# beacon_chain # Copyright (c) 2022 Status Research & Development GmbH # Licensed and distributed under either of # * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT). # * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0). # at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms. import std/[base64, json, options, os, strutils], chronicles, bearssl, nimcrypto/[hmac, utils], stew/[byteutils, results] {.push raises: [Defect].} proc base64urlEncode(x: auto): string = # The only strings this gets are internally generated, and don't have # encoding quirks. base64.encode(x, safe = true).replace("=", "") func getIatToken*(time: uint64): JsonNode = # https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/blob/v1.0.0-alpha.7/src/engine/authentication.md#jwt-claims # "Required: iat (issued-at) claim. The EL SHOULD only accept iat timestamps # which are within +-5 seconds from the current time." # # https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.6 describes iat # claims. # # https://pyjwt.readthedocs.io/en/stable/usage.html#issued-at-claim-iat shows # an example of an iat claim: {"iat": 1371720939} %* {"iat": time} proc getSignedToken*(key: openArray[byte], payload: string): string = # https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/blob/v1.0.0-alpha.7/src/engine/authentication.md#jwt-specifications # "The EL MUST support at least the following alg: HMAC + SHA256 (HS256)" # https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7515#appendix-A.1.1 const jwsProtectedHeader = base64url_encode($ %* {"typ": "JWT", "alg": "HS256"}) & "." # In theory, std/json might change how it encodes, and it doesn't per-se # matter but can also simply specify the base64-encoded form directly if # useful, since it's never checked here on its own. static: doAssert jwsProtectedHeader == "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9." let signingInput = jwsProtectedHeader & base64urlEncode(payload) signingInput & "." & base64_urlencode(sha256.hmac(key, signingInput).data) proc getSignedIatToken*(key: openArray[byte], time: uint64): string = getSignedToken(key, $getIatToken(time)) proc checkJwtSecret*( rng: var BrHmacDrbgContext, dataDir: string, jwtSecret: Option[string]): Result[seq[byte], cstring] = # If such a parameter is given, but the file cannot be read, or does not # contain a hex-encoded key of at least 256 bits, the client should treat # this as an error: either abort the startup, or show error and continue # without exposing the authenticated port. const MIN_SECRET_LEN = 32 if jwtSecret.isNone: # If such a parameter is not given, the client SHOULD generate such a # token, valid for the duration of the execution, and store it the # hex-encoded secret as a jwt.hex file on the filesystem. This file can # then be used to provision the counterpart client. # # https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/blob/v1.0.0-alpha.7/src/engine/authentication.md#key-distribution const jwtSecretFilename = "jwt.hex" let jwtSecretPath = dataDir / jwtSecretFilename var newSecret: seq[byte] newSecret.setLen(MIN_SECRET_LEN) rng.brHmacDrbgGenerate(newSecret) try: writeFile(jwtSecretPath, newSecret.to0xHex()) except IOError as e: # Allow continuing to run, though this is effectively fatal for a merge # client using authentication. This keeps it lower-risk initially. warn "Could not write JWT secret to data directory", jwtSecretPath return ok(newSecret) try: let lines = readLines(jwtSecret.get, 1) if lines.len > 0 and lines[0].startswith("0x"): let secret = utils.fromHex(lines[0]) if secret.len >= MIN_SECRET_LEN: ok(secret) else: err("JWT secret not at least 256 bits") else: err("no 0x-prefixed hex string found") except IOError: err("couldn't open specified JWT secret file") except ValueError: err("invalid JWT hex string")