (res: tuple[source, target: int64]):
|
||
minSourceEpoch = res.source
|
||
minTargetEpoch = res.target
|
||
|
||
if status.foundAnyResult():
|
||
# Overflows in 14 trillion years (minimal) or 112 trillion years (mainnet)
|
||
doAssert source <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
|
||
if source.int64 < minSourceEpoch:
|
||
return err(BadVote(
|
||
kind: MinSourceViolation,
|
||
minSource: Epoch minSourceEpoch,
|
||
candidateSource: source
|
||
))
|
||
|
||
# Overflows in 14 trillion years (minimal) or 112 trillion years (mainnet)
|
||
doAssert target <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
|
||
if target.int64 <= minTargetEpoch:
|
||
return err(BadVote(
|
||
kind: MinTargetViolation,
|
||
minTarget: Epoch minSourceEpoch,
|
||
candidateTarget: target
|
||
))
|
||
|
||
ok()
|
||
|
||
proc checkSlashableAttestation*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
index: Option[ValidatorIndex],
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||
source: Epoch,
|
||
target: Epoch
|
||
): Result[void, BadVote] =
|
||
if source > target:
|
||
return err(BadVote(kind: TargetPrecedesSource))
|
||
|
||
let valID = block:
|
||
let id = db.getValidatorInternalID(index, validator)
|
||
if id.isNone():
|
||
notice "No slashing protection data - first attestation?",
|
||
validator, source, target
|
||
return ok()
|
||
else:
|
||
id.unsafeGet()
|
||
|
||
? checkSlashableAttestationDoubleVote(db, valID, source, target)
|
||
? checkSlashableAttestationOther(db, valID, source, target)
|
||
|
||
ok()
|
||
|
||
# DB update
|
||
# --------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
proc registerValidator(db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2, validator: ValidatorPubKey) =
|
||
## Get validator from the database
|
||
## or register it
|
||
## Assumes the validator does not exist
|
||
let serializedPubkey = validator.toRaw() # Miracl/BLST to bytes
|
||
let status = db.sqlInsertValidator.exec(serializedPubkey)
|
||
doAssert status.isOk()
|
||
|
||
proc getOrRegisterValidator(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
index: Option[ValidatorIndex],
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey): ValidatorInternalID =
|
||
## Get validator from the database
|
||
## or register it and then return it
|
||
let id = db.getValidatorInternalID(index, validator)
|
||
if id.isNone():
|
||
info "No slashing protection data for validator - initiating",
|
||
validator = validator
|
||
|
||
db.registerValidator(validator)
|
||
let id = db.getValidatorInternalID(index, validator)
|
||
doAssert id.isSome()
|
||
id.unsafeGet()
|
||
else:
|
||
id.unsafeGet()
|
||
|
||
proc registerBlock*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
index: Option[ValidatorIndex],
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||
slot: Slot, block_root: Eth2Digest): Result[void, BadProposal] =
|
||
## Add a block to the slashing protection DB
|
||
## `checkSlashableBlockProposal` MUST be run
|
||
## before to ensure no overwrite.
|
||
let valID = db.getOrRegisterValidator(index, validator)
|
||
|
||
# 6 second (minimal preset) slots => overflow at ~1.75 trillion years under
|
||
# minimal preset, and twice that with mainnet preset
|
||
doAssert slot <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
|
||
let check = checkSlashableBlockProposalOther(db, valID, slot)
|
||
if check.isErr():
|
||
# Check for double vote to get more accurate error information
|
||
? checkSlashableBlockProposalDoubleProposal(db, valID, slot)
|
||
return check
|
||
|
||
let status = db.sqlInsertBlock.exec(
|
||
(valID, int64 slot, block_root.data))
|
||
if status.isErr():
|
||
# Inserting primarily fails when the constraint for double proposals is
|
||
# violated but may also happen due to disk full and other storage issues -
|
||
# in any case, we'll return an error so that production is halted
|
||
? checkSlashableBlockProposalDoubleProposal(db, valID, slot)
|
||
# If this was not a slashing error, it must have been a database error
|
||
return err(BadProposal(
|
||
kind: BadProposalKind.DatabaseError,
|
||
message: status.error))
|
||
|
||
ok()
|
||
|
||
proc registerBlock*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||
slot: Slot, block_root: Eth2Digest): Result[void, BadProposal] =
|
||
registerBlock(db, none(ValidatorIndex), validator, slot, block_root)
|
||
|
||
proc registerAttestation*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
index: Option[ValidatorIndex],
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||
source, target: Epoch,
|
||
attestation_root: Eth2Digest): Result[void, BadVote] =
|
||
## Add an attestation to the slashing protection DB
|
||
## `checkSlashableAttestation` MUST be run
|
||
## before to ensure no overwrite.
|
||
if source > target:
|
||
return err(BadVote(kind: TargetPrecedesSource))
|
||
|
||
let valID = db.getOrRegisterValidator(index, validator)
|
||
|
||
# Double votes caught by database index!
|
||
let check = checkSlashableAttestationOther(db, valID, source, target)
|
||
|
||
if check.isErr():
|
||
# Check for double vote to get more accurate error information
|
||
? checkSlashableAttestationDoubleVote(db, valID, source, target)
|
||
return check
|
||
|
||
# Overflows in 14 trillion years (minimal) or 112 trillion years (mainnet)
|
||
doAssert source <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
doAssert target <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
|
||
let status = db.sqlInsertAtt.exec(
|
||
(valID, int64 source, int64 target,
|
||
attestation_root.data))
|
||
if status.isErr():
|
||
# Inserting primarily fails when the constraint for double votes is
|
||
# violated but may also happen due to disk full and other storage issues -
|
||
# in any case, we'll return an error so that production is halted
|
||
? checkSlashableAttestationDoubleVote(db, valID, source, target)
|
||
# If this was not a slashing error, it must have been a database error
|
||
return err(BadVote(
|
||
kind: BadVoteKind.DatabaseError,
|
||
message: status.error))
|
||
|
||
ok()
|
||
|
||
proc registerAttestation*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||
source, target: Epoch,
|
||
attestation_root: Eth2Digest): Result[void, BadVote] =
|
||
registerAttestation(
|
||
db, none(ValidatorIndex), validator, source, target, attestation_root)
|
||
|
||
# DB maintenance
|
||
# --------------------------------------------
|
||
proc pruneBlocks*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
index: Option[ValidatorIndex],
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey, newMinSlot: Slot) =
|
||
## Prune all blocks from a validator before the specified newMinSlot
|
||
## This is intended for interchange import to ensure
|
||
## that in case of a gap, we don't allow signing in that gap.
|
||
let valID = db.getOrRegisterValidator(index, validator)
|
||
let status = db.sqlPruneValidatorBlocks.exec(
|
||
(valID, int64 newMinSlot))
|
||
doAssert status.isOk(),
|
||
"SQLite error when pruning validator blocks: " & $status.error & "\n" &
|
||
"for validator: 0x" & validator.toHex() & ", newMinSlot: " & $newMinSlot
|
||
|
||
proc pruneBlocks*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey, newMinSlot: Slot) =
|
||
pruneBlocks(db, none(ValidatorIndex), validator, newMinSlot)
|
||
|
||
proc pruneAttestations*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
index: Option[ValidatorIndex],
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||
newMinSourceEpoch: int64,
|
||
newMinTargetEpoch: int64) =
|
||
## Prune all blocks from a validator before the specified newMinSlot
|
||
## This is intended for interchange import.
|
||
## Negative source/target epoch of -1 can be received if no attestation was imported
|
||
## In that case nothing is done (since we used signed int in SQLite)
|
||
let valID = db.getOrRegisterValidator(index, validator)
|
||
|
||
let status = db.sqlPruneValidatorAttestations.exec(
|
||
(valID, newMinSourceEpoch, newMinTargetEpoch))
|
||
doAssert status.isOk(),
|
||
"SQLite error when pruning validator attestations: " & $status.error & "\n" &
|
||
"for validator: 0x" & validator.toHex() &
|
||
", newSourceEpoch: " & $newMinSourceEpoch &
|
||
", newTargetEpoch: " & $newMinTargetEpoch
|
||
|
||
proc pruneAttestations*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||
newMinSourceEpoch: int64,
|
||
newMinTargetEpoch: int64) =
|
||
pruneAttestations(
|
||
db, none(ValidatorIndex), validator, newMinSourceEpoch, newMinTargetEpoch)
|
||
|
||
proc pruneAfterFinalization*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
finalizedEpoch: Epoch
|
||
) =
|
||
## Prune blocks and attestations after a specified `finalizedEpoch`
|
||
## The block with the highest slot
|
||
## and the attestation(s) with the highest source and target epochs
|
||
## are never pruned.
|
||
##
|
||
## This ensures that even if pruning is called with an incorrect epoch
|
||
## slashing protection can fallback to the minimal / high-watermark protection mode.
|
||
|
||
block: # Prune blocks
|
||
let finalizedSlot = start_slot(finalizedEpoch)
|
||
let status = db.sqlPruneAfterFinalizationBlocks
|
||
.exec(int64 finalizedSlot)
|
||
doAssert status.isOk(),
|
||
"SQLite error when pruning validator attestations: " & $status.error & "\n" &
|
||
"for " &
|
||
"finalizedEpoch: " & $finalizedEpoch &
|
||
", firstSlotOfFinalizedEpoch: " & $finalizedSlot
|
||
|
||
block: # Prune attestations
|
||
let status = db.sqlPruneAfterFinalizationAttestations
|
||
.exec((int64 finalizedEpoch, int64 finalizedEpoch))
|
||
doAssert status.isOk(),
|
||
"SQLite error when pruning validator attestations: " & $status.error & "\n" &
|
||
"for finalized epoch: " & $finalizedEpoch
|
||
|
||
# Interchange
|
||
# --------------------------------------------
|
||
|
||
proc retrieveLatestValidatorData*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey
|
||
): tuple[
|
||
maxBlockSlot: Option[Slot],
|
||
maxAttSourceEpoch: Option[Epoch],
|
||
maxAttTargetEpoch: Option[Epoch]] =
|
||
|
||
let valID = db.getOrRegisterValidator(none(ValidatorIndex), validator)
|
||
|
||
var slot, source, target: int64
|
||
let status = db.sqlMaxBlockAtt.exec(
|
||
valID
|
||
) do (res: tuple[slot, source, target: int64]):
|
||
slot = res.slot
|
||
source = res.source
|
||
target = res.target
|
||
|
||
doAssert status.isOk(),
|
||
"SQLite error when querying validator: " & $status.error & "\n" &
|
||
"for validatorID " & $valID & " (0x" & $validator & ")"
|
||
|
||
# TODO: sqlite partial results ugly kludge
|
||
# if we find blocks but no attestation
|
||
# source and target would be set to 0 (from NULL in sqlite)
|
||
# 0 isn't an issue since it refers to Genesis (is it possible to have genesis epoch != 0?)
|
||
# but let's deal with those here
|
||
|
||
if slot != 0:
|
||
result.maxBlockSlot = some(Slot slot)
|
||
if source != 0:
|
||
result.maxAttSourceEpoch = some(Epoch source)
|
||
if target != 0:
|
||
result.maxAttTargetEpoch = some(Epoch target)
|
||
|
||
proc registerSyntheticAttestation*(
|
||
db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2,
|
||
validator: ValidatorPubKey,
|
||
source, target: Epoch) =
|
||
## Add a synthetic attestation to the slashing protection DB
|
||
|
||
# Spec require source < target (except genesis?), for synthetic attestation for slashing protection we want max(source, target)
|
||
doAssert (source < target) or (source == Epoch(0) and target == Epoch(0))
|
||
|
||
let valID = db.getOrRegisterValidator(none(ValidatorIndex), validator)
|
||
|
||
# Overflows in 14 trillion years (minimal) or 112 trillion years (mainnet)
|
||
doAssert source <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
doAssert target <= high(int64).uint64
|
||
|
||
template checkStatus: untyped =
|
||
doAssert status.isOk(),
|
||
"SQLite error when synthesizing an attestation: " & $status.error & "\n" &
|
||
"for validatorID " & $valID & " (0x" & $validator & ")\n" &
|
||
"sourceEpoch: " & $source & ", targetEpoch:" & $target & '\n'
|
||
|
||
block:
|
||
let status = db.sqlBeginTransaction.exec()
|
||
checkStatus()
|
||
block:
|
||
let status = db.sqlDeleteValidatorAtt.exec(valID)
|
||
checkStatus()
|
||
block:
|
||
let status = db.sqlInsertAtt.exec(
|
||
(valID, int64 source, int64 target, ZERO_HASH.data))
|
||
checkStatus()
|
||
block:
|
||
let status = db.sqlCommitTransaction.exec()
|
||
checkStatus()
|
||
|
||
proc toSPDIR*(db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2): SPDIR
|
||
{.raises: [IOError, Defect].} =
|
||
## Export the full slashing protection database
|
||
## to a json the Slashing Protection Database Interchange (Complete) Format
|
||
result.metadata.interchange_format_version = "5"
|
||
|
||
# genesis_validators_root
|
||
# -----------------------------------------------------
|
||
block:
|
||
let selectRootStmt = db.backend.prepareStmt(
|
||
"SELECT genesis_validators_root FROM metadata;",
|
||
NoParams, Hash32,
|
||
managed = false # manual memory management
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
# Can't capture var SPDIR in a closure
|
||
let genesis_validators_root {.byaddr.} = result.metadata.genesis_validators_root
|
||
let status = selectRootStmt.exec do (res: Hash32):
|
||
genesis_validators_root = Eth2Digest0x(Eth2Digest(data: res))
|
||
doAssert status.isOk()
|
||
|
||
selectRootStmt.dispose()
|
||
|
||
# Validators
|
||
# -----------------------------------------------------
|
||
block:
|
||
let selectValStmt = db.backend.prepareStmt(
|
||
"SELECT public_key FROM validators;",
|
||
NoParams, PubKeyBytes,
|
||
managed = false # manual memory management
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
# Can't capture var SPDIR in a closure
|
||
let data {.byaddr.} = result.data
|
||
let status = selectValStmt.exec do (res: PubKeyBytes):
|
||
data.add SPDIR_Validator(pubkey: PubKey0x res)
|
||
doAssert status.isOk()
|
||
|
||
selectValStmt.dispose()
|
||
|
||
# For each validator found, collect their signatures
|
||
# -----------------------------------------------------
|
||
block:
|
||
let selectBlkStmt = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
SELECT
|
||
slot, signing_root
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_blocks b
|
||
INNER JOIN
|
||
validators v on b.validator_id = v.id
|
||
WHERE
|
||
v.public_key = ?
|
||
ORDER BY
|
||
slot ASC
|
||
""", PubKeyBytes, (int64, Hash32),
|
||
managed = false # manual memory management
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
let selectAttStmt = db.backend.prepareStmt("""
|
||
SELECT
|
||
source_epoch, target_epoch, signing_root
|
||
FROM
|
||
signed_attestations a
|
||
INNER JOIN
|
||
validators v on a.validator_id = v.id
|
||
WHERE
|
||
v.public_key = ?
|
||
ORDER BY
|
||
target_epoch ASC
|
||
""", PubKeyBytes, (int64, int64, Hash32),
|
||
managed = false # manual memory management
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
defer:
|
||
selectBlkStmt.dispose()
|
||
selectAttStmt.dispose()
|
||
|
||
for i in 0 ..< result.data.len:
|
||
# Can't capture var SPDIR in a closure
|
||
let validator {.byaddr.} = result.data[i] # alias
|
||
block: # Blocks
|
||
let status = selectBlkStmt.exec(validator.pubkey.PubKeyBytes) do (res: tuple[slot: int64, root: Hash32]):
|
||
validator.signed_blocks.add SPDIR_SignedBlock(
|
||
slot: SlotString res.slot,
|
||
signing_root: Eth2Digest0x(Eth2Digest(data: res.root))
|
||
)
|
||
doAssert status.isOk()
|
||
block: # Attestations
|
||
let status = selectAttStmt.exec(validator.pubkey.PubKeyBytes) do (res: tuple[source, target: int64, root: Hash32]):
|
||
validator.signed_attestations.add SPDIR_SignedAttestation(
|
||
source_epoch: EpochString res.source,
|
||
target_epoch: EpochString res.target,
|
||
signing_root: Eth2Digest0x(Eth2Digest(data: res.root))
|
||
)
|
||
doAssert status.isOk()
|
||
|
||
proc inclSPDIR*(db: SlashingProtectionDB_v2, spdir: SPDIR): SlashingImportStatus
|
||
{.raises: [SerializationError, IOError, Defect].} =
|
||
## Import a Slashing Protection Database Intermediate Representation
|
||
## file into the specified slashing protection DB
|
||
##
|
||
## The database must be initialized.
|
||
## The genesis_validators_root must match or
|
||
## the DB must have a zero root
|
||
##
|
||
## This return true if the import was completed successfully.
|
||
## It will return false if the import failed.
|
||
##
|
||
## If some blocks/votes
|
||
## are in invalid due to slashing rules, they will be skipped.
|
||
doAssert not db.isNil, "The Slashing Protection DB must be initialized."
|
||
doAssert not db.backend.isNil, "The Slashing Protection DB must be initialized."
|
||
|
||
# genesis_validators_root
|
||
# -----------------------------------------------------
|
||
block:
|
||
var dbGenValRoot: Eth2Digest
|
||
|
||
let selectRootStmt = db.backend.prepareStmt(
|
||
"SELECT genesis_validators_root FROM metadata;",
|
||
NoParams, Hash32,
|
||
managed = false # manual memory management
|
||
).get()
|
||
|
||
let status = selectRootStmt.exec do (res: Hash32):
|
||
dbGenValRoot.data = res
|
||
doAssert status.isOk()
|
||
|
||
selectRootStmt.dispose()
|
||
|
||
if dbGenValRoot != default(Eth2Digest) and
|
||
dbGenValRoot != spdir.metadata.genesis_validators_root.Eth2Digest:
|
||
error "The slashing protection database and imported file refer to different blockchains.",
|
||
DB_genesis_validators_root = dbGenValRoot,
|
||
Imported_genesis_validators_root = spdir.metadata.genesis_validators_root.Eth2Digest
|
||
return siFailure
|
||
|
||
if not status.get():
|
||
# Query worked but returned no result
|
||
# We assume that the DB wasn't setup or
|
||
# is in an earlier version that used the kvstore table
|
||
db.setupDB(spdir.metadata.genesis_validators_root.Eth2Digest)
|
||
|
||
# TODO: dbGenValRoot == default(Eth2Digest)
|
||
|
||
db.setupCachedQueries()
|
||
|
||
# Create a mutable copy for sorting
|
||
var spdir = spdir
|
||
return db.importInterchangeV5Impl(spdir)
|