mirror of https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2.git synced 2025-02-15 16:06:45 +00:00

History

Whether new blocks/attestations/etc are produced internally or received
via REST, their journey through the node is the same - to ensure that
they get the same treatment (logging, metrics, processing), this PR
moves the routing to a dedicated module and fixes several small
differences that existed before.

* `xxxValidator` -> `processMessageName` - the processor also was adding
messages to pools, so we want the name to reflect that action
* add missing "sent" metrics for some messages
* document ignore policy better - already-seen messages are not actaully
rebroadcast by libp2p
* skip redundant signature checks for internal validators consistently

2022-07-06 16:11:44 +00:00

batch_validation.nim

bearssl: split abi (#3755 )

2022-06-21 10:29:16 +02:00

block_processor.nim

Introduce message router (#3829 )

2022-07-06 16:11:44 +00:00

consensus_manager.nim

optimistic sync (#3793 )

2022-07-04 23:35:33 +03:00

eth2_processor.nim

Introduce message router (#3829 )

2022-07-06 16:11:44 +00:00

gossip_validation.nim

Introduce message router (#3829 )

2022-07-06 16:11:44 +00:00

light_client_processor.nim

Introduce message router (#3829 )

2022-07-06 16:11:44 +00:00

README.md

update CL spec URLs (#3690 )

2022-06-01 15:52:45 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

validate raw gossip data before
- rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
- sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

Blocks: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.1.10/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
Attestations (aggregated): https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.1.10/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
Attestations (unaggregated): https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.2.0-rc.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attestation-subnets
Voluntary exits: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.2.0-rc.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#voluntary_exit
Proposer slashings: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.2.0-rc.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#proposer_slashing
Attester slashing: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.2.0-rc.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attester_slashing

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
- We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
- which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
- blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
- This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
- Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
- Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations