2019-02-19 23:35:02 +00:00
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import
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deques, options, sequtils, tables,
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chronicles,
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./spec/[beaconstate, datatypes, crypto, digest, helpers, validator], extras,
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./beacon_chain_db, ./ssz
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type
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Validation* = object
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aggregation_bitfield*: seq[byte]
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custody_bitfield*: seq[byte] ##\
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## Phase 1 - the handling of this field is probably broken..
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aggregate_signature*: ValidatorSig
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# Per Danny as of 2018-12-21:
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# Yeah, you can do any linear combination of signatures. but you have to
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# remember the linear combination of pubkeys that constructed
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# if you have two instances of a signature from pubkey p, then you need 2*p
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# in the group pubkey because the attestation bitfield is only 1 bit per
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# pubkey right now, attestations do not support this it could be extended to
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# support N overlaps up to N times per pubkey if we had N bits per validator
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# instead of 1
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# We are shying away from this for the time being. If there end up being
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# substantial difficulties in network layer aggregation, then adding bits to
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# aid in supporting overlaps is one potential solution
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AttestationEntry* = object
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data*: AttestationData
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validations*: seq[Validation] ## \
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## Instead of aggregating the signatures eagerly, we simply dump them in
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## this seq and aggregate only when needed
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## TODO there are obvious caching opportunities here..
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SlotData* = object
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attestations*: seq[AttestationEntry] ## \
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## Depending on the world view of the various validators, they may have
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## voted on different states - here we collect all the different
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## combinations that validators have come up with so that later, we can
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## count how popular each world view is (fork choice)
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## TODO this could be a Table[AttestationData, seq[Validation] or something
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## less naive
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AttestationPool* = object
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## The attestation pool keeps all attestations that are known to the
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## client - each attestation counts as votes towards the fork choice
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## rule that determines which block we consider to be the head. The pool
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## contains both votes that have been included in the chain and those that
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## have not.
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slots*: Deque[SlotData] ## \
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## We keep one item per slot such that indexing matches slot number
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## together with startingSlot
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2019-02-20 01:33:58 +00:00
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startingSlot*: Slot ## \
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2019-02-19 23:35:02 +00:00
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## Generally, we keep attestations only until a slot has been finalized -
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## after that, they may no longer affect fork choice.
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proc init*(T: type AttestationPool, dummy: int): T =
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result.slots = initDeque[SlotData]()
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proc overlaps(a, b: seq[byte]): bool =
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for i in 0..<a.len:
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if (a[i] and b[i]) > 0'u8: return true
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proc combineBitfield(tgt: var seq[byte], src: seq[byte]) =
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for i in 0 ..< tgt.len:
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# TODO:
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# when BLS signatures are combined, we must ensure that
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# the same participant key is not included on both sides
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tgt[i] = tgt[i] or src[i]
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proc combine*(tgt: var Attestation, src: Attestation, flags: UpdateFlags) =
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# Combine the signature and participation bitfield, with the assumption that
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# the same data is being signed!
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assert tgt.data == src.data
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# TODO:
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# when BLS signatures are combined, we must ensure that
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# the same participant key is not included on both sides
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tgt.aggregation_bitfield.combineBitfield(src.aggregation_bitfield)
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if skipValidation notin flags:
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tgt.aggregate_signature.combine(src.aggregate_signature)
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proc validate(
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state: BeaconState, attestation: Attestation, flags: UpdateFlags): bool =
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# TODO these validations should probably be done elsewhere, and really bad
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# attestations should probably cause some sort of feedback to the network
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# layer so they don't spread further.. is there a sliding scale here of
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# badness?
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# TODO half of this stuff is from beaconstate.validateAttestation - merge?
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let attestationSlot = attestation.data.slot
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if attestationSlot < state.finalized_epoch.get_epoch_start_slot():
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debug "Old attestation",
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attestationSlot = humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot),
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attestationEpoch = humaneEpochNum(attestationSlot.slot_to_epoch),
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stateSlot = humaneSlotNum(state.slot),
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finalizedEpoch = humaneEpochNum(state.finalized_epoch)
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return
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# TODO what makes sense here? If an attestation is from the future with
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# regards to the state, something is wrong - it's a bad attestation, we're
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# desperatly behind or someone is sending bogus attestations...
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if attestationSlot > state.slot + 64:
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debug "Future attestation",
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attestationSlot = humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot),
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attestationEpoch = humaneEpochNum(attestationSlot.slot_to_epoch),
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stateSlot = humaneSlotNum(state.slot),
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finalizedEpoch = humaneEpochNum(state.finalized_epoch)
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return
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if not allIt(attestation.custody_bitfield, it == 0):
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notice "Invalid custody bitfield for phase 0"
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return false
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if not anyIt(attestation.aggregation_bitfield, it != 0):
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notice "Empty aggregation bitfield"
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return false
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let crosslink_committee = mapIt(
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filterIt(get_crosslink_committees_at_slot(state, attestation.data.slot),
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it.shard == attestation.data.shard),
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it.committee)[0]
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# Extra checks not in specs
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# https://github.com/status-im/nim-beacon-chain/pull/105#issuecomment-462432544
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if attestation.aggregation_bitfield.len != (crosslink_committee.len + 7) div 8:
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notice "Invalid aggregation bitfield length",
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attestationLen = attestation.aggregation_bitfield.len,
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committeeLen = crosslink_committee.len
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return false
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if attestation.custody_bitfield.len != (crosslink_committee.len + 7) div 8:
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notice "Invalid custody bitfield length",
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attestationLen = attestation.aggregation_bitfield.len,
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committeeLen = crosslink_committee.len
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return false
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# End extra checks
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## the rest; turns into expensive NOP until then.
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if skipValidation notin flags:
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let
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participants = get_attestation_participants(
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state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bitfield)
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## TODO when the custody_bitfield assertion-to-emptiness disappears do this
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## and fix the custody_bit_0_participants check to depend on it.
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# custody_bit_1_participants = {nothing, always, because assertion above}
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custody_bit_1_participants: seq[ValidatorIndex] = @[]
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custody_bit_0_participants = participants
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group_public_key = bls_aggregate_pubkeys(
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participants.mapIt(state.validator_registry[it].pubkey))
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# Verify that aggregate_signature verifies using the group pubkey.
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if not bls_verify_multiple(
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@[
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bls_aggregate_pubkeys(mapIt(custody_bit_0_participants,
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state.validator_registry[it].pubkey)),
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bls_aggregate_pubkeys(mapIt(custody_bit_1_participants,
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state.validator_registry[it].pubkey)),
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],
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@[
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hash_tree_root(AttestationDataAndCustodyBit(
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data: attestation.data, custody_bit: false)),
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hash_tree_root(AttestationDataAndCustodyBit(
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data: attestation.data, custody_bit: true)),
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],
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attestation.aggregate_signature,
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get_domain(state.fork, slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot),
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DOMAIN_ATTESTATION),
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):
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notice "Invalid signature", participants
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return false
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true
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proc add*(pool: var AttestationPool,
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attestation: Attestation,
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state: BeaconState) =
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if not validate(state, attestation, {skipValidation}): return
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let
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attestationSlot = attestation.data.slot
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# We keep a sliding window of attestations, roughly from the last finalized
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# epoch to now, because these are the attestations that may affect the voting
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# outcome. Some of these attestations will already have been added to blocks,
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# while others are fresh off the network.
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doAssert attestationSlot >= pool.startingSlot,
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"""
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We should have checked in validate that attestation is newer than
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finalized_slot and we never prune things before that, per below condition!
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""" &
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", attestationSlot: " & $humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot) &
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", startingSlot: " & $humaneSlotNum(pool.startingSlot)
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if pool.slots.len == 0:
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2019-02-21 04:42:17 +00:00
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# Because the first attestations may arrive in any order, we'll make sure
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# to start counting at the last finalized epoch start slot - anything
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# earlier than that is thrown out by the above check
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2019-02-19 23:35:02 +00:00
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info "First attestation!",
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attestationSlot = $humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot)
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2019-02-21 04:42:17 +00:00
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pool.startingSlot = state.finalized_epoch.get_epoch_start_slot()
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2019-02-19 23:35:02 +00:00
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2019-02-20 01:33:58 +00:00
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if pool.startingSlot + pool.slots.len.Slot <= attestationSlot:
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2019-02-19 23:35:02 +00:00
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debug "Growing attestation pool",
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attestationSlot = $humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot),
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startingSlot = $humaneSlotNum(pool.startingSlot)
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# Make sure there's a pool entry for every slot, even when there's a gap
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2019-02-20 01:33:58 +00:00
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while pool.startingSlot + pool.slots.len.Slot <= attestationSlot:
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2019-02-19 23:35:02 +00:00
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pool.slots.addLast(SlotData())
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if pool.startingSlot < state.finalized_epoch.get_epoch_start_slot():
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debug "Pruning attestation pool",
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startingSlot = $humaneSlotNum(pool.startingSlot),
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finalizedSlot =
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$humaneSlotNum(state.finalized_epoch.get_epoch_start_slot())
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# TODO there should be a better way to remove a whole epoch of stuff..
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while pool.startingSlot < state.finalized_epoch.get_epoch_start_slot():
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pool.slots.popFirst()
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pool.startingSlot += 1
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let
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slotData = addr pool.slots[attestationSlot - pool.startingSlot]
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validation = Validation(
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aggregation_bitfield: attestation.aggregation_bitfield,
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custody_bitfield: attestation.custody_bitfield,
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aggregate_signature: attestation.aggregate_signature)
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var found = false
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for a in slotData.attestations.mitems():
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if a.data == attestation.data:
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for v in a.validations:
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if v.aggregation_bitfield.overlaps(validation.aggregation_bitfield):
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# TODO this check is here so that later, when we combine signatures,
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# there is no overlap (each validator must be represented once
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# only). this is wrong - we could technically receive
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# attestations that have already been combined (for example when
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# feeding in attestations from blocks, which we're not doing yet)
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# but then we'll also have to update the combine logic to deal
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# with this complication.
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debug "Ignoring overlapping attestation",
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existingParticipants = get_attestation_participants(
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state, a.data, v.aggregation_bitfield),
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newParticipants = get_attestation_participants(
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state, a.data, validation.aggregation_bitfield)
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found = true
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break
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if not found:
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a.validations.add(validation)
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found = true
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break
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if not found:
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slotData.attestations.add(AttestationEntry(
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data: attestation.data,
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validations: @[validation]
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))
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proc getAttestationsForBlock*(pool: AttestationPool,
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lastState: BeaconState,
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2019-02-20 01:33:58 +00:00
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newBlockSlot: Slot): seq[Attestation] =
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2019-02-19 23:35:02 +00:00
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if newBlockSlot - GENESIS_SLOT < MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY:
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debug "Too early for attestations",
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newBlockSlot = humaneSlotNum(newBlockSlot)
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return
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if pool.slots.len == 0: # startingSlot not set yet!
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info "No attestations found (pool empty)",
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newBlockSlot = humaneSlotNum(newBlockSlot)
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return
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let
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# TODO in theory we could include attestations from other slots also, but
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# we're currently not tracking which attestations have already been included
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# in blocks on the fork we're aiming for.. this is a conservative approach
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# that's guaranteed to not include any duplicates, because it's the first
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# time the attestations are up for inclusion!
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attestationSlot = newBlockSlot - MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY
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if attestationSlot < pool.startingSlot or
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2019-02-20 01:33:58 +00:00
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attestationSlot >= pool.startingSlot + pool.slots.len.Slot:
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2019-02-19 23:35:02 +00:00
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info "No attestations",
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attestationSlot = humaneSlotNum(attestationSlot),
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startingSlot = humaneSlotNum(pool.startingSlot),
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2019-02-20 01:33:58 +00:00
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endingSlot = humaneSlotNum(pool.startingSlot + pool.slots.len.Slot)
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2019-02-19 23:35:02 +00:00
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return
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let
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slotDequeIdx = int(attestationSlot - pool.startingSlot)
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slotData = pool.slots[slotDequeIdx]
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for a in slotData.attestations:
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var
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attestation = Attestation(
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aggregation_bitfield: a.validations[0].aggregation_bitfield,
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data: a.data,
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custody_bitfield: a.validations[0].custody_bitfield,
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aggregate_signature: a.validations[0].aggregate_signature
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)
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for v in a.validations[1..^1]:
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if not attestation.aggregation_bitfield.overlaps(
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v.aggregation_bitfield):
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attestation.aggregation_bitfield.combineBitfield(
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v.aggregation_bitfield)
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attestation.custody_bitfield.combineBitfield(v.custody_bitfield)
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attestation.aggregate_signature.combine(v.aggregate_signature)
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result.add(attestation)
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if result.len >= MAX_ATTESTATIONS:
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return
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