nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/networking
tersec 55ba43592b
req/resp status message requires zero hash for genesis finalized epoch (#6053)
2024-03-08 21:33:59 +01:00
..
README.md Reorg (5/5) (#2377) 2021-03-05 14:12:00 +01:00
eth2_discovery.nim remove unnecessary exports in `eth2_discovery` (#5987) 2024-02-28 13:34:16 +00:00
eth2_network.nim rm unused ForkedTrustedBeaconBlock; add some Electra overloads to consensus_object_pools; Electra BeaconBlock gossip support (#5965) 2024-02-26 06:49:12 +00:00
eth2_protocol_dsl.nim simplify eth2_network error handling (#5765) 2024-01-19 21:05:52 +00:00
libp2p_json_serialization.nim verify `genesis_time` more strictly (fixes #1667) (#5694) 2024-01-06 15:26:56 +01:00
network_metadata.nim fix `/eth/v1/beacon/deposit_snapshot` for EIP-4881 (#6038) 2024-03-08 14:22:03 +01:00
network_metadata_downloads.nim add missing `std/` prefix to more imports (#5696) 2024-01-06 07:18:28 +01:00
network_metadata_gnosis.S Revert "Revert "correctly align genesis size (#5244)" (#5253)" (#5254) 2023-08-04 20:49:12 +00:00
network_metadata_mainnet.S load Goerli metadata from `goerli` repo (#5680) 2024-01-02 16:15:44 +01:00
peer_pool.nim unrevert more of https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2/pull/5765 (#5834) 2024-01-29 08:35:16 +01:00
peer_protocol.nim req/resp status message requires zero hash for genesis finalized epoch (#6053) 2024-03-08 21:33:59 +01:00
peer_scores.nim verify `genesis_time` more strictly (fixes #1667) (#5694) 2024-01-06 15:26:56 +01:00
topic_params.nim verify `genesis_time` more strictly (fixes #1667) (#5694) 2024-01-06 15:26:56 +01:00

README.md

Networking

This folders hold a collection of modules to:

  • configure the Eth2 P2P network
  • discover, connect, and maintain quality Eth2 peers

Data received is handed other to the ../gossip_processing modules for validation.

Security concerns

  • Collusion: part of the peer selection must be kept random. This avoids peers bringing all their friends and colluding against a beacon node.
  • Denial-of-service: The beacon node must provide ways to handle burst of data that may come:
    • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
    • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations, forks