mirror of https://github.com/status-im/nim-eth.git
218 lines
6.6 KiB
Nim
218 lines
6.6 KiB
Nim
#
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# Ethereum P2P
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# (c) Copyright 2018
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# Status Research & Development GmbH
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#
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# Licensed under either of
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# Apache License, version 2.0, (LICENSE-APACHEv2)
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# MIT license (LICENSE-MIT)
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#
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## This module implements ECIES method encryption/decryption.
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{.push raises: [Defect].}
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import bearssl
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import eth/keys, nimcrypto/[rijndael, bcmode, hash, hmac, sha2, utils]
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import stew/[results, endians2]
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export results
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const
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emptyMac* = array[0, byte]([])
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type
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EciesError* = enum
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BufferOverrun = "ecies: output buffer size is too small"
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EcdhError = "ecies: ECDH shared secret could not be calculated"
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WrongHeader = "ecies: header is incorrect"
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IncorrectKey = "ecies: recovered public key is invalid"
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IncorrectTag = "ecies: tag verification failed"
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IncompleteError = "ecies: decryption needs more data"
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EciesHeader* {.packed.} = object
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version*: byte
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pubkey*: array[RawPublicKeySize, byte]
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iv*: array[aes128.sizeBlock, byte]
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data*: byte
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EciesResult*[T] = Result[T, EciesError]
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proc mapErrTo[T](r: SkResult[T], v: static EciesError): EciesResult[T] =
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r.mapErr(proc (e: cstring): EciesError = v)
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template eciesOverheadLength*(): int =
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## Return data overhead size for ECIES encrypted message
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1 + sizeof(PublicKey) + aes128.sizeBlock + sha256.sizeDigest
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template eciesEncryptedLength*(size: int): int =
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## Return size of encrypted message for message with size `size`.
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size + eciesOverheadLength()
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template eciesDecryptedLength*(size: int): int =
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## Return size of decrypted message for encrypted message with size `size`.
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size - eciesOverheadLength()
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template eciesMacLength(size: int): int =
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## Return size of authenticated data
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size + aes128.sizeBlock
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template eciesMacPos(size: int): int =
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## Return position of MAC code in encrypted block
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size - sha256.sizeDigest
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template eciesDataPos(): int =
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## Return position of encrypted data in block
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1 + sizeof(PublicKey) + aes128.sizeBlock
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template eciesIvPos(): int =
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## Return position of IV in block
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1 + sizeof(PublicKey)
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template eciesTagPos(size: int): int =
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1 + sizeof(PublicKey) + aes128.sizeBlock + size
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proc kdf*(data: openarray[byte]): array[KeyLength, byte] {.noInit.} =
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## NIST SP 800-56a Concatenation Key Derivation Function (see section 5.8.1)
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var ctx: sha256
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var counter: uint32
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var counterLe: uint32
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let reps = ((KeyLength + 7) * 8) div (int(ctx.sizeBlock) * 8)
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var offset = 0
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var storage = newSeq[byte](int(ctx.sizeDigest) * (reps + 1))
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while counter <= uint32(reps):
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counter = counter + 1
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counterLe = toBE(counter)
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ctx.init()
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ctx.update(cast[ptr byte](addr counterLe), uint(sizeof(uint32)))
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ctx.update(unsafeAddr data[0], uint(len(data)))
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var hash = ctx.finish()
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copyMem(addr storage[offset], addr hash.data[0], ctx.sizeDigest)
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offset += int(ctx.sizeDigest)
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ctx.clear() # clean ctx
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copyMem(addr result[0], addr storage[0], KeyLength)
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proc eciesEncrypt*(rng: var BrHmacDrbgContext, input: openarray[byte],
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output: var openarray[byte], pubkey: PublicKey,
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sharedmac: openarray[byte] = emptyMac): EciesResult[void] =
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## Encrypt data with ECIES method using given public key `pubkey`.
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## ``input`` - input data
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## ``output`` - output data
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## ``pubkey`` - ECC public key
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## ``sharedmac`` - additional data used to calculate encrypted message MAC
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## Length of output data can be calculated using ``eciesEncryptedLength()``
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## template.
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var
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encKey: array[aes128.sizeKey, byte]
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cipher: CTR[aes128]
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ctx: HMAC[sha256]
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iv: array[aes128.sizeBlock, byte]
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if len(output) < eciesEncryptedLength(len(input)):
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return err(BufferOverrun)
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brHmacDrbgGenerate(rng, iv)
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var
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ephemeral = KeyPair.random(rng)
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secret = ecdhRaw(ephemeral.seckey, pubkey)
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material = kdf(secret.data)
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clear(secret)
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copyMem(addr encKey[0], addr material[0], aes128.sizeKey)
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var macKey =
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sha256.digest(material.toOpenArray(KeyLength div 2, material.high))
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burnMem(material)
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var header = cast[ptr EciesHeader](addr output[0])
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header.version = 0x04
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header.pubkey = ephemeral.pubkey.toRaw()
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header.iv = iv
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clear(ephemeral)
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var so = eciesDataPos()
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var eo = so + len(input)
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cipher.init(encKey, iv)
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cipher.encrypt(input, toOpenArray(output, so, eo))
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burnMem(encKey)
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cipher.clear()
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so = eciesIvPos()
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eo = so + aes128.sizeBlock + len(input) - 1
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ctx.init(macKey.data)
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ctx.update(toOpenArray(output, so, eo))
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if len(sharedmac) > 0:
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ctx.update(sharedmac)
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var tag = ctx.finish()
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so = eciesTagPos(len(input))
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# ctx.sizeDigest() crash compiler
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copyMem(addr output[so], addr tag.data[0], sha256.sizeDigest)
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ctx.clear()
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ok()
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proc eciesDecrypt*(input: openarray[byte],
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output: var openarray[byte],
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seckey: PrivateKey,
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sharedmac: openarray[byte] = emptyMac): EciesResult[void] =
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## Decrypt data with ECIES method using given private key `seckey`.
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## ``input`` - input data
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## ``output`` - output data
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## ``pubkey`` - ECC private key
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## ``sharedmac`` - additional data used to calculate encrypted message MAC
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## Length of output data can be calculated using ``eciesDecryptedLength()``
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## template.
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var
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encKey: array[aes128.sizeKey, byte]
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cipher: CTR[aes128]
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ctx: HMAC[sha256]
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if len(input) <= 0:
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return err(IncompleteError)
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var header = cast[ptr EciesHeader](unsafeAddr input[0])
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if header.version != 0x04:
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return err(WrongHeader)
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if len(input) <= eciesOverheadLength():
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return err(IncompleteError)
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if len(input) - eciesOverheadLength() > len(output):
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return err(BufferOverrun)
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var
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pubkey = ? PublicKey.fromRaw(header.pubkey).mapErrTo(IncorrectKey)
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secret = ecdhRaw(seckey, pubkey)
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var material = kdf(secret.data)
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burnMem(secret)
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copyMem(addr encKey[0], addr material[0], aes128.sizeKey)
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var macKey =
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sha256.digest(material.toOpenArray(KeyLength div 2, material.high))
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burnMem(material)
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let macsize = eciesMacLength(len(input) - eciesOverheadLength())
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ctx.init(macKey.data)
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burnMem(macKey)
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ctx.update(toOpenArray(input, eciesIvPos(), eciesIvPos() + macsize - 1))
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if len(sharedmac) > 0:
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ctx.update(sharedmac)
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var tag = ctx.finish()
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ctx.clear()
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if not equalMem(addr tag.data[0], unsafeAddr input[eciesMacPos(len(input))],
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sha256.sizeDigest):
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return err(IncorrectTag)
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let datsize = eciesDecryptedLength(len(input))
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cipher.init(encKey, header.iv)
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burnMem(encKey)
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cipher.decrypt(toOpenArray(input, eciesDataPos(),
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eciesDataPos() + datsize - 1), output)
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cipher.clear()
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ok()
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