# beacon_chain # Copyright (c) 2018-2022 Status Research & Development GmbH # Licensed and distributed under either of # * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT). # * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0). # at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms. # At the time of writing, the exact definitions of what should be used for # cryptography in the spec is in flux, with sizes and test vectors still being # hashed out. This layer helps isolate those chagnes. # BLS signatures can be combined such that multiple signatures are aggregated. # Each time a new signature is added, the corresponding public key must be # added to the verification key as well - if a key signs twice, it must be added # twice to the verification key. Aggregated signatures can be combined # arbitrarily (like addition) as long as public keys are aggregated in the same # way. # # In eth2, we use a single bit to record which keys have signed, thus we cannot # combined overlapping aggregates - ie if we have an aggregate of signatures of # A, B and C, and another with B, C and D, we cannot practically combine them # even if in theory it is possible to allow this in BLS. {.push raises: [Defect].} import # Standard library std/[options, hashes, sequtils, tables], # Status stew/[endians2, objects, results, byteutils], blscurve, chronicles, json_serialization from nimcrypto/utils import burnMem export options, results, json_serialization, blscurve # Type definitions # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- const RawSigSize* = 96 RawPubKeySize* = 48 UncompressedPubKeySize* = 96 # RawPrivKeySize* = 48 for Miracl / 32 for BLST type ValidatorPubKey* = object ##\ ## Compressed raw serialized key bytes - this type is used in so as to not ## eagerly load keys - deserialization is slow, as are equality checks - ## however, it is not guaranteed that the key is valid (except in some ## cases, like the database state) blob*: array[RawPubKeySize, byte] UncompressedPubKey* = object ## Uncompressed variation of ValidatorPubKey - this type is faster to ## deserialize but doubles the storage footprint blob*: array[UncompressedPubKeySize, byte] CookedPubKey* = distinct blscurve.PublicKey ## Valid deserialized key ValidatorSig* = object blob*: array[RawSigSize, byte] ValidatorPrivKey* = distinct blscurve.SecretKey BlsCurveType* = ValidatorPrivKey | ValidatorPubKey | ValidatorSig BlsResult*[T] = Result[T, cstring] TrustedSig* = object data*: array[RawSigSize, byte] SomeSig* = TrustedSig | ValidatorSig CookedSig* = distinct blscurve.Signature ## \ ## Cooked signatures are those that have been loaded successfully from a ## ValidatorSig and are used to avoid expensive reloading as well as error ## checking export AggregateSignature # API # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.0.1/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#bls-signatures func toPubKey*(privkey: ValidatorPrivKey): CookedPubKey = ## Derive a public key from a private key # Un-specced in either hash-to-curve or Eth2 var pubKey: blscurve.PublicKey let ok = publicFromSecret(pubKey, SecretKey privkey) doAssert ok, "The validator private key was a zero key. This should never happen." CookedPubKey(pubKey) template toRaw*(x: CookedPubKey): auto = PublicKey(x).exportRaw() template toUncompressed*(x: CookedPubKey): auto = UncompressedPubKey(blob: PublicKey(x).exportUncompressed()) func toPubKey*(pubKey: CookedPubKey): ValidatorPubKey = ## Derive a public key from a private key # Un-specced in either hash-to-curve or Eth2 ValidatorPubKey(blob: pubKey.toRaw()) func load*(v: ValidatorPubKey): Option[CookedPubKey] = ## Parse signature blob - this may fail var val: blscurve.PublicKey if fromBytes(val, v.blob): some CookedPubKey(val) else: none CookedPubKey func load*(v: UncompressedPubKey): Option[CookedPubKey] = ## Parse signature blob - this may fail var val: blscurve.PublicKey if fromBytes(val, v.blob): some CookedPubKey(val) else: none CookedPubKey func loadValid*(v: UncompressedPubKey | ValidatorPubKey): CookedPubKey {.noinit.} = ## Parse known-to-be-valid key - this is the case for any key that's passed ## parsing once and is the output of serialization, such as those keys we ## keep in the database or state. var val: blscurve.PublicKey let ok = fromBytesKnownOnCurve(val, v.blob) doAssert ok, "Valid key no longer parses, data corrupt? " & $v CookedPubKey(val) proc loadWithCache*(v: ValidatorPubKey): Option[CookedPubKey] = ## Parse public key blob - this may fail - this function uses a cache to ## avoid the expensive deserialization - for now, external public keys only ## come from deposits in blocks - when more sources are added, the memory ## usage of the cache should be considered var cache {.threadvar.}: Table[typeof(v.blob), CookedPubKey] # Try to get parse value from cache - if it's not in there, try to parse it - # if that's not possible, it's broken cache.withValue(v.blob, key) do: return some key[] do: # Only valid keys are cached let cooked = v.load() if cooked.isSome(): cache[v.blob] = cooked.get() return cooked func load*(v: ValidatorSig): Option[CookedSig] = ## Parse signature blob - this may fail var parsed: blscurve.Signature if fromBytes(parsed, v.blob): some(CookedSig(parsed)) else: none(CookedSig) func init*(agg: var AggregatePublicKey, pubkey: CookedPubKey) {.inline.}= ## Initializes an aggregate signature context agg.init(blscurve.PublicKey(pubkey)) func init*(T: type AggregatePublicKey, pubkey: CookedPubKey): T = result.init(pubkey) func aggregate*(agg: var AggregatePublicKey, pubkey: CookedPubKey) {.inline.}= ## Aggregate two valid Validator Public Keys agg.aggregate(blscurve.PublicKey(pubkey)) func finish*(agg: AggregatePublicKey): CookedPubKey {.inline.} = ## Canonicalize an AggregatePublicKey into a signature var pubkey: blscurve.PublicKey pubkey.finish(agg) CookedPubKey(pubkey) func init*(agg: var AggregateSignature, sig: CookedSig) {.inline.}= ## Initializes an aggregate signature context agg.init(blscurve.Signature(sig)) func init*(T: type AggregateSignature, sig: CookedSig): T = result.init(sig) func aggregate*(agg: var AggregateSignature, sig: CookedSig) {.inline.}= ## Aggregate two valid Validator Signatures agg.aggregate(blscurve.Signature(sig)) func finish*(agg: AggregateSignature): CookedSig {.inline.} = ## Canonicalize an AggregateSignature into a signature var sig: blscurve.Signature sig.finish(agg) CookedSig(sig) # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.1.10/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#bls-signatures func blsVerify*( pubkey: CookedPubKey, message: openArray[byte], signature: CookedSig): bool = ## Check that a signature is valid for a message ## under the provided public key. ## returns `true` if the signature is valid, `false` otherwise. ## ## The proof-of-possession MUST be verified before calling this function. ## It is recommended to use the overload that accepts a proof-of-possession ## to enforce correct usage. PublicKey(pubkey).verify(message, blscurve.Signature(signature)) # https://github.com/ethereum/consensus-specs/blob/v1.1.10/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#bls-signatures proc blsVerify*( pubkey: ValidatorPubKey, message: openArray[byte], signature: CookedSig): bool = ## Check that a signature is valid for a message ## under the provided public key. ## returns `true` if the signature and the pubkey is valid, `false` otherwise. ## ## The proof-of-possession MUST be verified before calling this function. ## It is recommended to use the overload that accepts a proof-of-possession ## to enforce correct usage. let parsedKey = pubkey.loadWithCache() # Guard against invalid signature blobs that fail to parse parsedKey.isSome() and blsVerify(parsedKey.get(), message, signature) proc blsVerify*( pubkey: ValidatorPubKey | CookedPubKey, message: openArray[byte], signature: ValidatorSig): bool = let parsedSig = signature.load() # Guard against invalid signature blobs that fail to parse parsedSig.isSome() and blsVerify(pubkey, message, parsedSig.get()) func blsVerify*(sigSet: SignatureSet): bool = ## Unbatched verification ## of 1 SignatureSet ## tuple[pubkey: blscurve.PublicKey, message: array[32, byte], blscurve.signature: Signature] verify( sigSet.pubkey, sigSet.message, sigSet.signature ) func blsSign*(privkey: ValidatorPrivKey, message: openArray[byte]): CookedSig = ## Computes a signature from a secret key and a message CookedSig(SecretKey(privkey).sign(message)) func blsFastAggregateVerify*( publicKeys: openArray[CookedPubKey], message: openArray[byte], signature: CookedSig ): bool = ## Verify the aggregate of multiple signatures on the same message ## This function is faster than AggregateVerify ## ## The proof-of-possession MUST be verified before calling this function. ## It is recommended to use the overload that accepts a proof-of-possession ## to enforce correct usage. # TODO: Note: `invalid` in the following paragraph means invalid by construction # The keys/signatures are not even points on the elliptic curves. # To respect both the IETF API and the fact that # we can have invalid public keys (as in not point on the elliptic curve), # requiring a wrapper indirection, # we need a first pass to extract keys from the wrapper # and then call fastAggregateVerify. # Instead: # - either we expose a new API: context + init-update-finish # in blscurve which already exists internally # - or at network/databases/serialization boundaries we do not # allow invalid BLS objects to pollute consensus routines let keys = mapIt(publicKeys, PublicKey(it)) fastAggregateVerify(keys, message, blscurve.Signature(signature)) proc blsFastAggregateVerify*( publicKeys: openArray[ValidatorPubKey], message: openArray[byte], signature: CookedSig ): bool = var unwrapped: seq[PublicKey] for pubkey in publicKeys: let realkey = pubkey.loadWithCache() if realkey.isNone: return false unwrapped.add PublicKey(realkey.get) fastAggregateVerify(unwrapped, message, blscurve.Signature(signature)) func blsFastAggregateVerify*( publicKeys: openArray[CookedPubKey], message: openArray[byte], signature: ValidatorSig ): bool = let parsedSig = signature.load() parsedSig.isSome and blsFastAggregateVerify(publicKeys, message, parsedSig.get()) proc blsFastAggregateVerify*( publicKeys: openArray[ValidatorPubKey], message: openArray[byte], signature: ValidatorSig ): bool = let parsedSig = signature.load() parsedSig.isSome and blsFastAggregateVerify(publicKeys, message, parsedSig.get()) # Codecs # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- func `$`*(x: ValidatorPrivKey): string = "" func `$`*(x: ValidatorPubKey | ValidatorSig): string = x.blob.toHex() func toRaw*(x: ValidatorPrivKey): array[32, byte] = # TODO: distinct type - see https://github.com/status-im/nim-blscurve/pull/67 when BLS_BACKEND == BLST: result = SecretKey(x).exportRaw() else: # Miracl exports to 384-bit arrays, but Curve order is 256-bit let raw = SecretKey(x).exportRaw() result[0..32-1] = raw.toOpenArray(48-32, 48-1) template toRaw*(x: ValidatorPubKey | ValidatorSig): auto = x.blob template toRaw*(x: TrustedSig): auto = x.data func toHex*(x: BlsCurveType): string = toHex(toRaw(x)) func toHex*(x: CookedPubKey): string = toHex(x.toPubKey()) func `$`*(x: CookedPubKey): string = $(x.toPubKey()) func toValidatorSig*(x: CookedSig): ValidatorSig = ValidatorSig(blob: blscurve.Signature(x).exportRaw()) func fromRaw*(T: type ValidatorPrivKey, bytes: openArray[byte]): BlsResult[T] = var val: SecretKey if val.fromBytes(bytes): ok ValidatorPrivKey(val) else: err "bls: invalid private key" func fromRaw*(BT: type[ValidatorPubKey | ValidatorSig], bytes: openArray[byte]): BlsResult[BT] = # Signatures and keys are deserialized lazily if bytes.len() != sizeof(BT): err "bls: invalid bls length" else: ok BT(blob: toArray(sizeof(BT), bytes)) func fromHex*(T: type BlsCurveType, hexStr: string): BlsResult[T] {.inline.} = ## Initialize a BLSValue from its hex representation try: T.fromRaw(hexStr.hexToSeqByte()) except ValueError: err "bls: cannot parse value" func `==`*(a, b: ValidatorPubKey | ValidatorSig): bool = equalMem(unsafeAddr a.blob[0], unsafeAddr b.blob[0], sizeof(a.blob)) func `==`*(a, b: ValidatorPrivKey): bool {.error: "Secret keys should stay secret".} # Hashing # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- template hash*(x: ValidatorPubKey | ValidatorSig): Hash = static: doAssert sizeof(Hash) <= x.blob.len div 2 # We use rough "middle" of blob for the hash, assuming this is where most of # the entropy is found cast[ptr Hash](unsafeAddr x.blob[x.blob.len div 2])[] # Comparison/Sorting # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- template `<`*(x, y: ValidatorPubKey): bool = x.blob < y.blob # Serialization # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- {.pragma: serializationRaises, raises: [SerializationError, IOError, Defect].} proc writeValue*(writer: var JsonWriter, value: ValidatorPubKey | CookedPubKey) {. inline, raises: [IOError, Defect].} = writer.writeValue(value.toHex()) proc readValue*(reader: var JsonReader, value: var ValidatorPubKey) {.serializationRaises.} = let key = ValidatorPubKey.fromHex(reader.readValue(string)) if key.isOk: value = key.get else: # TODO: Can we provide better diagnostic? raiseUnexpectedValue(reader, "Valid hex-encoded public key expected") proc writeValue*(writer: var JsonWriter, value: ValidatorSig) {. inline, raises: [IOError, Defect].} = # Workaround: https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2/issues/374 writer.writeValue(value.toHex()) proc readValue*(reader: var JsonReader, value: var ValidatorSig) {.serializationRaises.} = let sig = ValidatorSig.fromHex(reader.readValue(string)) if sig.isOk: value = sig.get else: # TODO: Can we provide better diagnostic? raiseUnexpectedValue(reader, "Valid hex-encoded signature expected") proc writeValue*(writer: var JsonWriter, value: ValidatorPrivKey) {. inline, raises: [IOError, Defect].} = writer.writeValue(value.toHex()) proc readValue*(reader: var JsonReader, value: var ValidatorPrivKey) {.serializationRaises.} = let key = ValidatorPrivKey.fromHex(reader.readValue(string)) if key.isOk: value = key.get else: # TODO: Can we provide better diagnostic? raiseUnexpectedValue(reader, "Valid hex-encoded private key expected") template fromSszBytes*(T: type[ValidatorPubKey | ValidatorSig], bytes: openArray[byte]): auto = let v = fromRaw(T, bytes) if v.isErr: raise newException(MalformedSszError, $v.error) v[] # Logging # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- func shortLog*(x: ValidatorPubKey | ValidatorSig): string = ## Logging for wrapped BLS types ## that may contain valid or non-validated data byteutils.toHex(x.blob.toOpenArray(0, 3)) func shortLog*(x: CookedPubKey): string = let raw = x.toRaw() byteutils.toHex(raw.toOpenArray(0, 3)) func shortLog*(x: ValidatorPrivKey): string = ## Logging for raw unwrapped BLS types "" func shortLog*(x: TrustedSig): string = byteutils.toHex(x.data.toOpenArray(0, 3)) # Initialization # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # TODO more specific exceptions? don't raise? # For confutils func init*(T: typedesc[ValidatorPrivKey], hex: string): T {.noinit, raises: [ValueError, Defect].} = let v = T.fromHex(hex) if v.isErr: raise (ref ValueError)(msg: $v.error) v[] # For mainchain monitor func init*(T: typedesc[ValidatorPubKey], data: array[RawPubKeySize, byte]): T {.noinit, raises: [ValueError, Defect].} = let v = T.fromRaw(data) if v.isErr: raise (ref ValueError)(msg: $v.error) v[] # For mainchain monitor func init*(T: typedesc[ValidatorSig], data: array[RawSigSize, byte]): T {.noinit, raises: [ValueError, Defect].} = let v = T.fromRaw(data) if v.isErr: raise (ref ValueError)(msg: $v.error) v[] func infinity*(T: type ValidatorSig): T = result.blob[0] = byte 0xC0 func burnMem*(key: var ValidatorPrivKey) = burnMem(addr key, sizeof(ValidatorPrivKey))