History

Etan Kissling 9924aec1e3 extend light client protocol for Electra (#6375 ) * extend light client protocol for Electra Add missing Electra support for light client protocol: - https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/pull/3811 Tested against PR consensus-spec-tests, the test runner automatically picks up the new tests once available. * workaround `version-2-0`: `Error: cannot instantiate: 'SomeUnsignedInt'` * fix initialization when Electra not scheduled * try reduce stack size in test * put correct sync committee branch version into DB * adjust fork schedule in light client data tests * further reduce stack size * split function into multiple parts * rename variable * regenerate test reports to cover new Electra tests * add Nim bug reference		2024-06-26 19:02:03 +00:00
..
README.md	some consensus spec v1.4.0 spec URL updates (#6208 )	2024-04-17 05:51:16 +02:00
batch_validation.nim	add some support for electra aggregated attestations (#6283 )	2024-05-14 06:12:35 +02:00
block_processor.nim	rm Goerli remnant; add explanatory comment about opt sync validation (#6365 )	2024-06-17 09:40:41 +00:00
eth2_processor.nim	VC/NIMBUS-BN validators protection. (#6329 )	2024-06-11 19:38:16 +00:00
gossip_validation.nim	automated consensus spec URL updating to v1.5.0-alpha.3 (#6364 )	2024-06-16 02:59:25 +02:00
light_client_processor.nim	extend light client protocol for Electra (#6375 )	2024-06-26 19:02:03 +00:00
optimistic_processor.nim	remove Bellatrix EL syncing support from light client (#6352 )	2024-06-14 01:23:17 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

validate raw gossip data before
- rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
- sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

Blocks: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
Attestations (aggregated): https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
Attestations (unaggregated): https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attestation-subnets
Voluntary exits: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.4/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#voluntary_exit
Proposer slashings: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#proposer_slashing
Attester slashing: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.4.0-beta.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attester_slashing

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
- We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
- which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
- blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
- This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
- Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
- Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations