History

tersec b1d5609171 remove false OnBlockAdded dependency on phase0 HashedBeaconState (#2661 ) * remove false OnBlockAdded dependency on phase.HashedBeaconState * introduce altair data types into block_clearance; update some alpha.6 spec refs to alpha.7; add get_active_validator_indices_len ForkedHashedBeaconState wrapper * switch many modules from using datatypes (with phase0 states/blocks) to datatypes/base (fork-independent); update spec refs from alpha.6 to alpha.7 and remove rm'd G2_POINT_AT_INFINITY * switch more modules from using datatypes (with phase0 states/blocks) to datatypes/base (fork-independent); update spec refs from alpha.6 to alpha.7 * remove unnecessary phase0-only wrapper of get_attesting_indices(); allow signatures_batch to process either fork; remove O(n^2) nested loop in process_inactivity_updates(); add altair support to getAttestationsforTestBlock() * add Altair versions of asSigVerified(), asTrusted(), and makeBeaconBlock() * fix spec URL to be Altair for Altair makeBeaconBlock()		2021-06-21 08:35:24 +00:00
..
README.md	Reorg (5/5) (#2377 )	2021-03-05 14:12:00 +01:00
batch_validation.nim	remove false OnBlockAdded dependency on phase0 HashedBeaconState (#2661 )	2021-06-21 08:35:24 +00:00
block_processor.nim	remove false OnBlockAdded dependency on phase0 HashedBeaconState (#2661 )	2021-06-21 08:35:24 +00:00
consensus_manager.nim	singe validator key cache	2021-06-01 20:43:44 +03:00
eth2_processor.nim	remove false OnBlockAdded dependency on phase0 HashedBeaconState (#2661 )	2021-06-21 08:35:24 +00:00
gossip_validation.nim	use ForkedHashedBeaconState in StateData (#2634 )	2021-06-11 20:51:46 +03:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folders hold a collection of modules to:

validate raw gossip data before
- rebroadcasting them (potentially aggregated)
- sending it to one of the consensus object pool

Validation

Gossip Validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

Blocks: https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
Attestations (aggregate): https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
Attestations (single): https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attestation-subnets
Exits: https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#voluntary_exit
Proposer slashings: https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#proposer_slashing
Attester slashing: https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attester_slashing

There are 2 consumers of validated consensus objects:

a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
- method validate(PubSub, message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim in the
- which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
a xyzValidator message enqueues the validated object in one of the processing queue in eth2_processor
- blocksQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry], (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
- attestationsQueue: AsyncQueue[AttestationEntry]
- aggregatesQueue: AsyncQueue[AggregateEntry]

Those queues are then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle burst of data that may come:

from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations, forks