# beacon_chain # Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Status Research & Development GmbH # Licensed and distributed under either of # * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT). # * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0). # at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms. import chronicles, confutils/defs, bearssl/rand, nimcrypto/[hmac, utils], stew/[byteutils, results] from std/base64 import encode from std/json import JsonNode, `$`, `%*` from std/os import `/` from std/strutils import replace export rand, results {.push raises: [].} const JWT_SECRET_LEN = 32 func base64urlEncode(x: auto): string = # The only strings this gets are internally generated, and don't have # encoding quirks. base64.encode(x, safe = true).replace("=", "") func getIatToken*(time: int64): JsonNode = # https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/blob/v1.0.0-beta.3/src/engine/authentication.md#jwt-claims # "Required: `iat` (issued-at) claim. The execution layer client **SHOULD** # only accept `iat` timestamps which are within +-60 seconds from the current # time." # # https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.6 describes iat # claims. # # https://pyjwt.readthedocs.io/en/stable/usage.html#issued-at-claim-iat shows # an example of an iat claim: {"iat": 1371720939} %* {"iat": time} func getSignedToken*(key: openArray[byte], payload: string): string = # https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/blob/v1.0.0-beta.3/src/engine/authentication.md#jwt-specifications # "The execution layer client **MUST** support at least the following `alg` # `HMAC + SHA256` (`HS256`)" # https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7515#appendix-A.1.1 const jwsProtectedHeader = base64urlEncode($ %* {"typ": "JWT", "alg": "HS256"}) & "." # In theory, std/json might change how it encodes, and it doesn't per-se # matter but can also simply specify the base64-encoded form directly if # useful, since it's never checked here on its own. static: doAssert jwsProtectedHeader == "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9." let signingInput = jwsProtectedHeader & base64urlEncode(payload) signingInput & "." & base64urlEncode(sha256.hmac(key, signingInput).data) func getSignedIatToken*(key: openArray[byte], time: int64): string = getSignedToken(key, $getIatToken(time)) func parseJwtTokenValue*(input: string): Result[seq[byte], cstring] = # Secret JWT key is parsed in constant time using nimcrypto: # https://github.com/cheatfate/nimcrypto/pull/44 let secret = utils.fromHex(input) if secret.len == JWT_SECRET_LEN: ok(secret) else: err("The JWT secret should be 256 bits and hex-encoded") proc loadJwtSecretFile*(jwtSecretFile: InputFile): Result[seq[byte], cstring] = try: let lines = readLines(string jwtSecretFile, 1) if lines.len > 0: parseJwtTokenValue(lines[0]) else: err("The JWT token file should not be empty") except IOError: err("couldn't open specified JWT secret file") except ValueError: err("invalid JWT hex string") proc checkJwtSecret*( rng: var HmacDrbgContext, dataDir: string, jwtSecret: Opt[InputFile]): Result[seq[byte], cstring] = # If such a parameter is given, but the file cannot be read, or does not # contain a hex-encoded key of 256 bits, the client should treat this as an # error: either abort the startup, or show error and continue without # exposing the authenticated port. if jwtSecret.isNone: # If such a parameter is not given, the client SHOULD generate such a # token, valid for the duration of the execution, and store the # hex-encoded secret as a jwt.hex file on the filesystem. This file can # then be used to provision the counterpart client. # # https://github.com/ethereum/execution-apis/blob/v1.0.0-beta.3/src/engine/authentication.md#key-distribution const jwtSecretFilename = "jwt.hex" let jwtSecretPath = dataDir / jwtSecretFilename let newSecret = rng.generateBytes(JWT_SECRET_LEN) try: writeFile(jwtSecretPath, newSecret.to0xHex()) except IOError as exc: # Allow continuing to run, though this is effectively fatal for a merge # client using authentication. This keeps it lower-risk initially. warn "Could not write JWT secret to data directory", jwtSecretPath, err = exc.msg return ok(newSecret) loadJwtSecretFile(jwtSecret.get)