Additional sanity checking of the status message exchanged during a
fresh connection:
* check that head and finalized make sense, slot-wise
* verify that finalized root lies on the canonical chain, when possible
* re-check these things for every status message during sync
* book: add trusted node sync to index
...and some doc updates
* Update docs/the_nimbus_book/src/start-syncing.md
Co-authored-by: Ștefan Talpalaru <stefantalpalaru@yahoo.com>
Co-authored-by: Ștefan Talpalaru <stefantalpalaru@yahoo.com>
* Harden handling of unviable forks
In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us
blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an
error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a
case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than
allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative
score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them.
* keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with
known junk
* collect peer scores in single module
* descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync
* don't give score for duplicate blocks
* increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen
under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks
over and over in case of an unviable fork
* increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure
before disconnection
* log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too
* avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine
* reject gossip blocks with unviable parent
* continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable
dag
* docs
* Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim
* add unviable queue test
It's sometimes useful to simulate what happens when a chain runs from a
given state with a given set of private keys - `wss_sim` allows running
such a simulation.
One use of such a tool is to simulate a weak subjectivity attack,
creating alternative histories of the same chain:
https://notes.status.im/nimbus-insecura-network#
* limit by-root requests to non-finalized blocks
Presently, we keep a mapping from block root to `BlockRef` in memory -
this has simplified reasoning about the dag, but is not sustainable with
the chain growing.
We can distinguish between two cases where by-root access is useful:
* unfinalized blocks - this is where the beacon chain is operating
generally, by validating incoming data as interesting for future fork
choice decisions - bounded by the length of the unfinalized period
* finalized blocks - historical access in the REST API etc - no bounds,
really
In this PR, we limit the by-root block index to the first use case:
finalized chain data can more efficiently be addressed by slot number.
Future work includes:
* limiting the `BlockRef` horizon in general - each instance is 40
bytes+overhead which adds up - this needs further refactoring to deal
with the tail vs state problem
* persisting the finalized slot-to-hash index - this one also keeps
growing unbounded (albeit slowly)
Anyway, this PR easily shaves ~128mb of memory usage at the time of
writing.
* No longer honor `BeaconBlocksByRoot` requests outside of the
non-finalized period - previously, Nimbus would generously return any
block through this libp2p request - per the spec, finalized blocks
should be fetched via `BeaconBlocksByRange` instead.
* return `Opt[BlockRef]` instead of `nil` when blocks can't be found -
this becomes a lot more common now and thus deserves more attention
* `dag.blocks` -> `dag.forkBlocks` - this index only carries unfinalized
blocks from now - `finalizedBlocks` covers the other `BlockRef`
instances
* in backfill, verify that the last backfilled block leads back to
genesis, or panic
* add backfill timings to log
* fix missing check that `BlockRef` block can be fetched with
`getForkedBlock` reliably
* shortcut doppelganger check when feature is not enabled
* in REST/JSON-RPC, fetch blocks without involving `BlockRef`
* fix dag.blocks ref
I found this documentation a little confusing because it says "you must" leading me to think there may be some kind of dire consequences for NOT having it synced before starting the validator (in the context of importing existing keys from another setup, not starting a new validator with a new deposit). Modifying the language to make the consequences of not having the syncing done clear.
* initial support for minification and new interchange tests. Removal of v1 and v1 migration.
* Synthetic attestations: SQLite3 requires one statement/query per prepared statement
* Fix DB import interrupted if no attestation was found
* Skip test relying on undocumented test behavior (https://github.com/eth-clients/slashing-protection-interchange-tests/pull/12#issuecomment-1011158701)
* Skip test relying on unclear minification behavior:
creating an invalid minified attestation with source > target or setting target = max(source, target)
* remove DB v1 and update submodule
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Jacek Sieka <jacek@status.im>
Co-authored-by: Jacek Sieka <jacek@status.im>
Backfilling is the process of downloading historical blocks via P2P that
are required to fulfill `GetBlocksByRange` duties - this happens during
both trusted node and finalized checkpoint syncs.
In particular, backfilling happens after syncing to head, such that
attestation work can start as soon as possible.
* Fix SyncQueue initialization procedure.
Remove usage of `awaitne`.
Add cancellation support.
Remove unneeded `sleepAsync()` if peer's head is older than needed.
Add `direction` field to all logs.
Fix syncmanager wedge issue.
Add proper resource cleaning procedure on backward sync finish.
Co-authored-by: cheatfate <eugene.kabanov@status.im>
The new format is based on compressed CSV files in two channels:
* Detailed per-epoch data
* Aggregated "daily" summaries
The use of append-only CSV file speeds up significantly the epoch
processing speed during data generation. The use of compression
results in smaller storage requirements overall. The use of the
aggregated files has a very minor cost in both CPU and storage,
but leads to near interactive speed for report generation.
Other changes:
- Implemented support for graceful shut downs to avoid corrupting
the saved files.
- Fixed a memory leak caused by lacking `StateCache` clean up on each
iteration.
- Addressed review comments
- Moved the rewards and penalties calculation code in a separate module
Required invasive changes to existing modules:
- The `data` field of the `KeyedBlockRef` type is made public to be used
by the validator rewards monitor's Chain DAG update procedure.
- The `getForkedBlock` procedure from the `blockchain_dag.nim` module
is made public to be used by the validator rewards monitor's Chain DAG
update procedure.
This is an alternative take on https://github.com/status-im/nimbus-eth2/pull/3107
that aims for more minimal interventions in the spec modules at the expense of
duplicating more of the spec logic in ncli_db.
Using the wrong type here causes requests to fail due to the overly
zealous parameter validation - the failure is harmless in the current
duty subscription model, but would have caused more serious failures
down the line.
* Trusted node sync
Trusted node sync, aka checkpoint sync, allows syncing tyhe chain from a
trusted node instead of relying on a full sync from genesis.
Features include:
* sync from any slot, including the latest finalized slot
* backfill blocks either from the REST api (default) or p2p (#3263)
Future improvements:
* top up blocks between head in database and some other node - this
makes for an efficient backup tool
* recreate historical state to enable historical queries
* fixes
* load genesis from network metadata
* check checkpoint block root against state
* fix invalid block root in rest json decoding
* odds and ends
* retry looking for epoch-boundary checkpoint blocks
tersec
cheatfate
Jacek Sieka
Zahary Karadjov
Ștefan Talpalaru
sacha
Emil
lbly
Mamy Ratsimbazafy