# beacon_chain # Copyright (c) 2018 Status Research & Development GmbH # Licensed and distributed under either of # * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT). # * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0). # at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms. # Uncategorized helper functions from the spec import ./datatypes, ./digest, sequtils, math # TODO spec candidate? there's bits in nim-ranges but that one has some API # issues regarding bit endianess that need resolving.. func bitIsSet*(bitfield: openArray[byte], index: int): bool = (bitfield[index div 8] shr byte(7 - (index mod 8))) mod 2 > 0'u8 func bitSet*(bitfield: var openArray[byte], index: int) = bitfield[index div 8] = bitfield[index div 8] or 1'u8 shl (7 - (index mod 8)) func mod_get[T](arr: openarray[T], pos: Natural): T = arr[pos mod arr.len] func shuffle*[T](values: seq[T], seed: Eth2Digest): seq[T] = ## Returns the shuffled ``values`` with seed as entropy. ## TODO: this calls out for tests, but I odn't particularly trust spec ## right now. let values_count = values.len const # Entropy is consumed from the seed in 3-byte (24 bit) chunks. rand_bytes = 3 # The highest possible result of the RNG. rand_max = 2^(rand_bytes * 8) - 1 # The range of the RNG places an upper-bound on the size of the list that # may be shuffled. It is a logic error to supply an oversized list. assert values_count < rand_max result = values var source = seed index = 0 while index < values_count - 1: # Re-hash the `source` to obtain a new pattern of bytes. source = eth2hash source.data # Iterate through the `source` bytes in 3-byte chunks. for pos in countup(0, 29, 3): let remaining = values_count - index if remaining == 1: break # Read 3-bytes of `source` as a 24-bit big-endian integer. let sample_from_source = source.data[pos].Uint24 shl 16 or source.data[pos+1].Uint24 shl 8 or source.data[pos+2].Uint24 # Sample values greater than or equal to `sample_max` will cause # modulo bias when mapped into the `remaining` range. let sample_max = rand_max - rand_max mod remaining # Perform a swap if the consumed entropy will not cause modulo bias. if sample_from_source < sample_max: # Select a replacement index for the current index. let replacement_position = sample_from_source mod remaining + index swap result[index], result[replacement_position] inc index func split*[T](lst: openArray[T], N: Positive): seq[seq[T]] = ## split lst in N pieces, with each piece having `len(lst) div N` or ## `len(lst) div N + 1` pieces # TODO: implement as an iterator result = newSeq[seq[T]](N) for i in 0 ..< N: result[i] = lst[lst.len * i div N ..< lst.len * (i+1) div N] # TODO: avoid alloc via toOpenArray func get_new_recent_block_roots*(old_block_roots: seq[Eth2Digest], parent_slot, current_slot: int64, parent_hash: Eth2Digest ): seq[Eth2Digest] = # Should throw for `current_slot - CYCLE_LENGTH * 2 - 1` according to spec comment let d = current_slot - parent_slot result = old_block_roots[d .. ^1] for _ in 0 ..< min(d, old_block_roots.len): result.add parent_hash func ceil_div8*(v: int): int = (v + 7) div 8 # TODO use a proper bitarray! func repeat_hash*(v: Eth2Digest, n: SomeInteger): Eth2Digest = # Spec version: # if n == 0: v # else: repeat_hash(eth2hash(v.data), n - 1) # Nim is pretty bad at recursion though (max 2k levels / no tco), so: result = v var n = n while n != 0: result = eth2hash(result.data) dec n func get_shard_committees_index*(state: BeaconState, slot: uint64): uint64 = ## Warning: as it stands, this helper only works during state updates _after_ ## state.slot has been incremented but before shard_committees_at_slots has ## been updated! # TODO spec unsigned-unsafe here doAssert slot + (state.slot mod EPOCH_LENGTH) + EPOCH_LENGTH > state.slot slot + (state.slot mod EPOCH_LENGTH) + EPOCH_LENGTH - state.slot proc get_shard_committees_at_slot*( state: BeaconState, slot: uint64): seq[ShardCommittee] = let index = state.get_shard_committees_index(slot) state.shard_committees_at_slots[index] func get_beacon_proposer_index*(state: BeaconState, slot: uint64): Uint24 = ## From Casper RPJ mini-spec: ## When slot i begins, validator Vidx is expected ## to create ("propose") a block, which contains a pointer to some parent block ## that they perceive as the "head of the chain", ## and includes all of the **attestations** that they know about ## that have not yet been included into that chain. ## ## idx in Vidx == p(i mod N), pi being a random permutation of validators indices (i.e. a committee) # TODO this index is invalid outside of the block state transition function # because presently, `state.slot += 1` happens before this function # is called - see also testutil.getNextBeaconProposerIndex let idx = get_shard_committees_index(state, slot) doAssert idx.int < state.shard_committees_at_slots.len doAssert state.shard_committees_at_slots[idx].len > 0 state.shard_committees_at_slots[idx][0].committee.mod_get(slot) func integer_squareroot*(n: SomeInteger): SomeInteger = ## The largest integer ``x`` such that ``x**2`` is less than ``n``. var x = n y = (x + 1) div 2 while y < x: x = y y = (x + n div x) div 2 x func get_fork_version*(fork_data: ForkData, slot: uint64): uint64 = if slot < fork_data.fork_slot: fork_data.pre_fork_version else: fork_data.post_fork_version func get_domain*( fork_data: ForkData, slot: uint64, domain_type: SignatureDomain): uint64 = # TODO Slot overflow? Or is slot 32 bits for all intents and purposes? (get_fork_version(fork_data, slot) shl 32) + domain_type.uint32 func is_power_of_2*(v: uint64): bool = (v and (v-1)) == 0 func merkle_root*(values: openArray[Eth2Digest]): Eth2Digest = # o = [0] * len(values) + values # for i in range(len(values)-1, 0, -1): # o[i] = hash(o[i*2] + o[i*2+1]) # return o[1] # TODO discard proc is_double_vote*(attestation_data_1: AttestationData, attestation_data_2: AttestationData): bool = ## Assumes ``attestation_data_1`` is distinct from ``attestation_data_2``. ## Returns True if the provided ``AttestationData`` are slashable ## due to a 'double vote'. ## A double vote is when a validator votes for two attestations within the ## same slot - doing so means risking getting slashed. attestation_data_1.slot == attestation_data_2.slot proc is_surround_vote*(attestation_data_1: AttestationData, attestation_data_2: AttestationData): bool = ## Assumes ``attestation_data_1`` is distinct from ``attestation_data_2``. ## Returns True if the provided ``AttestationData`` are slashable ## due to a 'surround vote'. ## Note: parameter order matters as this function only checks ## that ``attestation_data_1`` surrounds ``attestation_data_2``. ( (attestation_data_1.justified_slot < attestation_data_2.justified_slot) and (attestation_data_1.justified_slot + 1 == attestation_data_2.slot) and (attestation_data_2.slot < attestation_data_1.slot) )