nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/networking
Jacek Sieka 20e700fae4
Harden CommitteeIndex, SubnetId, SyncSubcommitteeIndex (#3259)
* Harden CommitteeIndex, SubnetId, SyncSubcommitteeIndex

Harden the use of `CommitteeIndex` et al to prevent future issues by
using a distinct type, then validating before use in several cases -
datatypes in spec are kept simple though so that invalid data still can
be read.

* fix invalid epoch used in REST
`/eth/v1/beacon/states/{state_id}/committees` committee length (could
return invalid data)
* normalize some variable names
* normalize committee index loops
* fix `RestAttesterDuty` to use `uint64` for `validator_committee_index`
* validate `CommitteeIndex` on ingress in REST API
* update rest rules with stricter parsing
* better REST serializers
* save lots of memory by not using `zip` ...at least a few bytes!
2022-01-09 01:28:49 +02:00
..
README.md Reorg (5/5) (#2377) 2021-03-05 14:12:00 +01:00
eth2_discovery.nim log doppelganger attestation signature; rm withState.HashedBeaconState uses (#2608) 2021-05-28 15:51:15 +03:00
eth2_network.nim Harden CommitteeIndex, SubnetId, SyncSubcommitteeIndex (#3259) 2022-01-09 01:28:49 +02:00
faststreams_backend.nim add copyright header to streams backends (#3177) 2021-12-10 02:28:09 +00:00
libp2p_json_serialization.nim EH cleanup (#2455) 2021-03-26 07:52:01 +01:00
libp2p_streams_backend.nim add copyright header to streams backends (#3177) 2021-12-10 02:28:09 +00:00
network_metadata.nim fix typo (`snapshop` -> `snapshot`) (#3192) 2021-12-14 15:44:34 +00:00
peer_pool.nim EH cleanup (#2455) 2021-03-26 07:52:01 +01:00

README.md

Networking

This folders hold a collection of modules to:

  • configure the Eth2 P2P network
  • discover, connect, and maintain quality Eth2 peers

Data received is handed other to the ../gossip_processing modules for validation.

Security concerns

  • Collusion: part of the peer selection must be kept random. This avoids peers bringing all their friends and colluding against a beacon node.
  • Denial-of-service: The beacon node must provide ways to handle burst of data that may come:
    • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
    • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations, forks