mirror of https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2.git synced 2025-02-04 10:43:40 +00:00

History

* optimistic sync

* flag that initially loaded blocks from database might need execution block root filled in

* return optimistic status in REST calls

* refactor blockslot pruning

* ensure beacon_blocks_by_{root,range} do not provide optimistic blocks

* handle forkchoice head being pre-merge with block being postmerge

* re-enable blocking head updates on validator duties

* fix is_optimistic_candidate_block per spec; don't crash with nil future

* fix is_optimistic_candidate_block per spec; don't crash with nil future

* mark blocks sans execution payloads valid during head update

2022-07-04 23:35:33 +03:00

batch_validation.nim

bearssl: split abi (#3755 )

2022-06-21 10:29:16 +02:00

block_processor.nim

optimistic sync (#3793 )

2022-07-04 23:35:33 +03:00

consensus_manager.nim

optimistic sync (#3793 )

2022-07-04 23:35:33 +03:00

eth2_processor.nim

bearssl: split abi (#3755 )

2022-06-21 10:29:16 +02:00

gossip_validation.nim

encapsulate LC data variables into single structure (#3777 )

2022-06-24 16:57:50 +02:00

light_client_processor.nim

integrate light client into beacon node (#3557 )

2022-06-07 19:01:11 +02:00

README.md

update CL spec URLs (#3690 )

2022-06-01 15:52:45 +00:00

README.md

Gossip Processing

This folder holds a collection of modules to:

validate raw gossip data before
- rebroadcasting it (potentially aggregated)
- sending it to one of the consensus object pools

Validation

Gossip validation is different from consensus verification in particular for blocks.

Blocks: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.1.10/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_block
Attestations (aggregated): https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.1.10/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#beacon_aggregate_and_proof
Attestations (unaggregated): https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.2.0-rc.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attestation-subnets
Voluntary exits: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.2.0-rc.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#voluntary_exit
Proposer slashings: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.2.0-rc.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#proposer_slashing
Attester slashing: https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.2.0-rc.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#attester_slashing

There are multiple consumers of validated consensus objects:

a ValidationResult.Accept output triggers rebroadcasting in libp2p
- We jump into method validate(PubSub, Message) in libp2p/protocols/pubsub/pubsub.nim
- which was called by rpcHandler(GossipSub, PubSubPeer, RPCMsg)
a blockValidator message enqueues the validated object to the processing queue in block_processor
- blockQueue: AsyncQueue[BlockEntry] (shared with request_manager and sync_manager)
- This queue is then regularly processed to be made available to the consensus object pools.
a xyzValidator message adds the validated object to a pool in eth2_processor
- Attestations (unaggregated and aggregated) get collected into batches.
- Once a threshold is exceeded or after a timeout, they get validated together using BatchCrypto.

Security concerns

As the first line of defense in Nimbus, modules must be able to handle bursts of data that may come:

from malicious nodes trying to DOS us
from long periods of non-finality, creating lots of forks, attestations