2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# beacon_chain
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# Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Status Research & Development GmbH
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# Licensed and distributed under either of
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# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
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# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
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# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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{.push raises: [Defect].}
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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import
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2020-06-05 11:28:52 +00:00
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chronicles, sequtils, tables,
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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metrics, stew/results,
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2020-06-03 13:52:02 +00:00
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../ssz/merkleization, ../state_transition, ../extras,
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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../spec/[crypto, datatypes, digest, helpers, signatures],
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2020-06-18 10:03:36 +00:00
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block_pools_types, candidate_chains, quarantine
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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export results
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# Clearance
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# ---------------------------------------------
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#
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# This module is in charge of making the
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# "quarantined" network blocks
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# pass the firewall and be stored in the blockpool
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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logScope:
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topics = "clearance"
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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func getOrResolve*(dag: CandidateChains, quarantine: var Quarantine, root: Eth2Digest): BlockRef =
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## Fetch a block ref, or nil if not found (will be added to list of
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## blocks-to-resolve)
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result = dag.getRef(root)
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if result.isNil:
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2020-06-18 10:03:36 +00:00
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quarantine.missing[root] = MissingBlock()
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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proc add*(
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dag: var CandidateChains, quarantine: var Quarantine,
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blockRoot: Eth2Digest,
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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signedBlock: SignedBeaconBlock): Result[BlockRef, BlockError] {.gcsafe.}
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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proc addResolvedBlock(
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dag: var CandidateChains, quarantine: var Quarantine,
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state: BeaconState, blockRoot: Eth2Digest,
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signedBlock: SignedBeaconBlock, parent: BlockRef): BlockRef =
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logScope: pcs = "block_resolution"
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doAssert state.slot == signedBlock.message.slot, "state must match block"
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let blockRef = BlockRef.init(blockRoot, signedBlock.message)
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2020-06-05 11:28:52 +00:00
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blockRef.epochsInfo = filterIt(parent.epochsInfo,
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it.epoch + 1 >= state.slot.compute_epoch_at_slot)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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link(parent, blockRef)
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dag.blocks[blockRoot] = blockRef
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trace "Populating block dag", key = blockRoot, val = blockRef
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# Resolved blocks should be stored in database
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dag.putBlock(blockRoot, signedBlock)
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# This block *might* have caused a justification - make sure we stow away
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# that information:
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let justifiedSlot =
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state.current_justified_checkpoint.epoch.compute_start_slot_at_epoch()
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var foundHead: Option[Head]
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for head in dag.heads.mitems():
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if head.blck.isAncestorOf(blockRef):
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if head.justified.slot != justifiedSlot:
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head.justified = blockRef.atSlot(justifiedSlot)
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head.blck = blockRef
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foundHead = some(head)
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break
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if foundHead.isNone():
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foundHead = some(Head(
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blck: blockRef,
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justified: blockRef.atSlot(justifiedSlot)))
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dag.heads.add(foundHead.get())
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info "Block resolved",
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blck = shortLog(signedBlock.message),
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blockRoot = shortLog(blockRoot),
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justifiedHead = foundHead.get().justified,
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heads = dag.heads.len(),
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cat = "filtering"
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# Now that we have the new block, we should see if any of the previously
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# unresolved blocks magically become resolved
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# TODO there are more efficient ways of doing this that don't risk
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# running out of stack etc
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# TODO This code is convoluted because when there are more than ~1.5k
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# blocks being synced, there's a stack overflow as `add` gets called
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# for the whole chain of blocks. Instead we use this ugly field in `dag`
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# which could be avoided by refactoring the code
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if not quarantine.inAdd:
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quarantine.inAdd = true
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defer: quarantine.inAdd = false
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var keepGoing = true
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while keepGoing:
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2020-06-18 10:03:36 +00:00
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let retries = quarantine.orphans
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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for k, v in retries:
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discard add(dag, quarantine, k, v)
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# Keep going for as long as the pending dag is shrinking
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# TODO inefficient! so what?
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2020-06-18 10:03:36 +00:00
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keepGoing = quarantine.orphans.len < retries.len
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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blockRef
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proc add*(
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dag: var CandidateChains, quarantine: var Quarantine,
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blockRoot: Eth2Digest,
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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signedBlock: SignedBeaconBlock): Result[BlockRef, BlockError] {.gcsafe.} =
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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## return the block, if resolved...
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## the state parameter may be updated to include the given block, if
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## everything checks out
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# TODO reevaluate passing the state in like this
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2020-06-10 06:58:12 +00:00
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# TODO: to facilitate adding the block to the attestation pool
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# this should also return justified and finalized epoch corresponding
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# to each block.
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# This would be easy apart from the "Block already exists"
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# early return.
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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let blck = signedBlock.message
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doAssert blockRoot == hash_tree_root(blck)
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logScope: pcs = "block_addition"
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# Already seen this block??
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dag.blocks.withValue(blockRoot, blockRef):
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debug "Block already exists",
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blck = shortLog(blck),
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blockRoot = shortLog(blockRoot),
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cat = "filtering"
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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return ok blockRef[]
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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quarantine.missing.del(blockRoot)
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# If the block we get is older than what we finalized already, we drop it.
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# One way this can happen is that we start resolving a block and finalization
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# happens in the meantime - the block we requested will then be stale
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# by the time it gets here.
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if blck.slot <= dag.finalizedHead.slot:
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debug "Old block, dropping",
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blck = shortLog(blck),
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finalizedHead = shortLog(dag.finalizedHead),
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tail = shortLog(dag.tail),
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blockRoot = shortLog(blockRoot),
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cat = "filtering"
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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return err Old
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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let parent = dag.blocks.getOrDefault(blck.parent_root)
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if parent != nil:
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if parent.slot >= blck.slot:
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# TODO Malicious block? inform peer dag?
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notice "Invalid block slot",
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blck = shortLog(blck),
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blockRoot = shortLog(blockRoot),
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parentBlock = shortLog(parent)
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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return err Invalid
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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2020-06-18 10:03:36 +00:00
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# The block might have been in either of `orphans` or `missing` - we don't
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# want any more work done on its behalf
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quarantine.orphans.del(blockRoot)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# The block is resolved, now it's time to validate it to ensure that the
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# blocks we add to the database are clean for the given state
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# TODO if the block is from the future, we should not be resolving it (yet),
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# but maybe we should use it as a hint that our clock is wrong?
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updateStateData(
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dag, dag.tmpState, BlockSlot(blck: parent, slot: blck.slot - 1))
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let
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poolPtr = unsafeAddr dag # safe because restore is short-lived
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func restore(v: var HashedBeaconState) =
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# TODO address this ugly workaround - there should probably be a
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# `state_transition` that takes a `StateData` instead and updates
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# the block as well
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doAssert v.addr == addr poolPtr.tmpState.data
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avoid genericAssign for beacon node types (#1166)
* avoid genericAssign for beacon node types
ok, I got fed up of this function messing up cpu measurements - it's so
ridiculously slow, it's sad.
before, while syncing:
```
40,65% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.]
genericAssignAux__U5DxFPRpHCCZDKWQzM9adaw
9,02% libc-2.31.so [.] __memmove_avx_unaligned_erms
7,07% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_monty
5,19% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_mul
2,72% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] memcpy@plt
1,18% [kernel] [k] rb_next
1,17% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] genericReset
1,06% [kernel] [k] map_private_extent_buffer
```
after:
```
24,88% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_monty
20,29% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_mul
3,15% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_norm
2,93% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_add
2,55% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_sqr
1,64% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_mod
1,63% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.]
sha256Transform__BJNBQtWr9bJwzqbyfKXd38Q
1,48% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] FP_BLS381_add
1,39% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_sub
1,33% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_dnorm
1,14% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] FP2_BLS381_mul
1,05% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.] BIG_384_58_cmove
1,05% beacon_node_shared_witti_0 [.]
get_shuffled_seq__4uncAHNsSG3Pndo5H11U9aQ
```
* better field iteration
2020-06-12 19:10:22 +00:00
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assign(poolPtr.tmpState, poolPtr.headState)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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2020-06-01 07:44:50 +00:00
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var stateCache = getEpochCache(parent, dag.tmpState.data.data)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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if not state_transition(
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2020-05-29 06:10:20 +00:00
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dag.tmpState.data, signedBlock, stateCache, dag.updateFlags, restore):
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# TODO find a better way to log all this block data
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notice "Invalid block",
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blck = shortLog(blck),
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blockRoot = shortLog(blockRoot),
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cat = "filtering"
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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return err Invalid
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# Careful, tmpState.data has been updated but not blck - we need to create
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# the BlockRef first!
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dag.tmpState.blck = addResolvedBlock(
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dag, quarantine,
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dag.tmpState.data.data, blockRoot, signedBlock, parent)
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dag.putState(dag.tmpState.data, dag.tmpState.blck)
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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return ok dag.tmpState.blck
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# TODO already checked hash though? main reason to keep this is because
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# the pending dag calls this function back later in a loop, so as long
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# as dag.add(...) requires a SignedBeaconBlock, easier to keep them in
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# pending too.
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2020-06-18 10:03:36 +00:00
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quarantine.add(dag, signedBlock, some(blockRoot))
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# TODO possibly, it makes sense to check the database - that would allow sync
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# to simply fill up the database with random blocks the other clients
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# think are useful - but, it would also risk filling the database with
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# junk that's not part of the block graph
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if blck.parent_root in quarantine.missing or
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2020-06-18 10:03:36 +00:00
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blck.parent_root in quarantine.orphans:
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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return err MissingParent
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# This is an unresolved block - put its parent on the missing list for now...
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# TODO if we receive spam blocks, one heurestic to implement might be to wait
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# for a couple of attestations to appear before fetching parents - this
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# would help prevent using up network resources for spam - this serves
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# two purposes: one is that attestations are likely to appear for the
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# block only if it's valid / not spam - the other is that malicious
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# validators that are not proposers can sign invalid blocks and send
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# them out without penalty - but signing invalid attestations carries
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# a risk of being slashed, making attestations a more valuable spam
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# filter.
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# TODO when we receive the block, we don't know how many others we're missing
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# from that branch, so right now, we'll just do a blind guess
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debug "Unresolved block (parent missing)",
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blck = shortLog(blck),
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blockRoot = shortLog(blockRoot),
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2020-06-18 10:03:36 +00:00
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orphans = quarantine.orphans.len,
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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missing = quarantine.missing.len,
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cat = "filtering"
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2020-05-21 17:08:31 +00:00
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return err MissingParent
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v0.11.1/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#global-topics
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proc isValidBeaconBlock*(
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dag: CandidateChains, quarantine: var Quarantine,
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signed_beacon_block: SignedBeaconBlock, current_slot: Slot,
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2020-06-16 08:49:32 +00:00
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flags: UpdateFlags): Result[void, BlockError] =
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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logScope:
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topics = "clearance valid_blck"
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received_block = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.message)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# In general, checks are ordered from cheap to expensive. Especially, crypto
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# verification could be quite a bit more expensive than the rest. This is an
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# externally easy-to-invoke function by tossing network packets at the node.
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# The block is not from a future slot
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# TODO allow `MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY` leniency, especially towards
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# seemingly future slots.
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2020-06-12 16:43:20 +00:00
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# TODO using +1 here while this is being sorted - should queue these until
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# they're within the DISPARITY limit
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if not (signed_beacon_block.message.slot <= current_slot + 1):
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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debug "block is from a future slot",
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current_slot
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2020-06-16 08:49:32 +00:00
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return err(Invalid)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# The block is from a slot greater than the latest finalized slot (with a
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# MAXIMUM_GOSSIP_CLOCK_DISPARITY allowance) -- i.e. validate that
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# signed_beacon_block.message.slot >
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# compute_start_slot_at_epoch(state.finalized_checkpoint.epoch)
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if not (signed_beacon_block.message.slot > dag.finalizedHead.slot):
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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debug "block is not from a slot greater than the latest finalized slot"
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2020-06-16 08:49:32 +00:00
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return err(Invalid)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# The block is the first block with valid signature received for the proposer
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# for the slot, signed_beacon_block.message.slot.
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#
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# While this condition is similar to the proposer slashing condition at
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2020-06-17 11:59:02 +00:00
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# https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/v0.12.1/specs/phase0/validator.md#proposer-slashing
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# it's not identical, and this check does not address slashing:
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#
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# (1) The beacon blocks must be conflicting, i.e. different, for the same
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# slot and proposer. This check also catches identical blocks.
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#
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# (2) By this point in the function, it's not been checked whether they're
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# signed yet. As in general, expensive checks should be deferred, this
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# would add complexity not directly relevant this function.
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#
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# (3) As evidenced by point (1), the similarity in the validation condition
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# and slashing condition, while not coincidental, aren't similar enough
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# to combine, as one or the other might drift.
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#
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# (4) Furthermore, this function, as much as possible, simply returns a yes
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# or no answer, without modifying other state for p2p network interface
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# validation. Complicating this interface, for the sake of sharing only
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# couple lines of code, wouldn't be worthwhile.
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#
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# TODO might check unresolved/orphaned blocks too, and this might not see all
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# blocks at a given slot (though, in theory, those get checked elsewhere), or
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# adding metrics that count how often these conditions occur.
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let
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slotBlockRef = getBlockBySlot(dag, signed_beacon_block.message.slot)
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if not slotBlockRef.isNil:
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let blck = dag.get(slotBlockRef).data
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if blck.message.proposer_index ==
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signed_beacon_block.message.proposer_index and
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blck.message.slot == signed_beacon_block.message.slot and
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blck.signature.toRaw() != signed_beacon_block.signature.toRaw():
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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debug "block isn't first block with valid signature received for the proposer",
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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blckRef = slotBlockRef,
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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existing_block = shortLog(blck.message)
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2020-06-16 08:49:32 +00:00
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return err(Invalid)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# If this block doesn't have a parent we know about, we can't/don't really
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# trace it back to a known-good state/checkpoint to verify its prevenance;
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# while one could getOrResolve to queue up searching for missing parent it
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# might not be the best place. As much as feasible, this function aims for
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# answering yes/no, not queuing other action or otherwise altering state.
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let parent_ref = dag.getRef(signed_beacon_block.message.parent_root)
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if parent_ref.isNil:
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# This doesn't mean a block is forever invalid, only that we haven't seen
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# its ancestor blocks yet. While that means for now it should be blocked,
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# at least, from libp2p propagation, it shouldn't be ignored. TODO, if in
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# the future this block moves from pending to being resolved, consider if
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# it's worth broadcasting it then.
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# Pending dag gets checked via `CandidateChains.add(...)` later, and relevant
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# checks are performed there. In usual paths beacon_node adds blocks via
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# CandidateChains.add(...) directly, with no additional validity checks. TODO,
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# not specific to this, but by the pending dag keying on the htr of the
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# BeaconBlock, not SignedBeaconBlock, opens up certain spoofing attacks.
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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debug "parent unknown, putting block in quarantine"
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2020-06-18 10:03:36 +00:00
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quarantine.add(dag, signed_beacon_block)
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2020-06-16 08:49:32 +00:00
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return err(MissingParent)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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# The proposer signature, signed_beacon_block.signature, is valid with
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# respect to the proposer_index pubkey.
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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let
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proposer = getProposer(dag, parent_ref, signed_beacon_block.message.slot)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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if proposer.isNone:
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notice "cannot compute proposer for message"
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2020-06-16 08:49:32 +00:00
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return err(Invalid)
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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if proposer.get()[0] !=
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ValidatorIndex(signed_beacon_block.message.proposer_index):
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debug "block had unexpected proposer",
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expected_proposer = proposer.get()[0]
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2020-06-16 08:49:32 +00:00
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return err(Invalid)
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2020-06-16 05:45:04 +00:00
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if not verify_block_signature(
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dag.headState.data.data.fork,
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dag.headState.data.data.genesis_validators_root,
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signed_beacon_block.message.slot,
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signed_beacon_block.message,
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proposer.get()[1],
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signed_beacon_block.signature):
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debug "block failed signature verification",
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signature = shortLog(signed_beacon_block.signature)
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2020-06-16 08:49:32 +00:00
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return err(Invalid)
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2020-05-19 14:18:07 +00:00
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2020-06-16 08:49:32 +00:00
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ok()
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