342 lines
12 KiB
Nim
342 lines
12 KiB
Nim
# beacon_chain
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# Copyright (c) 2018-2021 Status Research & Development GmbH
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# Licensed and distributed under either of
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# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
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# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
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# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
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{.push raises: [Defect].}
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import
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std/tables,
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stew/results,
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chronicles, chronos, metrics,
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../spec/[crypto, digest],
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../spec/datatypes/base,
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../consensus_object_pools/[block_clearance, blockchain_dag, exit_pool, attestation_pool],
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./gossip_validation, ./block_processor,
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./batch_validation,
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../validators/validator_pool,
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../beacon_node_types,
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../beacon_clock, ../ssz/sszdump
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# Metrics for tracking attestation and beacon block loss
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declareCounter beacon_attestations_received,
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"Number of beacon chain attestations received by this peer"
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declareCounter beacon_aggregates_received,
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"Number of beacon chain aggregate attestations received by this peer"
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declareCounter beacon_blocks_received,
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"Number of beacon chain blocks received by this peer"
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declareCounter beacon_attester_slashings_received,
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"Number of beacon chain attester slashings received by this peer"
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declareCounter beacon_proposer_slashings_received,
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"Number of beacon chain proposer slashings received by this peer"
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declareCounter beacon_voluntary_exits_received,
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"Number of beacon chain voluntary exits received by this peer"
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const delayBuckets = [2.0, 4.0, 6.0, 8.0, 10.0, 12.0, 14.0, Inf]
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declareHistogram beacon_attestation_delay,
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"Time(s) between slot start and attestation reception", buckets = delayBuckets
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declareHistogram beacon_aggregate_delay,
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"Time(s) between slot start and aggregate reception", buckets = delayBuckets
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declareHistogram beacon_block_delay,
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"Time(s) between slot start and beacon block reception", buckets = delayBuckets
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type
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DoppelgangerProtection = object
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broadcastStartEpoch*: Epoch ##\
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## Set anew, each time gossip is re-enabled after syncing completes, so
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## might reset multiple times per instance. This allows some safe level
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## of gossip interleaving between nodes so long as they don't gossip at
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## the same time.
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nodeLaunchSlot: Slot ##\
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## Set once, at node launch. This functions as a basic protection against
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## false positives from attestations persisting within the gossip network
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## across quick restarts.
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Eth2Processor* = object
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doppelGangerDetectionEnabled*: bool
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getWallTime*: GetWallTimeFn
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# Local sources of truth for validation
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------
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dag*: ChainDAGRef
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attestationPool*: ref AttestationPool
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validatorPool: ref ValidatorPool
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doppelgangerDetection*: DoppelgangerProtection
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# Gossip validated -> enqueue for further verification
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------
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blockProcessor: ref BlockProcessor
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# Validated with no further verification required
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------
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exitPool: ref ExitPool
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# Almost validated, pending cryptographic signature check
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------
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batchCrypto*: ref BatchCrypto
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# Missing information
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------
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quarantine*: QuarantineRef
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# Initialization
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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proc new*(T: type Eth2Processor,
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doppelGangerDetectionEnabled: bool,
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blockProcessor: ref BlockProcessor,
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dag: ChainDAGRef,
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attestationPool: ref AttestationPool,
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exitPool: ref ExitPool,
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validatorPool: ref ValidatorPool,
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quarantine: QuarantineRef,
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rng: ref BrHmacDrbgContext,
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getWallTime: GetWallTimeFn): ref Eth2Processor =
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(ref Eth2Processor)(
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doppelGangerDetectionEnabled: doppelGangerDetectionEnabled,
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doppelgangerDetection: DoppelgangerProtection(
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nodeLaunchSlot: getWallTime().slotOrZero),
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getWallTime: getWallTime,
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blockProcessor: blockProcessor,
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dag: dag,
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attestationPool: attestationPool,
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exitPool: exitPool,
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validatorPool: validatorPool,
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quarantine: quarantine,
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batchCrypto: BatchCrypto.new(
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rng = rng,
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# Only run eager attestation signature verification if we're not
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# processing blocks in order to give priority to block processing
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eager = proc(): bool = not blockProcessor[].hasBlocks())
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)
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# Gossip Management
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# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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proc blockValidator*(
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self: var Eth2Processor,
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signedBlock: SignedBeaconBlock): ValidationResult =
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logScope:
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signedBlock = shortLog(signedBlock.message)
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blockRoot = shortLog(signedBlock.root)
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let
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wallTime = self.getWallTime()
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(afterGenesis, wallSlot) = wallTime.toSlot()
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if not afterGenesis:
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return ValidationResult.Ignore # not an issue with block, so don't penalize
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logScope: wallSlot
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let delay = wallTime - signedBlock.message.slot.toBeaconTime
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if signedBlock.root in self.dag:
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# The gossip algorithm itself already does one round of hashing to find
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# already-seen data, but it is fairly aggressive about forgetting about
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# what it has seen already
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debug "Dropping already-seen gossip block", delay
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return ValidationResult.Ignore # "[IGNORE] The block is the first block ..."
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# Start of block processing - in reality, we have already gone through SSZ
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# decoding at this stage, which may be significant
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debug "Block received", delay
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let blck = self.dag.isValidBeaconBlock(
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self.quarantine, signedBlock, wallTime, {})
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self.blockProcessor[].dumpBlock(signedBlock, blck)
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if not blck.isOk:
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return blck.error[0]
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beacon_blocks_received.inc()
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beacon_block_delay.observe(delay.toFloatSeconds())
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# Block passed validation - enqueue it for processing. The block processing
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# queue is effectively unbounded as we use a freestanding task to enqueue
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# the block - this is done so that when blocks arrive concurrently with
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# sync, we don't lose the gossip blocks, but also don't block the gossip
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# propagation of seemingly good blocks
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trace "Block validated"
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self.blockProcessor[].addBlock(
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signedBlock, validationDur = self.getWallTime() - wallTime)
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ValidationResult.Accept
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proc checkForPotentialDoppelganger(
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self: var Eth2Processor, attestation: Attestation,
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attesterIndices: openArray[ValidatorIndex]) =
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# Only check for attestations after node launch. There might be one slot of
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# overlap in quick intra-slot restarts so trade off a few true negatives in
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# the service of avoiding more likely false positives.
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if attestation.data.slot <= self.doppelgangerDetection.nodeLaunchSlot + 1:
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return
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if attestation.data.slot.epoch <
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self.doppelgangerDetection.broadcastStartEpoch:
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let tgtBlck = self.dag.getRef(attestation.data.target.root)
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doAssert not tgtBlck.isNil # because attestation is valid above
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let epochRef = self.dag.getEpochRef(
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tgtBlck, attestation.data.target.epoch)
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for validatorIndex in attesterIndices:
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let validatorPubkey = epochRef.validatorKey(validatorIndex).get().toPubKey()
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if self.doppelgangerDetectionEnabled and
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self.validatorPool[].getValidator(validatorPubkey) !=
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default(AttachedValidator):
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warn "We believe you are currently running another instance of the same validator. We've disconnected you from the network as this presents a significant slashing risk. Possible next steps are (a) making sure you've disconnected your validator from your old machine before restarting the client; and (b) running the client again with the gossip-slashing-protection option disabled, only if you are absolutely sure this is the only instance of your validator running, and reporting the issue at https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2/issues.",
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validatorIndex,
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validatorPubkey,
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attestation = shortLog(attestation)
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quit QuitFailure
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proc attestationValidator*(
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self: ref Eth2Processor,
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attestation: Attestation,
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subnet_id: SubnetId,
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checkSignature: bool = true): Future[ValidationResult] {.async.} =
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logScope:
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attestation = shortLog(attestation)
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subnet_id
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let wallTime = self.getWallTime()
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var (afterGenesis, wallSlot) = wallTime.toSlot()
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if not afterGenesis:
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notice "Attestation before genesis"
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return ValidationResult.Ignore
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logScope: wallSlot
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# Potential under/overflows are fine; would just create odd metrics and logs
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let delay = wallTime - attestation.data.slot.toBeaconTime
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debug "Attestation received", delay
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# Now proceed to validation
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let v = await self.attestationPool.validateAttestation(
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self.batchCrypto, attestation, wallTime, subnet_id, checkSignature)
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if v.isErr():
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debug "Dropping attestation", validationError = v.error
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return v.error[0]
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# Due to async validation the wallSlot here might have changed
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(afterGenesis, wallSlot) = self.getWallTime().toSlot()
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beacon_attestations_received.inc()
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beacon_attestation_delay.observe(delay.toFloatSeconds())
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let (attestation_index, sig) = v.get()
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self[].checkForPotentialDoppelganger(attestation, [attestation_index])
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trace "Attestation validated"
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self.attestationPool[].addAttestation(
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attestation, [attestation_index], sig, wallSlot)
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return ValidationResult.Accept
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proc aggregateValidator*(
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self: ref Eth2Processor,
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signedAggregateAndProof: SignedAggregateAndProof): Future[ValidationResult] {.async.} =
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logScope:
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aggregate = shortLog(signedAggregateAndProof.message.aggregate)
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signature = shortLog(signedAggregateAndProof.signature)
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let wallTime = self.getWallTime()
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var (afterGenesis, wallSlot) = wallTime.toSlot()
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if not afterGenesis:
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notice "Aggregate before genesis"
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return ValidationResult.Ignore
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logScope: wallSlot
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# Potential under/overflows are fine; would just create odd logs
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let delay =
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wallTime - signedAggregateAndProof.message.aggregate.data.slot.toBeaconTime
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debug "Aggregate received", delay
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let v = await self.attestationPool.validateAggregate(
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self.batchCrypto,
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signedAggregateAndProof, wallTime)
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if v.isErr:
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debug "Dropping aggregate",
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validationError = v.error,
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aggregator_index = signedAggregateAndProof.message.aggregator_index,
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selection_proof = signedAggregateAndProof.message.selection_proof,
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wallSlot
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return v.error[0]
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# Due to async validation the wallSlot here might have changed
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(afterGenesis, wallSlot) = self.getWallTime().toSlot()
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beacon_aggregates_received.inc()
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beacon_aggregate_delay.observe(delay.toFloatSeconds())
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let (attesting_indices, sig) = v.get()
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self[].checkForPotentialDoppelganger(
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signedAggregateAndProof.message.aggregate, attesting_indices)
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trace "Aggregate validated",
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aggregator_index = signedAggregateAndProof.message.aggregator_index,
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selection_proof = signedAggregateAndProof.message.selection_proof
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self.attestationPool[].addAttestation(
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signedAggregateAndProof.message.aggregate, attesting_indices, sig, wallSlot)
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return ValidationResult.Accept
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proc attesterSlashingValidator*(
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self: var Eth2Processor, attesterSlashing: AttesterSlashing):
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ValidationResult =
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logScope:
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attesterSlashing = shortLog(attesterSlashing)
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let v = self.exitPool[].validateAttesterSlashing(attesterSlashing)
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if v.isErr:
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debug "Dropping attester slashing", validationError = v.error
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return v.error[0]
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beacon_attester_slashings_received.inc()
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ValidationResult.Accept
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proc proposerSlashingValidator*(
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self: var Eth2Processor, proposerSlashing: ProposerSlashing):
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ValidationResult =
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logScope:
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proposerSlashing = shortLog(proposerSlashing)
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let v = self.exitPool[].validateProposerSlashing(proposerSlashing)
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if v.isErr:
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debug "Dropping proposer slashing", validationError = v.error
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return v.error[0]
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beacon_proposer_slashings_received.inc()
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ValidationResult.Accept
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proc voluntaryExitValidator*(
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self: var Eth2Processor, signedVoluntaryExit: SignedVoluntaryExit):
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ValidationResult =
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logScope:
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signedVoluntaryExit = shortLog(signedVoluntaryExit)
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let v = self.exitPool[].validateVoluntaryExit(signedVoluntaryExit)
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if v.isErr:
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debug "Dropping voluntary exit", validationError = v.error
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return v.error[0]
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beacon_voluntary_exits_received.inc()
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ValidationResult.Accept
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