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nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing/gossip_validation.nim

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# beacon_chain
# Copyright (c) 2019-2024 Status Research & Development GmbH
# Licensed and distributed under either of
# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
{.push raises: [].}
import
# Status
chronicles, chronos, metrics,
results,
kzg4844/[kzg, kzg_abi],
stew/byteutils,
# Internals
../spec/[
beaconstate, state_transition_block, forks, helpers, network, signatures],
../consensus_object_pools/[
attestation_pool, blockchain_dag, blob_quarantine, block_quarantine,
spec_cache, light_client_pool, sync_committee_msg_pool,
validator_change_pool],
".."/[beacon_clock],
./batch_validation
from libp2p/protocols/pubsub/errors import ValidationResult
export results, ValidationResult
logScope:
topics = "gossip_checks"
declareCounter beacon_attestations_dropped_queue_full,
"Number of attestations dropped because queue is full"
declareCounter beacon_aggregates_dropped_queue_full,
"Number of aggregates dropped because queue is full"
declareCounter beacon_sync_messages_dropped_queue_full,
"Number of sync committee messages dropped because queue is full"
declareCounter beacon_contributions_dropped_queue_full,
"Number of sync committee contributions dropped because queue is full"
# This result is a little messy in that it returns Result.ok for
# ValidationResult.Accept and an err for the others - this helps transport
# an error message to callers but could arguably be done in an cleaner way.
type
ValidationError* = (ValidationResult, cstring)
template errIgnore*(msg: cstring): untyped =
err((ValidationResult.Ignore, cstring msg))
template errReject*(msg: cstring): untyped =
err((ValidationResult.Reject, cstring msg))
# Internal checks
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
func check_attestation_block(
pool: AttestationPool, attestationSlot: Slot, blck: BlockRef):
Result[void, ValidationError] =
# The voted-for block must be a descendant of the finalized block, thus it
# must at least as new than the finalized checkpoint - in theory it could be
# equal, but then we're voting for an already-finalized block which is pretty
# useless - other blocks that are not rooted in the finalized chain will be
# pruned by the chain dag, and thus we can no longer get a BlockRef for them
if not (blck.slot > pool.dag.finalizedHead.slot):
return errIgnore("Voting for already-finalized block")
# The attestation shouldn't be voting for a block that didn't exist at the
# time - not in spec, but hard to reason about
if not (attestationSlot >= blck.slot):
return errIgnore("Voting for block that didn't exist at the time")
# We'll also cap it at 4 epochs which is somewhat arbitrary, but puts an
# upper bound on the processing done to validate the attestation
# TODO revisit with less arbitrary approach
if not ((attestationSlot - blck.slot) <= uint64(4 * SLOTS_PER_EPOCH)):
return errIgnore("Voting for very old block")
ok()
func check_propagation_slot_range(
consensusFork: ConsensusFork, msgSlot: Slot, wallTime: BeaconTime):
Result[Slot, ValidationError] =
let futureSlot = (wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).toSlot()
if not futureSlot.afterGenesis or msgSlot > futureSlot.slot:
return errIgnore("Attestation slot in the future")
let pastSlot = (wallTime - MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).toSlot()
if not pastSlot.afterGenesis:
return ok(msgSlot)
if consensusFork < ConsensusFork.Deneb:
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.5.0-alpha.6/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#configuration
# The spec value of ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE is 32, but it can
# retransmit attestations on the cusp of being out of spec, and which by
# the time they reach their destination might be out of spec.
const TIME_IN_FLIGHT_BUFFER = 4
static: doAssert ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE > TIME_IN_FLIGHT_BUFFER
if msgSlot + (ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE - TIME_IN_FLIGHT_BUFFER) <
pastSlot.slot:
return errIgnore("Attestation slot in the past")
else:
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.2/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_attestation_subnet_id
# "[IGNORE] the epoch of attestation.data.slot is either the current or
# previous epoch (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e.
# compute_epoch_at_slot(attestation.data.slot) in
# (get_previous_epoch(state), get_current_epoch(state))"
#
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.2/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
# "[IGNORE] the epoch of aggregate.data.slot is either the current or
# previous epoch (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e.
# compute_epoch_at_slot(aggregate.data.slot) in
# (get_previous_epoch(state), get_current_epoch(state))"
if msgSlot.epoch < pastSlot.slot.epoch.get_previous_epoch:
return errIgnore("Attestation slot in the past")
ok(msgSlot)
func check_slot_exact(msgSlot: Slot, wallTime: BeaconTime):
Result[Slot, ValidationError] =
let futureSlot = (wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).toSlot()
if not futureSlot.afterGenesis or msgSlot > futureSlot.slot:
return errIgnore("Sync committee slot in the future")
let pastSlot = (wallTime - MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).toSlot()
if pastSlot.afterGenesis and msgSlot < pastSlot.slot:
return errIgnore("Sync committee slot in the past")
ok(msgSlot)
func check_beacon_and_target_block(
pool: var AttestationPool, data: AttestationData):
Result[BlockSlot, ValidationError] =
# The block being voted for (data.beacon_block_root) passes validation - by
# extension, the target block must at that point also pass validation.
# The target block is returned.
# We rely on the chain DAG to have been validated, so check for the existence
# of the block in the pool.
let blck = pool.dag.getBlockRef(data.beacon_block_root).valueOr:
pool.quarantine[].addMissing(data.beacon_block_root)
return errIgnore("Attestation block unknown")
# Not in spec - check that rewinding to the state is sane
? check_attestation_block(pool, data.slot, blck)
# [REJECT] The attestation's target block is an ancestor of the block named
# in the LMD vote -- i.e.
# get_checkpoint_block(store, attestation.data.beacon_block_root,
# attestation.data.target.epoch) == attestation.data.target.root
# the sanity of target.epoch has been checked by check_attestation_slot_target
let target = blck.atCheckpoint(data.target).valueOr:
return errReject("Attestation target is not ancestor of LMD vote block")
ok(target)
func check_aggregation_count(
attestation: phase0.Attestation, singular: bool):
Result[void, ValidationError] =
let ones = attestation.aggregation_bits.countOnes()
if singular and ones != 1:
return errReject("Attestation must have a single attestation bit set")
elif not singular and ones < 1:
return errReject("Attestation must have at least one attestation bit set")
ok()
func check_aggregation_count(
attestation: electra.Attestation, singular: bool):
Result[void, ValidationError] =
block:
let ones = attestation.committee_bits.countOnes()
if singular and ones != 1:
return errReject("Attestation must have a single committee bit set")
elif not singular and ones < 1:
return errReject("Attestation must have at least one committee bit set")
block:
let ones = attestation.aggregation_bits.countOnes()
if singular and ones != 1:
return errReject("Attestation must have a single attestation bit set")
elif not singular and ones < 1:
return errReject("Attestation must have at least one attestation bit set")
ok()
func check_attestation_subnet(
shufflingRef: ShufflingRef, slot: Slot, committee_index: CommitteeIndex,
subnet_id: SubnetId): Result[void, ValidationError] =
let
expectedSubnet = compute_subnet_for_attestation(
get_committee_count_per_slot(shufflingRef), slot, committee_index)
if expectedSubnet != subnet_id:
return errReject("Attestation not on the correct subnet")
ok()
func check_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof(
blob_sidecar: deneb.BlobSidecar): Result[void, ValidationError] =
let res = blob_sidecar.verify_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof()
if res.isErr:
return errReject(res.error)
ok()
# Gossip Validation
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
# Generally, the following rules apply for gossip validation:
#
# [REJECT]
# This doesn't depend on the wall clock or the exact state of the DAG; it's
# an internal consistency/correctness check only, and effectively never has
# false positives. These don't, for example, arise from timeouts.
#
# [IGNORE]
# This may be intermittent, depend on timing or the current state of the DAG.
template checkedReject(
msg: cstring, strictVerification: bool): untyped =
if strictVerification:
raiseAssert $msg
errReject(msg)
template checkedReject(
error: ValidationError, strictVerification: bool): untyped =
doAssert error[0] == ValidationResult.Reject
if strictVerification:
raiseAssert $error[1]
err(error)
template checkedResult*(
error: ValidationError, strictVerification: bool): untyped =
if error[0] == ValidationResult.Reject and strictVerification:
raiseAssert $error[1]
err(error)
# ChainDAGRef
template checkedReject(
dag: ChainDAGRef, msg: cstring): untyped =
checkedReject(msg, strictVerification in dag.updateFlags)
template checkedReject(
dag: ChainDAGRef, error: ValidationError): untyped =
checkedReject(error, strictVerification in dag.updateFlags)
template checkedResult(
dag: ChainDAGRef, error: ValidationError): untyped =
checkedResult(error, strictVerification in dag.updateFlags)
# AttestationPool
template checkedReject(
pool: ref AttestationPool, msg: cstring): untyped =
pool[].dag.checkedReject(msg)
template checkedReject(
pool: ref AttestationPool, error: ValidationError): untyped =
pool[].dag.checkedReject(error)
template checkedResult(
pool: ref AttestationPool, error: ValidationError): untyped =
pool[].dag.checkedResult(error)
# ValidatorChangePool
template checkedReject(
pool: ValidatorChangePool, msg: cstring): untyped =
pool.dag.checkedReject(msg)
template checkedReject(
pool: ValidatorChangePool, error: ValidationError): untyped =
pool.dag.checkedReject(error)
template validateBeaconBlockBellatrix(
signed_beacon_block: phase0.SignedBeaconBlock | altair.SignedBeaconBlock,
parent: BlockRef): untyped =
discard
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/bellatrix/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
template validateBeaconBlockBellatrix(
signed_beacon_block:
bellatrix.SignedBeaconBlock |
capella.SignedBeaconBlock |
deneb.SignedBeaconBlock |
electra.SignedBeaconBlock,
parent: BlockRef): untyped =
# If the execution is enabled for the block -- i.e.
# is_execution_enabled(state, block.body) then validate the following:
#
# `is_execution_enabled(state, block.body)` is
# `is_merge_transition_block(state, block.body) or is_merge_transition_complete(state)` is
# `(not is_merge_transition_complete(state) and block.body.execution_payload != ExecutionPayload()) or is_merge_transition_complete(state)` is
# `is_merge_transition_complete(state) or block.body.execution_payload != ExecutionPayload()` is
# `is_merge_transition_complete(state) or is_execution_block(block)`
#
# `is_merge_transition_complete(state)` tests for
# `state.latest_execution_payload_header != ExecutionPayloadHeader()`, while
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.5.0-alpha.6/specs/bellatrix/beacon-chain.md#block-processing
# shows that `state.latest_execution_payload_header` being default or not is
# exactly equivalent to whether that block's execution payload is default or
# not, so test cached block information rather than reconstructing a state.
let isExecutionEnabled =
if signed_beacon_block.message.is_execution_block:
true
else:
# If we don't know whether the parent block had execution enabled,
# assume it didn't. This way, we don't reject here if the timestamp
# is invalid, and let state transition check the timestamp.
# This is an edge case, and may be hit in a pathological scenario with
# checkpoint sync, because the checkpoint block may be unavailable
# and it could already be the parent of the new block before backfill.
not dag.loadExecutionBlockHash(parent).get(ZERO_HASH).isZero
if isExecutionEnabled:
# [REJECT] The block's execution payload timestamp is correct with respect
# to the slot -- i.e. execution_payload.timestamp ==
# compute_timestamp_at_slot(state, block.slot).
let timestampAtSlot =
withState(dag.headState):
compute_timestamp_at_slot(
forkyState.data, signed_beacon_block.message.slot)
if not (signed_beacon_block.message.body.execution_payload.timestamp ==
timestampAtSlot):
quarantine[].addUnviable(signed_beacon_block.root)
return dag.checkedReject(
"BeaconBlock: mismatched execution payload timestamp")
# The condition:
# [REJECT] The block's parent (defined by `block.parent_root`) passes all
# validation (excluding execution node verification of the
# `block.body.execution_payload`).
# cannot occur here, because Nimbus's optimistic sync waits for either
# `ACCEPTED` or `SYNCING` from the EL to get this far.
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.4/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#blob_sidecar_subnet_id
proc validateBlobSidecar*(
dag: ChainDAGRef, quarantine: ref Quarantine,
blobQuarantine: ref BlobQuarantine, blob_sidecar: BlobSidecar,
wallTime: BeaconTime, subnet_id: BlobId): Result[void, ValidationError] =
# Some of the checks below have been reordered compared to the spec, to
# perform the cheap checks first - in particular, we want to avoid loading
# an `EpochRef` and checking signatures. This reordering might lead to
# different IGNORE/REJECT results in turn affecting gossip scores.
template block_header: untyped = blob_sidecar.signed_block_header.message
# [REJECT] The sidecar's index is consistent with `MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK`
# -- i.e. `blob_sidecar.index < MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK`
if not (blob_sidecar.index < MAX_BLOBS_PER_BLOCK):
return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: index inconsistent")
# [REJECT] The sidecar is for the correct subnet -- i.e.
# `compute_subnet_for_blob_sidecar(blob_sidecar.index) == subnet_id`.
if not (compute_subnet_for_blob_sidecar(blob_sidecar.index) == subnet_id):
return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: subnet incorrect")
# [IGNORE] The sidecar is not from a future slot (with a
# `MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY` allowance) -- i.e. validate that
# `block_header.slot <= current_slot` (a client MAY queue future sidecars
# for processing at the appropriate slot).
if not (block_header.slot <=
(wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).slotOrZero):
return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: slot too high")
# [IGNORE] The sidecar is from a slot greater than the latest
# finalized slot -- i.e. validate that `block_header.slot >
# compute_start_slot_at_epoch(state.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)`
if not (block_header.slot > dag.finalizedHead.slot):
return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: slot already finalized")
# [IGNORE] The sidecar is the first sidecar for the tuple
# (block_header.slot, block_header.proposer_index, blob_sidecar.index)
# with valid header signature, sidecar inclusion proof, and kzg proof.
let block_root = hash_tree_root(block_header)
if dag.getBlockRef(block_root).isSome():
return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: already have block")
if blobQuarantine[].hasBlob(
block_header.slot, block_header.proposer_index, blob_sidecar.index):
return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: already have valid blob from same proposer")
# [REJECT] The sidecar's inclusion proof is valid as verified by
# `verify_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof(blob_sidecar)`.
block:
let v = check_blob_sidecar_inclusion_proof(blob_sidecar)
if v.isErr:
return dag.checkedReject(v.error)
# [IGNORE] The sidecar's block's parent (defined by
# `block_header.parent_root`) has been seen (via both gossip and
# non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue sidecars for processing
# once the parent block is retrieved).
#
# [REJECT] The sidecar's block's parent (defined by
# `block_header.parent_root`) passes validation.
let parent = dag.getBlockRef(block_header.parent_root).valueOr:
if block_header.parent_root in quarantine[].unviable:
quarantine[].addUnviable(block_root)
return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: parent not validated")
else:
quarantine[].addMissing(block_header.parent_root)
return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: parent not found")
# [REJECT] The sidecar is from a higher slot than the sidecar's
# block's parent (defined by `block_header.parent_root`).
if not (block_header.slot > parent.bid.slot):
return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: slot lower than parents'")
# [REJECT] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of the sidecar's
# block -- i.e. `get_checkpoint_block(store, block_header.parent_root,
# store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch) == store.finalized_checkpoint.root`.
let
finalized_checkpoint = getStateField(dag.headState, finalized_checkpoint)
ancestor = get_ancestor(parent, finalized_checkpoint.epoch.start_slot)
if ancestor.isNil:
# This shouldn't happen: we should always be able to trace the parent back
# to the finalized checkpoint (else it wouldn't be in the DAG)
return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: Can't find ancestor")
if not (
finalized_checkpoint.root == ancestor.root or
finalized_checkpoint.root.isZero):
quarantine[].addUnviable(block_root)
return dag.checkedReject(
"BlobSidecar: Finalized checkpoint not an ancestor")
# [REJECT] The sidecar is proposed by the expected `proposer_index`
# for the block's slot in the context of the current shuffling
# (defined by `block_header.parent_root`/`block_header.slot`).
# If the proposer_index cannot immediately be verified against the expected
# shuffling, the sidecar MAY be queued for later processing while proposers
# for the block's branch are calculated -- in such a case do not
# REJECT, instead IGNORE this message.
let proposer = getProposer(dag, parent, block_header.slot).valueOr:
warn "cannot compute proposer for blob"
return errIgnore("BlobSidecar: Cannot compute proposer") # internal issue
if uint64(proposer) != block_header.proposer_index:
return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: Unexpected proposer")
# [REJECT] The proposer signature of `blob_sidecar.signed_block_header`,
# is valid with respect to the `block_header.proposer_index` pubkey.
if not verify_block_signature(
dag.forkAtEpoch(block_header.slot.epoch),
getStateField(dag.headState, genesis_validators_root),
block_header.slot,
block_root,
dag.validatorKey(proposer).get(),
blob_sidecar.signed_block_header.signature):
return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: Invalid proposer signature")
# [REJECT] The sidecar's blob is valid as verified by `verify_blob_kzg_proof(
# blob_sidecar.blob, blob_sidecar.kzg_commitment, blob_sidecar.kzg_proof)`.
block:
let ok = verifyBlobKzgProof(
KzgBlob(bytes: blob_sidecar.blob),
blob_sidecar.kzg_commitment,
blob_sidecar.kzg_proof).valueOr:
return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: blob verify failed")
if not ok:
return dag.checkedReject("BlobSidecar: blob invalid")
# Send notification about new blob sidecar via callback
if not(isNil(blobQuarantine.onBlobSidecarCallback)):
blobQuarantine.onBlobSidecarCallback BlobSidecarInfoObject(
block_root: hash_tree_root(blob_sidecar.signed_block_header.message),
index: blob_sidecar.index,
slot: blob_sidecar.signed_block_header.message.slot,
kzg_commitment: blob_sidecar.kzg_commitment,
versioned_hash:
blob_sidecar.kzg_commitment.kzg_commitment_to_versioned_hash.to0xHex())
ok()
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/bellatrix/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
proc validateBeaconBlock*(
dag: ChainDAGRef, quarantine: ref Quarantine,
signed_beacon_block: ForkySignedBeaconBlock,
wallTime: BeaconTime, flags: UpdateFlags): Result[void, ValidationError] =
# In general, checks are ordered from cheap to expensive. Especially, crypto
# verification could be quite a bit more expensive than the rest. This is an
# externally easy-to-invoke function by tossing network packets at the node.
# [IGNORE] The block is not from a future slot (with a
# MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. validate that
# signed_beacon_block.message.slot <= current_slot (a client MAY queue future
# blocks for processing at the appropriate slot).
if not (signed_beacon_block.message.slot <=
(wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY).slotOrZero):
return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: slot too high")
# [IGNORE] The block is from a slot greater than the latest finalized slot --
# i.e. validate that signed_beacon_block.message.slot >
# compute_start_slot_at_epoch(state.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)
if not (signed_beacon_block.message.slot > dag.finalizedHead.slot):
return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: slot already finalized")
# [IGNORE] The block is the first block with valid signature received for the
# proposer for the slot, signed_beacon_block.message.slot.
#
# While this condition is similar to the proposer slashing condition at
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/phase0/validator.md#proposer-slashing
# it's not identical, and this check does not address slashing:
#
# (1) The beacon blocks must be conflicting, i.e. different, for the same
# slot and proposer. This check also catches identical blocks.
#
# (2) By this point in the function, it's not been checked whether they're
# signed yet. As in general, expensive checks should be deferred, this
# would add complexity not directly relevant this function.
#
# (3) As evidenced by point (1), the similarity in the validation condition
# and slashing condition, while not coincidental, aren't similar enough
# to combine, as one or the other might drift.
#
# (4) Furthermore, this function, as much as possible, simply returns a yes
# or no answer, without modifying other state for p2p network interface
# validation. Complicating this interface, for the sake of sharing only
# couple lines of code, wouldn't be worthwhile.
#
# TODO might check unresolved/orphaned blocks too, and this might not see all
# blocks at a given slot (though, in theory, those get checked elsewhere), or
# adding metrics that count how often these conditions occur.
if dag.containsForkBlock(signed_beacon_block.root):
# The gossip algorithm itself already does one round of hashing to find
# already-seen data, but it is fairly aggressive about forgetting about
# what it has seen already
# "[IGNORE] The block is the first block ..."
return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: already seen")
let
slotBlock = getBlockIdAtSlot(dag, signed_beacon_block.message.slot)
if slotBlock.isSome() and slotBlock.get().isProposed() and
slotBlock.get().bid.slot == signed_beacon_block.message.slot:
let curBlock = dag.getForkedBlock(slotBlock.get().bid)
if curBlock.isOk():
let data = curBlock.get()
if getForkedBlockField(data, proposer_index) ==
signed_beacon_block.message.proposer_index and
data.signature.toRaw() != signed_beacon_block.signature.toRaw():
return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: already proposed in the same slot")
# [IGNORE] The block's parent (defined by block.parent_root) has been seen
# (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue blocks for
# processing once the parent block is retrieved).
#
# [REJECT] The block's parent (defined by block.parent_root)
# passes validation.
let parent = dag.getBlockRef(signed_beacon_block.message.parent_root).valueOr:
if signed_beacon_block.message.parent_root in quarantine[].unviable:
quarantine[].addUnviable(signed_beacon_block.root)
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/bellatrix/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
# `is_execution_enabled(state, block.body)` check, but unlike in
# validateBeaconBlockBellatrix() don't have parent BlockRef.
if signed_beacon_block.message.is_execution_block:
# Blocks with execution enabled will be permitted to propagate
# regardless of the validity of the execution payload. This prevents
# network segregation between optimistic and non-optimistic nodes.
#
# If execution_payload verification of block's parent by an execution
# node is not complete:
#
# - [REJECT] The block's parent (defined by `block.parent_root`) passes
# all validation (excluding execution node verification of the
# `block.body.execution_payload`).
#
# otherwise:
#
# - [IGNORE] The block's parent (defined by `block.parent_root`) passes
# all validation (including execution node verification of the
# `block.body.execution_payload`).
# Implementation restrictions:
#
# - We don't know if the parent state had execution enabled.
# If it had, and the block doesn't have it enabled anymore,
# we end up in the pre-Merge path below (`else`) and REJECT.
# Such a block is clearly invalid, though, without asking the EL.
#
# - We know that the parent was marked unviable, but don't know
# whether it was marked unviable due to consensus (REJECT) or
# execution (IGNORE) verification failure. We err on the IGNORE side.
return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: ignored, parent from unviable fork")
else:
# [REJECT] The block's parent (defined by `block.parent_root`) passes
# validation.
return dag.checkedReject(
"BeaconBlock: rejected, parent from unviable fork")
# When the parent is missing, we can't validate the block - we'll queue it
# in the quarantine for later processing
if (let r = quarantine[].addOrphan(
dag.finalizedHead.slot,
ForkedSignedBeaconBlock.init(signed_beacon_block)); r.isErr):
debug "validateBeaconBlock: could not add orphan",
blockRoot = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.root),
blck = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.message),
err = r.error()
else:
debug "Block quarantined",
blockRoot = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.root),
blck = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.message),
signature = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.signature)
return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: parent not found")
# Continues block parent validity checking in optimistic case, where it does
# appear as a `BlockRef` (and not handled above) but isn't usable for gossip
# validation.
validateBeaconBlockBellatrix(signed_beacon_block, parent)
# [REJECT] The block is from a higher slot than its parent.
if not (signed_beacon_block.message.slot > parent.bid.slot):
return dag.checkedReject(
"BeaconBlock: block not from higher slot than its parent")
# [REJECT] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of block -- i.e.
# get_ancestor(store, block.parent_root,
# compute_start_slot_at_epoch(store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)) ==
# store.finalized_checkpoint.root
let
finalized_checkpoint = getStateField(dag.headState, finalized_checkpoint)
ancestor = get_ancestor(parent, finalized_checkpoint.epoch.start_slot)
if ancestor.isNil:
# This shouldn't happen: we should always be able to trace the parent back
# to the finalized checkpoint (else it wouldn't be in the DAG)
return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: Can't find ancestor")
if not (
finalized_checkpoint.root == ancestor.root or
finalized_checkpoint.root.isZero):
quarantine[].addUnviable(signed_beacon_block.root)
return dag.checkedReject(
"BeaconBlock: Finalized checkpoint not an ancestor")
# [REJECT] The block is proposed by the expected proposer_index for the
# block's slot in the context of the current shuffling (defined by
# parent_root/slot). If the proposer_index cannot immediately be verified
# against the expected shuffling, the block MAY be queued for later
# processing while proposers for the block's branch are calculated -- in such
# a case do not REJECT, instead IGNORE this message.
let
proposer = getProposer(
dag, parent, signed_beacon_block.message.slot).valueOr:
warn "cannot compute proposer for block"
return errIgnore("BeaconBlock: Cannot compute proposer") # internal issue
if uint64(proposer) != signed_beacon_block.message.proposer_index:
quarantine[].addUnviable(signed_beacon_block.root)
return dag.checkedReject("BeaconBlock: Unexpected proposer")
# [REJECT] The proposer signature, signed_beacon_block.signature, is valid
# with respect to the proposer_index pubkey.
if not verify_block_signature(
dag.forkAtEpoch(signed_beacon_block.message.slot.epoch),
getStateField(dag.headState, genesis_validators_root),
signed_beacon_block.message.slot,
signed_beacon_block.root,
dag.validatorKey(proposer).get(),
signed_beacon_block.signature):
quarantine[].addUnviable(signed_beacon_block.root)
return dag.checkedReject("BeaconBlock: Invalid proposer signature")
ok()
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_attestation_subnet_id
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
proc validateAttestation*(
pool: ref AttestationPool,
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
attestation: phase0.Attestation,
wallTime: BeaconTime,
subnet_id: SubnetId, checkSignature: bool):
Future[Result[
tuple[attesting_index: ValidatorIndex, sig: CookedSig],
ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
# Some of the checks below have been reordered compared to the spec, to
# perform the cheap checks first - in particular, we want to avoid loading
# an `EpochRef` and checking signatures. This reordering might lead to
# different IGNORE/REJECT results in turn affecting gossip scores.
# [REJECT] The attestation's epoch matches its target -- i.e.
# attestation.data.target.epoch ==
# compute_epoch_at_slot(attestation.data.slot)
let slot = block:
let v = check_attestation_slot_target(attestation.data)
if v.isErr():
return pool.checkedReject(v.error())
v.get()
# attestation.data.slot is within the last ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE
# slots (within a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e.
# attestation.data.slot + ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE >= current_slot
# >= attestation.data.slot (a client MAY queue future attestations for
# processing at the appropriate slot).
#
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.2/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_attestation_subnet_id
# modifies this for Deneb and newer forks.
block:
let v = check_propagation_slot_range(
pool.dag.cfg.consensusForkAtEpoch(wallTime.slotOrZero.epoch), slot,
wallTime)
if v.isErr(): # [IGNORE]
return err(v.error())
# The attestation is unaggregated -- that is, it has exactly one
# participating validator (len([bit for bit in attestation.aggregation_bits
# if bit == 0b1]) == 1).
block:
let v = check_aggregation_count(attestation, singular = true)
if v.isErr(): # [REJECT]
return pool.checkedReject(v.error)
# The block being voted for (attestation.data.beacon_block_root) has been seen
# (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue attestations
# for processing once block is retrieved).
# [REJECT] The block being voted for (attestation.data.beacon_block_root)
# passes validation.
# [IGNORE] if block is unseen so far and enqueue it in missing blocks
let target = block:
let v = check_beacon_and_target_block(pool[], attestation.data)
if v.isErr(): # [IGNORE/REJECT]
return pool.checkedResult(v.error)
v.get()
# The following rule follows implicitly from that we clear out any
# unviable blocks from the chain dag:
#
# [IGNORE] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of the block
# defined by attestation.data.beacon_block_root -- i.e.
# get_checkpoint_block(store, attestation.data.beacon_block_root,
# store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch) == store.finalized_checkpoint.root
let
shufflingRef =
pool.dag.getShufflingRef(target.blck, target.slot.epoch, false).valueOr:
# Target is verified - shouldn't happen
warn "No shuffling for attestation - report bug",
attestation = shortLog(attestation), target = shortLog(target)
return errIgnore("Attestation: no shuffling")
# [REJECT] The committee index is within the expected range -- i.e.
# data.index < get_committee_count_per_slot(state, data.target.epoch).
let committee_index = block:
let idx = shufflingRef.get_committee_index(attestation.data.index)
if idx.isErr():
return pool.checkedReject(
"Attestation: committee index not within expected range")
idx.get()
# [REJECT] The attestation is for the correct subnet -- i.e.
# compute_subnet_for_attestation(committees_per_slot,
# attestation.data.slot, attestation.data.index) == subnet_id, where
# committees_per_slot = get_committee_count_per_slot(state,
# attestation.data.target.epoch), which may be pre-computed along with the
# committee information for the signature check.
block:
let v = check_attestation_subnet(
shufflingRef, attestation.data.slot, committee_index, subnet_id)
if v.isErr(): # [REJECT]
return pool.checkedReject(v.error)
# [REJECT] The number of aggregation bits matches the committee size -- i.e.
# len(attestation.aggregation_bits) == len(get_beacon_committee(state,
# data.slot, data.index)).
#
# This uses the same epochRef as data.target.epoch, because the attestation's
# epoch matches its target and attestation.data.target.root is an ancestor of
# attestation.data.beacon_block_root.
if not attestation.aggregation_bits.compatible_with_shuffling(
shufflingRef, slot, committee_index):
return pool.checkedReject(
"Attestation: number of aggregation bits and committee size mismatch")
let
fork = pool.dag.forkAtEpoch(attestation.data.slot.epoch)
attesting_index = get_attesting_indices_one(
shufflingRef, slot, committee_index, attestation.aggregation_bits)
# The number of aggregation bits matches the committee size, which ensures
# this condition holds.
doAssert attesting_index.isSome(),
"We've checked bits length and one count already"
let validator_index = attesting_index.get()
# There has been no other valid attestation seen on an attestation subnet
# that has an identical `attestation.data.target.epoch` and participating
# validator index.
# Slightly modified to allow only newer attestations than were previously
# seen (no point in propagating older votes)
if (pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 > validator_index.uint64) and
pool.nextAttestationEpoch[validator_index].subnet >
attestation.data.target.epoch:
return errIgnore("Attestation: Validator has already voted in epoch")
let pubkey = pool.dag.validatorKey(validator_index).valueOr:
# can't happen, in theory, because we checked the aggregator index above
return errIgnore("Attestation: cannot find validator pubkey")
# [REJECT] The signature of `attestation` is valid.
# In the spec, is_valid_indexed_attestation is used to verify the signature -
# here, we do a batch verification instead
let sig =
if checkSignature:
# Attestation signatures are batch-verified
let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto
.scheduleAttestationCheck(
fork, attestation.data, pubkey,
attestation.signature)
if deferredCrypto.isErr():
return pool.checkedReject(deferredCrypto.error)
let (cryptoFut, sig) = deferredCrypto.get()
# Await the crypto check
let x = (await cryptoFut)
case x
of BatchResult.Invalid:
return pool.checkedReject("Attestation: invalid signature")
of BatchResult.Timeout:
beacon_attestations_dropped_queue_full.inc()
return errIgnore("Attestation: timeout checking signature")
of BatchResult.Valid:
sig # keep going only in this case
else:
attestation.signature.load().valueOr:
return pool.checkedReject("Attestation: unable to load signature")
# Only valid attestations go in the list, which keeps validator_index
# in range
if not (pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 > validator_index.uint64):
pool.nextAttestationEpoch.setLen(validator_index.int + 1)
pool.nextAttestationEpoch[validator_index].subnet =
attestation.data.target.epoch + 1
return ok((validator_index, sig))
proc validateAttestation*(
pool: ref AttestationPool,
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
attestation: electra.Attestation,
wallTime: BeaconTime,
subnet_id: SubnetId, checkSignature: bool):
Future[Result[
tuple[attesting_index: ValidatorIndex, sig: CookedSig],
ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
debugComment "should reject a bunch"
# [REJECT] The attestation's epoch matches its target -- i.e.
# attestation.data.target.epoch ==
# compute_epoch_at_slot(attestation.data.slot)
let slot = block:
let v = check_attestation_slot_target(attestation.data)
if v.isErr():
return pool.checkedReject(v.error())
v.get()
# The block being voted for (attestation.data.beacon_block_root) has been seen
# (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue attestations
# for processing once block is retrieved).
# [REJECT] The block being voted for (attestation.data.beacon_block_root)
# passes validation.
# [IGNORE] if block is unseen so far and enqueue it in missing blocks
let target = block:
let v = check_beacon_and_target_block(pool[], attestation.data)
if v.isErr(): # [IGNORE/REJECT]
return pool.checkedResult(v.error)
v.get()
# The following rule follows implicitly from that we clear out any
# unviable blocks from the chain dag:
#
# [IGNORE] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of the block
# defined by attestation.data.beacon_block_root -- i.e.
# get_checkpoint_block(store, attestation.data.beacon_block_root,
# store.finalized_checkpoint.epoch) == store.finalized_checkpoint.root
let
shufflingRef =
pool.dag.getShufflingRef(target.blck, target.slot.epoch, false).valueOr:
# Target is verified - shouldn't happen
warn "No shuffling for attestation - report bug",
attestation = shortLog(attestation), target = shortLog(target)
return errIgnore("Attestation: no shuffling")
let attesting_index = get_attesting_indices_one(
shufflingRef, slot, attestation.committee_bits,
attestation.aggregation_bits, false)
# The number of aggregation bits matches the committee size, which ensures
# this condition holds.
doAssert attesting_index.isSome(),
"We've checked bits length and one count already"
let validator_index = attesting_index.get()
# In the spec, is_valid_indexed_attestation is used to verify the signature -
# here, we do a batch verification instead
let sig =
attestation.signature.load().valueOr:
return pool.checkedReject("Attestation: unable to load signature")
return ok((validator_index, sig))
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
proc validateAggregate*(
pool: ref AttestationPool,
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
signedAggregateAndProof: phase0.SignedAggregateAndProof,
wallTime: BeaconTime,
checkSignature = true, checkCover = true):
Future[Result[
tuple[attestingIndices: seq[ValidatorIndex], sig: CookedSig],
ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
# Some of the checks below have been reordered compared to the spec, to
# perform the cheap checks first - in particular, we want to avoid loading
# an `EpochRef` and checking signatures. This reordering might lead to
# different IGNORE/REJECT results in turn affecting gossip scores.
template aggregate_and_proof: untyped = signedAggregateAndProof.message
template aggregate: untyped = aggregate_and_proof.aggregate
# [REJECT] The aggregate attestation's epoch matches its target -- i.e.
# `aggregate.data.target.epoch == compute_epoch_at_slot(aggregate.data.slot)`
let slot = block:
let v = check_attestation_slot_target(aggregate.data)
if v.isErr():
return pool.checkedReject(v.error)
v.get()
# [IGNORE] aggregate.data.slot is within the last
# ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE slots (with a
# MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. aggregate.data.slot +
# ATTESTATION_PROPAGATION_SLOT_RANGE >= current_slot >= aggregate.data.slot
#
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.2/specs/deneb/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
# modifies this for Deneb and newer forks.
block:
let v = check_propagation_slot_range(
pool.dag.cfg.consensusForkAtEpoch(wallTime.slotOrZero.epoch), slot,
wallTime)
if v.isErr(): # [IGNORE]
return err(v.error())
# [IGNORE] The aggregate is the first valid aggregate received for the
# aggregator with index aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index for the epoch
# aggregate.data.target.epoch.
# Slightly modified to allow only newer attestations than were previously
# seen (no point in propagating older votes)
if (pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 >
aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index) and
pool.nextAttestationEpoch[
aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index].aggregate >
aggregate.data.target.epoch:
return errIgnore("Aggregate: validator has already aggregated in epoch")
# [REJECT] The attestation has participants -- that is,
# len(get_attesting_indices(state, aggregate.data, aggregate.aggregation_bits)) >= 1.
#
# get_attesting_indices() is:
# committee = get_beacon_committee(state, data.slot, data.index)
# return set(index for i, index in enumerate(committee) if bits[i])
#
# the attestation doesn't have participants is iff either:
# (1) the aggregation bits are all 0; or
# (2) the non-zero aggregation bits don't overlap with extant committee
# members, i.e. they counts don't match.
# But (2) would reflect an invalid aggregation in other ways, so reject it
# either way.
block:
let v = check_aggregation_count(aggregate, singular = false)
if v.isErr(): # [REJECT]
return pool.checkedReject(v.error)
# [REJECT] The block being voted for (aggregate.data.beacon_block_root)
# passes validation.
# [IGNORE] if block is unseen so far and enqueue it in missing blocks
let target = block:
let v = check_beacon_and_target_block(pool[], aggregate.data)
if v.isErr(): # [IGNORE/REJECT]
return pool.checkedResult(v.error)
v.get()
let
shufflingRef =
pool.dag.getShufflingRef(target.blck, target.slot.epoch, false).valueOr:
# Target is verified - shouldn't happen
warn "No shuffling for attestation - report bug",
aggregate = shortLog(aggregate), target = shortLog(target)
return errIgnore("Aggregate: no shuffling")
# [REJECT] The committee index is within the expected range -- i.e.
# data.index < get_committee_count_per_slot(state, data.target.epoch).
let committee_index = block:
let idx = shufflingRef.get_committee_index(aggregate.data.index)
if idx.isErr():
return pool.checkedReject(
"Attestation: committee index not within expected range")
idx.get()
if not aggregate.aggregation_bits.compatible_with_shuffling(
shufflingRef, slot, committee_index):
return pool.checkedReject(
"Aggregate: number of aggregation bits and committee size mismatch")
if checkCover and
pool[].covers(aggregate.data, aggregate.aggregation_bits):
# [IGNORE] A valid aggregate attestation defined by
# `hash_tree_root(aggregate.data)` whose `aggregation_bits` is a non-strict
# superset has _not_ already been seen.
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/2847
return errIgnore("Aggregate: already covered")
# [REJECT] aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof selects the validator as an
# aggregator for the slot -- i.e. is_aggregator(state, aggregate.data.slot,
# aggregate.data.index, aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof) returns True.
if not is_aggregator(
shufflingRef, slot, committee_index, aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof):
return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: incorrect aggregator")
# [REJECT] The aggregator's validator index is within the committee -- i.e.
# aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index in get_beacon_committee(state,
# aggregate.data.slot, aggregate.data.index).
let aggregator_index =
ValidatorIndex.init(aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index).valueOr:
return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: invalid aggregator index")
if aggregator_index notin
get_beacon_committee(shufflingRef, slot, committee_index):
return pool.checkedReject(
"Aggregate: aggregator's validator index not in committee")
# 1. [REJECT] The aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof is a valid signature
# of the aggregate.data.slot by the validator with index
# aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index.
# get_slot_signature(state, aggregate.data.slot, privkey)
# 2. [REJECT] The aggregator signature,
# signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
# 3. [REJECT] The signature of aggregate is valid.
let
fork = pool.dag.forkAtEpoch(aggregate.data.slot.epoch)
attesting_indices = get_attesting_indices(
shufflingRef, slot, committee_index, aggregate.aggregation_bits)
let
sig = if checkSignature:
let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto
.scheduleAggregateChecks(
fork, signedAggregateAndProof, pool.dag,
attesting_indices
)
if deferredCrypto.isErr():
return pool.checkedReject(deferredCrypto.error)
let
(aggregatorFut, slotFut, aggregateFut, sig) = deferredCrypto.get()
block:
# [REJECT] The aggregator signature,
# signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
let x = await aggregatorFut
case x
of BatchResult.Invalid:
return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: invalid aggregator signature")
of BatchResult.Timeout:
beacon_aggregates_dropped_queue_full.inc()
return errIgnore("Aggregate: timeout checking aggregator signature")
of BatchResult.Valid:
discard
block:
# [REJECT] aggregate_and_proof.selection_proof
let x = await slotFut
case x
of BatchResult.Invalid:
return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: invalid slot signature")
of BatchResult.Timeout:
beacon_aggregates_dropped_queue_full.inc()
return errIgnore("Aggregate: timeout checking slot signature")
of BatchResult.Valid:
discard
block:
# [REJECT] The aggregator signature,
# signed_aggregate_and_proof.signature, is valid.
let x = await aggregateFut
case x
of BatchResult.Invalid:
return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: invalid aggregate signature")
of BatchResult.Timeout:
beacon_aggregates_dropped_queue_full.inc()
return errIgnore("Aggregate: timeout checking aggregate signature")
of BatchResult.Valid:
discard
sig
else:
aggregate.signature.load().valueOr:
return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: unable to load signature")
# The following rule follows implicitly from that we clear out any
# unviable blocks from the chain dag:
#
# [IGNORE] The current finalized_checkpoint is an ancestor of the block
# defined by aggregate.data.beacon_block_root -- i.e.
# get_checkpoint_block(store, aggregate.data.beacon_block_root,
# finalized_checkpoint.epoch) == store.finalized_checkpoint.root
# Only valid aggregates go in the list
if pool.nextAttestationEpoch.lenu64 <= aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index:
pool.nextAttestationEpoch.setLen(
aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index.int + 1)
pool.nextAttestationEpoch[aggregate_and_proof.aggregator_index].aggregate =
aggregate.data.target.epoch + 1
return ok((attesting_indices, sig))
proc validateAggregate*(
pool: ref AttestationPool,
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
signedAggregateAndProof: electra.SignedAggregateAndProof,
wallTime: BeaconTime,
checkSignature = true, checkCover = true):
Future[Result[
tuple[attestingIndices: seq[ValidatorIndex], sig: CookedSig],
ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
template aggregate_and_proof: untyped = signedAggregateAndProof.message
template aggregate: untyped = aggregate_and_proof.aggregate
# [REJECT] The aggregate attestation's epoch matches its target -- i.e.
# `aggregate.data.target.epoch == compute_epoch_at_slot(aggregate.data.slot)`
let slot = block:
let v = check_attestation_slot_target(aggregate.data)
if v.isErr():
return pool.checkedReject(v.error)
v.get()
# [REJECT] The block being voted for (aggregate.data.beacon_block_root)
# passes validation.
# [IGNORE] if block is unseen so far and enqueue it in missing blocks
let target = block:
let v = check_beacon_and_target_block(pool[], aggregate.data)
if v.isErr(): # [IGNORE/REJECT]
return pool.checkedResult(v.error)
v.get()
let
shufflingRef =
pool.dag.getShufflingRef(target.blck, target.slot.epoch, false).valueOr:
# Target is verified - shouldn't happen
warn "No shuffling for attestation - report bug",
aggregate = shortLog(aggregate), target = shortLog(target)
return errIgnore("Aggregate: no shuffling")
# [REJECT] The committee index is within the expected range -- i.e.
# data.index < get_committee_count_per_slot(state, data.target.epoch).
let committee_index = block:
let idx = shufflingRef.get_committee_index(aggregate.data.index)
if idx.isErr():
return pool.checkedReject(
"Attestation: committee index not within expected range")
idx.get()
let
attesting_indices = get_attesting_indices(
shufflingRef, slot, committee_index, aggregate.aggregation_bits, false)
sig =
aggregate.signature.load().valueOr:
return pool.checkedReject("Aggregate: unable to load signature")
ok((attesting_indices, sig))
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.5.0-alpha.6/specs/capella/p2p-interface.md#bls_to_execution_change
proc validateBlsToExecutionChange*(
pool: ValidatorChangePool, batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
signed_address_change: SignedBLSToExecutionChange,
wallEpoch: Epoch): Future[Result[void, ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
# [IGNORE] `current_epoch >= CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH`, where `current_epoch` is
# defined by the current wall-clock time.
if not (wallEpoch >= pool.dag.cfg.CAPELLA_FORK_EPOCH):
return errIgnore(
"SignedBLSToExecutionChange: not accepting gossip until Capella")
# [IGNORE] The `signed_bls_to_execution_change` is the first valid signed bls
# to execution change received for the validator with index
# `signed_bls_to_execution_change.message.validator_index`.
if pool.isSeen(signed_address_change):
return errIgnore(
"SignedBLSToExecutionChange: not first valid change for validator index")
# [REJECT] All of the conditions within `process_bls_to_execution_change`
# pass validation.
withState(pool.dag.headState):
when consensusFork < ConsensusFork.Capella:
return errIgnore(
"SignedBLSToExecutionChange: can't validate against pre-Capella state")
else:
let res = check_bls_to_execution_change(
pool.dag.cfg.genesisFork, forkyState.data, signed_address_change,
{skipBlsValidation})
if res.isErr:
return pool.checkedReject(res.error)
# BLS to execution change signatures are batch-verified
let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto.scheduleBlsToExecutionChangeCheck(
pool.dag.cfg.genesisFork, signed_address_change)
if deferredCrypto.isErr():
return pool.checkedReject(deferredCrypto.error)
let (cryptoFut, _) = deferredCrypto.get()
case await cryptoFut
of BatchResult.Invalid:
return pool.checkedReject(
"SignedBLSToExecutionChange: invalid signature")
of BatchResult.Timeout:
return errIgnore(
"SignedBLSToExecutionChange: timeout checking signature")
of BatchResult.Valid:
discard # keep going only in this case
# Send notification about new BLS to execution change via callback
if not(isNil(pool.onBLSToExecutionChangeReceived)):
pool.onBLSToExecutionChangeReceived(signed_address_change)
return ok()
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attester_slashing
proc validateAttesterSlashing*(
pool: ValidatorChangePool, attester_slashing: phase0.AttesterSlashing):
Result[void, ValidationError] =
# [IGNORE] At least one index in the intersection of the attesting indices of
# each attestation has not yet been seen in any prior attester_slashing (i.e.
# attester_slashed_indices = set(attestation_1.attesting_indices).intersection(attestation_2.attesting_indices),
# verify if any(attester_slashed_indices.difference(prior_seen_attester_slashed_indices))).
if pool.isSeen(attester_slashing):
return errIgnore(
"AttesterSlashing: attester-slashed index already attester-slashed")
# [REJECT] All of the conditions within process_attester_slashing pass
# validation.
let attester_slashing_validity =
check_attester_slashing(pool.dag.headState, attester_slashing, {})
if attester_slashing_validity.isErr:
return pool.checkedReject(attester_slashing_validity.error)
# Send notification about new attester slashing via callback
if not(isNil(pool.onAttesterSlashingReceived)):
pool.onAttesterSlashingReceived(attester_slashing)
ok()
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.4/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#proposer_slashing
proc validateProposerSlashing*(
pool: ValidatorChangePool, proposer_slashing: ProposerSlashing):
Result[void, ValidationError] =
# Not from spec; the rest of NBC wouldn't have correctly processed it either.
if proposer_slashing.signed_header_1.message.proposer_index > int.high.uint64:
return errIgnore("ProposerSlashing: proposer-slashed index too high")
# [IGNORE] The proposer slashing is the first valid proposer slashing
# received for the proposer with index
# proposer_slashing.signed_header_1.message.proposer_index.
if pool.isSeen(proposer_slashing):
return errIgnore(
"ProposerSlashing: proposer-slashed index already proposer-slashed")
# [REJECT] All of the conditions within process_proposer_slashing
# pass validation.
let proposer_slashing_validity =
check_proposer_slashing(pool.dag.headState, proposer_slashing, {})
if proposer_slashing_validity.isErr:
return pool.checkedReject(proposer_slashing_validity.error)
# Send notification about new proposer slashing via callback
if not(isNil(pool.onProposerSlashingReceived)):
pool.onProposerSlashingReceived(proposer_slashing)
ok()
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#voluntary_exit
proc validateVoluntaryExit*(
pool: ValidatorChangePool, signed_voluntary_exit: SignedVoluntaryExit):
Result[void, ValidationError] =
# [IGNORE] The voluntary exit is the first valid voluntary exit received for
# the validator with index signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index.
if signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index >=
getStateField(pool.dag.headState, validators).lenu64:
return errIgnore("VoluntaryExit: validator index too high")
# Given that getStateField(pool.dag.headState, validators) is a seq,
# signed_voluntary_exit.message.validator_index.int is already valid, but
# check explicitly if one changes that data structure.
if pool.isSeen(signed_voluntary_exit):
return errIgnore(
"VoluntaryExit: validator index already voluntarily exited")
# [REJECT] All of the conditions within process_voluntary_exit pass
# validation.
let voluntary_exit_validity =
check_voluntary_exit(
pool.dag.cfg, pool.dag.headState, signed_voluntary_exit, {})
if voluntary_exit_validity.isErr:
return pool.checkedReject(voluntary_exit_validity.error)
# Send notification about new voluntary exit via callback
if not(isNil(pool.onVoluntaryExitReceived)):
pool.onVoluntaryExitReceived(signed_voluntary_exit)
ok()
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.1/specs/altair/p2p-interface.md#sync_committee_subnet_id
proc validateSyncCommitteeMessage*(
dag: ChainDAGRef,
quarantine: ref Quarantine,
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
syncCommitteeMsgPool: ref SyncCommitteeMsgPool,
msg: SyncCommitteeMessage,
subcommitteeIdx: SyncSubcommitteeIndex,
wallTime: BeaconTime,
checkSignature: bool):
Future[Result[
(BlockId, CookedSig, seq[uint64]), ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
block:
# [IGNORE] The message's slot is for the current slot (with a
# `MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY` allowance), i.e.
# `sync_committee_message.slot == current_slot`.
let v = check_slot_exact(msg.slot, wallTime)
if v.isErr():
return err(v.error())
# [REJECT] The subnet_id is valid for the given validator
# i.e. subnet_id in compute_subnets_for_sync_committee(state, sync_committee_message.validator_index).
# Note this validation implies the validator is part of the broader
# current sync committee along with the correct subcommittee.
# This check also ensures that the validator index is in range
let positionsInSubcommittee = dag.getSubcommitteePositions(
msg.slot + 1, subcommitteeIdx, msg.validator_index)
if positionsInSubcommittee.len == 0:
return dag.checkedReject(
"SyncCommitteeMessage: originator not part of sync committee")
# [IGNORE] The block being signed (`sync_committee_message.beacon_block_root`)
# has been seen (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue
# sync committee messages for processing once block is received)
# [REJECT] The block being signed (`sync_committee_message.beacon_block_root`)
# passes validation.
let
blockRoot = msg.beacon_block_root
blck = dag.getBlockRef(blockRoot).valueOr:
if blockRoot in quarantine[].unviable:
return dag.checkedReject("SyncCommitteeMessage: target invalid")
quarantine[].addMissing(blockRoot)
return errIgnore("SyncCommitteeMessage: target not found")
block:
# [IGNORE] There has been no other valid sync committee message for the
# declared `slot` for the validator referenced by
# `sync_committee_message.validator_index`
#
# Note this validation is per topic so that for a given slot, multiple
# messages could be forwarded with the same validator_index as long as
# the subnet_ids are distinct.
if syncCommitteeMsgPool[].isSeen(msg, subcommitteeIdx, dag.head.bid):
return errIgnore("SyncCommitteeMessage: duplicate message")
# [REJECT] The signature is valid for the message beacon_block_root for the
# validator referenced by validator_index.
let
senderPubKey = dag.validatorKey(msg.validator_index).valueOr:
return dag.checkedReject("SyncCommitteeMessage: invalid validator index")
let sig =
if checkSignature:
# Attestation signatures are batch-verified
let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto
.scheduleSyncCommitteeMessageCheck(
dag.forkAtEpoch(msg.slot.epoch),
msg.slot, msg.beacon_block_root,
senderPubKey, msg.signature)
if deferredCrypto.isErr():
return dag.checkedReject(deferredCrypto.error)
# Await the crypto check
let
(cryptoFut, sig) = deferredCrypto.get()
let x = (await cryptoFut)
case x
of BatchResult.Invalid:
return dag.checkedReject("SyncCommitteeMessage: invalid signature")
of BatchResult.Timeout:
beacon_sync_messages_dropped_queue_full.inc()
return errIgnore("SyncCommitteeMessage: timeout checking signature")
of BatchResult.Valid:
sig # keep going only in this case
else:
msg.signature.load().valueOr:
return dag.checkedReject(
"SyncCommitteeMessage: unable to load signature")
return ok((blck.bid, sig, positionsInSubcommittee))
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0/specs/altair/p2p-interface.md#sync_committee_contribution_and_proof
proc validateContribution*(
dag: ChainDAGRef,
quarantine: ref Quarantine,
batchCrypto: ref BatchCrypto,
syncCommitteeMsgPool: ref SyncCommitteeMsgPool,
msg: SignedContributionAndProof,
wallTime: BeaconTime,
checkSignature: bool
): Future[Result[
(BlockId, CookedSig, seq[ValidatorIndex]), ValidationError]] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError]).} =
block:
# [IGNORE] The contribution's slot is for the current slot
# (with a MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance)
# i.e. contribution.slot == current_slot.
let v = check_slot_exact(msg.message.contribution.slot, wallTime)
if v.isErr(): # [IGNORE]
return err(v.error())
# [REJECT] The subcommittee index is in the allowed range
# i.e. contribution.subcommittee_index < SYNC_COMMITTEE_SUBNET_COUNT.
let subcommitteeIdx = SyncSubcommitteeIndex.init(
msg.message.contribution.subcommittee_index).valueOr:
return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: subcommittee index too high")
# [REJECT] The contribution has participants
# that is, any(contribution.aggregation_bits).
if msg.message.contribution.aggregation_bits.isZeros:
return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: aggregation bits empty")
# [REJECT] contribution_and_proof.selection_proof selects the validator
# as an aggregator for the slot
# i.e. is_sync_committee_aggregator(contribution_and_proof.selection_proof)
# returns True.
if not is_sync_committee_aggregator(msg.message.selection_proof):
return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: invalid selection_proof")
# [IGNORE] The sync committee contribution is the first valid
# contribution received for the aggregator with index
# contribution_and_proof.aggregator_index for the slot contribution.slot
# and subcommittee index contribution.subcommittee_index
# (this requires maintaining a cache of size SYNC_COMMITTEE_SIZE for this
# topic that can be flushed after each slot).
if syncCommitteeMsgPool[].isSeen(msg.message):
return errIgnore("Contribution: validator has already aggregated in slot")
# [REJECT] The aggregator's validator index is in the declared subcommittee
# of the current sync committee.
# i.e. state.validators[contribution_and_proof.aggregator_index].pubkey in
# get_sync_subcommittee_pubkeys(state, contribution.subcommittee_index).
let
aggregator_index =
ValidatorIndex.init(msg.message.aggregator_index).valueOr:
return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: invalid aggregator index")
# TODO we take a copy of the participants to avoid the data going stale
# between validation and use - nonetheless, a design that avoids it and
# stays safe would be nice
participants = dag.syncCommitteeParticipants(
msg.message.contribution.slot + 1, subcommitteeIdx)
if aggregator_index notin participants:
return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: aggregator not in subcommittee")
# [IGNORE] The block being signed
# (`contribution_and_proof.contribution.beacon_block_root`) has been seen
# (via both gossip and non-gossip sources) (a client MAY queue sync committee
# contributions for processing once block is received)
# [REJECT] The block being signed
# (`contribution_and_proof.contribution.beacon_block_root`) passes validation.
let
blockRoot = msg.message.contribution.beacon_block_root
blck = dag.getBlockRef(blockRoot).valueOr:
if blockRoot in quarantine[].unviable:
return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: target invalid")
quarantine[].addMissing(blockRoot)
return errIgnore("Contribution: target not found")
# [IGNORE] A valid sync committee contribution with equal `slot`,
# `beacon_block_root` and `subcommittee_index` whose `aggregation_bits`
# is non-strict superset has _not_ already been seen.
if syncCommitteeMsgPool[].covers(msg.message.contribution, blck.bid):
return errIgnore("Contribution: already covered")
let sig = if checkSignature:
let deferredCrypto = batchCrypto.scheduleContributionChecks(
dag.forkAtEpoch(msg.message.contribution.slot.epoch),
msg, subcommitteeIdx, dag)
if deferredCrypto.isErr():
return dag.checkedReject(deferredCrypto.error)
let
(aggregatorFut, proofFut, contributionFut, sig) = deferredCrypto.get()
block:
# [REJECT] The aggregator signature,
# `signed_contribution_and_proof.signature`, is valid.
let x = await aggregatorFut
case x
of BatchResult.Invalid:
return dag.checkedReject(
"Contribution: invalid aggregator signature")
of BatchResult.Timeout:
beacon_contributions_dropped_queue_full.inc()
return errIgnore(
"Contribution: timeout checking aggregator signature")
of BatchResult.Valid:
discard
block:
# [REJECT] The `contribution_and_proof.selection_proof`
# is a valid signature of the `SyncAggregatorSelectionData`
# derived from the `contribution` by the validator with index
# `contribution_and_proof.aggregator_index`.
let x = await proofFut
case x
of BatchResult.Invalid:
return dag.checkedReject("Contribution: invalid proof")
of BatchResult.Timeout:
beacon_contributions_dropped_queue_full.inc()
return errIgnore("Contribution: timeout checking proof")
of BatchResult.Valid:
discard
block:
# [REJECT] The aggregate signature is valid for the message
# `beacon_block_root` and aggregate pubkey derived from the
# participation info in `aggregation_bits` for the subcommittee
# specified by the `contribution.subcommittee_index`.
let x = await contributionFut
case x
of BatchResult.Invalid:
return dag.checkedReject(
"Contribution: invalid contribution signature")
of BatchResult.Timeout:
beacon_contributions_dropped_queue_full.inc()
return errIgnore(
"Contribution: timeout checking contribution signature")
of BatchResult.Valid:
discard
sig
else:
msg.message.contribution.signature.load().valueOr:
return dag.checkedReject("SyncCommitteeMessage: unable to load signature")
return ok((blck.bid, sig, participants))
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/altair/light-client/p2p-interface.md#light_client_finality_update
proc validateLightClientFinalityUpdate*(
pool: var LightClientPool, dag: ChainDAGRef,
finality_update: ForkedLightClientFinalityUpdate,
wallTime: BeaconTime): Result[void, ValidationError] =
# [IGNORE] The `finalized_header.beacon.slot` is greater than that of all
# previously forwarded `finality_update`s, or it matches the highest
# previously forwarded slot and also has a `sync_aggregate` indicating
# supermajority (> 2/3) sync committee participation while the previously
# forwarded `finality_update` for that slot did not indicate supermajority
let finalized_slot = withForkyFinalityUpdate(finality_update):
when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
forkyFinalityUpdate.finalized_header.beacon.slot
else:
GENESIS_SLOT
if finalized_slot < pool.latestForwardedFinalitySlot:
return errIgnore("LightClientFinalityUpdate: slot already forwarded")
let has_supermajority = withForkyFinalityUpdate(finality_update):
when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
forkyFinalityUpdate.sync_aggregate.hasSupermajoritySyncParticipation
else:
false
if finalized_slot == pool.latestForwardedFinalitySlot:
if pool.latestForwardedFinalityHasSupermajority:
return errIgnore("LightClientFinalityUpdate: already have supermajority")
if not has_supermajority:
return errIgnore("LightClientFinalityUpdate: no new supermajority")
let
signature_slot = withForkyFinalityUpdate(finality_update):
when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
forkyFinalityUpdate.signature_slot
else:
GENESIS_SLOT
currentTime = wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY
forwardTime = signature_slot.light_client_finality_update_time
if currentTime < forwardTime:
# [IGNORE] The `finality_update` is received after the block at
# `signature_slot` was given enough time to propagate through the network.
return errIgnore("LightClientFinalityUpdate: received too early")
if not finality_update.matches(dag.lcDataStore.cache.latest):
# [IGNORE] The received `finality_update` matches the locally computed one
# exactly.
return errIgnore("LightClientFinalityUpdate: not matching local")
pool.latestForwardedFinalitySlot = finalized_slot
pool.latestForwardedFinalityHasSupermajority = has_supermajority
ok()
# https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/altair/light-client/p2p-interface.md#light_client_optimistic_update
proc validateLightClientOptimisticUpdate*(
pool: var LightClientPool, dag: ChainDAGRef,
optimistic_update: ForkedLightClientOptimisticUpdate,
wallTime: BeaconTime): Result[void, ValidationError] =
let attested_slot = withForkyOptimisticUpdate(optimistic_update):
when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
forkyOptimisticUpdate.attested_header.beacon.slot
else:
GENESIS_SLOT
if attested_slot <= pool.latestForwardedOptimisticSlot:
# [IGNORE] The `attested_header.beacon.slot` is greater than that of all
# previously forwarded `optimistic_update`s
return errIgnore("LightClientOptimisticUpdate: slot already forwarded")
let
signature_slot = withForkyOptimisticUpdate(optimistic_update):
when lcDataFork > LightClientDataFork.None:
forkyOptimisticUpdate.signature_slot
else:
GENESIS_SLOT
currentTime = wallTime + MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY
forwardTime = signature_slot.light_client_optimistic_update_time
if currentTime < forwardTime:
# [IGNORE] The `optimistic_update` is received after the block at
# `signature_slot` was given enough time to propagate through the network.
return errIgnore("LightClientOptimisticUpdate: received too early")
if not optimistic_update.matches(dag.lcDataStore.cache.latest):
# [IGNORE] The received `optimistic_update` matches the locally computed one
# exactly.
return errIgnore("LightClientOptimisticUpdate: not matching local")
pool.latestForwardedOptimisticSlot = attested_slot
ok()
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