nimbus-eth2/beacon_chain/networking
tersec 16c21e1c1e
rm unused code/type conversoins; re-enable Electra block gossip verification (#6545)
2024-09-12 11:11:08 +02:00
..
README.md Reorg (5/5) (#2377) 2021-03-05 14:12:00 +01:00
eth2_agents.nim fix some UnusedImport warnings (#6448) 2024-07-25 08:49:26 +00:00
eth2_discovery.nim Replace deprecated ENR functions (#6419) 2024-07-12 17:18:24 +02:00
eth2_network.nim some v1.5.0-alpha.5 consensus spec URL updates (#6509) 2024-08-23 12:43:54 +02:00
eth2_protocol_dsl.nim simplify eth2_network error handling (#5765) 2024-01-19 21:05:52 +00:00
libp2p_json_serialization.nim verify `genesis_time` more strictly (fixes #1667) (#5694) 2024-01-06 15:26:56 +01:00
network_metadata.nim rm unused code/type conversoins; re-enable Electra block gossip verification (#6545) 2024-09-12 11:11:08 +02:00
network_metadata_downloads.nim add missing `std/` prefix to more imports (#5696) 2024-01-06 07:18:28 +01:00
network_metadata_gnosis.S Revert "Revert "correctly align genesis size (#5244)" (#5253)" (#5254) 2023-08-04 20:49:12 +00:00
network_metadata_mainnet.S bump sepolia for new bootnodes (#6421) 2024-07-11 07:13:37 +02:00
peer_pool.nim rank peers by their score instead of their memory address (#6149) 2024-04-10 14:09:37 +02:00
peer_protocol.nim BN: User agent recognition and error codes decoding. (#6414) 2024-07-15 16:53:41 +02:00
peer_scores.nim add branch discovery module for supporting chain stall situation (#6125) 2024-03-24 08:41:47 +00:00
topic_params.nim verify `genesis_time` more strictly (fixes #1667) (#5694) 2024-01-06 15:26:56 +01:00

README.md

Networking

This folders hold a collection of modules to:

  • configure the Eth2 P2P network
  • discover, connect, and maintain quality Eth2 peers

Data received is handed other to the ../gossip_processing modules for validation.

Security concerns

  • Collusion: part of the peer selection must be kept random. This avoids peers bringing all their friends and colluding against a beacon node.
  • Denial-of-service: The beacon node must provide ways to handle burst of data that may come:
    • from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
    • from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations, forks