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History

Simplify block quarantine blobless (#4824 )

* Simplify block quarantine blobless

The quarantine blobless table was initially keyed off of (Eth2Digest,
ValidatorSig). This was modelled off the orphan table. The presence of
the signature in the key is necessary for orphans, because we can't
verify the signature for an orphan. That is not the case for a
blobless block, where the signature can be verified.

So this PR changes the blobless block table to be keyed off a
Eth2Digest only. This simplifies the retrieval and handling of
blobless blocks.

* review feedback

2023-04-16 08:37:56 +00:00

batch_validation.nim

refactor batch validation not to require genesis_validators_root each time (#4640 )

2023-02-20 09:26:22 +01:00

block_processor.nim

Simplify block quarantine blobless (#4824 )

2023-04-16 08:37:56 +00:00

eth2_processor.nim

Simplify block quarantine blobless (#4824 )

2023-04-16 08:37:56 +00:00

gossip_validation.nim

rename loadExecutionBlockRoot > loadExecutionBlockHash (#4807 )

2023-04-11 16:56:29 +00:00

light_client_processor.nim

bump light client spec references to v1.3.0-rc.3 (#4719 )

2023-03-11 01:11:51 +00:00

optimistic_processor.nim

remove Nim 1.2-compatible push raises and update copyright notice years (#4528 )

2023-01-20 14:14:37 +00:00

README.md

automated consensus spec URL updating from v1.3.0-rc.4 to rc.5 (#4756 )

2023-03-21 00:42:22 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

validate raw gossip data before
- rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
- sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

Blocks: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0-rc.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
Attestations (aggregated): https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0-rc.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
Attestations (unaggregated): https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0-rc.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attestation-subnets
Voluntary exits: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0-rc.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#voluntary_exit
Proposer slashings: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0-rc.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#proposer_slashing
Attester slashing: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.3.0-rc.5/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attester_slashing

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
- We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
- which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
- blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
- This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
- Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
- Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations