# beacon_chain # Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Status Research & Development GmbH # Licensed and distributed under either of # * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT). # * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0). # at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms. # At the time of writing, the exact definitions of what should be used for # cryptography in the spec is in flux, with sizes and test vectors still being # hashed out. This layer helps isolate those chagnes. # BLS signatures can be combined such that multiple signatures are aggregated. # Each time a new signature is added, the corresponding public key must be # added to the verification key as well - if a key signs twice, it must be added # twice to the verification key. Aggregated signatures can be combined # arbitrarily (like addition) as long as public keys are aggregated in the same # way. # # In eth2, we use a single bit to record which keys have signed, thus we cannot # combined overlapping aggregates - ie if we have an aggregate of signatures of # A, B and C, and another with B, C and D, we cannot practically combine them # even if in theory it is possible to allow this in BLS. {.push raises: [Defect].} import # Internal ./digest, ../ssz/types, # Status stew/[endians2, objects, results, byteutils], nimcrypto/sysrand, blscurve, chronicles, json_serialization, # Standard library hashes export results, json_serialization # Type definitions # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- const RawSigSize* = 96 RawPubKeySize* = 48 RawPrivKeySize* = 48 type BlsValueType* = enum Real OpaqueBlob BlsValue*[N: static int, T] = object # TODO This is a temporary type needed until we sort out the # issues with invalid BLS values appearing in the SSZ test suites. case kind*: BlsValueType of Real: blsValue*: T of OpaqueBlob: blob*: array[N, byte] ValidatorPubKey* = BlsValue[RawPubKeySize, blscurve.PublicKey] ValidatorPrivKey* = distinct blscurve.SecretKey ValidatorSig* = BlsValue[RawSigSize, blscurve.Signature] BlsCurveType* = ValidatorPrivKey | ValidatorPubKey | ValidatorSig BlsResult*[T] = Result[T, cstring] func `==`*(a, b: BlsValue): bool = if a.kind != b.kind: return false if a.kind == Real: return a.blsValue == b.blsValue else: return a.blob == b.blob template `==`*[N, T](a: BlsValue[N, T], b: T): bool = a.blsValue == b template `==`*[N, T](a: T, b: BlsValue[N, T]): bool = a == b.blsValue # API # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v0.10.1/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#bls-signatures func toPubKey*(privkey: ValidatorPrivKey): ValidatorPubKey = ## Create a private key from a public key # Un-specced in either hash-to-curve or Eth2 # TODO: Test suite should use `keyGen` instead when ValidatorPubKey is BlsValue: ValidatorPubKey(kind: Real, blsValue: SecretKey(privkey).privToPub()) elif ValidatorPubKey is array: privkey.getKey.getBytes else: privkey.getKey # https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v0.11.1/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#bls-signatures func aggregate*[T](values: openarray[ValidatorSig]): ValidatorSig = ## Aggregate arrays of sequences of Validator Signatures ## This assumes that they are real signatures result = BlsValue[T](kind: Real, blsValue: values[0].BlsValue) for i in 1 ..< values.len: result.blsValue.aggregate(values[i].blsValue) func aggregate*(x: var ValidatorSig, other: ValidatorSig) = ## Aggregate 2 Validator Signatures ## This assumes that they are real signatures x.blsValue.aggregate(other.blsValue) # https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v0.10.1/specs/phase0/beacon-chain.md#bls-signatures func blsVerify*( pubkey: ValidatorPubKey, message: openArray[byte], signature: ValidatorSig): bool = ## Check that a signature is valid for a message ## under the provided public key. ## returns `true` if the signature is valid, `false` otherwise. ## ## The proof-of-possession MUST be verified before calling this function. ## It is recommended to use the overload that accepts a proof-of-possession ## to enforce correct usage. if signature.kind != Real: # Invalid signatures are possible in deposits (discussed with Danny) return false if pubkey.kind != Real: # TODO: chronicles warning return false # TODO: remove fully if the comment below is not true anymore and # and we don't need this workaround # # TODO bls_verify_multiple(...) used to have this workaround, and now it # # lives here. No matter the signature, there's also no meaningful way to # # verify it -- it's a kind of vacuous truth. No pubkey/sig pairs. Sans a # # getBytes() or similar mechanism, pubKey == default(ValidatorPubKey) is # # a way to create many false positive matches. This seems odd. # if pubkey.getBytes() == default(ValidatorPubKey).getBytes(): # return true pubkey.blsValue.verify(message, signature.blsValue) func blsSign*(privkey: ValidatorPrivKey, message: openarray[byte]): ValidatorSig = ## Computes a signature from a secret key and a message ValidatorSig(kind: Real, blsValue: SecretKey(privkey).sign(message)) func blsFastAggregateVerify*[T: byte|char]( publicKeys: openarray[ValidatorPubKey], message: openarray[T], signature: ValidatorSig ): bool = ## Verify the aggregate of multiple signatures on the same message ## This function is faster than AggregateVerify ## ## The proof-of-possession MUST be verified before calling this function. ## It is recommended to use the overload that accepts a proof-of-possession ## to enforce correct usage. # TODO: Note: `invalid` in the following paragraph means invalid by construction # The keys/signatures are not even points on the elliptic curves. # To respect both the IETF API and the fact that # we can have invalid public keys (as in not point on the elliptic curve), # requiring a wrapper indirection, # we need a first pass to extract keys from the wrapper # and then call fastAggregateVerify. # Instead: # - either we expose a new API: context + init-update-finish # in blscurve which already exists internally # - or at network/databases/serialization boundaries we do not # allow invalid BLS objects to pollute consensus routines if signature.kind != Real: return false var unwrapped: seq[PublicKey] for pubkey in publicKeys: if pubkey.kind != Real: return false unwrapped.add pubkey.blsValue return fastAggregateVerify(unwrapped, message, signature.blsValue) proc newKeyPair*(): BlsResult[tuple[pub: ValidatorPubKey, priv: ValidatorPrivKey]] = ## Generates a new public-private keypair ## This requires entropy on the system # The input-keying-material requires 32 bytes at least for security # The generation is deterministic and the input-keying-material # must be protected against side-channel attacks var ikm: array[32, byte] if randomBytes(ikm) != 32: return err "bls: no random bytes" var sk: SecretKey pk: PublicKey if keyGen(ikm, pk, sk): ok((ValidatorPubKey(kind: Real, blsValue: pk), ValidatorPrivKey(sk))) else: err "bls: cannot generate keypair" proc toGaugeValue*(hash: Eth2Digest): int64 = # Only the last 8 bytes are taken into consideration in accordance # to the ETH2 metrics spec: # https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-metrics/blob/6a79914cb31f7d54858c7dd57eee75b6162ec737/metrics.md#interop-metrics cast[int64](uint64.fromBytesLE(hash.data[24..31])) # Codecs # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- func `$`*(x: ValidatorPrivKey): string = "" func `$`*(x: BlsValue): string = # The prefix must be short # due to the mechanics of the `shortLog` function. if x.kind == Real: x.blsValue.toHex() else: "raw: " & x.blob.toHex() func toRaw*(x: ValidatorPrivKey): array[RawPrivKeySize, byte] = SecretKey(x).exportRaw() func toRaw*(x: BlsValue): auto = if x.kind == Real: x.blsValue.exportRaw() else: x.blob func toHex*(x: BlsCurveType): string = toHex(toRaw(x)) func fromRaw*(T: type ValidatorPrivKey, bytes: openarray[byte]): BlsResult[T] = var val: SecretKey if val.fromBytes(bytes): ok ValidatorPrivKey(val) else: err "bls: invalid private key" func fromRaw*[N, T](BT: type BlsValue[N, T], bytes: openarray[byte]): BlsResult[BT] = # This is a workaround, so that we can deserialize the serialization of a # default-initialized BlsValue without raising an exception when defined(ssz_testing): # Only for SSZ parsing tests, everything is an opaque blob ok BT(kind: OpaqueBlob, blob: toArray(N, bytes)) else: # Try if valid BLS value var val: T if fromBytes(val, bytes): ok BT(kind: Real, blsValue: val) else: ok BT(kind: OpaqueBlob, blob: toArray(N, bytes)) func fromHex*(T: type BlsCurveType, hexStr: string): BlsResult[T] {.inline.} = ## Initialize a BLSValue from its hex representation try: T.fromRaw(hexStr.hexToSeqByte()) except ValueError: err "bls: cannot parse value" # Hashing # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- template hash*(x: BlsCurveType): Hash = # TODO: prevent using secret keys bind toRaw hash(toRaw(x)) # Serialization # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- proc writeValue*(writer: var JsonWriter, value: ValidatorPubKey) {. inline, raises: [IOError, Defect].} = writer.writeValue(value.toHex()) proc readValue*(reader: var JsonReader, value: var ValidatorPubKey) {. inline, raises: [Exception].} = value = ValidatorPubKey.fromHex(reader.readValue(string)).tryGet() proc writeValue*(writer: var JsonWriter, value: ValidatorSig) {. inline, raises: [IOError, Defect].} = # Workaround: https://github.com/status-im/nim-beacon-chain/issues/374 writer.writeValue(value.toHex()) proc readValue*(reader: var JsonReader, value: var ValidatorSig) {. inline, raises: [Exception].} = value = ValidatorSig.fromHex(reader.readValue(string)).tryGet() proc writeValue*(writer: var JsonWriter, value: ValidatorPrivKey) {. inline, raises: [IOError, Defect].} = writer.writeValue(value.toHex()) proc readValue*(reader: var JsonReader, value: var ValidatorPrivKey) {. inline, raises: [Exception].} = value = ValidatorPrivKey.fromHex(reader.readValue(string)).tryGet() template fromSszBytes*(T: type BlsValue, bytes: openarray[byte]): auto = let v = fromRaw(T, bytes) if v.isErr: raise newException(MalformedSszError, $v.error) v[] # Logging # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- func shortLog*(x: BlsValue): string = ## Logging for wrapped BLS types ## that may contain valid or non-validated data # The prefix must be short # due to the mechanics of the `shortLog` function. if x.kind == Real: x.blsValue.exportRaw()[0..3].toHex() else: "raw: " & x.blob[0..3].toHex() func shortLog*(x: ValidatorPrivKey): string = ## Logging for raw unwrapped BLS types x.toRaw()[0..3].toHex() # Initialization # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # TODO more specific exceptions? don't raise? # For confutils func init*(T: typedesc[ValidatorPrivKey], hex: string): T {.noInit, raises: [ValueError, Defect].} = let v = T.fromHex(hex) if v.isErr: raise (ref ValueError)(msg: $v.error) return v[] # For mainchain monitor func init*(T: typedesc[ValidatorPubKey], data: array[RawPubKeySize, byte]): T {.noInit, raises: [ValueError, Defect].} = let v = T.fromRaw(data) if v.isErr: raise (ref ValueError)(msg: $v.error) return v[] # For mainchain monitor func init*(T: typedesc[ValidatorSig], data: array[RawSigSize, byte]): T {.noInit, raises: [ValueError, Defect].} = let v = T.fromRaw(data) if v.isErr: raise (ref ValueError)(msg: $v.error) return v[]