nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/gossip_processing
Etan Kissling 4743807079 use errReject template everywhere
There were still a few instances that used the expansion of `errReject`
instead of using the template itself. It seems that those cases were
forgotten as part of other cleanups in #2809. Done now for readability.
2021-09-29 14:16:09 +03:00
..
README.md update 40 spec URLs to v1.1.0 (#2918) 2021-09-28 18:23:15 +00:00
batch_validation.nim Parallel attestation verification (#2718) 2021-09-17 03:13:52 +03:00
block_processor.nim implement forked merge state/block support (#2890) 2021-09-27 14:22:58 +00:00
consensus_manager.nim disentangle eth2 types from the ssz library (#2785) 2021-08-18 20:57:58 +02:00
eth2_processor.nim Parallel attestation verification (#2718) 2021-09-17 03:13:52 +03:00
gossip_validation.nim use errReject template everywhere 2021-09-29 14:16:09 +03:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

  • validate raw gossip data before
    • rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
    • sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

  • a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
    • We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
    • which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
  • a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
    • blocksQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
    • This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
  • a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
    • Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
    • Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

  • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
  • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations