mirror of https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2.git synced 2025-01-18 10:31:04 +00:00

History

validate EL block hash in Electra when no EL is connected (#6407 )

When no EL is connected, it is still required to validate the block hash
of `ExecutionPayload` to prevent attacks that trick us into attesting to
a circular chain with invalid in-between block hashes. This is already
done through Deneb but was still missing in Electra to be rectified now.

2024-07-05 10:18:50 +02:00

batch_validation.nim

add some support for electra aggregated attestations (#6283 )

2024-05-14 06:12:35 +02:00

block_processor.nim

validate EL block hash in Electra when no EL is connected (#6407 )

2024-07-05 10:18:50 +02:00

eth2_processor.nim

VC/NIMBUS-BN validators protection. (#6329 )

2024-06-11 19:38:16 +00:00

gossip_validation.nim

Fix for gcc-14 issues in kzg-4844. (#6403 )

2024-07-03 10:01:33 +00:00

light_client_processor.nim

extend light client protocol for Electra (#6375 )

2024-06-26 19:02:03 +00:00

optimistic_processor.nim

remove Bellatrix EL syncing support from light client (#6352 )

2024-06-14 01:23:17 +00:00

README.md

some consensus spec v1.4.0 spec URL updates (#6208 )

2024-04-17 05:51:16 +02:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

validate raw gossip data before
- rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
- sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

Blocks: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
Attestations (aggregated): https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
Attestations (unaggregated): https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attestation-subnets
Voluntary exits: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.4/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#voluntary_exit
Proposer slashings: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#proposer_slashing
Attester slashing: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attester_slashing

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
- We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
- which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
- blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
- This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
- Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
- Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations