nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
tersec 79e886c6fc
implement EIP-7691 gossip validation for increased max blobs per block (#6785)
2024-12-23 14:06:14 +01:00
..
README.md automated consensus spec URL updating to v1.5.0-alpha.8 (#6617) 2024-10-09 08:37:35 +02:00
batch_validation.nim taskpools: bump (#6757) 2024-12-11 11:12:56 +00:00
block_processor.nim automated consensus spec URL updating to v1.5.0-alpha.9 (#6725) 2024-11-24 13:16:09 +01:00
eth2_processor.nim taskpools: bump (#6757) 2024-12-11 11:12:56 +00:00
gossip_validation.nim implement EIP-7691 gossip validation for increased max blobs per block (#6785) 2024-12-23 14:06:14 +01:00
light_client_processor.nim extend light client protocol for Electra (#6375) 2024-06-26 19:02:03 +00:00
optimistic_processor.nim remove Bellatrix EL syncing support from light client (#6352) 2024-06-14 01:23:17 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
    • blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
  • a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
    • Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
    • Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations