mirror of https://github.com/status-im/nim-eth.git
devp2p: drop pre-EIP8 support, fix snappy negotiation (#758)
Support for previous versions was
[removed](7194c847b6)
from geth in 2021 after other clients had migrated - should be safe to
remove here also.
* fix snappy detection - it should use the hello version, not the RLPx
handshake
* simplify generation of auth messages
* pad 100-300 bytes like spec suggests
TODO: error handling is all over the place - will be addressed in a
follow-up PR
This commit is contained in:
Jacek Sieka
GitHub
parent
719c0dfd56
commit
ee845a1768
482
eth/p2p/auth.nim
482
eth/p2p/auth.nim
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@ -8,7 +8,10 @@
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# MIT license (LICENSE-MIT)
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#
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## This module implements Ethereum RLPx authentication
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## This module implements Ethereum EIP-8 RLPx authentication - pre-EIP-8
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## messages are not supported
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## https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/5713591d0366da78a913a811c7502d9ca91d29a8/rlpx.md#initial-handshake
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## https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/b479473414cf94445b450c266a9dedc079a12158/EIPS/eip-8.md
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{.push raises: [].}
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@ -25,57 +28,49 @@ export results
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type keccak256 = keccak.keccak256
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const
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SupportedRlpxVersion* = 4'u8
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# Auth message sizes
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MsgLenLenEIP8* = 2
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## auth-size = size of enc-auth-body, encoded as a big-endian 16-bit integer
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## ack-size = size of enc-ack-body, encoded as a big-endian 16-bit integer
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# Pre EIP8
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PlainAuthMessageV4Length* = 194
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AuthMessageV4Length* = 307
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MinPadLenEIP8* = 100
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MaxPadLenEIP8* = 300
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## Padding makes message length unpredictable which makes packet filtering
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## a tiny bit harder - although not necessary any more, we always add at
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## least 100 bytes of padding to make the message distinguishable from
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## pre-EIP8 and at most 200 to stay within recommendation
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# EIP8
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# signature + pubkey + nounce + version + rlp encoding overhead
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# 65 + 64 + 32 + 1 + 7 = 169
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PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length = 169
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PlainAuthMessageMaxEIP8* = PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length + 255 # with padding
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PlainAuthMessageMaxEIP8 = PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length + MaxPadLenEIP8
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# Min. encrypted message + size prefix = 284
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AuthMessageEIP8Length* = PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length + eciesOverheadLength + 2
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AuthMessageMaxEIP8* = AuthMessageEIP8Length + 255 # with padding
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AuthMessageEIP8Length* =
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eciesEncryptedLength(PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length) + MsgLenLenEIP8
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AuthMessageMaxEIP8* = AuthMessageEIP8Length + MaxPadLenEIP8
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## Minimal output buffer size to pass into `authMessage`
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# Ack message sizes
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# Pre EIP8
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PlainAckMessageV4Length* = 97
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AckMessageV4Length* = 210
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# EIP 8
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# pubkey + nounce + version + rlp encoding overhead
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# 64 + 32 + 1 + 5 = 102
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PlainAckMessageEIP8Length* = 102
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PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8* = PlainAckMessageEIP8Length + 255 # with padding
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PlainAckMessageEIP8Length = 102
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PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8 = PlainAckMessageEIP8Length + MaxPadLenEIP8
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# Min. encrypted message + size prefix = 217
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AckMessageEIP8Length* = PlainAckMessageEIP8Length + eciesOverheadLength + 2
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AckMessageMaxEIP8* = AckMessageEIP8Length + 255 # with padding
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AckMessageEIP8Length* = eciesEncryptedLength(PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8) + MsgLenLenEIP8
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AckMessageMaxEIP8* = AckMessageEIP8Length + MaxPadLenEIP8
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## Minimal output buffer size to pass into `ackMessage`
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Vsn = [byte 4]
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## auth-vsn = 4
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## ack-vsn = 4
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type
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Nonce* = array[KeyLength, byte]
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AuthMessageV4* {.packed.} = object
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signature: array[RawSignatureSize, byte]
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keyhash: array[keccak256.sizeDigest, byte]
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pubkey: array[RawPublicKeySize, byte]
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nonce: array[keccak256.sizeDigest, byte]
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flag: byte
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AckMessageV4* {.packed.} = object
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pubkey: array[RawPublicKeySize, byte]
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nonce: array[keccak256.sizeDigest, byte]
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flag: byte
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HandshakeFlag* = enum
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Initiator, ## `Handshake` owner is connection initiator
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Responder, ## `Handshake` owner is connection responder
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EIP8 ## Flag indicates that EIP-8 handshake is used
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Initiator ## `Handshake` owner is connection initiator
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Responder ## `Handshake` owner is connection responder
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AuthError* = enum
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EcdhError = "auth: ECDH shared secret could not be calculated"
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@ -89,7 +84,6 @@ type
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IncompleteError = "auth: data incomplete"
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Handshake* = object
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version*: uint8 ## protocol version
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flags*: set[HandshakeFlag] ## handshake flags
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host*: KeyPair ## host keypair
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ephemeral*: KeyPair ## ephemeral host keypair
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@ -97,7 +91,6 @@ type
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remoteEPubkey*: PublicKey ## remote host ephemeral public key
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initiatorNonce*: Nonce ## initiator nonce
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responderNonce*: Nonce ## responder nonce
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expectedLength*: int ## expected incoming message length
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ConnectionSecret* = object
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aesKey*: array[aes256.sizeKey, byte]
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@ -111,291 +104,154 @@ template toa(a, b, c: untyped): untyped =
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toOpenArray((a), (b), (b) + (c) - 1)
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proc mapErrTo[T, E](r: Result[T, E], v: static AuthError): AuthResult[T] =
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r.mapErr(proc (e: E): AuthError = v)
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r.mapErr(
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proc(e: E): AuthError =
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v
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)
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proc init*(
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T: type Handshake, rng: var HmacDrbgContext, host: KeyPair,
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flags: set[HandshakeFlag] = {Initiator},
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version: uint8 = SupportedRlpxVersion): T =
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T: type Handshake,
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rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
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host: KeyPair,
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flags: set[HandshakeFlag],
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): T =
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## Create new `Handshake` object.
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var
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initiatorNonce: Nonce
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responderNonce: Nonce
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expectedLength: int
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ephemeral = KeyPair.random(rng)
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if Initiator in flags:
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expectedLength = AckMessageV4Length
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rng.generate(initiatorNonce)
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else:
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expectedLength = AuthMessageV4Length
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rng.generate(responderNonce)
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return T(
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version: version,
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flags: flags,
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host: host,
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ephemeral: ephemeral,
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initiatorNonce: initiatorNonce,
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responderNonce: responderNonce,
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expectedLength: expectedLength
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)
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proc authMessagePreEIP8(h: var Handshake,
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proc authMessage*(
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h: var Handshake,
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rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
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pubkey: PublicKey,
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output: var openArray[byte],
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outlen: var int,
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flag: byte = 0,
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encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
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## Create plain pre-EIP8 authentication message.
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var
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buffer: array[PlainAuthMessageV4Length, byte]
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outlen = 0
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let header = cast[ptr AuthMessageV4](addr buffer[0])
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var secret = ecdhSharedSecret(h.host.seckey, pubkey)
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secret.data = secret.data xor h.initiatorNonce
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let signature = sign(h.ephemeral.seckey, SkMessage(secret.data))
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secret.clear()
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h.remoteHPubkey = pubkey
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header.signature = signature.toRaw()
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header.keyhash = keccak256.digest(h.ephemeral.pubkey.toRaw()).data
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header.pubkey = h.host.pubkey.toRaw()
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header.nonce = h.initiatorNonce
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header.flag = flag
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if encrypt:
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if len(output) < AuthMessageV4Length:
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): AuthResult[int] =
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## Create EIP8 authentication message - returns length of encoded message
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## The output should be a buffer of AuthMessageMaxEIP8 bytes at least.
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if len(output) < AuthMessageMaxEIP8:
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return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
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if eciesEncrypt(rng, buffer, output, h.remoteHPubkey).isErr:
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return err(AuthError.EciesError)
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outlen = AuthMessageV4Length
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else:
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if len(output) < PlainAuthMessageV4Length:
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return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
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copyMem(addr output[0], addr buffer[0], PlainAuthMessageV4Length)
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outlen = PlainAuthMessageV4Length
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ok()
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proc authMessageEIP8(h: var Handshake,
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rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
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pubkey: PublicKey,
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output: var openArray[byte],
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outlen: var int,
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flag: byte = 0,
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encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
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## Create EIP8 authentication message.
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var
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buffer: array[PlainAuthMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
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doAssert(EIP8 in h.flags)
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outlen = 0
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var secret = ecdhSharedSecret(h.host.seckey, pubkey)
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secret.data = secret.data xor h.initiatorNonce
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let signature = sign(h.ephemeral.seckey, SkMessage(secret.data))
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secret.clear()
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h.remoteHPubkey = pubkey
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var payload = rlp.encodeList(signature.toRaw(),
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h.host.pubkey.toRaw(),
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h.initiatorNonce,
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[byte(h.version)])
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doAssert(len(payload) == PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length)
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let
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pencsize = eciesEncryptedLength(len(payload))
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var padsize = int(rng.generate(byte)) # aka rand(max)
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while padsize <= (AuthMessageV4Length - (pencsize + 2)):
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var padsize = int(rng.generate(byte))
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while padsize > (MaxPadLenEIP8 - MinPadLenEIP8):
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padsize = int(rng.generate(byte))
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padsize += MinPadLenEIP8
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# It is possible to make packet size constant by uncommenting this line
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# padsize = 24
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let
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pencsize = eciesEncryptedLength(PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length)
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wosize = pencsize + padsize
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fullsize = wosize + 2
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rng.generate(toa(buffer, PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length, padsize))
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if encrypt:
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if len(output) < fullsize:
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return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
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copyMem(addr buffer[0], addr payload[0], len(payload))
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let wosizeBE = uint16(wosize).toBytesBE()
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output[0..<2] = wosizeBE
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if eciesEncrypt(rng, toa(buffer, 0, len(payload) + padsize),
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toa(output, 2, wosize), pubkey,
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toa(output, 0, 2)).isErr:
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return err(AuthError.EciesError)
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outlen = fullsize
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else:
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let plainsize = len(payload) + padsize
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if len(output) < plainsize:
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return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
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copyMem(addr output[0], addr buffer[0], plainsize)
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outlen = plainsize
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ok()
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proc ackMessagePreEIP8(h: var Handshake,
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rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
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output: var openArray[byte],
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outlen: var int,
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flag: byte = 0,
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encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
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## Create plain pre-EIP8 authentication ack message.
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var buffer: array[PlainAckMessageV4Length, byte]
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outlen = 0
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let header = cast[ptr AckMessageV4](addr buffer[0])
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header.pubkey = h.ephemeral.pubkey.toRaw()
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header.nonce = h.responderNonce
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header.flag = flag
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if encrypt:
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if len(output) < AckMessageV4Length:
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return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
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if eciesEncrypt(rng, buffer, output, h.remoteHPubkey).isErr:
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return err(AuthError.EciesError)
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outlen = AckMessageV4Length
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else:
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if len(output) < PlainAckMessageV4Length:
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return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
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copyMem(addr output[0], addr buffer[0], PlainAckMessageV4Length)
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outlen = PlainAckMessageV4Length
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ok()
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proc ackMessageEIP8(h: var Handshake,
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rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
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output: var openArray[byte],
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outlen: var int,
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flag: byte = 0,
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encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
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## Create EIP8 authentication ack message.
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var
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buffer: array[PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
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padsize: array[1, byte]
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doAssert(EIP8 in h.flags)
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var payload = rlp.encodeList(h.ephemeral.pubkey.toRaw(),
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h.responderNonce,
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[byte(h.version)])
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doAssert(len(payload) == PlainAckMessageEIP8Length)
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outlen = 0
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let pencsize = eciesEncryptedLength(len(payload))
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while true:
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generate(rng, padsize)
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if int(padsize[0]) > (AckMessageV4Length - (pencsize + 2)):
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break
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# It is possible to make packet size constant by uncommenting this line
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# padsize = 0
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let wosize = pencsize + int(padsize[0])
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let fullsize = wosize + 2
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if int(padsize[0]) > 0:
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rng.generate(toa(buffer, PlainAckMessageEIP8Length, int(padsize[0])))
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copyMem(addr buffer[0], addr payload[0], len(payload))
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if encrypt:
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if len(output) < fullsize:
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return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
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output[0..<2] = uint16(wosize).toBytesBE()
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if eciesEncrypt(rng, toa(buffer, 0, len(payload) + int(padsize[0])),
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toa(output, 2, wosize), h.remoteHPubkey,
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toa(output, 0, 2)).isErr:
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return err(AuthError.EciesError)
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outlen = fullsize
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else:
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let plainsize = len(payload) + int(padsize[0])
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if len(output) < plainsize:
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return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
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copyMem(addr output[0], addr buffer[0], plainsize)
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outlen = plainsize
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ok()
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template authSize*(h: Handshake, encrypt: bool = true): int =
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## Get number of bytes needed to store AuthMessage.
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if EIP8 in h.flags:
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if encrypt: (AuthMessageMaxEIP8) else: (PlainAuthMessageMaxEIP8)
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else:
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if encrypt: (AuthMessageV4Length) else: (PlainAuthMessageV4Length)
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template ackSize*(h: Handshake, encrypt: bool = true): int =
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## Get number of bytes needed to store AckMessage.
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if EIP8 in h.flags:
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if encrypt: (AckMessageMaxEIP8) else: (PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8)
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else:
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if encrypt: (AckMessageV4Length) else: (PlainAckMessageV4Length)
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proc authMessage*(h: var Handshake, rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
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pubkey: PublicKey,
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output: var openArray[byte],
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outlen: var int, flag: byte = 0,
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encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
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## Create new AuthMessage for specified `pubkey` and store it inside
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## of `output`, size of generated AuthMessage will stored in `outlen`.
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if EIP8 in h.flags:
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authMessageEIP8(h, rng, pubkey, output, outlen, flag, encrypt)
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else:
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authMessagePreEIP8(h, rng, pubkey, output, outlen, flag, encrypt)
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proc ackMessage*(h: var Handshake, rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
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output: var openArray[byte],
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outlen: var int, flag: byte = 0,
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encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
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## Create new AckMessage and store it inside of `output`, size of generated
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## AckMessage will stored in `outlen`.
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if EIP8 in h.flags:
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ackMessageEIP8(h, rng, output, outlen, flag, encrypt)
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else:
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ackMessagePreEIP8(h, rng, output, outlen, flag, encrypt)
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proc decodeAuthMessageV4(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
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## Decodes V4 AuthMessage.
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var
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buffer: array[PlainAuthMessageV4Length, byte]
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doAssert(Responder in h.flags)
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if eciesDecrypt(m, buffer, h.host.seckey).isErr:
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return err(EciesError)
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let
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header = cast[ptr AuthMessageV4](addr buffer[0])
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pubkey = ? PublicKey.fromRaw(header.pubkey).mapErrTo(InvalidPubKey)
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signature = ? Signature.fromRaw(header.signature).mapErrTo(SignatureError)
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doAssert fullsize <= len(output), "We checked against max possible length above"
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var secret = ecdhSharedSecret(h.host.seckey, pubkey)
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secret.data = secret.data xor header.nonce
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secret.data = secret.data xor h.initiatorNonce
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var recovered = recover(signature, SkMessage(secret.data))
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let signature = sign(h.ephemeral.seckey, SkMessage(secret.data))
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secret.clear()
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h.remoteEPubkey = ? recovered.mapErrTo(SignatureError)
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h.initiatorNonce = header.nonce
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h.remoteHPubkey = pubkey
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var payload =
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rlp.encodeList(signature.toRaw(), h.host.pubkey.toRaw(), h.initiatorNonce, Vsn)
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doAssert(len(payload) == PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length)
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ok()
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var buffer {.noinit.}: array[PlainAuthMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
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copyMem(addr buffer[0], addr payload[0], len(payload))
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rng.generate(toa(buffer, PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length, padsize))
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proc decodeAuthMessageEIP8(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
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let wosizeBE = uint16(wosize).toBytesBE()
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output[0 ..< 2] = wosizeBE
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if eciesEncrypt(
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rng,
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toa(buffer, 0, len(payload) + padsize),
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toa(output, 2, wosize),
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pubkey,
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toa(output, 0, 2),
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).isErr:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
|
||||
|
||||
ok(fullsize)
|
||||
|
||||
proc ackMessage*(
|
||||
h: var Handshake, rng: var HmacDrbgContext, output: var openArray[byte]
|
||||
): AuthResult[int] =
|
||||
## Create EIP8 authentication ack message - returns length of encoded message
|
||||
## The output should be a buffer of AckMessageMaxEIP8 bytes at least.
|
||||
if len(output) < AckMessageMaxEIP8:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
|
||||
|
||||
var padsize = int(rng.generate(byte))
|
||||
while padsize > (MaxPadLenEIP8 - MinPadLenEIP8):
|
||||
padsize = int(rng.generate(byte))
|
||||
padsize += MinPadLenEIP8
|
||||
|
||||
let
|
||||
pencsize = eciesEncryptedLength(PlainAckMessageEIP8Length)
|
||||
wosize = pencsize + padsize
|
||||
fullsize = wosize + 2
|
||||
|
||||
doAssert fullsize <= len(output), "We checked against max possible length above"
|
||||
|
||||
var
|
||||
buffer: array[PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
|
||||
payload = rlp.encodeList(h.ephemeral.pubkey.toRaw(), h.responderNonce, Vsn)
|
||||
doAssert(len(payload) == PlainAckMessageEIP8Length)
|
||||
|
||||
copyMem(addr buffer[0], addr payload[0], PlainAckMessageEIP8Length)
|
||||
rng.generate(toa(buffer, PlainAckMessageEIP8Length, padsize))
|
||||
|
||||
output[0 ..< MsgLenLenEIP8] = uint16(wosize).toBytesBE()
|
||||
|
||||
if eciesEncrypt(
|
||||
rng,
|
||||
toa(buffer, 0, PlainAckMessageEIP8Length + padsize),
|
||||
toa(output, MsgLenLenEIP8, wosize),
|
||||
h.remoteHPubkey,
|
||||
toa(output, 0, MsgLenLenEIP8),
|
||||
).isErr:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
|
||||
ok(fullsize)
|
||||
|
||||
proc decodeMsgLen*(h: Handshake, input: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[int] =
|
||||
if input.len < 2:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
|
||||
let len = int(uint16.fromBytesBE(input)) + 2
|
||||
if len < AuthMessageEIP8Length:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
|
||||
ok(len)
|
||||
|
||||
proc decodeAuthMessage*(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
|
||||
## Decodes EIP-8 AuthMessage.
|
||||
let size = uint16.fromBytesBE(m)
|
||||
h.expectedLength = 2 + int(size)
|
||||
let
|
||||
expectedLength = ?h.decodeMsgLen(m)
|
||||
size = expectedLength - MsgLenLenEIP8
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if the prefixed size is => than the minimum
|
||||
if h.expectedLength < AuthMessageEIP8Length:
|
||||
if expectedLength < AuthMessageEIP8Length:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
|
||||
|
||||
if h.expectedLength > len(m):
|
||||
if expectedLength > len(m):
|
||||
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
|
||||
|
||||
var buffer = newSeq[byte](eciesDecryptedLength(int(size)))
|
||||
var buffer = newSeq[byte](eciesDecryptedLength(size))
|
||||
if eciesDecrypt(
|
||||
toa(m, 2, int(size)), buffer, h.host.seckey, toa(m, 0, 2)).isErr:
|
||||
toa(m, MsgLenLenEIP8, int(size)), buffer, h.host.seckey, toa(m, 0, MsgLenLenEIP8)
|
||||
).isErr:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
var reader = rlpFromBytes(buffer)
|
||||
if not reader.isList() or reader.listLen() < 4:
|
||||
|
|
@ -412,11 +268,9 @@ proc decodeAuthMessageEIP8(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[voi
|
|||
signatureBr = reader.listElem(0).toBytes()
|
||||
pubkeyBr = reader.listElem(1).toBytes()
|
||||
nonceBr = reader.listElem(2).toBytes()
|
||||
versionBr = reader.listElem(3).toBytes()
|
||||
|
||||
let
|
||||
signature = ? Signature.fromRaw(signatureBr).mapErrTo(SignatureError)
|
||||
pubkey = ? PublicKey.fromRaw(pubkeyBr).mapErrTo(InvalidPubKey)
|
||||
signature = ?Signature.fromRaw(signatureBr).mapErrTo(SignatureError)
|
||||
pubkey = ?PublicKey.fromRaw(pubkeyBr).mapErrTo(InvalidPubKey)
|
||||
nonce = toArray(KeyLength, nonceBr)
|
||||
|
||||
var secret = ecdhSharedSecret(h.host.seckey, pubkey)
|
||||
|
|
@ -425,100 +279,52 @@ proc decodeAuthMessageEIP8(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[voi
|
|||
let recovered = recover(signature, SkMessage(secret.data))
|
||||
secret.clear()
|
||||
|
||||
h.remoteEPubkey = ? recovered.mapErrTo(SignatureError)
|
||||
h.remoteEPubkey = ?recovered.mapErrTo(SignatureError)
|
||||
h.initiatorNonce = nonce
|
||||
h.remoteHPubkey = pubkey
|
||||
h.version = versionBr[0]
|
||||
ok()
|
||||
except CatchableError:
|
||||
err(AuthError.RlpError)
|
||||
|
||||
proc decodeAckMessageEIP8*(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
|
||||
proc decodeAckMessage*(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
|
||||
## Decodes EIP-8 AckMessage.
|
||||
let size = uint16.fromBytesBE(m)
|
||||
h.expectedLength = 2 + int(size)
|
||||
let
|
||||
expectedLength = ?h.decodeMsgLen(m)
|
||||
size = expectedLength - MsgLenLenEIP8
|
||||
|
||||
# Check if the prefixed size is => than the minimum
|
||||
if h.expectedLength < AckMessageEIP8Length:
|
||||
if expectedLength > len(m):
|
||||
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
|
||||
|
||||
if h.expectedLength > len(m):
|
||||
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
|
||||
|
||||
var buffer = newSeq[byte](eciesDecryptedLength(int(size)))
|
||||
var buffer = newSeq[byte](eciesDecryptedLength(size))
|
||||
if eciesDecrypt(
|
||||
toa(m, 2, int(size)), buffer, h.host.seckey, toa(m, 0, 2)).isErr:
|
||||
toa(m, MsgLenLenEIP8, size), buffer, h.host.seckey, toa(m, 0, MsgLenLenEIP8)
|
||||
).isErr:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
var reader = rlpFromBytes(buffer)
|
||||
# The last element, the version, is ignored
|
||||
if not reader.isList() or reader.listLen() < 3:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.InvalidAck)
|
||||
if reader.listElem(0).blobLen != RawPublicKeySize:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.InvalidAck)
|
||||
if reader.listElem(1).blobLen != KeyLength:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.InvalidAck)
|
||||
if reader.listElem(2).blobLen != 1:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.InvalidAck)
|
||||
|
||||
let
|
||||
pubkeyBr = reader.listElem(0).toBytes()
|
||||
nonceBr = reader.listElem(1).toBytes()
|
||||
versionBr = reader.listElem(2).toBytes()
|
||||
|
||||
h.remoteEPubkey = ? PublicKey.fromRaw(pubkeyBr).mapErrTo(InvalidPubKey)
|
||||
h.remoteEPubkey = ?PublicKey.fromRaw(pubkeyBr).mapErrTo(InvalidPubKey)
|
||||
h.responderNonce = toArray(KeyLength, nonceBr)
|
||||
h.version = versionBr[0]
|
||||
|
||||
ok()
|
||||
except CatchableError:
|
||||
err(AuthError.RlpError)
|
||||
|
||||
proc decodeAckMessageV4(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
|
||||
## Decodes V4 AckMessage.
|
||||
var
|
||||
buffer: array[PlainAckMessageV4Length, byte]
|
||||
doAssert(Initiator in h.flags)
|
||||
|
||||
if eciesDecrypt(m, buffer, h.host.seckey).isErr:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
|
||||
var header = cast[ptr AckMessageV4](addr buffer[0])
|
||||
|
||||
h.remoteEPubkey = ? PublicKey.fromRaw(header.pubkey).mapErrTo(InvalidPubKey)
|
||||
h.responderNonce = header.nonce
|
||||
|
||||
ok()
|
||||
|
||||
proc decodeAuthMessage*(h: var Handshake, input: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
|
||||
## Decodes AuthMessage from `input`.
|
||||
# Using the smallest min. message length of the two types
|
||||
if len(input) < AuthMessageEIP8Length:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
|
||||
|
||||
if len(input) == AuthMessageV4Length:
|
||||
let res = h.decodeAuthMessageV4(input)
|
||||
if res.isOk(): return res
|
||||
|
||||
let res = h.decodeAuthMessageEIP8(input)
|
||||
if res.isOk():
|
||||
h.flags.incl(EIP8)
|
||||
res
|
||||
|
||||
proc decodeAckMessage*(h: var Handshake, input: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
|
||||
## Decodes AckMessage from `input`.
|
||||
# Using the smallest min. message length of the two types
|
||||
if len(input) < AckMessageV4Length:
|
||||
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
|
||||
|
||||
if len(input) == AckMessageV4Length:
|
||||
let res = h.decodeAckMessageV4(input)
|
||||
if res.isOk(): return res
|
||||
|
||||
let res = h.decodeAckMessageEIP8(input)
|
||||
if res.isOk(): h.flags.incl(EIP8)
|
||||
res
|
||||
|
||||
proc getSecrets*(
|
||||
h: Handshake, authmsg: openArray[byte],
|
||||
ackmsg: openArray[byte]): ConnectionSecret =
|
||||
h: Handshake, authmsg: openArray[byte], ackmsg: openArray[byte]
|
||||
): ConnectionSecret =
|
||||
## Derive secrets from handshake `h` using encrypted AuthMessage `authmsg` and
|
||||
## encrypted AckMessage `ackmsg`.
|
||||
var
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
225
eth/p2p/rlpx.nim
225
eth/p2p/rlpx.nim
|
|
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
|
|||
import
|
||||
std/[algorithm, deques, options, typetraits, os],
|
||||
stew/shims/macros, chronicles, nimcrypto/utils, chronos, metrics,
|
||||
".."/[rlp, common, async_utils],
|
||||
".."/[rlp, async_utils],
|
||||
./private/p2p_types, "."/[kademlia, auth, rlpxcrypt, enode, p2p_protocol_dsl]
|
||||
|
||||
# TODO: This doesn't get enabled currently in any of the builds, so we send a
|
||||
|
|
@ -76,8 +76,6 @@ type
|
|||
DisconnectionReasonList = object
|
||||
value: DisconnectionReason
|
||||
|
||||
Address = enode.Address
|
||||
|
||||
proc read(rlp: var Rlp; T: type DisconnectionReasonList): T
|
||||
{.gcsafe, raises: [RlpError].} =
|
||||
## Rlp mixin: `DisconnectionReasonList` parser
|
||||
|
|
@ -108,7 +106,6 @@ proc read(rlp: var Rlp; T: type DisconnectionReasonList): T
|
|||
|
||||
raise newException(RlpTypeMismatch, "Single entry list expected")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
const
|
||||
devp2pVersion* = 4
|
||||
maxMsgSize = 1024 * 1024 * 10
|
||||
|
|
@ -543,45 +540,37 @@ proc resolveResponseFuture(peer: Peer, msgId: uint64, msg: pointer, reqId: uint6
|
|||
|
||||
trace "late or dup RPLx reply ignored"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
proc recvMsg*(peer: Peer): Future[tuple[msgId: uint64, msgData: Rlp]] {.async.} =
|
||||
## This procs awaits the next complete RLPx message in the TCP stream
|
||||
|
||||
var headerBytes: array[32, byte]
|
||||
await peer.transport.readExactly(addr headerBytes[0], 32)
|
||||
|
||||
var msgSize: int
|
||||
var msgHeader: RlpxHeader
|
||||
if decryptHeaderAndGetMsgSize(peer.secretsState,
|
||||
headerBytes, msgSize, msgHeader).isErr():
|
||||
let msgSize = decryptHeader(
|
||||
peer.secretsState, headerBytes, msgHeader).valueOr:
|
||||
await peer.disconnectAndRaise(BreachOfProtocol,
|
||||
"Cannot decrypt RLPx frame header")
|
||||
0 # TODO raises analysis insufficient
|
||||
|
||||
if msgSize > maxMsgSize:
|
||||
await peer.disconnectAndRaise(BreachOfProtocol,
|
||||
"RLPx message exceeds maximum size")
|
||||
|
||||
let remainingBytes = encryptedLength(msgSize) - 32
|
||||
# TODO: Migrate this to a thread-local seq
|
||||
# JACEK:
|
||||
# or pass it in, allowing the caller to choose - they'll likely be in a
|
||||
# better position to decide if buffer should be reused or not. this will
|
||||
# also be useful for chunked messages where part of the buffer may have
|
||||
# been processed and needs filling in
|
||||
var encryptedBytes = newSeq[byte](remainingBytes)
|
||||
await peer.transport.readExactly(addr encryptedBytes[0], len(encryptedBytes))
|
||||
|
||||
let decryptedMaxLength = decryptedLength(msgSize)
|
||||
var
|
||||
decryptedBytes = newSeq[byte](decryptedMaxLength)
|
||||
decryptedBytesCount = 0
|
||||
|
||||
if decryptBody(peer.secretsState, encryptedBytes, msgSize,
|
||||
decryptedBytes, decryptedBytesCount).isErr():
|
||||
decryptedBytes).isErr():
|
||||
await peer.disconnectAndRaise(BreachOfProtocol,
|
||||
"Cannot decrypt RLPx frame body")
|
||||
|
||||
decryptedBytes.setLen(decryptedBytesCount)
|
||||
decryptedBytes.setLen(msgSize)
|
||||
|
||||
when useSnappy:
|
||||
if peer.snappyEnabled:
|
||||
|
|
@ -1138,21 +1127,10 @@ template `^`(arr): auto =
|
|||
# variable as an open array
|
||||
arr.toOpenArray(0, `arr Len` - 1)
|
||||
|
||||
proc initSecretState(p: Peer, hs: Handshake, authMsg, ackMsg: openArray[byte]) =
|
||||
var secrets = hs.getSecrets(authMsg, ackMsg)
|
||||
initSecretState(secrets, p.secretsState)
|
||||
burnMem(secrets)
|
||||
|
||||
template setSnappySupport(peer: Peer, node: EthereumNode, handshake: Handshake) =
|
||||
template setSnappySupport(peer: Peer, node: EthereumNode, hello: DevP2P.hello) =
|
||||
when useSnappy:
|
||||
peer.snappyEnabled = node.protocolVersion >= devp2pSnappyVersion.uint64 and
|
||||
handshake.version >= devp2pSnappyVersion.uint64
|
||||
|
||||
template getVersion(handshake: Handshake): uint64 =
|
||||
when useSnappy:
|
||||
handshake.version
|
||||
else:
|
||||
devp2pVersion
|
||||
hello.version >= devp2pSnappyVersion.uint64
|
||||
|
||||
template baseProtocolVersion(node: EthereumNode): untyped =
|
||||
when useSnappy:
|
||||
|
|
@ -1160,13 +1138,6 @@ template baseProtocolVersion(node: EthereumNode): untyped =
|
|||
else:
|
||||
devp2pVersion
|
||||
|
||||
template baseProtocolVersion(peer: Peer): uint64 =
|
||||
when useSnappy:
|
||||
if peer.snappyEnabled: devp2pSnappyVersion
|
||||
else: devp2pVersion
|
||||
else:
|
||||
devp2pVersion
|
||||
|
||||
type
|
||||
RlpxError* = enum
|
||||
TransportConnectError,
|
||||
|
|
@ -1180,6 +1151,79 @@ type
|
|||
PeerDisconnectedError,
|
||||
TooManyPeersError
|
||||
|
||||
proc initiatorHandshake(
|
||||
node: EthereumNode, transport: StreamTransport, pubkey: PublicKey
|
||||
): Future[ConnectionSecret] {.
|
||||
async: (raises: [CancelledError, TransportError, EthP2PError])
|
||||
.} =
|
||||
# https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/5713591d0366da78a913a811c7502d9ca91d29a8/rlpx.md#initial-handshake
|
||||
var
|
||||
handshake = Handshake.init(node.rng[], node.keys, {Initiator})
|
||||
authMsg: array[AuthMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
|
||||
|
||||
let
|
||||
authMsgLen = handshake.authMessage(node.rng[], pubkey, authMsg).expect(
|
||||
"No errors with correctly sized buffer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
writeRes = await transport.write(addr authMsg[0], authMsgLen)
|
||||
if writeRes != authMsgLen:
|
||||
raisePeerDisconnected("Unexpected disconnect while authenticating", TcpError)
|
||||
|
||||
var ackMsg = newSeqOfCap[byte](1024)
|
||||
ackMsg.setLen(MsgLenLenEIP8)
|
||||
await transport.readExactly(addr ackMsg[0], len(ackMsg))
|
||||
|
||||
let ackMsgLen = handshake.decodeMsgLen(ackMsg).valueOr:
|
||||
raise (ref MalformedMessageError)(
|
||||
msg: "Could not decode handshake ack length: " & $error
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
ackMsg.setLen(ackMsgLen)
|
||||
await transport.readExactly(addr ackMsg[MsgLenLenEIP8], ackMsgLen - MsgLenLenEIP8)
|
||||
|
||||
handshake.decodeAckMessage(ackMsg).isOkOr:
|
||||
raise (ref MalformedMessageError)(msg: "Could not decode handshake ack: " & $error)
|
||||
|
||||
handshake.getSecrets(^authMsg, ackMsg)
|
||||
|
||||
proc responderHandshake(
|
||||
node: EthereumNode, transport: StreamTransport
|
||||
): Future[(ConnectionSecret, PublicKey)] {.
|
||||
async: (raises: [CancelledError, TransportError, EthP2PError])
|
||||
.} =
|
||||
# https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/5713591d0366da78a913a811c7502d9ca91d29a8/rlpx.md#initial-handshake
|
||||
var
|
||||
handshake = Handshake.init(node.rng[], node.keys, {auth.Responder})
|
||||
authMsg = newSeqOfCap[byte](1024)
|
||||
|
||||
authMsg.setLen(MsgLenLenEIP8)
|
||||
await transport.readExactly(addr authMsg[0], len(authMsg))
|
||||
|
||||
let authMsgLen = handshake.decodeMsgLen(authMsg).valueOr:
|
||||
raise (ref MalformedMessageError)(
|
||||
msg: "Could not decode handshake auth length: " & $error
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
authMsg.setLen(authMsgLen)
|
||||
await transport.readExactly(addr authMsg[MsgLenLenEIP8], authMsgLen - MsgLenLenEIP8)
|
||||
|
||||
handshake.decodeAuthMessage(authMsg).isOkOr:
|
||||
raise (ref MalformedMessageError)(
|
||||
msg: "Could not decode handshake auth message: " & $error
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var ackMsg: array[AckMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
|
||||
let ackMsgLen = handshake.ackMessage(node.rng[], ackMsg).expect(
|
||||
"no errors with correcly sized buffer"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var res = await transport.write(addr ackMsg[0], ackMsgLen)
|
||||
if res != ackMsgLen:
|
||||
raisePeerDisconnected("Unexpected disconnect while authenticating", TcpError)
|
||||
|
||||
(handshake.getSecrets(authMsg, ^ackMsg), handshake.remoteHPubkey)
|
||||
|
||||
proc rlpxConnect*(node: EthereumNode, remote: Node):
|
||||
Future[Result[Peer, RlpxError]] {.async.} =
|
||||
# TODO: Should we not set some timeouts on the `connect` and `readExactly`s?
|
||||
|
|
@ -1208,64 +1252,23 @@ proc rlpxConnect*(node: EthereumNode, remote: Node):
|
|||
trace "TCP connect with peer failed", err = $e.name, errMsg = $e.msg
|
||||
return err(TransportConnectError)
|
||||
|
||||
# RLPx initial handshake
|
||||
var
|
||||
handshake = Handshake.init(
|
||||
node.rng[], node.keys, {Initiator, EIP8}, node.baseProtocolVersion)
|
||||
authMsg: array[AuthMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
|
||||
authMsgLen = 0
|
||||
# TODO: Rework this so we won't have to pass an array as parameter?
|
||||
authMessage(
|
||||
handshake, node.rng[], remote.node.pubkey, authMsg, authMsgLen).tryGet()
|
||||
|
||||
let writeRes =
|
||||
try:
|
||||
await peer.transport.write(addr authMsg[0], authMsgLen)
|
||||
except TransportError:
|
||||
return err(RlpxHandshakeTransportError)
|
||||
except CatchableError as e: # TODO: Only TransportErrors can occur?
|
||||
raiseAssert($e.name & " " & $e.msg)
|
||||
if writeRes != authMsgLen:
|
||||
return err(RlpxHandshakeTransportError)
|
||||
|
||||
let initialSize = handshake.expectedLength
|
||||
var ackMsg = newSeqOfCap[byte](1024)
|
||||
ackMsg.setLen(initialSize)
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
await peer.transport.readExactly(addr ackMsg[0], len(ackMsg))
|
||||
let secrets = await node.initiatorHandshake(peer.transport, remote.node.pubkey)
|
||||
initSecretState(secrets, peer.secretsState)
|
||||
except TransportError:
|
||||
return err(RlpxHandshakeTransportError)
|
||||
except EthP2PError:
|
||||
return err(RlpxHandshakeError)
|
||||
except CatchableError as e:
|
||||
raiseAssert($e.name & " " & $e.msg)
|
||||
|
||||
let res = handshake.decodeAckMessage(ackMsg)
|
||||
if res.isErr and res.error == AuthError.IncompleteError:
|
||||
ackMsg.setLen(handshake.expectedLength)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
await peer.transport.readExactly(addr ackMsg[initialSize],
|
||||
len(ackMsg) - initialSize)
|
||||
except TransportError:
|
||||
return err(RlpxHandshakeTransportError)
|
||||
except CatchableError as e: # TODO: Only TransportErrors can occur?
|
||||
raiseAssert($e.name & " " & $e.msg)
|
||||
|
||||
# TODO: Bullet 1 of https://github.com/status-im/nim-eth/issues/559
|
||||
let res = handshake.decodeAckMessage(ackMsg)
|
||||
if res.isErr():
|
||||
trace "rlpxConnect handshake error", error = res.error
|
||||
return err(RlpxHandshakeError)
|
||||
|
||||
peer.setSnappySupport(node, handshake)
|
||||
peer.initSecretState(handshake, ^authMsg, ackMsg)
|
||||
|
||||
logConnectedPeer peer
|
||||
|
||||
# RLPx p2p capability handshake: After the initial handshake, both sides of
|
||||
# the connection must send either Hello or a Disconnect message.
|
||||
let
|
||||
sendHelloFut = peer.hello(
|
||||
handshake.getVersion(),
|
||||
node.baseProtocolVersion(),
|
||||
node.clientId,
|
||||
node.capabilities,
|
||||
uint(node.address.tcpPort),
|
||||
|
|
@ -1304,6 +1307,8 @@ proc rlpxConnect*(node: EthereumNode, remote: Node):
|
|||
trace "Wrong devp2p identity in Hello message"
|
||||
return err(InvalidIdentityError)
|
||||
|
||||
peer.setSnappySupport(node, response)
|
||||
|
||||
trace "DevP2P handshake completed", peer = remote,
|
||||
clientId = response.clientId
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1338,56 +1343,17 @@ proc rlpxAccept*(
|
|||
initTracing(devp2pInfo, node.protocols)
|
||||
|
||||
let peer = Peer(transport: transport, network: node)
|
||||
var handshake = Handshake.init(node.rng[], node.keys, {auth.Responder})
|
||||
var ok = false
|
||||
try:
|
||||
let initialSize = handshake.expectedLength
|
||||
var authMsg = newSeqOfCap[byte](1024)
|
||||
|
||||
authMsg.setLen(initialSize)
|
||||
# TODO: Should we not set some timeouts on these `readExactly`s?
|
||||
await transport.readExactly(addr authMsg[0], len(authMsg))
|
||||
var ret = handshake.decodeAuthMessage(authMsg)
|
||||
if ret.isErr and ret.error == AuthError.IncompleteError:
|
||||
# Eip8 auth message is possible, but not likely
|
||||
authMsg.setLen(handshake.expectedLength)
|
||||
await transport.readExactly(addr authMsg[initialSize],
|
||||
len(authMsg) - initialSize)
|
||||
ret = handshake.decodeAuthMessage(authMsg)
|
||||
|
||||
if ret.isErr():
|
||||
# It is likely that errors on the handshake Auth is just garbage arriving
|
||||
# on the TCP port as it is the first data on the incoming connection,
|
||||
# hence log them as trace.
|
||||
trace "rlpxAccept handshake error", error = ret.error
|
||||
if not isNil(peer.transport):
|
||||
peer.transport.close()
|
||||
|
||||
rlpx_accept_failure.inc()
|
||||
rlpx_accept_failure.inc(labelValues = ["handshake_error"])
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
|
||||
ret.get()
|
||||
|
||||
peer.setSnappySupport(node, handshake)
|
||||
handshake.version = uint8(peer.baseProtocolVersion)
|
||||
|
||||
var ackMsg: array[AckMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
|
||||
var ackMsgLen: int
|
||||
handshake.ackMessage(node.rng[], ackMsg, ackMsgLen).tryGet()
|
||||
var res = await transport.write(addr ackMsg[0], ackMsgLen)
|
||||
if res != ackMsgLen:
|
||||
raisePeerDisconnected("Unexpected disconnect while authenticating",
|
||||
TcpError)
|
||||
|
||||
peer.initSecretState(handshake, authMsg, ^ackMsg)
|
||||
let (secrets, pubkey) = await node.responderHandshake(transport)
|
||||
initSecretState(secrets, peer.secretsState)
|
||||
|
||||
let listenPort = transport.localAddress().port
|
||||
|
||||
logAcceptedPeer peer
|
||||
|
||||
var sendHelloFut = peer.hello(
|
||||
peer.baseProtocolVersion,
|
||||
node.baseProtocolVersion(),
|
||||
node.clientId,
|
||||
node.capabilities,
|
||||
listenPort.uint,
|
||||
|
|
@ -1400,14 +1366,15 @@ proc rlpxAccept*(
|
|||
|
||||
trace "Received Hello", version=response.version, id=response.clientId
|
||||
|
||||
if not validatePubKeyInHello(response, handshake.remoteHPubkey):
|
||||
trace "A Remote nodeId is not its public key" # XXX: Do we care?
|
||||
if not validatePubKeyInHello(response, pubkey):
|
||||
raise (ref MalformedMessageError)(msg: "Wrong pubkey in hello message")
|
||||
|
||||
peer.setSnappySupport(node, response)
|
||||
|
||||
let remote = transport.remoteAddress()
|
||||
let address = Address(ip: remote.address, tcpPort: remote.port,
|
||||
udpPort: remote.port)
|
||||
peer.remote = newNode(
|
||||
ENode(pubkey: handshake.remoteHPubkey, address: address))
|
||||
peer.remote = newNode(ENode(pubkey: pubkey, address: address))
|
||||
|
||||
trace "devp2p handshake completed", peer = peer.remote,
|
||||
clientId = response.clientId
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ proc sxor[T](a: var openArray[T], b: openArray[T]) {.inline.} =
|
|||
proc initSecretState*(secrets: ConnectionSecret, context: var SecretState) =
|
||||
## Initialized `context` with values from `secrets`.
|
||||
|
||||
# FIXME: Yes, the encryption is insecure,
|
||||
# see: https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/issues/32
|
||||
# This scheme is insecure, see:
|
||||
# https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/issues/32
|
||||
# https://github.com/ethereum/py-evm/blob/master/p2p/peer.py#L159-L160
|
||||
var iv: array[context.aesenc.sizeBlock, byte]
|
||||
context.aesenc.init(secrets.aesKey, iv)
|
||||
|
|
@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ proc encrypt*(c: var SecretState, header: openArray[byte],
|
|||
var frameMac = tmpmac.finish()
|
||||
tmpmac.clear()
|
||||
# return header_ciphertext + header_mac + frame_ciphertext + frame_mac
|
||||
copyMem(addr output[headerMacPos], addr headerMac.data[0], RlpHeaderLength)
|
||||
copyMem(addr output[frameMacPos], addr frameMac.data[0], RlpHeaderLength)
|
||||
copyMem(addr output[headerMacPos], addr headerMac.data[0], RlpMacLength)
|
||||
copyMem(addr output[frameMacPos], addr frameMac.data[0], RlpMacLength)
|
||||
ok()
|
||||
|
||||
proc encryptMsg*(msg: openArray[byte], secrets: var SecretState): seq[byte] =
|
||||
|
|
@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ proc getBodySize*(a: RlpxHeader): int =
|
|||
(int(a[0]) shl 16) or (int(a[1]) shl 8) or int(a[2])
|
||||
|
||||
proc decryptHeader*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte],
|
||||
output: var openArray[byte]): RlpxResult[void] =
|
||||
output: var RlpxHeader): RlpxResult[int] =
|
||||
## Decrypts header `data` using SecretState `c` context and store
|
||||
## result into `output`.
|
||||
##
|
||||
|
|
@ -190,30 +190,14 @@ proc decryptHeader*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte],
|
|||
let headerMacPos = RlpHeaderLength
|
||||
if not equalMem(cast[pointer](unsafeAddr data[headerMacPos]),
|
||||
cast[pointer](addr expectMac.data[0]), RlpMacLength):
|
||||
result = err(IncorrectMac)
|
||||
err(IncorrectMac)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# return self.aes_dec.update(header_ciphertext)
|
||||
c.aesdec.decrypt(toa(data, 0, RlpHeaderLength), output)
|
||||
result = ok()
|
||||
|
||||
proc decryptHeaderAndGetMsgSize*(c: var SecretState,
|
||||
encryptedHeader: openArray[byte],
|
||||
outSize: var int,
|
||||
outHeader: var RlpxHeader): RlpxResult[void] =
|
||||
result = decryptHeader(c, encryptedHeader, outHeader)
|
||||
if result.isOk():
|
||||
outSize = outHeader.getBodySize
|
||||
|
||||
proc decryptHeaderAndGetMsgSize*(c: var SecretState,
|
||||
encryptedHeader: openArray[byte],
|
||||
outSize: var int): RlpxResult[void] =
|
||||
var decryptedHeader: RlpxHeader
|
||||
result = decryptHeader(c, encryptedHeader, decryptedHeader)
|
||||
if result.isOk():
|
||||
outSize = decryptedHeader.getBodySize
|
||||
ok(output.getBodySize())
|
||||
|
||||
proc decryptBody*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte], bodysize: int,
|
||||
output: var openArray[byte], outlen: var int): RlpxResult[void] =
|
||||
output: var openArray[byte]): RlpxResult[void] =
|
||||
## Decrypts body `data` using SecretState `c` context and store
|
||||
## result into `output`.
|
||||
##
|
||||
|
|
@ -224,7 +208,6 @@ proc decryptBody*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte], bodysize: int,
|
|||
var
|
||||
tmpmac: keccak256
|
||||
aes: array[RlpHeaderLength, byte]
|
||||
outlen = 0
|
||||
let rsize = roundup16(bodysize)
|
||||
if len(data) < rsize + RlpMacLength:
|
||||
return err(IncompleteError)
|
||||
|
|
@ -245,8 +228,7 @@ proc decryptBody*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte], bodysize: int,
|
|||
let bodyMacPos = rsize
|
||||
if not equalMem(cast[pointer](unsafeAddr data[bodyMacPos]),
|
||||
cast[pointer](addr expectMac.data[0]), RlpMacLength):
|
||||
result = err(IncorrectMac)
|
||||
err(IncorrectMac)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
c.aesdec.decrypt(toa(data, 0, rsize), output)
|
||||
outlen = bodysize
|
||||
result = ok()
|
||||
ok()
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -14,87 +14,6 @@ import
|
|||
nimcrypto/[utils, keccak],
|
||||
../../eth/common/keys, ../../eth/p2p/auth
|
||||
|
||||
# This was generated by `print` actual auth message generated by
|
||||
# https://github.com/ethereum/py-evm/blob/master/tests/p2p/test_auth.py
|
||||
const pyevmAuth = """
|
||||
22034ad2e7545e2b0bf02ecb1e40db478dfbbf7aeecc834aec2523eb2b7e74ee
|
||||
77ba40c70a83bfe9f2ab91f0131546dcf92c3ee8282d9907fee093017fd0302d
|
||||
0034fdb5419558137e0d44cd13d319afe5629eeccb47fd9dfe55cc6089426e46
|
||||
cc762dd8a0636e07a54b31169eba0c7a20a1ac1ef68596f1f283b5c676bae406
|
||||
4abfcce24799d09f67e392632d3ffdc12e3d6430dcb0ea19c318343ffa7aae74
|
||||
d4cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb
|
||||
1100"""
|
||||
|
||||
# This data comes from https://gist.github.com/fjl/3a78780d17c755d22df2
|
||||
const data = [
|
||||
("initiator_private_key",
|
||||
"5e173f6ac3c669587538e7727cf19b782a4f2fda07c1eaa662c593e5e85e3051"),
|
||||
("receiver_private_key",
|
||||
"c45f950382d542169ea207959ee0220ec1491755abe405cd7498d6b16adb6df8"),
|
||||
("initiator_ephemeral_private_key",
|
||||
"19c2185f4f40634926ebed3af09070ca9e029f2edd5fae6253074896205f5f6c"),
|
||||
("receiver_ephemeral_private_key",
|
||||
"d25688cf0ab10afa1a0e2dba7853ed5f1e5bf1c631757ed4e103b593ff3f5620"),
|
||||
("auth_plaintext",
|
||||
"""884c36f7ae6b406637c1f61b2f57e1d2cab813d24c6559aaf843c3f48962f32f
|
||||
46662c066d39669b7b2e3ba14781477417600e7728399278b1b5d801a519aa57
|
||||
0034fdb5419558137e0d44cd13d319afe5629eeccb47fd9dfe55cc6089426e46
|
||||
cc762dd8a0636e07a54b31169eba0c7a20a1ac1ef68596f1f283b5c676bae406
|
||||
4abfcce24799d09f67e392632d3ffdc12e3d6430dcb0ea19c318343ffa7aae74
|
||||
d4cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb
|
||||
1100"""),
|
||||
("authresp_plaintext",
|
||||
"""802b052f8b066640bba94a4fc39d63815c377fced6fcb84d27f791c9921ddf3e
|
||||
9bf0108e298f490812847109cbd778fae393e80323fd643209841a3b7f110397
|
||||
f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a7
|
||||
00"""),
|
||||
("auth_ciphertext",
|
||||
"""04a0274c5951e32132e7f088c9bdfdc76c9d91f0dc6078e848f8e3361193dbdc
|
||||
43b94351ea3d89e4ff33ddcefbc80070498824857f499656c4f79bbd97b6c51a
|
||||
514251d69fd1785ef8764bd1d262a883f780964cce6a14ff206daf1206aa073a
|
||||
2d35ce2697ebf3514225bef186631b2fd2316a4b7bcdefec8d75a1025ba2c540
|
||||
4a34e7795e1dd4bc01c6113ece07b0df13b69d3ba654a36e35e69ff9d482d88d
|
||||
2f0228e7d96fe11dccbb465a1831c7d4ad3a026924b182fc2bdfe016a6944312
|
||||
021da5cc459713b13b86a686cf34d6fe6615020e4acf26bf0d5b7579ba813e77
|
||||
23eb95b3cef9942f01a58bd61baee7c9bdd438956b426a4ffe238e61746a8c93
|
||||
d5e10680617c82e48d706ac4953f5e1c4c4f7d013c87d34a06626f498f34576d
|
||||
c017fdd3d581e83cfd26cf125b6d2bda1f1d56"""),
|
||||
("authresp_ciphertext",
|
||||
"""049934a7b2d7f9af8fd9db941d9da281ac9381b5740e1f64f7092f3588d4f87f
|
||||
5ce55191a6653e5e80c1c5dd538169aa123e70dc6ffc5af1827e546c0e958e42
|
||||
dad355bcc1fcb9cdf2cf47ff524d2ad98cbf275e661bf4cf00960e74b5956b79
|
||||
9771334f426df007350b46049adb21a6e78ab1408d5e6ccde6fb5e69f0f4c92b
|
||||
b9c725c02f99fa72b9cdc8dd53cff089e0e73317f61cc5abf6152513cb7d833f
|
||||
09d2851603919bf0fbe44d79a09245c6e8338eb502083dc84b846f2fee1cc310
|
||||
d2cc8b1b9334728f97220bb799376233e113"""),
|
||||
("ecdhe_shared_secret",
|
||||
"e3f407f83fc012470c26a93fdff534100f2c6f736439ce0ca90e9914f7d1c381"),
|
||||
("initiator_nonce",
|
||||
"cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb11"),
|
||||
("receiver_nonce",
|
||||
"f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a7"),
|
||||
("aes_secret",
|
||||
"c0458fa97a5230830e05f4f20b7c755c1d4e54b1ce5cf43260bb191eef4e418d"),
|
||||
("mac_secret",
|
||||
"48c938884d5067a1598272fcddaa4b833cd5e7d92e8228c0ecdfabbe68aef7f1"),
|
||||
("token",
|
||||
"3f9ec2592d1554852b1f54d228f042ed0a9310ea86d038dc2b401ba8cd7fdac4"),
|
||||
("initial_egress_MAC",
|
||||
"09771e93b1a6109e97074cbe2d2b0cf3d3878efafe68f53c41bb60c0ec49097e"),
|
||||
("initial_ingress_MAC",
|
||||
"75823d96e23136c89666ee025fb21a432be906512b3dd4a3049e898adb433847"),
|
||||
("initiator_hello_packet",
|
||||
"""6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63b550cdb8517fefd8dd398fc2acd1d935e
|
||||
6e0434a2b96769078477637347b7b01924fff9ff1c06df2f804df3b0402bbb9f
|
||||
87365b3c6856b45e1e2b6470986813c3816a71bff9d69dd297a5dbd935ab578f
|
||||
6e5d7e93e4506a44f307c332d95e8a4b102585fd8ef9fc9e3e055537a5cec2e9"""),
|
||||
("receiver_hello_packet",
|
||||
"""6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63be36a1cdd1b19179146019984f3625d4a
|
||||
6e0434a2b96769050577657247b7b02bc6c314470eca7e3ef650b98c83e9d7dd
|
||||
4830b3f718ff562349aead2530a8d28a8484604f92e5fced2c6183f304344ab0
|
||||
e7c301a0c05559f4c25db65e36820b4b909a226171a60ac6cb7beea09376d6d8""")
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
# These test vectors were copied from EIP8 specification
|
||||
# https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-8.md
|
||||
const eip8data = [
|
||||
|
|
@ -110,17 +29,6 @@ const eip8data = [
|
|||
"7e968bba13b6c50e2c4cd7f241cc0d64d1ac25c7f5952df231ac6a2bda8ee5d6"),
|
||||
("receiver_nonce",
|
||||
"559aead08264d5795d3909718cdd05abd49572e84fe55590eef31a88a08fdffd"),
|
||||
("auth_ciphertext_v4",
|
||||
"""048ca79ad18e4b0659fab4853fe5bc58eb83992980f4c9cc147d2aa31532efd29
|
||||
a3d3dc6a3d89eaf913150cfc777ce0ce4af2758bf4810235f6e6ceccfee1acc6b
|
||||
22c005e9e3a49d6448610a58e98744ba3ac0399e82692d67c1f58849050b3024e
|
||||
21a52c9d3b01d871ff5f210817912773e610443a9ef142e91cdba0bd77b5fdf07
|
||||
69b05671fc35f83d83e4d3b0b000c6b2a1b1bba89e0fc51bf4e460df3105c444f
|
||||
14be226458940d6061c296350937ffd5e3acaceeaaefd3c6f74be8e23e0f45163
|
||||
cc7ebd76220f0128410fd05250273156d548a414444ae2f7dea4dfca2d43c057a
|
||||
db701a715bf59f6fb66b2d1d20f2c703f851cbf5ac47396d9ca65b6260bd141ac
|
||||
4d53e2de585a73d1750780db4c9ee4cd4d225173a4592ee77e2bd94d0be3691f3
|
||||
b406f9bba9b591fc63facc016bfa8"""),
|
||||
("auth_ciphertext_eip8",
|
||||
"""01b304ab7578555167be8154d5cc456f567d5ba302662433674222360f08d5f15
|
||||
34499d3678b513b0fca474f3a514b18e75683032eb63fccb16c156dc6eb2c0b15
|
||||
|
|
@ -151,14 +59,6 @@ const eip8data = [
|
|||
f37407ac044b55be0908ecb94d4ed172ece66fd31bfdadf2b97a8bc690163ee11
|
||||
f5b575a4b44e36e2bfb2f0fce91676fd64c7773bac6a003f481fddd0bae0a1f31
|
||||
aa27504e2a533af4cef3b623f4791b2cca6d490"""),
|
||||
("authack_ciphertext_v4",
|
||||
"""049f8abcfa9c0dc65b982e98af921bc0ba6e4243169348a236abe9df5f93aa69d
|
||||
99cadddaa387662b0ff2c08e9006d5a11a278b1b3331e5aaabf0a32f01281b6f4
|
||||
ede0e09a2d5f585b26513cb794d9635a57563921c04a9090b4f14ee42be1a5461
|
||||
049af4ea7a7f49bf4c97a352d39c8d02ee4acc416388c1c66cec761d2bc1c72da
|
||||
6ba143477f049c9d2dde846c252c111b904f630ac98e51609b3b1f58168ddca65
|
||||
05b7196532e5f85b259a20c45e1979491683fee108e9660edbf38f3add489ae73
|
||||
e3dda2c71bd1497113d5c755e942d1"""),
|
||||
("authack_ciphertext_eip8",
|
||||
"""01ea0451958701280a56482929d3b0757da8f7fbe5286784beead59d95089c217
|
||||
c9b917788989470b0e330cc6e4fb383c0340ed85fab836ec9fb8a49672712aeab
|
||||
|
|
@ -204,12 +104,6 @@ const eip8data = [
|
|||
|
||||
let rng = newRng()
|
||||
|
||||
proc testValue(s: string): string =
|
||||
for item in data:
|
||||
if item[0] == s:
|
||||
result = item[1]
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
proc testE8Value(s: string): string =
|
||||
for item in eip8data:
|
||||
if item[0] == s:
|
||||
|
|
@ -217,118 +111,6 @@ proc testE8Value(s: string): string =
|
|||
break
|
||||
|
||||
suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
|
||||
block:
|
||||
proc newTestHandshake(flags: set[HandshakeFlag]): Handshake =
|
||||
if Initiator in flags:
|
||||
let pk = PrivateKey.fromHex(testValue("initiator_private_key"))[]
|
||||
result = Handshake.init(rng[], pk.toKeyPair(), flags)
|
||||
|
||||
let epki = testValue("initiator_ephemeral_private_key")
|
||||
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromHex(epki)[].toKeyPair()
|
||||
let nonce = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("initiator_nonce")))
|
||||
result.initiatorNonce[0..^1] = nonce[0..^1]
|
||||
elif Responder in flags:
|
||||
let pk = PrivateKey.fromHex(testValue("receiver_private_key"))[]
|
||||
result = Handshake.init(rng[], pk.toKeyPair(), flags)
|
||||
let epkr = testValue("receiver_ephemeral_private_key")
|
||||
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromHex(epkr)[].toKeyPair()
|
||||
let nonce = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("receiver_nonce")))
|
||||
result.responderNonce[0..^1] = nonce[0..^1]
|
||||
|
||||
test "Create plain auth message":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize(false))
|
||||
var k0 = 0
|
||||
initiator.authMessage(
|
||||
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0, 0, false).expect("auth success")
|
||||
var expect1 = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("auth_plaintext")))
|
||||
var expect2 = fromHex(stripSpaces(pyevmAuth))
|
||||
check:
|
||||
m0[65..^1] == expect1[65..^1]
|
||||
m0[0..^1] == expect2[0..^1]
|
||||
|
||||
test "Auth message decoding":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
|
||||
var k0 = 0
|
||||
let remoteEPubkey0 = initiator.ephemeral.pubkey
|
||||
let remoteHPubkey0 = initiator.host.pubkey
|
||||
|
||||
initiator.authMessage(
|
||||
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0).expect("auth success")
|
||||
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("decode success")
|
||||
check:
|
||||
responder.initiatorNonce[0..^1] == initiator.initiatorNonce[0..^1]
|
||||
responder.remoteEPubkey == remoteEPubkey0
|
||||
responder.remoteHPubkey == remoteHPubkey0
|
||||
|
||||
test "ACK message expectation":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
|
||||
var m1 = newSeq[byte](responder.ackSize(false))
|
||||
var k0 = 0
|
||||
var k1 = 0
|
||||
var expect0 = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("authresp_plaintext")))
|
||||
initiator.authMessage(
|
||||
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0).expect("auth success")
|
||||
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("decode success")
|
||||
responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1, k1, 0, false).expect("ack success")
|
||||
check:
|
||||
m1 == expect0
|
||||
responder.initiatorNonce == initiator.initiatorNonce
|
||||
|
||||
test "ACK message decoding":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
|
||||
var m1 = newSeq[byte](responder.ackSize())
|
||||
var k0 = 0
|
||||
var k1 = 0
|
||||
|
||||
initiator.authMessage(
|
||||
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0).expect("auth success")
|
||||
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("decode success")
|
||||
responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1, k1).expect("ack success")
|
||||
initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).expect("decode success")
|
||||
let remoteEPubkey0 = responder.ephemeral.pubkey
|
||||
let remoteHPubkey0 = responder.host.pubkey
|
||||
check:
|
||||
initiator.remoteEPubkey == remoteEPubkey0
|
||||
initiator.remoteHPubkey == remoteHPubkey0
|
||||
initiator.responderNonce == responder.responderNonce
|
||||
|
||||
test "Check derived secrets":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
var authm = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("auth_ciphertext")))
|
||||
var ackm = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("authresp_ciphertext")))
|
||||
var taes = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("aes_secret")))
|
||||
var tmac = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("mac_secret")))
|
||||
var temac = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("initial_egress_MAC")))
|
||||
var timac = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("initial_ingress_MAC")))
|
||||
|
||||
responder.decodeAuthMessage(authm).expect("decode success")
|
||||
initiator.decodeAckMessage(ackm).expect("ack success")
|
||||
var csecInitiator = initiator.getSecrets(authm, ackm)
|
||||
var csecResponder = responder.getSecrets(authm, ackm)
|
||||
check:
|
||||
csecInitiator.aesKey == csecResponder.aesKey
|
||||
csecInitiator.macKey == csecResponder.macKey
|
||||
taes[0..^1] == csecInitiator.aesKey[0..^1]
|
||||
tmac[0..^1] == csecInitiator.macKey[0..^1]
|
||||
let iemac = csecInitiator.egressMac.finish()
|
||||
let iimac = csecInitiator.ingressMac.finish()
|
||||
let remac = csecResponder.egressMac.finish()
|
||||
let rimac = csecResponder.ingressMac.finish()
|
||||
check:
|
||||
iemac.data[0..^1] == temac[0..^1]
|
||||
iimac.data[0..^1] == timac[0..^1]
|
||||
remac.data[0..^1] == timac[0..^1]
|
||||
rimac.data[0..^1] == temac[0..^1]
|
||||
|
||||
block:
|
||||
proc newTestHandshake(flags: set[HandshakeFlag]): Handshake =
|
||||
if Initiator in flags:
|
||||
|
|
@ -348,25 +130,6 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
|
|||
let nonce = fromHex(stripSpaces(testE8Value("receiver_nonce")))
|
||||
result.responderNonce[0..^1] = nonce[0..^1]
|
||||
|
||||
test "AUTH/ACK v4 test vectors": # auth/ack v4
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
var m0 = fromHex(stripSpaces(testE8Value("auth_ciphertext_v4")))
|
||||
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("decode success")
|
||||
check:
|
||||
responder.initiatorNonce[0..^1] == initiator.initiatorNonce[0..^1]
|
||||
let remoteEPubkey0 = initiator.ephemeral.pubkey
|
||||
let remoteHPubkey0 = initiator.host.pubkey
|
||||
check:
|
||||
responder.remoteEPubkey == remoteEPubkey0
|
||||
responder.remoteHPubkey == remoteHPubkey0
|
||||
var m1 = fromHex(stripSpaces(testE8Value("authack_ciphertext_v4")))
|
||||
initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).expect("decode success")
|
||||
let remoteEPubkey1 = responder.ephemeral.pubkey
|
||||
check:
|
||||
initiator.remoteEPubkey == remoteEPubkey1
|
||||
initiator.responderNonce[0..^1] == responder.responderNonce[0..^1]
|
||||
|
||||
test "AUTH/ACK EIP-8 test vectors":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
|
|
@ -390,8 +153,6 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
|
|||
var csecInitiator = initiator.getSecrets(m0, m1)
|
||||
var csecResponder = responder.getSecrets(m0, m1)
|
||||
check:
|
||||
int(initiator.version) == 4
|
||||
int(responder.version) == 4
|
||||
csecInitiator.aesKey == csecResponder.aesKey
|
||||
csecInitiator.macKey == csecResponder.macKey
|
||||
taes[0..^1] == csecInitiator.aesKey[0..^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -418,25 +179,21 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
|
|||
initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).expect("decode success")
|
||||
let remoteEPubkey1 = responder.ephemeral.pubkey
|
||||
check:
|
||||
int(initiator.version) == 57
|
||||
int(responder.version) == 56
|
||||
initiator.remoteEPubkey == remoteEPubkey1
|
||||
initiator.responderNonce[0..^1] == responder.responderNonce[0..^1]
|
||||
|
||||
test "100 AUTH/ACK EIP-8 handshakes":
|
||||
for i in 1..100:
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator, EIP8})
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
|
||||
var k0 = 0
|
||||
var k1 = 0
|
||||
initiator.authMessage(
|
||||
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0).expect("auth success")
|
||||
var m0 = newSeq[byte](AuthMessageMaxEIP8)
|
||||
let k0 = initiator.authMessage(
|
||||
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0).expect("auth success")
|
||||
m0.setLen(k0)
|
||||
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("decode success")
|
||||
check (EIP8 in responder.flags) == true
|
||||
var m1 = newSeq[byte](responder.ackSize())
|
||||
responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1, k1).expect("ack success")
|
||||
|
||||
var m1 = newSeq[byte](AckMessageMaxEIP8)
|
||||
let k1 = responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1).expect("ack success")
|
||||
m1.setLen(k1)
|
||||
initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).expect("decode success")
|
||||
var csecInitiator = initiator.getSecrets(m0, m1)
|
||||
|
|
@ -449,15 +206,13 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
|
|||
for i in 1..100:
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
|
||||
var k0 = 0
|
||||
var k1 = 0
|
||||
initiator.authMessage(
|
||||
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0).expect("auth success")
|
||||
var m0 = newSeq[byte](AuthMessageMaxEIP8)
|
||||
let k0 = initiator.authMessage(
|
||||
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0).expect("auth success")
|
||||
m0.setLen(k0)
|
||||
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("auth success")
|
||||
var m1 = newSeq[byte](responder.ackSize())
|
||||
responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1, k1).expect("ack success")
|
||||
var m1 = newSeq[byte](AckMessageMaxEIP8)
|
||||
let k1 = responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1).expect("ack success")
|
||||
m1.setLen(k1)
|
||||
initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).expect("ack success")
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -507,10 +262,10 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
|
|||
res.error == AuthError.IncompleteError
|
||||
|
||||
test "Invalid AckMessage - Minimum input size":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator, EIP8})
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator,})
|
||||
|
||||
# 1 byte short on minimum size
|
||||
let m = newSeq[byte](AckMessageV4Length - 1)
|
||||
let m = newSeq[byte](AckMessageEIP8Length - 1)
|
||||
|
||||
let res = initiator.decodeAckMessage(m)
|
||||
check:
|
||||
|
|
@ -518,7 +273,7 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
|
|||
res.error == AuthError.IncompleteError
|
||||
|
||||
test "Invalid AckMessage - Minimum size prefix":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator, EIP8})
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
|
||||
# Minimum size for EIP8 AckMessage
|
||||
var m = newSeq[byte](AckMessageEIP8Length)
|
||||
|
|
@ -532,7 +287,7 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
|
|||
res.error == AuthError.IncompleteError
|
||||
|
||||
test "Invalid AckMessage - Size prefix bigger than input":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator, EIP8})
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
|
||||
# Minimum size for EIP8 AckMessage
|
||||
var m = newSeq[byte](AckMessageEIP8Length)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,176 +11,147 @@
|
|||
|
||||
import
|
||||
unittest2,
|
||||
nimcrypto/[utils, sysrand],
|
||||
nimcrypto/[utils, keccak, sysrand],
|
||||
../../eth/common/keys, ../../eth/p2p/[auth, rlpxcrypt]
|
||||
|
||||
const data = [
|
||||
("initiator_private_key",
|
||||
"5e173f6ac3c669587538e7727cf19b782a4f2fda07c1eaa662c593e5e85e3051"),
|
||||
("receiver_private_key",
|
||||
"c45f950382d542169ea207959ee0220ec1491755abe405cd7498d6b16adb6df8"),
|
||||
("initiator_ephemeral_private_key",
|
||||
"19c2185f4f40634926ebed3af09070ca9e029f2edd5fae6253074896205f5f6c"),
|
||||
("receiver_ephemeral_private_key",
|
||||
"d25688cf0ab10afa1a0e2dba7853ed5f1e5bf1c631757ed4e103b593ff3f5620"),
|
||||
("auth_plaintext",
|
||||
"""884c36f7ae6b406637c1f61b2f57e1d2cab813d24c6559aaf843c3f48962f32f
|
||||
46662c066d39669b7b2e3ba14781477417600e7728399278b1b5d801a519aa57
|
||||
0034fdb5419558137e0d44cd13d319afe5629eeccb47fd9dfe55cc6089426e46
|
||||
cc762dd8a0636e07a54b31169eba0c7a20a1ac1ef68596f1f283b5c676bae406
|
||||
4abfcce24799d09f67e392632d3ffdc12e3d6430dcb0ea19c318343ffa7aae74
|
||||
d4cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb
|
||||
1100"""),
|
||||
("authresp_plaintext",
|
||||
"""802b052f8b066640bba94a4fc39d63815c377fced6fcb84d27f791c9921ddf3e
|
||||
9bf0108e298f490812847109cbd778fae393e80323fd643209841a3b7f110397
|
||||
f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a7
|
||||
00"""),
|
||||
("auth_ciphertext",
|
||||
"""04a0274c5951e32132e7f088c9bdfdc76c9d91f0dc6078e848f8e3361193dbdc
|
||||
43b94351ea3d89e4ff33ddcefbc80070498824857f499656c4f79bbd97b6c51a
|
||||
514251d69fd1785ef8764bd1d262a883f780964cce6a14ff206daf1206aa073a
|
||||
2d35ce2697ebf3514225bef186631b2fd2316a4b7bcdefec8d75a1025ba2c540
|
||||
4a34e7795e1dd4bc01c6113ece07b0df13b69d3ba654a36e35e69ff9d482d88d
|
||||
2f0228e7d96fe11dccbb465a1831c7d4ad3a026924b182fc2bdfe016a6944312
|
||||
021da5cc459713b13b86a686cf34d6fe6615020e4acf26bf0d5b7579ba813e77
|
||||
23eb95b3cef9942f01a58bd61baee7c9bdd438956b426a4ffe238e61746a8c93
|
||||
d5e10680617c82e48d706ac4953f5e1c4c4f7d013c87d34a06626f498f34576d
|
||||
c017fdd3d581e83cfd26cf125b6d2bda1f1d56"""),
|
||||
("authresp_ciphertext",
|
||||
"""049934a7b2d7f9af8fd9db941d9da281ac9381b5740e1f64f7092f3588d4f87f
|
||||
5ce55191a6653e5e80c1c5dd538169aa123e70dc6ffc5af1827e546c0e958e42
|
||||
dad355bcc1fcb9cdf2cf47ff524d2ad98cbf275e661bf4cf00960e74b5956b79
|
||||
9771334f426df007350b46049adb21a6e78ab1408d5e6ccde6fb5e69f0f4c92b
|
||||
b9c725c02f99fa72b9cdc8dd53cff089e0e73317f61cc5abf6152513cb7d833f
|
||||
09d2851603919bf0fbe44d79a09245c6e8338eb502083dc84b846f2fee1cc310
|
||||
d2cc8b1b9334728f97220bb799376233e113"""),
|
||||
("ecdhe_shared_secret",
|
||||
"e3f407f83fc012470c26a93fdff534100f2c6f736439ce0ca90e9914f7d1c381"),
|
||||
("initiator_nonce",
|
||||
"cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb11"),
|
||||
("receiver_nonce",
|
||||
"f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a7"),
|
||||
("aes_secret",
|
||||
"c0458fa97a5230830e05f4f20b7c755c1d4e54b1ce5cf43260bb191eef4e418d"),
|
||||
("mac_secret",
|
||||
"48c938884d5067a1598272fcddaa4b833cd5e7d92e8228c0ecdfabbe68aef7f1"),
|
||||
("token",
|
||||
"3f9ec2592d1554852b1f54d228f042ed0a9310ea86d038dc2b401ba8cd7fdac4"),
|
||||
("initial_egress_MAC",
|
||||
"09771e93b1a6109e97074cbe2d2b0cf3d3878efafe68f53c41bb60c0ec49097e"),
|
||||
("initial_ingress_MAC",
|
||||
"75823d96e23136c89666ee025fb21a432be906512b3dd4a3049e898adb433847"),
|
||||
("initiator_hello_packet",
|
||||
"""6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63b550cdb8517fefd8dd398fc2acd1d935e
|
||||
6e0434a2b96769078477637347b7b01924fff9ff1c06df2f804df3b0402bbb9f
|
||||
87365b3c6856b45e1e2b6470986813c3816a71bff9d69dd297a5dbd935ab578f
|
||||
6e5d7e93e4506a44f307c332d95e8a4b102585fd8ef9fc9e3e055537a5cec2e9"""),
|
||||
("receiver_hello_packet",
|
||||
"""6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63be36a1cdd1b19179146019984f3625d4a
|
||||
6e0434a2b96769050577657247b7b02bc6c314470eca7e3ef650b98c83e9d7dd
|
||||
4830b3f718ff562349aead2530a8d28a8484604f92e5fced2c6183f304344ab0
|
||||
e7c301a0c05559f4c25db65e36820b4b909a226171a60ac6cb7beea09376d6d8""")
|
||||
]
|
||||
# EIP-8 test case
|
||||
# https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-8.md#rlpx-handshake
|
||||
|
||||
const
|
||||
staticKeyA = fromHex("49a7b37aa6f6645917e7b807e9d1c00d4fa71f18343b0d4122a4d2df64dd6fee")
|
||||
staticKeyB = fromHex("b71c71a67e1177ad4e901695e1b4b9ee17ae16c6668d313eac2f96dbcda3f291")
|
||||
ephemeralKeyA = fromHex("869d6ecf5211f1cc60418a13b9d870b22959d0c16f02bec714c960dd2298a32d")
|
||||
ephemeralKeyB = fromHex("e238eb8e04fee6511ab04c6dd3c89ce097b11f25d584863ac2b6d5b35b1847e4")
|
||||
nonceA = fromHex("7e968bba13b6c50e2c4cd7f241cc0d64d1ac25c7f5952df231ac6a2bda8ee5d6")
|
||||
nonceB = fromHex("559aead08264d5795d3909718cdd05abd49572e84fe55590eef31a88a08fdffd")
|
||||
|
||||
auth1 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
|
||||
048ca79ad18e4b0659fab4853fe5bc58eb83992980f4c9cc147d2aa31532efd29a3d3dc6a3d89eaf
|
||||
913150cfc777ce0ce4af2758bf4810235f6e6ceccfee1acc6b22c005e9e3a49d6448610a58e98744
|
||||
ba3ac0399e82692d67c1f58849050b3024e21a52c9d3b01d871ff5f210817912773e610443a9ef14
|
||||
2e91cdba0bd77b5fdf0769b05671fc35f83d83e4d3b0b000c6b2a1b1bba89e0fc51bf4e460df3105
|
||||
c444f14be226458940d6061c296350937ffd5e3acaceeaaefd3c6f74be8e23e0f45163cc7ebd7622
|
||||
0f0128410fd05250273156d548a414444ae2f7dea4dfca2d43c057adb701a715bf59f6fb66b2d1d2
|
||||
0f2c703f851cbf5ac47396d9ca65b6260bd141ac4d53e2de585a73d1750780db4c9ee4cd4d225173
|
||||
a4592ee77e2bd94d0be3691f3b406f9bba9b591fc63facc016bfa8"""))
|
||||
auth2 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
|
||||
01b304ab7578555167be8154d5cc456f567d5ba302662433674222360f08d5f1534499d3678b513b
|
||||
0fca474f3a514b18e75683032eb63fccb16c156dc6eb2c0b1593f0d84ac74f6e475f1b8d56116b84
|
||||
9634a8c458705bf83a626ea0384d4d7341aae591fae42ce6bd5c850bfe0b999a694a49bbbaf3ef6c
|
||||
da61110601d3b4c02ab6c30437257a6e0117792631a4b47c1d52fc0f8f89caadeb7d02770bf999cc
|
||||
147d2df3b62e1ffb2c9d8c125a3984865356266bca11ce7d3a688663a51d82defaa8aad69da39ab6
|
||||
d5470e81ec5f2a7a47fb865ff7cca21516f9299a07b1bc63ba56c7a1a892112841ca44b6e0034dee
|
||||
70c9adabc15d76a54f443593fafdc3b27af8059703f88928e199cb122362a4b35f62386da7caad09
|
||||
c001edaeb5f8a06d2b26fb6cb93c52a9fca51853b68193916982358fe1e5369e249875bb8d0d0ec3
|
||||
6f917bc5e1eafd5896d46bd61ff23f1a863a8a8dcd54c7b109b771c8e61ec9c8908c733c0263440e
|
||||
2aa067241aaa433f0bb053c7b31a838504b148f570c0ad62837129e547678c5190341e4f1693956c
|
||||
3bf7678318e2d5b5340c9e488eefea198576344afbdf66db5f51204a6961a63ce072c8926c"""))
|
||||
auth3 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
|
||||
01b8044c6c312173685d1edd268aa95e1d495474c6959bcdd10067ba4c9013df9e40ff45f5bfd6f7
|
||||
2471f93a91b493f8e00abc4b80f682973de715d77ba3a005a242eb859f9a211d93a347fa64b597bf
|
||||
280a6b88e26299cf263b01b8dfdb712278464fd1c25840b995e84d367d743f66c0e54a586725b7bb
|
||||
f12acca27170ae3283c1073adda4b6d79f27656993aefccf16e0d0409fe07db2dc398a1b7e8ee93b
|
||||
cd181485fd332f381d6a050fba4c7641a5112ac1b0b61168d20f01b479e19adf7fdbfa0905f63352
|
||||
bfc7e23cf3357657455119d879c78d3cf8c8c06375f3f7d4861aa02a122467e069acaf513025ff19
|
||||
6641f6d2810ce493f51bee9c966b15c5043505350392b57645385a18c78f14669cc4d960446c1757
|
||||
1b7c5d725021babbcd786957f3d17089c084907bda22c2b2675b4378b114c601d858802a55345a15
|
||||
116bc61da4193996187ed70d16730e9ae6b3bb8787ebcaea1871d850997ddc08b4f4ea668fbf3740
|
||||
7ac044b55be0908ecb94d4ed172ece66fd31bfdadf2b97a8bc690163ee11f5b575a4b44e36e2bfb2
|
||||
f0fce91676fd64c7773bac6a003f481fddd0bae0a1f31aa27504e2a533af4cef3b623f4791b2cca6
|
||||
d490"""))
|
||||
ack1 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
|
||||
049f8abcfa9c0dc65b982e98af921bc0ba6e4243169348a236abe9df5f93aa69d99cadddaa387662
|
||||
b0ff2c08e9006d5a11a278b1b3331e5aaabf0a32f01281b6f4ede0e09a2d5f585b26513cb794d963
|
||||
5a57563921c04a9090b4f14ee42be1a5461049af4ea7a7f49bf4c97a352d39c8d02ee4acc416388c
|
||||
1c66cec761d2bc1c72da6ba143477f049c9d2dde846c252c111b904f630ac98e51609b3b1f58168d
|
||||
dca6505b7196532e5f85b259a20c45e1979491683fee108e9660edbf38f3add489ae73e3dda2c71b
|
||||
d1497113d5c755e942d1"""))
|
||||
ack2 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
|
||||
01ea0451958701280a56482929d3b0757da8f7fbe5286784beead59d95089c217c9b917788989470
|
||||
b0e330cc6e4fb383c0340ed85fab836ec9fb8a49672712aeabbdfd1e837c1ff4cace34311cd7f4de
|
||||
05d59279e3524ab26ef753a0095637ac88f2b499b9914b5f64e143eae548a1066e14cd2f4bd7f814
|
||||
c4652f11b254f8a2d0191e2f5546fae6055694aed14d906df79ad3b407d94692694e259191cde171
|
||||
ad542fc588fa2b7333313d82a9f887332f1dfc36cea03f831cb9a23fea05b33deb999e85489e645f
|
||||
6aab1872475d488d7bd6c7c120caf28dbfc5d6833888155ed69d34dbdc39c1f299be1057810f34fb
|
||||
e754d021bfca14dc989753d61c413d261934e1a9c67ee060a25eefb54e81a4d14baff922180c395d
|
||||
3f998d70f46f6b58306f969627ae364497e73fc27f6d17ae45a413d322cb8814276be6ddd13b885b
|
||||
201b943213656cde498fa0e9ddc8e0b8f8a53824fbd82254f3e2c17e8eaea009c38b4aa0a3f306e8
|
||||
797db43c25d68e86f262e564086f59a2fc60511c42abfb3057c247a8a8fe4fb3ccbadde17514b7ac
|
||||
8000cdb6a912778426260c47f38919a91f25f4b5ffb455d6aaaf150f7e5529c100ce62d6d92826a7
|
||||
1778d809bdf60232ae21ce8a437eca8223f45ac37f6487452ce626f549b3b5fdee26afd2072e4bc7
|
||||
5833c2464c805246155289f4"""))
|
||||
ack3 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
|
||||
01f004076e58aae772bb101ab1a8e64e01ee96e64857ce82b1113817c6cdd52c09d26f7b90981cd7
|
||||
ae835aeac72e1573b8a0225dd56d157a010846d888dac7464baf53f2ad4e3d584531fa203658fab0
|
||||
3a06c9fd5e35737e417bc28c1cbf5e5dfc666de7090f69c3b29754725f84f75382891c561040ea1d
|
||||
dc0d8f381ed1b9d0d4ad2a0ec021421d847820d6fa0ba66eaf58175f1b235e851c7e2124069fbc20
|
||||
2888ddb3ac4d56bcbd1b9b7eab59e78f2e2d400905050f4a92dec1c4bdf797b3fc9b2f8e84a482f3
|
||||
d800386186712dae00d5c386ec9387a5e9c9a1aca5a573ca91082c7d68421f388e79127a5177d4f8
|
||||
590237364fd348c9611fa39f78dcdceee3f390f07991b7b47e1daa3ebcb6ccc9607811cb17ce51f1
|
||||
c8c2c5098dbdd28fca547b3f58c01a424ac05f869f49c6a34672ea2cbbc558428aa1fe48bbfd6115
|
||||
8b1b735a65d99f21e70dbc020bfdface9f724a0d1fb5895db971cc81aa7608baa0920abb0a565c9c
|
||||
436e2fd13323428296c86385f2384e408a31e104670df0791d93e743a3a5194ee6b076fb6323ca59
|
||||
3011b7348c16cf58f66b9633906ba54a2ee803187344b394f75dd2e663a57b956cb830dd7a908d4f
|
||||
39a2336a61ef9fda549180d4ccde21514d117b6c6fd07a9102b5efe710a32af4eeacae2cb3b1dec0
|
||||
35b9593b48b9d3ca4c13d245d5f04169b0b1"""))
|
||||
|
||||
aesSecret2 = fromHex("80e8632c05fed6fc2a13b0f8d31a3cf645366239170ea067065aba8e28bac487")
|
||||
macSecret2 = fromHex("2ea74ec5dae199227dff1af715362700e989d889d7a493cb0639691efb8e5f98")
|
||||
|
||||
let rng = newRng()
|
||||
|
||||
proc testValue(s: string): string =
|
||||
for item in data:
|
||||
if item[0] == s:
|
||||
result = item[1]
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
suite "Ethereum RLPx encryption/decryption test suite":
|
||||
proc newTestHandshake(flags: set[HandshakeFlag]): Handshake =
|
||||
if Initiator in flags:
|
||||
let pk = PrivateKey.fromHex(testValue("initiator_private_key"))[]
|
||||
let pk = PrivateKey.fromRaw(staticKeyA)[]
|
||||
result = Handshake.init(rng[], pk.toKeyPair(), flags)
|
||||
let epki = testValue("initiator_ephemeral_private_key")
|
||||
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromHex(epki)[].toKeyPair()
|
||||
let nonce = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("initiator_nonce")))
|
||||
result.initiatorNonce[0..^1] = nonce[0..^1]
|
||||
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromRaw(ephemeralKeyA)[].toKeyPair()
|
||||
result.initiatorNonce[0..^1] = nonceA
|
||||
elif Responder in flags:
|
||||
let pk = PrivateKey.fromHex(testValue("receiver_private_key"))[]
|
||||
let pk = PrivateKey.fromRaw(staticKeyB)[]
|
||||
result = Handshake.init(rng[], pk.toKeyPair(), flags)
|
||||
let epkr = testValue("receiver_ephemeral_private_key")
|
||||
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromHex(epkr)[].toKeyPair()
|
||||
let nonce = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("receiver_nonce")))
|
||||
result.responderNonce[0..^1] = nonce[0..^1]
|
||||
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromRaw(ephemeralKeyB)[].toKeyPair()
|
||||
result.responderNonce[0..^1] = nonceB
|
||||
|
||||
test "Encrypt/Decrypt Hello packet test vectors":
|
||||
test "Fail on pre-EIP8 messages":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
var authm = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("auth_ciphertext")))
|
||||
var ackm = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("authresp_ciphertext")))
|
||||
var stateInitiator0, stateInitiator1: SecretState
|
||||
var stateResponder0, stateResponder1: SecretState
|
||||
responder.decodeAuthMessage(authm).expect("success")
|
||||
initiator.decodeAckMessage(ackm).expect("success")
|
||||
check: responder.decodeAuthMessage(auth1).isErr()
|
||||
check: initiator.decodeAckMessage(ack1).isErr()
|
||||
|
||||
var csecInitiator = initiator.getSecrets(authm, ackm)
|
||||
var csecResponder = responder.getSecrets(authm, ackm)
|
||||
initSecretState(csecInitiator, stateInitiator0)
|
||||
initSecretState(csecResponder, stateResponder0)
|
||||
initSecretState(csecInitiator, stateInitiator1)
|
||||
initSecretState(csecResponder, stateResponder1)
|
||||
var packet0 = testValue("initiator_hello_packet")
|
||||
var initiatorHello = fromHex(stripSpaces(packet0))
|
||||
var packet1 = testValue("receiver_hello_packet")
|
||||
var responderHello = fromHex(stripSpaces(packet1))
|
||||
var header: array[RlpHeaderLength, byte]
|
||||
test "Correct shared EIP-8 secret":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
|
||||
check: responder.decodeAuthMessage(auth2).isOk()
|
||||
check: initiator.decodeAckMessage(ack2).isOk()
|
||||
|
||||
var csecResponder = responder.getSecrets(auth2, ack2)
|
||||
|
||||
block:
|
||||
check stateResponder0.decryptHeader(toOpenArray(initiatorHello, 0, 31),
|
||||
header).isOk()
|
||||
let bodysize = getBodySize(header)
|
||||
check bodysize == 79
|
||||
# we need body size to be rounded to 16 bytes boundary to properly
|
||||
# encrypt/decrypt it.
|
||||
var body = newSeq[byte](decryptedLength(bodysize))
|
||||
var decrsize = 0
|
||||
check:
|
||||
stateResponder0.decryptBody(
|
||||
toOpenArray(initiatorHello, 32, len(initiatorHello) - 1),
|
||||
getBodySize(header), body, decrsize).isOk()
|
||||
decrsize == 79
|
||||
body.setLen(decrsize)
|
||||
var hello = newSeq[byte](encryptedLength(bodysize))
|
||||
csecResponder.aesKey == aesSecret2
|
||||
csecResponder.macKey == macSecret2
|
||||
var tmpMac = csecResponder.ingressMac
|
||||
tmpMac.update("foo".toOpenArrayByte(0, 2))
|
||||
check:
|
||||
stateInitiator1.encrypt(header, body, hello).isOk()
|
||||
hello == initiatorHello
|
||||
block:
|
||||
check stateInitiator0.decryptHeader(toOpenArray(responderHello, 0, 31),
|
||||
header).isOk()
|
||||
let bodysize = getBodySize(header)
|
||||
check bodysize == 79
|
||||
# we need body size to be rounded to 16 bytes boundary to properly
|
||||
# encrypt/decrypt it.
|
||||
var body = newSeq[byte](decryptedLength(bodysize))
|
||||
var decrsize = 0
|
||||
check:
|
||||
stateInitiator0.decryptBody(
|
||||
toOpenArray(responderHello, 32, len(initiatorHello) - 1),
|
||||
getBodySize(header), body, decrsize).isOk()
|
||||
decrsize == 79
|
||||
body.setLen(decrsize)
|
||||
var hello = newSeq[byte](encryptedLength(bodysize))
|
||||
check:
|
||||
stateResponder1.encrypt(header, body, hello).isOk()
|
||||
hello == responderHello
|
||||
tmpMac.finish().data == fromHex("0c7ec6340062cc46f5e9f1e3cf86f8c8c403c5a0964f5df0ebd34a75ddc86db5")
|
||||
|
||||
test "Can parse auth/ack with extra bytes":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
check: responder.decodeAuthMessage(auth3).isOk()
|
||||
check: initiator.decodeAckMessage(ack3).isOk()
|
||||
|
||||
test "Continuous stream of different lengths (1000 times)":
|
||||
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
|
||||
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
|
||||
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
|
||||
var k0 = 0
|
||||
var k1 = 0
|
||||
check initiator.authMessage(rng[], responder.host.pubkey,
|
||||
m0, k0).isOk
|
||||
var m0 = newSeq[byte](AuthMessageMaxEIP8)
|
||||
let k0 = initiator.authMessage(rng[], responder.host.pubkey,
|
||||
m0).expect("correct buf size")
|
||||
m0.setLen(k0)
|
||||
check responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).isOk
|
||||
var m1 = newSeq[byte](responder.ackSize())
|
||||
check responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1, k1).isOk
|
||||
var m1 = newSeq[byte](AckMessageMaxEIP8)
|
||||
let k1 = responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1).expect("correct buf size")
|
||||
m1.setLen(k1)
|
||||
check initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).isOk
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -210,13 +181,11 @@ suite "Ethereum RLPx encryption/decryption test suite":
|
|||
var length = getBodySize(rheader)
|
||||
check length == len(ibody)
|
||||
var rbody = newSeq[byte](decryptedLength(length))
|
||||
var decrsize = 0
|
||||
check:
|
||||
stateResponder.decryptBody(
|
||||
toOpenArray(encrypted, 32, len(encrypted) - 1),
|
||||
length, rbody, decrsize).isOk()
|
||||
decrsize == length
|
||||
rbody.setLen(decrsize)
|
||||
length, rbody).isOk()
|
||||
rbody.setLen(length)
|
||||
check:
|
||||
iheader == rheader
|
||||
ibody == rbody
|
||||
|
|
@ -238,12 +207,10 @@ suite "Ethereum RLPx encryption/decryption test suite":
|
|||
var length = getBodySize(rheader)
|
||||
check length == len(ibody)
|
||||
var rbody = newSeq[byte](decryptedLength(length))
|
||||
var decrsize = 0
|
||||
check:
|
||||
stateInitiator.decryptBody(
|
||||
toOpenArray(encrypted, 32, len(encrypted) - 1),
|
||||
length, rbody, decrsize).isOk()
|
||||
decrsize == length
|
||||
length, rbody).isOk()
|
||||
rbody.setLen(length)
|
||||
check:
|
||||
iheader == rheader
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue