nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/attestation_pool.nim

323 lines
13 KiB
Nim

import
deques, options, sequtils, tables,
chronicles,
./spec/[beaconstate, datatypes, crypto, digest, helpers, validator], extras,
./beacon_chain_db, ./ssz
type
Validation* = object
aggregation_bitfield*: seq[byte]
custody_bitfield*: seq[byte] ##\
## Phase 1 - the handling of this field is probably broken..
aggregate_signature*: ValidatorSig
# Per Danny as of 2018-12-21:
# Yeah, you can do any linear combination of signatures. but you have to
# remember the linear combination of pubkeys that constructed
# if you have two instances of a signature from pubkey p, then you need 2*p
# in the group pubkey because the attestation bitfield is only 1 bit per
# pubkey right now, attestations do not support this it could be extended to
# support N overlaps up to N times per pubkey if we had N bits per validator
# instead of 1
# We are shying away from this for the time being. If there end up being
# substantial difficulties in network layer aggregation, then adding bits to
# aid in supporting overlaps is one potential solution
AttestationEntry* = object
data*: AttestationData
validations*: seq[Validation] ## \
## Instead of aggregating the signatures eagerly, we simply dump them in
## this seq and aggregate only when needed
## TODO there are obvious caching opportunities here..
SlotData* = object
attestations*: seq[AttestationEntry] ## \
## Depending on the world view of the various validators, they may have
## voted on different states - here we collect all the different
## combinations that validators have come up with so that later, we can
## count how popular each world view is (fork choice)
## TODO this could be a Table[AttestationData, seq[Validation] or something
## less naive
AttestationPool* = object
## The attestation pool keeps all attestations that are known to the
## client - each attestation counts as votes towards the fork choice
## rule that determines which block we consider to be the head. The pool
## contains both votes that have been included in the chain and those that
## have not.
slots*: Deque[SlotData] ## \
## We keep one item per slot such that indexing matches slot number
## together with startingSlot
startingSlot*: Slot ## \
## Generally, we keep attestations only until a slot has been finalized -
## after that, they may no longer affect fork choice.
proc init*(T: type AttestationPool, dummy: int): T =
result.slots = initDeque[SlotData]()
proc overlaps(a, b: seq[byte]): bool =
for i in 0..<a.len:
if (a[i] and b[i]) > 0'u8: return true
proc combineBitfield(tgt: var seq[byte], src: seq[byte]) =
for i in 0 ..< tgt.len:
# TODO:
# when BLS signatures are combined, we must ensure that
# the same participant key is not included on both sides
tgt[i] = tgt[i] or src[i]
proc combine*(tgt: var Attestation, src: Attestation, flags: UpdateFlags) =
# Combine the signature and participation bitfield, with the assumption that
# the same data is being signed!
assert tgt.data == src.data
# TODO:
# when BLS signatures are combined, we must ensure that
# the same participant key is not included on both sides
tgt.aggregation_bitfield.combineBitfield(src.aggregation_bitfield)
if skipValidation notin flags:
tgt.aggregate_signature.combine(src.aggregate_signature)
proc validate(
state: BeaconState, attestation: Attestation, flags: UpdateFlags): bool =
# TODO these validations should probably be done elsewhere, and really bad
# attestations should probably cause some sort of feedback to the network
# layer so they don't spread further.. is there a sliding scale here of
# badness?
# TODO half of this stuff is from beaconstate.validateAttestation - merge?
let attestationSlot = attestation.data.slot
if attestationSlot < state.finalized_epoch.get_epoch_start_slot():
debug "Old attestation",
attestationSlot = humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot),
attestationEpoch = humaneEpochNum(attestationSlot.slot_to_epoch),
stateSlot = humaneSlotNum(state.slot),
finalizedEpoch = humaneEpochNum(state.finalized_epoch)
return
# TODO what makes sense here? If an attestation is from the future with
# regards to the state, something is wrong - it's a bad attestation, we're
# desperatly behind or someone is sending bogus attestations...
if attestationSlot > state.slot + 64:
debug "Future attestation",
attestationSlot = humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot),
attestationEpoch = humaneEpochNum(attestationSlot.slot_to_epoch),
stateSlot = humaneSlotNum(state.slot),
finalizedEpoch = humaneEpochNum(state.finalized_epoch)
return
if not allIt(attestation.custody_bitfield, it == 0):
notice "Invalid custody bitfield for phase 0"
return false
if not anyIt(attestation.aggregation_bitfield, it != 0):
notice "Empty aggregation bitfield"
return false
let crosslink_committee = mapIt(
filterIt(get_crosslink_committees_at_slot(state, attestation.data.slot),
it.shard == attestation.data.shard),
it.committee)[0]
# Extra checks not in specs
# https://github.com/status-im/nim-beacon-chain/pull/105#issuecomment-462432544
if attestation.aggregation_bitfield.len != (crosslink_committee.len + 7) div 8:
notice "Invalid aggregation bitfield length",
attestationLen = attestation.aggregation_bitfield.len,
committeeLen = crosslink_committee.len
return false
if attestation.custody_bitfield.len != (crosslink_committee.len + 7) div 8:
notice "Invalid custody bitfield length",
attestationLen = attestation.aggregation_bitfield.len,
committeeLen = crosslink_committee.len
return false
# End extra checks
## the rest; turns into expensive NOP until then.
if skipValidation notin flags:
let
participants = get_attestation_participants(
state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bitfield)
## TODO when the custody_bitfield assertion-to-emptiness disappears do this
## and fix the custody_bit_0_participants check to depend on it.
# custody_bit_1_participants = {nothing, always, because assertion above}
custody_bit_1_participants: seq[ValidatorIndex] = @[]
custody_bit_0_participants = participants
group_public_key = bls_aggregate_pubkeys(
participants.mapIt(state.validator_registry[it].pubkey))
# Verify that aggregate_signature verifies using the group pubkey.
if not bls_verify_multiple(
@[
bls_aggregate_pubkeys(mapIt(custody_bit_0_participants,
state.validator_registry[it].pubkey)),
bls_aggregate_pubkeys(mapIt(custody_bit_1_participants,
state.validator_registry[it].pubkey)),
],
@[
hash_tree_root(AttestationDataAndCustodyBit(
data: attestation.data, custody_bit: false)),
hash_tree_root(AttestationDataAndCustodyBit(
data: attestation.data, custody_bit: true)),
],
attestation.aggregate_signature,
get_domain(state.fork, slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot),
DOMAIN_ATTESTATION),
):
notice "Invalid signature", participants
return false
true
proc add*(pool: var AttestationPool,
attestation: Attestation,
state: BeaconState) =
if not validate(state, attestation, {skipValidation}): return
let
attestationSlot = attestation.data.slot
# We keep a sliding window of attestations, roughly from the last finalized
# epoch to now, because these are the attestations that may affect the voting
# outcome. Some of these attestations will already have been added to blocks,
# while others are fresh off the network.
doAssert attestationSlot >= pool.startingSlot,
"""
We should have checked in validate that attestation is newer than
finalized_slot and we never prune things before that, per below condition!
""" &
", attestationSlot: " & $humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot) &
", startingSlot: " & $humaneSlotNum(pool.startingSlot)
if pool.slots.len == 0:
# When receiving the first attestation, we want to avoid adding a lot of
# empty SlotData items, so we'll cheat a bit here
info "First attestation!",
attestationSlot = $humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot)
pool.startingSlot = attestationSlot
if pool.startingSlot + pool.slots.len.Slot <= attestationSlot:
debug "Growing attestation pool",
attestationSlot = $humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot),
startingSlot = $humaneSlotNum(pool.startingSlot)
# Make sure there's a pool entry for every slot, even when there's a gap
while pool.startingSlot + pool.slots.len.Slot <= attestationSlot:
pool.slots.addLast(SlotData())
if pool.startingSlot < state.finalized_epoch.get_epoch_start_slot():
debug "Pruning attestation pool",
startingSlot = $humaneSlotNum(pool.startingSlot),
finalizedSlot =
$humaneSlotNum(state.finalized_epoch.get_epoch_start_slot())
# TODO there should be a better way to remove a whole epoch of stuff..
while pool.startingSlot < state.finalized_epoch.get_epoch_start_slot():
pool.slots.popFirst()
pool.startingSlot += 1
let
slotData = addr pool.slots[attestationSlot - pool.startingSlot]
validation = Validation(
aggregation_bitfield: attestation.aggregation_bitfield,
custody_bitfield: attestation.custody_bitfield,
aggregate_signature: attestation.aggregate_signature)
var found = false
for a in slotData.attestations.mitems():
if a.data == attestation.data:
for v in a.validations:
if v.aggregation_bitfield.overlaps(validation.aggregation_bitfield):
# TODO this check is here so that later, when we combine signatures,
# there is no overlap (each validator must be represented once
# only). this is wrong - we could technically receive
# attestations that have already been combined (for example when
# feeding in attestations from blocks, which we're not doing yet)
# but then we'll also have to update the combine logic to deal
# with this complication.
debug "Ignoring overlapping attestation",
existingParticipants = get_attestation_participants(
state, a.data, v.aggregation_bitfield),
newParticipants = get_attestation_participants(
state, a.data, validation.aggregation_bitfield)
found = true
break
if not found:
a.validations.add(validation)
found = true
break
if not found:
slotData.attestations.add(AttestationEntry(
data: attestation.data,
validations: @[validation]
))
proc getAttestationsForBlock*(pool: AttestationPool,
lastState: BeaconState,
newBlockSlot: Slot): seq[Attestation] =
if newBlockSlot - GENESIS_SLOT < MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY:
debug "Too early for attestations",
newBlockSlot = humaneSlotNum(newBlockSlot)
return
if pool.slots.len == 0: # startingSlot not set yet!
info "No attestations found (pool empty)",
newBlockSlot = humaneSlotNum(newBlockSlot)
return
let
# TODO in theory we could include attestations from other slots also, but
# we're currently not tracking which attestations have already been included
# in blocks on the fork we're aiming for.. this is a conservative approach
# that's guaranteed to not include any duplicates, because it's the first
# time the attestations are up for inclusion!
attestationSlot = newBlockSlot - MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY
if attestationSlot < pool.startingSlot or
attestationSlot >= pool.startingSlot + pool.slots.len.Slot:
info "No attestations",
attestationSlot = humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot),
startingSlot = humaneSlotNum(pool.startingSlot),
endingSlot = humaneSlotNum(pool.startingSlot + pool.slots.len.Slot)
return
let
slotDequeIdx = int(attestationSlot - pool.startingSlot)
slotData = pool.slots[slotDequeIdx]
for a in slotData.attestations:
var
attestation = Attestation(
aggregation_bitfield: a.validations[0].aggregation_bitfield,
data: a.data,
custody_bitfield: a.validations[0].custody_bitfield,
aggregate_signature: a.validations[0].aggregate_signature
)
for v in a.validations[1..^1]:
if not attestation.aggregation_bitfield.overlaps(
v.aggregation_bitfield):
attestation.aggregation_bitfield.combineBitfield(
v.aggregation_bitfield)
attestation.custody_bitfield.combineBitfield(v.custody_bitfield)
attestation.aggregate_signature.combine(v.aggregate_signature)
result.add(attestation)
if result.len >= MAX_ATTESTATIONS:
return