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nimbus-eth2/tests/test_block_quarantine.nim

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Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
# beacon_chain
verify `genesis_time` more strictly (fixes #1667) (#5694) Bogus values lead to crashes down the line when timers overflow
2024-01-06 14:26:56 +00:00
# Copyright (c) 2022-2024 Status Research & Development GmbH
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
# Licensed and distributed under either of
# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
add trivial `{.push raises: [].}` to `research` and `test` folders (#5988) Annotate the `research` and `test` files for which no further changes are needed to successfully compile them, to not interfere with periodic tasks such as spec reference bumps.
2024-02-29 13:24:08 +00:00
{.push raises: [].}
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
{.used.}
import
unittest2,
../beacon_chain/spec/forks,
finish eip4844 to deneb module rename (#4705)
2023-03-09 00:34:17 +00:00
../beacon_chain/spec/datatypes/[phase0, deneb],
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
../beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_quarantine
proc -> func, mainly in spec/state transition and adjecent modules (#3405)
2022-02-17 11:53:55 +00:00
func makeBlock(slot: Slot, parent: Eth2Digest): ForkedSignedBeaconBlock =
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
var
b = phase0.SignedBeaconBlock(
message: phase0.BeaconBlock(slot: slot, parent_root: parent))
b.root = hash_tree_root(b.message)
ForkedSignedBeaconBlock.init(b)
Quarantine and reassembly of gossiped blobs and blocks (#4808)
2023-04-13 19:11:40 +00:00
func makeBlobbyBlock(slot: Slot, parent: Eth2Digest): deneb.SignedBeaconBlock =
var
b = deneb.SignedBeaconBlock(
message: deneb.BeaconBlock(slot: slot, parent_root: parent))
b.root = hash_tree_root(b.message)
b
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
suite "Block quarantine":
test "Unviable smoke test":
let
use ZERO_HASH for default(Eth2Digest)/Eth2Digest() in func calls (#3770)
2022-06-18 04:57:37 +00:00
b0 = makeBlock(Slot 0, ZERO_HASH)
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
b1 = makeBlock(Slot 1, b0.root)
b2 = makeBlock(Slot 2, b1.root)
b3 = makeBlock(Slot 3, b2.root)
b4 = makeBlock(Slot 4, b2.root)
Quarantine and reassembly of gossiped blobs and blocks (#4808)
2023-04-13 19:11:40 +00:00
b5 = makeBlobbyBlock(Slot 4, b3.root)
b6 = makeBlobbyBlock(Slot 4, b4.root)
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
var quarantine: Quarantine
quarantine.addMissing(b1.root)
check:
Fetch by-root request directly from quarantine (#5167) When the requestmanager is busy fetching blocks, the queue might get filled with multiple entries of the same root - since there is no deduplication, requests containing the same root multiple times will be sent out. Also, because the items sit in the queue for a long time potentially, the request might be stale by the time that the manager is ready with the previous request. This PR removes the queue and directly fetches the blocks to download from the quarantine which solves both problems (the quarantine already de-duplicates and is clean of stale information). Removing the queue for blobs is left for a future PR. Co-authored-by: tersec <tersec@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-07-11 16:22:02 +00:00
FetchRecord(root: b1.root) in quarantine.checkMissing(32)
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
Clarify addOrphan error/logging (#4981) * Clarify addOrphan error/logging addOrphan returned a bool to indicate success. Change this to a Result so that different errors can be distinguished. * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_quarantine.nim Co-authored-by: tersec <tersec@users.noreply.github.com> * Update beacon_chain/gossip_processing/gossip_validation.nim --------- Co-authored-by: tersec <tersec@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-05-21 17:47:00 +00:00
quarantine.addOrphan(Slot 0, b1).isOk
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
Fetch by-root request directly from quarantine (#5167) When the requestmanager is busy fetching blocks, the queue might get filled with multiple entries of the same root - since there is no deduplication, requests containing the same root multiple times will be sent out. Also, because the items sit in the queue for a long time potentially, the request might be stale by the time that the manager is ready with the previous request. This PR removes the queue and directly fetches the blocks to download from the quarantine which solves both problems (the quarantine already de-duplicates and is clean of stale information). Removing the queue for blobs is left for a future PR. Co-authored-by: tersec <tersec@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-07-11 16:22:02 +00:00
FetchRecord(root: b1.root) notin quarantine.checkMissing(32)
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
Clarify addOrphan error/logging (#4981) * Clarify addOrphan error/logging addOrphan returned a bool to indicate success. Change this to a Result so that different errors can be distinguished. * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_quarantine.nim Co-authored-by: tersec <tersec@users.noreply.github.com> * Update beacon_chain/gossip_processing/gossip_validation.nim --------- Co-authored-by: tersec <tersec@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-05-21 17:47:00 +00:00
quarantine.addOrphan(Slot 0, b2).isOk
quarantine.addOrphan(Slot 0, b3).isOk
quarantine.addOrphan(Slot 0, b4).isOk
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
Quarantine and reassembly of gossiped blobs and blocks (#4808)
2023-04-13 19:11:40 +00:00
quarantine.addBlobless(Slot 0, b5)
quarantine.addBlobless(Slot 0, b6)
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
(b4.root, ValidatorSig()) in quarantine.orphans
Simplify block quarantine blobless (#4824) * Simplify block quarantine blobless The quarantine blobless table was initially keyed off of (Eth2Digest, ValidatorSig). This was modelled off the orphan table. The presence of the signature in the key is necessary for orphans, because we can't verify the signature for an orphan. That is not the case for a blobless block, where the signature can be verified. So this PR changes the blobless block table to be keyed off a Eth2Digest only. This simplifies the retrieval and handling of blobless blocks. * review feedback
2023-04-16 08:37:56 +00:00
b5.root in quarantine.blobless
b6.root in quarantine.blobless
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
quarantine.addUnviable(b4.root)
check:
(b4.root, ValidatorSig()) notin quarantine.orphans
Simplify block quarantine blobless (#4824) * Simplify block quarantine blobless The quarantine blobless table was initially keyed off of (Eth2Digest, ValidatorSig). This was modelled off the orphan table. The presence of the signature in the key is necessary for orphans, because we can't verify the signature for an orphan. That is not the case for a blobless block, where the signature can be verified. So this PR changes the blobless block table to be keyed off a Eth2Digest only. This simplifies the retrieval and handling of blobless blocks. * review feedback
2023-04-16 08:37:56 +00:00
b5.root in quarantine.blobless
b6.root notin quarantine.blobless
Quarantine and reassembly of gossiped blobs and blocks (#4808)
2023-04-13 19:11:40 +00:00
Harden handling of unviable forks (#3312) * Harden handling of unviable forks In our current handling of unviable forks, we allow peers to send us blocks that come from a different fork - this is not necessarily an error as it can happen naturally, but it does open up the client to a case where the same unviable fork keeps getting requested - rather than allowing this to happen, we'll now give these peers a small negative score - if it keeps happening, we'll disconnect them. * keep track of unviable forks in quarantine, to avoid filling it with known junk * collect peer scores in single module * descore peers when they send unviable blocks during sync * don't give score for duplicate blocks * increase quarantine size to a level that allows finality to happen under optimal conditions - this helps avoid downloading the same blocks over and over in case of an unviable fork * increase initial score for new peers to make room for one more failure before disconnection * log and score invalid/unviable blocks in requestmanager too * avoid ChainDAG dependency in quarantine * reject gossip blocks with unviable parent * continue processing unviable sync blocks in order to build unviable dag * docs * Update beacon_chain/consensus_object_pools/block_pools_types.nim * add unviable queue test
2022-01-26 12:20:08 +00:00
quarantine.addUnviable(b1.root)
check:
(b1.root, ValidatorSig()) notin quarantine.orphans
(b2.root, ValidatorSig()) notin quarantine.orphans
(b3.root, ValidatorSig()) notin quarantine.orphans
Quarantine and reassembly of gossiped blobs and blocks (#4808)
2023-04-13 19:11:40 +00:00
Simplify block quarantine blobless (#4824) * Simplify block quarantine blobless The quarantine blobless table was initially keyed off of (Eth2Digest, ValidatorSig). This was modelled off the orphan table. The presence of the signature in the key is necessary for orphans, because we can't verify the signature for an orphan. That is not the case for a blobless block, where the signature can be verified. So this PR changes the blobless block table to be keyed off a Eth2Digest only. This simplifies the retrieval and handling of blobless blocks. * review feedback
2023-04-16 08:37:56 +00:00
b5.root notin quarantine.blobless
b6.root notin quarantine.blobless
when adding duplicates to quarantine, schedule deepest missing parent (#6112) During sync, sometimes the same block gets encountered and added to quarantine multiple times. If its parent is already known, quarantine incorrectly registers it as missing, leading to re-download. This can be fixed by registering the parent's deepest missing parent recursively. Also increase the stickiness of `missing`. We only perform 4 attempts within ~16 seconds before giving up. Very frequently, this is not enough and there is no progress until sync manager kicks in even on holesky.
2024-03-21 18:41:05 +00:00
test "Recursive missing parent":
let
b0 = makeBlock(Slot 0, ZERO_HASH)
b1 = makeBlock(Slot 1, b0.root)
b2 = makeBlock(Slot 2, b1.root)
var quarantine: Quarantine
check:
b0.root notin quarantine.missing
b1.root notin quarantine.missing
b2.root notin quarantine.missing
# Add b2
quarantine.addOrphan(Slot 0, b2).isOk
b0.root notin quarantine.missing
b1.root in quarantine.missing
b2.root notin quarantine.missing
# Add b1
quarantine.addOrphan(Slot 0, b1).isOk
b0.root in quarantine.missing
b1.root notin quarantine.missing
b2.root notin quarantine.missing
# Re-add b2
quarantine.addOrphan(Slot 0, b2).isOk
b0.root in quarantine.missing
b1.root notin quarantine.missing
b2.root notin quarantine.missing
# Empty missing
while quarantine.missing.len > 0:
discard quarantine.checkMissing(max = 5)
check:
# Re-add b2
quarantine.addOrphan(Slot 0, b2).isOk
b0.root in quarantine.missing
b1.root notin quarantine.missing
upstream peerdas alpha3 related spec changes + fix upstream related issues (#6468) * reworked some of the das core specs, pr'd to check whether whether the conflicting type issue is centric to my machine or not * bumped nim-blscurve to 9c6e80c6109133c0af3025654f5a8820282cff05, same as unstable * bumped nim-eth2-scenarios, nim-nat-traversal at par with unstable, added more pathches, made peerdas devnet branch backward compatible, peerdas passing new ssz tests as per alpha3, disabled electra fixture tests, as branch hasn't been rebased for a while * refactor test fixture files * rm: serializeDataColumn * refactor: took data columns extracted from blobs during block proposal to the heap * disable blob broadcast in pd devnet * fix addBlock in message router * fix: data column iterator * added debug checkpoints to check CI * refactor if else conditions * add: updated das core specs to alpha 3, and unit tests pass
2024-08-05 13:57:39 +00:00
b2.root notin quarantine.missing