536 lines
21 KiB
Nim
536 lines
21 KiB
Nim
## Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Status Research & Development GmbH
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## Licensed under either of
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## * Apache License, version 2.0, ([LICENSE-APACHE](LICENSE-APACHE))
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## * MIT license ([LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT))
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## at your option.
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## This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to
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## those terms.
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##
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{.push raises: [Defect].}
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import
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strformat, typetraits,
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stew/[byteutils, objects, results, ctops],
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./secp256k1_abi
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from nimcrypto/utils import burnMem
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export results
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# Implementation notes
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#
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# The goal of this wrapper is to create a thin layer on top of the API presented
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# in secp256k1_abi, exploiting some of its regulatities to make it slightly more
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# convenient to use from Nim
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#
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# * Types like keys and signatures are guaranteed to hold valid values which
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# simplifies reasoning about errors
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# * An exception is keys that have been cleared - these are no longer valid
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# to be passed as arguments to functions
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# * TODO a sink that makes the compiler guarantee that `clear` is the last
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# thing called on the instance
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# * We hide raw pointer accesses and lengths behind nim types
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# * We guarantee certain parameter properties, like not null and proper length,
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# on the Nim side - in turn, we can rely on certain errors never happening in
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# libsecp256k1, so we can skip checking for them
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# * Functions like "fromRaw/toRaw" are balanced and will always rountrip
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# * Functions like `fromRaw` are not called `init` because they may fail
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# * No CatchableErrors
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# * Where `secp256k1_context_no_precomp`, we surround the code with
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# `{.noSideEffect.}` as the compiler cannot deduce that this is a constant
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const
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SkRawSecretKeySize* = 32 # 256 div 8
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## Size of private key in octets (bytes)
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SkRawSignatureSize* = 64
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## Compact serialized non-recoverable signature
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SkDerSignatureMaxSize* = 72
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## Max bytes in DER encoding
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SkRawRecoverableSignatureSize* = 65
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## Size of recoverable signature in octets (bytes)
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SkRawPublicKeySize* = 65
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## Size of uncompressed public key in octets (bytes)
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SkRawCompressedPublicKeySize* = 33
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## Size of compressed public key in octets (bytes)
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SkMessageSize* = 32
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## Size of message that can be signed
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SkEdchSecretSize* = 32
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## ECDH-agreed key size
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SkEcdhRawSecretSize* = 33
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## ECDH-agreed raw key size
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type
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SkPublicKey* {.requiresInit.} = object
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## Representation of public key.
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data: secp256k1_pubkey
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SkSecretKey* {.requiresInit.} = object
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## Representation of secret key.
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data: array[SkRawSecretKeySize, byte]
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SkKeyPair* = object
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## Representation of private/public keys pair.
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seckey*: SkSecretKey
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pubkey*: SkPublicKey
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SkSignature* {.requiresInit.} = object
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## Representation of non-recoverable signature.
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data: secp256k1_ecdsa_signature
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SkRecoverableSignature* {.requiresInit.} = object
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## Representation of recoverable signature.
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data: secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature
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SkContext* = ref object
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## Representation of Secp256k1 context object.
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context: ptr secp256k1_context
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SkMessage* = distinct array[SkMessageSize, byte]
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## Message that can be signed or verified
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SkEcdhSecret* {.requiresInit.} = object
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## Representation of ECDH shared secret
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data*: array[SkEdchSecretSize, byte]
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SkEcdhRawSecret* {.requiresInit.} = object
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## Representation of ECDH shared secret, with leading `y` byte
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# (`y` is 0x02 when pubkey.y is even or 0x03 when odd)
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data*: array[SkEcdhRawSecretSize, byte]
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SkResult*[T] = Result[T, cstring]
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##
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## Private procedures interface
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##
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var secpContext {.threadvar.}: SkContext
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## Thread local variable which holds current context
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proc illegalCallback(message: cstring, data: pointer) {.cdecl, raises: [].} =
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# Internal panic - should never happen - all objects we pass into functions
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# are guaranteed valid per their type
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echo message
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echo getStackTrace()
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quit 1
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proc errorCallback(message: cstring, data: pointer) {.cdecl, raises: [].} =
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# Internal panic - should never happen
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echo message
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echo getStackTrace()
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quit 1
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template ptr0(v: array|openArray): ptr cuchar =
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cast[ptr cuchar](unsafeAddr v[0])
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template ptr0(v: SkMessage): ptr cuchar =
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ptr0(distinctBase(v))
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func shutdownLibsecp256k1(ctx: SkContext) =
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# TODO: use destructor when finalizer are deprecated for destructors
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if not(isNil(ctx.context)):
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secp256k1_context_destroy(ctx.context)
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proc newSkContext(): SkContext =
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## Create new Secp256k1 context object.
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new(result, shutdownLibsecp256k1)
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let flags = cuint(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY or SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN)
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result.context = secp256k1_context_create(flags)
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secp256k1_context_set_illegal_callback(
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result.context, illegalCallback, cast[pointer](result))
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secp256k1_context_set_error_callback(
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result.context, errorCallback, cast[pointer](result))
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func getContext(): ptr secp256k1_context =
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## Get current `EccContext`
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{.noSideEffect.}:
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# TODO modifying the secp context here is a side effect, but not
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# necessarily an observable one, since the modification is done to
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# a thread-local variable that is only updated from within here.
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# Technically, it should be possible to precompute a static context
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# at compile time and use that instead, which would turn this into
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# a truly side-effect-free function, instead of an as-if-free one.
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if isNil(secpContext):
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secpContext = newSkContext()
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secpContext.context
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func fromHex*(T: type seq[byte], s: string): SkResult[T] =
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# TODO move this to some common location and return a general error?
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try:
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ok(hexToSeqByte(s))
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except CatchableError:
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err("secp: cannot parse hex string")
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type
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Rng* = proc(data: var openArray[byte]): bool {.raises: [Defect], gcsafe.}
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## A function that fills data with random bytes from a cryptographically
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## secure source or returns false
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FoolproofRng* = proc(data: var openArray[byte]) {.raises: [Defect], gcsafe.}
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## The world will run out of fools before this RNG fails!
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proc random*(T: type SkSecretKey, rng: Rng): SkResult[T] =
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## Generates new random private key - a cryptographically secure RNG should be
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## used - see nimcrypto or bearssl for good RNG's.
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##
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## The random number generator in the Nim standard library `random` module is
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## not cryptographically secure.
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##
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## This function may fail to generate a valid key if the RNG fails. In the
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## current version, the random number generation will be called in a loop
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## which may be vulnerable to timing attacks. Generate your keys elsewhere
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## if this is a issue.
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var data{.noinit.}: array[SkRawSecretKeySize, byte]
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while rng(data):
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if secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(secp256k1_context_no_precomp, data.ptr0) == 1:
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return ok(T(data: data))
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return err("secp: cannot get random bytes for key")
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proc random*(T: type SkSecretKey, rng: FoolproofRng): T =
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## Generates new random private key - a cryptographically secure RNG should be
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## used - see nimcrypto or bearssl for good RNG's.
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##
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## The random number generator in the Nim standard library `random` module is
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## not cryptographically secure.
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##
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## This function may fail to generate a valid key if the RNG fails, in which
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## case it will raise a Defect.
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##
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## In the current version, the random number generation will be called in a
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## loop which may be vulnerable to timing attacks. Generate your keys
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## elsewhere if this is a issue.
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var data{.noinit.}: array[SkRawSecretKeySize, byte]
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for _ in 0..1000*1000:
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rng(data)
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if secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(secp256k1_context_no_precomp, data.ptr0) == 1:
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return T(data: data)
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result = T(data: default(array[32, byte])) # Silence compiler
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# All-zeroes all the time for example will break this function
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raiseAssert "RNG not giving random enough bytes, can't create valid key"
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func fromRaw*(T: type SkSecretKey, data: openArray[byte]): SkResult[T] =
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## Load a valid private key, as created by `toRaw`
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if len(data) < SkRawSecretKeySize:
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return err(static(&"secp: raw private key should be {SkRawSecretKeySize} bytes"))
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{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
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if secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(secp256k1_context_no_precomp, data.ptr0) != 1:
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return err("secp: invalid private key")
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ok(T(data: toArray(32, data.toOpenArray(0, SkRawSecretKeySize - 1))))
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func fromHex*(T: type SkSecretKey, data: string): SkResult[T] =
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## Initialize Secp256k1 `private key` ``key`` from hexadecimal string
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## representation ``data``.
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T.fromRaw(? seq[byte].fromHex(data))
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func toRaw*(seckey: SkSecretKey): array[SkRawSecretKeySize, byte] =
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## Serialize Secp256k1 `private key` ``key`` to raw binary form
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seckey.data
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func toHex*(seckey: SkSecretKey): string =
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toHex(toRaw(seckey))
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func toPublicKey*(key: SkSecretKey): SkPublicKey =
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## Calculate and return Secp256k1 `public key` from `private key` ``key``.
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var pubkey {.noinit.}: secp256k1_pubkey
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let res = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(
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getContext(), addr pubkey, key.data.ptr0)
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doAssert res == 1, "Valid private keys should always have a corresponding pub"
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SkPublicKey(data: pubkey)
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func fromRaw*(T: type SkPublicKey, data: openArray[byte]): SkResult[T] =
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## Initialize Secp256k1 `public key` ``key`` from raw binary
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## representation ``data``, which may be compressed, uncompressed or hybrid
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if len(data) < SkRawCompressedPublicKeySize:
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return err(static(
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&"secp: public key must be {SkRawCompressedPublicKeySize} or {SkRawPublicKeySize} bytes"))
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var length: int
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if data[0] == 0x02'u8 or data[0] == 0x03'u8:
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length = min(len(data), SkRawCompressedPublicKeySize)
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elif data[0] == 0x04'u8 or data[0] == 0x06'u8 or data[0] == 0x07'u8:
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length = min(len(data), SkRawPublicKeySize)
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else:
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return err("secp: public key format not recognised")
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var key {.noinit.}: secp256k1_pubkey
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{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
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if secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(
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secp256k1_context_no_precomp, addr key, data.ptr0, csize_t(length)) != 1:
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return err("secp: cannot parse public key")
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ok(SkPublicKey(data: key))
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func fromHex*(T: type SkPublicKey, data: string): SkResult[T] =
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## Initialize Secp256k1 `public key` ``key`` from hexadecimal string
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## representation ``data``.
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T.fromRaw(? seq[byte].fromHex(data))
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func toRaw*(pubkey: SkPublicKey): array[SkRawPublicKeySize, byte] =
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## Serialize Secp256k1 `public key` ``key`` to raw uncompressed form
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var length = csize_t(len(result))
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{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
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let res = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
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secp256k1_context_no_precomp, result.ptr0, addr length,
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unsafeAddr pubkey.data, SECP256K1_EC_UNCOMPRESSED)
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doAssert res == 1, "Can't fail, per documentation"
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func toHex*(pubkey: SkPublicKey): string =
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toHex(toRaw(pubkey))
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func toRawCompressed*(pubkey: SkPublicKey): array[SkRawCompressedPublicKeySize, byte] =
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## Serialize Secp256k1 `public key` ``key`` to raw compressed form
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var length = csize_t(len(result))
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{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
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let res = secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
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secp256k1_context_no_precomp, result.ptr0, addr length,
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unsafeAddr pubkey.data, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED)
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doAssert res == 1, "Can't fail, per documentation"
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func toHexCompressed*(pubkey: SkPublicKey): string =
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toHex(toRawCompressed(pubkey))
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func fromRaw*(T: type SkSignature, data: openArray[byte]): SkResult[T] =
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## Load compact signature from data
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if data.len() < SkRawSignatureSize:
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return err(static(&"secp: signature must be {SkRawSignatureSize} bytes"))
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var sig {.noinit.}: secp256k1_ecdsa_signature
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{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
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if secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_compact(
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secp256k1_context_no_precomp, addr sig, data.ptr0) != 1:
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return err("secp: cannot parse signaure")
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ok(T(data: sig))
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func fromDer*(T: type SkSignature, data: openarray[byte]): SkResult[T] =
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## Initialize Secp256k1 `signature` ``sig`` from DER
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## representation ``data``.
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if len(data) < 1:
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return err("secp: DER signature too short")
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var sig {.noinit.}: secp256k1_ecdsa_signature
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{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
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if secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_parse_der(
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secp256k1_context_no_precomp, addr sig, data.ptr0, csize_t(len(data))) != 1:
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return err("secp: cannot parse DER signature")
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ok(T(data: sig))
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func fromHex*(T: type SkSignature, data: string): SkResult[T] =
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## Initialize Secp256k1 `signature` ``sig`` from hexadecimal string
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## representation ``data``.
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T.fromRaw(? seq[byte].fromHex(data))
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func toRaw*(sig: SkSignature): array[SkRawSignatureSize, byte] =
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## Serialize signature to compact binary form
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{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
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let res = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_compact(
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secp256k1_context_no_precomp, result.ptr0, unsafeAddr sig.data)
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doAssert res == 1, "Can't fail, per documentation"
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func toDer*(sig: SkSignature, data: var openarray[byte]): int =
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## Serialize Secp256k1 `signature` ``sig`` to raw binary form and store it
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## to ``data``.
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##
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## Returns number of bytes (octets) needed to store secp256k1 signature - if
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## this is more than `data.len`, `data` is not written to.
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var buffer: array[SkDerSignatureMaxSize, byte]
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var plength = csize_t(len(buffer))
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{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
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let res = secp256k1_ecdsa_signature_serialize_der(
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secp256k1_context_no_precomp, buffer.ptr0, addr plength,
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unsafeAddr sig.data)
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doAssert res == 1, "Can't fail, per documentation"
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result = int(plength)
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if len(data) >= result:
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copyMem(addr data[0], addr buffer[0], result)
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func toDer*(sig: SkSignature): seq[byte] =
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## Serialize Secp256k1 `signature` and return it.
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result = newSeq[byte](72)
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let length = toDer(sig, result)
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result.setLen(length)
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func toHex*(sig: SkSignature): string =
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toHex(toRaw(sig))
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func fromRaw*(T: type SkRecoverableSignature, data: openArray[byte]): SkResult[T] =
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if data.len() < SkRawRecoverableSignatureSize:
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return err(
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static(&"secp: recoverable signature must be {SkRawRecoverableSignatureSize} bytes"))
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let recid = cint(data[64])
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var sig {.noinit.}: secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature
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{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
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if secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_parse_compact(
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secp256k1_context_no_precomp, addr sig, data.ptr0, recid) != 1:
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return err("secp: invalid recoverable signature")
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ok(T(data: sig))
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func fromHex*(T: type SkRecoverableSignature, data: string): SkResult[T] =
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## Initialize Secp256k1 `signature` ``sig`` from hexadecimal string
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## representation ``data``.
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T.fromRaw(? seq[byte].fromHex(data))
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func toRaw*(sig: SkRecoverableSignature): array[SkRawRecoverableSignatureSize, byte] =
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## Converts recoverable signature to compact binary form
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var recid = cint(0)
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{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
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let res = secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact(
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secp256k1_context_no_precomp, result.ptr0, addr recid, unsafeAddr sig.data)
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doAssert res == 1, "can't fail, per documentation"
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result[64] = byte(recid)
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func toHex*(sig: SkRecoverableSignature): string =
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toHex(toRaw(sig))
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proc random*(T: type SkKeyPair, rng: Rng): SkResult[T] =
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## Generates new random key pair.
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let seckey = ? SkSecretKey.random(rng)
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ok(T(
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seckey: seckey,
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pubkey: seckey.toPublicKey()
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))
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proc random*(T: type SkKeyPair, rng: FoolproofRng): T =
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## Generates new random key pair.
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let seckey = SkSecretKey.random(rng)
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T(
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seckey: seckey,
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pubkey: seckey.toPublicKey()
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)
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func `==`*(lhs, rhs: SkPublicKey): bool =
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## Compare Secp256k1 `public key` objects for equality.
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CT.isEqual(lhs.toRaw(), rhs.toRaw())
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func `==`*(lhs, rhs: SkSignature): bool =
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## Compare Secp256k1 `signature` objects for equality.
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CT.isEqual(lhs.toRaw(), rhs.toRaw())
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func `==`*(lhs, rhs: SkRecoverableSignature): bool =
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## Compare Secp256k1 `recoverable signature` objects for equality.
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CT.isEqual(lhs.toRaw(), rhs.toRaw())
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func sign*(key: SkSecretKey, msg: SkMessage): SkSignature =
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## Sign message `msg` using private key `key` and return signature object.
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## It is recommended that `msg` is produced by hashing the input data to
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## a 32-byte hash, like sha256.
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var data {.noinit.}: secp256k1_ecdsa_signature
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let res = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign(
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getContext(), addr data, msg.ptr0, key.data.ptr0, nil, nil)
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doAssert res == 1, "cannot create signature, key invalid?"
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SkSignature(data: data)
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func signRecoverable*(key: SkSecretKey, msg: SkMessage): SkRecoverableSignature =
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## Sign message `msg` using private key `key` and return signature object.
|
|
var data {.noinit.}: secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature
|
|
let res = secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(
|
|
getContext(), addr data, msg.ptr0, key.data.ptr0, nil, nil)
|
|
doAssert res == 1, "cannot create recoverable signature, key invalid?"
|
|
SkRecoverableSignature(data: data)
|
|
|
|
func verify*(sig: SkSignature, msg: SkMessage, key: SkPublicKey): bool =
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_verify(
|
|
getContext(), unsafeAddr sig.data, msg.ptr0, unsafeAddr key.data) == 1
|
|
|
|
func recover*(sig: SkRecoverableSignature, msg: SkMessage): SkResult[SkPublicKey] =
|
|
var data {.noinit.}: secp256k1_pubkey
|
|
if secp256k1_ecdsa_recover(
|
|
getContext(), addr data, unsafeAddr sig.data, msg.ptr0) != 1:
|
|
return err("secp: cannot recover public key from signature")
|
|
|
|
ok(SkPublicKey(data: data))
|
|
|
|
func ecdh*(seckey: SkSecretKey, pubkey: SkPublicKey): SkEcdhSecret =
|
|
## Calculate ECDH shared secret.
|
|
var secret {.noinit.}: array[SkEdchSecretSize, byte]
|
|
{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
|
|
let res = secp256k1_ecdh(
|
|
secp256k1_context_no_precomp, secret.ptr0, unsafeAddr pubkey.data,
|
|
seckey.data.ptr0)
|
|
doAssert res == 1, "cannot compute ECDH secret, keys invalid?"
|
|
|
|
SkEcdhSecret(data: secret)
|
|
|
|
func ecdhRaw*(seckey: SkSecretKey, pubkey: SkPublicKey): SkEcdhRawSecret =
|
|
## Calculate ECDH shared secret, ethereum style
|
|
# TODO - deprecate: https://github.com/status-im/nim-eth/issues/222
|
|
var secret {.noinit.}: array[SkEcdhRawSecretSize, byte]
|
|
{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
|
|
let res = secp256k1_ecdh_raw(
|
|
secp256k1_context_no_precomp, secret.ptr0, unsafeAddr pubkey.data,
|
|
seckey.data.ptr0)
|
|
doAssert res == 1, "cannot compute raw ECDH secret, keys invalid?"
|
|
|
|
SkEcdhRawSecret(data: secret)
|
|
|
|
func clear*(v: var SkSecretKey) =
|
|
## Wipe and clear memory of Secp256k1 `private key`.
|
|
## After calling this function, the key is invalid and using it elsewhere will
|
|
## result in undefined behaviour or Defect
|
|
burnMem(v.data)
|
|
|
|
func clear*(v: var SkEcdhSecret) =
|
|
## Wipe and clear memory of ECDH `shared secret`.
|
|
## After calling this function, the key is invalid and using it elsewhere will
|
|
## result in undefined behaviour or Defect
|
|
burnMem(v.data)
|
|
|
|
func clear*(v: var SkEcdhRawSecret) =
|
|
## Wipe and clear memory of ECDH `shared secret`.
|
|
## After calling this function, the key is invalid and using it elsewhere will
|
|
## result in undefined behaviour or Defect
|
|
burnMem(v.data)
|
|
|
|
func `$`*(
|
|
v: SkPublicKey | SkSecretKey | SkSignature | SkRecoverableSignature): string =
|
|
toHex(v)
|
|
|
|
func fromBytes*(T: type SkMessage, data: openArray[byte]): SkResult[SkMessage] =
|
|
if data.len() != SkMessageSize:
|
|
return err("Message must be 32 bytes")
|
|
|
|
ok(SkMessage(toArray(SkMessageSize, data)))
|
|
|
|
# Close `requiresInit` loophole
|
|
# TODO replace `requiresInit` with a pragma that does the expected thing
|
|
proc default*(T: type SkPublicKey): T {.error: "loophole".}
|
|
proc default*(T: type SkSecretKey): T {.error: "loophole".}
|
|
proc default*(T: type SkSignature): T {.error: "loophole".}
|
|
proc default*(T: type SkRecoverableSignature): T {.error: "loophole".}
|
|
proc default*(T: type SkEcdhSecret): T {.error: "loophole".}
|
|
proc default*(T: type SkEcdhRawSecret): T {.error: "loophole".}
|
|
|
|
func tweakAdd*(secretKey: var SkSecretKey, tweak: openArray[byte]): SkResult[void] =
|
|
{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
|
|
let res = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_add(secp256k1_context_no_precomp, secretKey.data.ptr0, tweak.ptr0)
|
|
if res != 1:
|
|
err("Tweak out of range, or invalid private key")
|
|
else:
|
|
ok()
|
|
|
|
func tweakMul*(secretKey: var SkSecretKey, tweak: openArray[byte]): SkResult[void] =
|
|
{.noSideEffect.}: # secp256k1_context_no_precomp is actually const, see above
|
|
let res = secp256k1_ec_privkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_context_no_precomp, secretKey.data.ptr0, tweak.ptr0)
|
|
if res != 1:
|
|
err("Tweak out of range, or equal to zero")
|
|
else:
|
|
ok()
|