Removed obsolete chunked rlpx message protocol extension (#719)

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Jordan Hrycaj 2024-08-13 15:10:47 +00:00 committed by GitHub
parent 56f72c7a66
commit 9511502273
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1 changed files with 10 additions and 128 deletions

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@ -13,17 +13,6 @@ import
".."/[rlp, common, keys, async_utils], ".."/[rlp, common, keys, async_utils],
./private/p2p_types, "."/[kademlia, auth, rlpxcrypt, enode, p2p_protocol_dsl] ./private/p2p_types, "."/[kademlia, auth, rlpxcrypt, enode, p2p_protocol_dsl]
const
# Insane kludge for supporting chunked messages when syncing against clients
# like Nethermind.
#
# The original specs which are now obsoleted can be found here:
# github.com/ethereum/devp2p/commit/6504d410bc4b8dda2b43941e1cb48c804b90cf22.
#
# The current requirement is stated at
# github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#framing
allowObsoletedChunkedMessages = defined(chunked_rlpx_enabled)
# TODO: This doesn't get enabled currently in any of the builds, so we send a # TODO: This doesn't get enabled currently in any of the builds, so we send a
# devp2p protocol handshake message with version. Need to check if some peers # devp2p protocol handshake message with version. Need to check if some peers
# drop us because of this. # drop us because of this.
@ -510,42 +499,6 @@ proc resolveResponseFuture(peer: Peer, msgId: int, msg: pointer, reqId: int) =
debug "late or duplicate reply for a RLPx request" debug "late or duplicate reply for a RLPx request"
proc getRlpxHeaderData(header: RlpxHeader): (int,int,int) =
## Helper for `recvMsg()`
# This is insane. Some clients like Nethermind use the now obsoleted
# chunked message frame protocol, see
# github.com/ethereum/devp2p/commit/6504d410bc4b8dda2b43941e1cb48c804b90cf22.
result = (-1, -1, 0)
proc datagramSize: int =
# For logging only
(header[0].int shl 16) or (header[1].int shl 8) or header[1].int
try:
let optsLen = max(0, header[3].int - 0xc0)
var hdrData = header[4 ..< 4 + optsLen].rlpFromBytes
result[0] = hdrData.read(int) # capability ID
result[1] = hdrData.read(int) # context ID
if hdrData.isBlob:
result[2] = hdrData.read(int) # total packet size
trace "RLPx message first chunked header-data",
capabilityId = result[0],
contextId = result[1],
totalPacketSize = result[2],
datagramSize = datagramSize()
#[
elif 0 < result[1]:
# This should be all zero according to latest specs
trace "RLPx message chunked next header-data",
capabilityId = result[0],
contextId = result[1],
datagramSize = datagramSize()
]#
except:
error "RLPx message header-data options, parse error",
capabilityId = result[0],
contextId = result[1],
totalPacketSize = result[2],
datagramSize = datagramSize()
result = (-1, -1, -1)
proc recvMsg*(peer: Peer): Future[tuple[msgId: int, msgData: Rlp]] {.async.} = proc recvMsg*(peer: Peer): Future[tuple[msgId: int, msgData: Rlp]] {.async.} =
## This procs awaits the next complete RLPx message in the TCP stream ## This procs awaits the next complete RLPx message in the TCP stream
@ -594,19 +547,18 @@ proc recvMsg*(peer: Peer): Future[tuple[msgId: int, msgData: Rlp]] {.async.} =
"Snappy uncompress encountered malformed data") "Snappy uncompress encountered malformed data")
# Check embedded header-data for start of an obsoleted chunked message. # Check embedded header-data for start of an obsoleted chunked message.
# Note that the check should come *before* the `msgId` is read. For
# instance, if this is a malformed packet, then the `msgId` might be
# random which in turn might try to access a `peer.dispatcher.messages[]`
# slot with a `nil` entry.
# #
# The current RLPx requirements need all triple entries <= 0, see # The current RLPx requirements need both tuuple entries be zero, see
# github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#framing # github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#framing
let (capaId, ctxId, totalMsgSize) = msgHeader.getRlpxHeaderData #
if (msgHeader[4] and 127) != 0 or # capability-id, now required to be zero
when not allowObsoletedChunkedMessages: (msgHeader[5] and 127) != 0: # context-id, now required to be zero
# Note that the check should come *before* the `msgId` is read. For await peer.disconnectAndRaise(
# instance, if this is a malformed packet, then the `msgId` might be BreachOfProtocol, "Rejected obsoleted chunked message header")
# random which in turn might try to access a `peer.dispatcher.messages[]`
# slot with a `nil` entry.
if 0 < capaId or 0 < ctxId or 0 < totalMsgSize:
await peer.disconnectAndRaise(
BreachOfProtocol, "Rejected obsoleted chunked message header")
var rlp = rlpFromBytes(decryptedBytes) var rlp = rlpFromBytes(decryptedBytes)
@ -619,76 +571,6 @@ proc recvMsg*(peer: Peer): Future[tuple[msgId: int, msgData: Rlp]] {.async.} =
await peer.disconnectAndRaise(BreachOfProtocol, await peer.disconnectAndRaise(BreachOfProtocol,
"Cannot read RLPx message id") "Cannot read RLPx message id")
# Handle chunked messages
when allowObsoletedChunkedMessages:
# Snappy with obsolete chunked RLPx message datagrams is unsupported here
when useSnappy:
if peer.snappyEnabled:
return
# This also covers totalMessageSize <= 0
if totalMsgSize <= msgSize:
return
# Loop over chunked RLPx datagram fragments
var moreData = totalMsgSize - msgSize
while 0 < moreData:
# Load and parse next header
block:
await peer.transport.readExactly(addr headerBytes[0], 32)
if decryptHeaderAndGetMsgSize(peer.secretsState,
headerBytes, msgSize, msgHeader).isErr():
trace "RLPx next chunked header-data failed",
peer, msgId, ctxId, maxSize = moreData
await peer.disconnectAndRaise(
BreachOfProtocol, "Cannot decrypt next chunked RLPx header")
# Verify that this is really the next chunk
block:
let (_, ctyId, totalSize) = msgHeader.getRlpxHeaderData
if ctyId != ctxId or 0 < totalSize:
trace "Malformed RLPx next chunked header-data",
peer, msgId, msgSize, ctxtId = ctyId, expCtxId = ctxId, totalSize
await peer.disconnectAndRaise(
BreachOfProtocol, "Malformed next chunked RLPx header")
# Append payload to `decryptedBytes` collector
block:
var encBytes = newSeq[byte](msgSize.encryptedLength - 32)
await peer.transport.readExactly(addr encBytes[0], encBytes.len)
var
dcrBytes = newSeq[byte](msgSize.decryptedLength)
dcrBytesCount = 0
# TODO: This should be improved by passing a reference into
# `decryptedBytes` where to append the data.
if decryptBody(peer.secretsState, encBytes, msgSize,
dcrBytes, dcrBytesCount).isErr():
await peer.disconnectAndRaise(
BreachOfProtocol, "Cannot decrypt next chunked RLPx frame body")
decryptedBytes.add dcrBytes[0 ..< dcrBytesCount]
moreData -= msgSize
#[
trace "RLPx next chunked datagram fragment",
peer, msgId = result[0], ctxId, msgSize, moreData, totalMsgSize,
dcrBytesCount, payloadSoFar = decryptedBytes.len
]#
# End While
if moreData != 0:
await peer.disconnectAndRaise(
BreachOfProtocol, "Malformed assembly of chunked RLPx message")
# Pass back extended message (first entry remains `msgId`)
result[1] = decryptedBytes.rlpFromBytes
result[1].position = rlp.position
trace "RLPx chunked datagram payload",
peer, msgId, ctxId, totalMsgSize, moreData, payload = decryptedBytes.len
# End `allowObsoletedChunkedMessages`
proc checkedRlpRead(peer: Peer, r: var Rlp, MsgType: type): proc checkedRlpRead(peer: Peer, r: var Rlp, MsgType: type):
auto {.raises: [RlpError].} = auto {.raises: [RlpError].} =