status-im
/
nim-eth
mirror of https://github.com/status-im/nim-eth.git
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge branch 'master' into eip-7742

This commit is contained in:
jangko 2024-11-08 10:34:27 +07:00
parent 183418151c 88e4be4dc4
commit 660d8e8c40
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 31702AE10541E6B9
33 changed files with 1745 additions and 2312 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
eth.nimble
View File

@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ requires "nim >= 1.6.0",
"testutils",
"unittest2",
"results",
"minilru"
"minilru",
"snappy"
let nimc = getEnv("NIMC", "nim") # Which nim compiler to use
let lang = getEnv("NIMLANG", "c") # Which backend (c/cpp/js)

21
eth/common/base_rlp.nim
View File

@ -7,30 +7,17 @@
{.push raises: [].}
import std/typetraits, ./base, ../rlp
import
std/typetraits, ./base, ../rlp,
../rlp/results as rlp_results
export base, rlp
export base, rlp, rlp_results
# TODO why is rlp serialization of `Opt` here and not in rlp?
proc append*[T](w: var RlpWriter, val: Opt[T]) =
mixin append
if val.isSome:
w.append(val.get())
else:
w.append("")
template read*[T](rlp: var Rlp, val: var T) =
mixin read
val = rlp.read(type val)
proc read*[T](rlp: var Rlp, val: var Opt[T]) {.raises: [RlpError].} =
mixin read
if rlp.blobLen != 0:
val = Opt.some(rlp.read(T))
else:
rlp.skipElem
proc read*(rlp: var Rlp, T: type StUint): T {.raises: [RlpError].} =
if rlp.isBlob:
let bytes = rlp.toBytes

45
eth/common/blocks.nim
View File

@ -18,49 +18,16 @@ type
address* : Address
amount* : uint64
DepositRequest* = object # EIP-6110
pubkey* : Bytes48
withdrawalCredentials*: Bytes32
amount* : uint64
signature* : Bytes96
index* : uint64
WithdrawalRequest* = object # EIP-7002
sourceAddress* : Address
validatorPubkey*: Bytes48
amount* : uint64
ConsolidationRequest* = object # EIP-7251
sourceAddress*: Address
sourcePubkey* : Bytes48
targetPubkey* : Bytes48
RequestType* = enum
DepositRequestType # EIP-6110
WithdrawalRequestType # EIP-7002
ConsolidationRequestType # EIP-7251
Request* = object
case requestType*: RequestType
of DepositRequestType:
deposit*: DepositRequest
of WithdrawalRequestType:
withdrawal*: WithdrawalRequest
of ConsolidationRequestType:
consolidation*: ConsolidationRequest
BlockBody* = object
transactions*: seq[Transaction]
uncles*: seq[Header]
withdrawals*: Opt[seq[Withdrawal]] # EIP-4895
requests*: Opt[seq[Request]] # EIP-7865
Block* = object
header* : Header
transactions*: seq[Transaction]
uncles* : seq[Header]
withdrawals*: Opt[seq[Withdrawal]] # EIP-4895
requests*: Opt[seq[Request]] # EIP-7865
const
EMPTY_UNCLE_HASH* = hash32"1dcc4de8dec75d7aab85b567b6ccd41ad312451b948a7413f0a142fd40d49347"
@ -77,15 +44,3 @@ func init*(T: type Block, header: Header, body: BlockBody): T =
template txs*(blk: Block): seq[Transaction] =
# Legacy name emulation
blk.transactions
func `==`*(a, b: Request): bool =
if a.requestType != b.requestType:
return false
case a.requestType
of DepositRequestType:
a.deposit == b.deposit
of WithdrawalRequestType:
a.withdrawal == b.withdrawal
of ConsolidationRequestType:
a.consolidation == b.consolidation

143
eth/common/blocks_rlp.nim
View File

@ -12,146 +12,3 @@ import ./[addresses_rlp, blocks, base_rlp, hashes_rlp], ../rlp
from stew/objects import checkedEnumAssign
export addresses_rlp, blocks, base_rlp, hashes_rlp, rlp
proc append*(rlpWriter: var RlpWriter, request: DepositRequest) =
rlpWriter.appendRawBytes([DepositRequestType.byte])
rlpWriter.startList(5)
rlpWriter.append(request.pubkey)
rlpWriter.append(request.withdrawalCredentials)
rlpWriter.append(request.amount)
rlpWriter.append(request.signature)
rlpWriter.append(request.index)
proc read*(rlp: var Rlp, T: type DepositRequest): T {.raises: [RlpError].} =
if not rlp.hasData:
raise (ref MalformedRlpError)(
msg: "DepositRequestType expected but source RLP is empty"
)
let reqType = rlp.readRawByte()
if reqType != DepositRequestType:
raise (ref UnsupportedRlpError)(msg: "Unexpected DepositRequestType: " & $reqType)
var res: DepositRequest
rlp.tryEnterList()
rlp.read(res.pubkey)
rlp.read(res.withdrawalCredentials)
rlp.read(res.amount)
rlp.read(res.signature)
rlp.read(res.index)
if rlp.hasData:
raise (ref MalformedRlpError)(msg: "Extra data after DepositRequest")
res
proc append*(rlpWriter: var RlpWriter, request: WithdrawalRequest) =
rlpWriter.appendRawBytes([WithdrawalRequestType.byte])
rlpWriter.startList(3)
rlpWriter.append(request.sourceAddress)
rlpWriter.append(request.validatorPubkey)
rlpWriter.append(request.amount)
proc read*(rlp: var Rlp, T: type WithdrawalRequest): T {.raises: [RlpError].} =
if not rlp.hasData:
raise (ref MalformedRlpError)(
msg: "WithdrawalRequestType expected but source RLP is empty"
)
let reqType = rlp.readRawByte()
if reqType != WithdrawalRequestType:
raise
(ref UnsupportedRlpError)(msg: "Unexpected WithdrawalRequestType: " & $reqType)
var res: WithdrawalRequest
rlp.tryEnterList()
rlp.read(res.sourceAddress)
rlp.read(res.validatorPubkey)
rlp.read(res.amount)
if rlp.hasData:
raise (ref MalformedRlpError)(msg: "Extra data after WithdrawalRequest")
res
proc append*(rlpWriter: var RlpWriter, request: ConsolidationRequest) =
rlpWriter.appendRawBytes([ConsolidationRequestType.byte])
rlpWriter.startList(3)
rlpWriter.append(request.sourceAddress)
rlpWriter.append(request.sourcePubkey)
rlpWriter.append(request.targetPubkey)
proc read*(rlp: var Rlp, T: type ConsolidationRequest): T {.raises: [RlpError].} =
if not rlp.hasData:
raise (ref MalformedRlpError)(
msg: "ConsolidationRequestType expected but source RLP is empty"
)
let reqType = rlp.readRawByte()
if reqType != ConsolidationRequestType:
raise
(ref UnsupportedRlpError)(msg: "Unexpected ConsolidationRequestType: " & $reqType)
var res: ConsolidationRequest
rlp.tryEnterList()
rlp.read(res.sourceAddress)
rlp.read(res.sourcePubkey)
rlp.read(res.targetPubkey)
if rlp.hasData:
raise (ref MalformedRlpError)(msg: "Extra data after ConsolidationRequest")
res
proc append*(rlpWriter: var RlpWriter, request: Request) =
case request.requestType
of DepositRequestType:
rlpWriter.append(request.deposit)
of WithdrawalRequestType:
rlpWriter.append(request.withdrawal)
of ConsolidationRequestType:
rlpWriter.append(request.consolidation)
proc append*(rlpWriter: var RlpWriter, reqs: seq[Request] | openArray[Request]) =
rlpWriter.startList(reqs.len)
for req in reqs:
rlpWriter.append(rlp.encode(req))
proc read*(rlp: var Rlp, T: type Request): T {.raises: [RlpError].} =
if not rlp.hasData:
raise newException(MalformedRlpError, "Request expected but source RLP is empty")
if not rlp.isSingleByte:
raise newException(
MalformedRlpError, "RequestType byte is out of range, must be 0x00 to 0x7f"
)
let reqType = rlp.getByteValue
rlp.position += 1
var reqVal: RequestType
if checkedEnumAssign(reqVal, reqType):
result = Request(requestType: reqVal)
rlp.tryEnterList()
case reqVal
of DepositRequestType:
rlp.read(result.deposit.pubkey)
rlp.read(result.deposit.withdrawalCredentials)
rlp.read(result.deposit.amount)
rlp.read(result.deposit.signature)
rlp.read(result.deposit.index)
of WithdrawalRequestType:
rlp.read(result.withdrawal.sourceAddress)
rlp.read(result.withdrawal.validatorPubkey)
rlp.read(result.withdrawal.amount)
of ConsolidationRequestType:
rlp.read(result.consolidation.sourceAddress)
rlp.read(result.consolidation.sourcePubkey)
rlp.read(result.consolidation.targetPubkey)
else:
raise (ref UnsupportedRlpError)(msg: "Unexpected RequestType: " & $reqType)
proc read*(
rlp: var Rlp, T: (type seq[Request]) | (type openArray[Request])
): seq[Request] {.raises: [RlpError].} =
if not rlp.isList:
raise newException(
RlpTypeMismatch, "Requests list expected, but source RLP is not a list"
)
var reqs: seq[Request]
for item in rlp:
var rr = rlpFromBytes(rlp.read(seq[byte]))
reqs.add rr.read(Request)
reqs

8
eth/common/eth_hash.nim
View File

@ -30,5 +30,11 @@ template keccakHash*(v: Address): Hash32 {.deprecated.} =
from nimcrypto/hash import MDigest
converter toMDigest*(v: Hash32): MDigest[256] {.deprecated.} =
# TODO https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/issues/24241
when (NimMajor, NimMinor) >= (2, 12) or defined(ethDigestConverterWarning):
{.pragma: convdeprecated, deprecated.}
else:
{.pragma: convdeprecated.}
converter toMDigest*(v: Hash32): MDigest[256] {.convdeprecated.} =
MDigest[256](data: v.data)

3
eth/common/eth_types.nim
View File

@ -33,14 +33,11 @@ type
EthAccount* = Account
EthAddress* = Address
EthBlock* = Block
EthConsolidationRequest* = ConsolidationRequest
EthDepositRequest* = DepositRequest
EthHash32* = Hash32
EthHeader* = Header
EthTransaction* = Transaction
EthReceipt* = Receipt
EthWithdrawal* = Withdrawal
EthWithdrawalRequest* = WithdrawalRequest
func init*(T: type BlockHashOrNumber, str: string): T {.raises: [ValueError].} =
if str.startsWith "0x":

4
eth/common/eth_types_rlp.nim
View File

@ -6,13 +6,13 @@
import
"."/[
accounts_rlp, addresses_rlp, base_rlp, blocks_rlp, eth_types, hashes_rlp,
accounts_rlp, addresses_rlp, base_rlp, eth_types, hashes_rlp,
headers_rlp, receipts_rlp, times_rlp, transactions_rlp,
],
../rlp
export
accounts_rlp, addresses_rlp, base_rlp, blocks_rlp, eth_types, hashes_rlp,
accounts_rlp, addresses_rlp, base_rlp, eth_types, hashes_rlp,
headers_rlp, receipts_rlp, times_rlp, transactions_rlp, rlp
proc append*(rlpWriter: var RlpWriter, value: BlockHashOrNumber) =

10
eth/p2p.nim
View File

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ proc addCapability*(node: EthereumNode,
let pos = lowerBound(node.protocols, p, rlpx.cmp)
node.protocols.insert(p, pos)
node.capabilities.insert(p.asCapability, pos)
node.capabilities.insert(p.capability, pos)
if p.networkStateInitializer != nil and networkState.isNil:
node.protocolStates[p.index] = p.networkStateInitializer(node)
@ -79,12 +79,11 @@ proc newEthereumNode*(
networkId: NetworkId,
clientId = "nim-eth-p2p",
addAllCapabilities = true,
useCompression: bool = false,
minPeers = 10,
bootstrapNodes: seq[ENode] = @[],
bindUdpPort: Port,
bindTcpPort: Port,
bindIp = IPv4_any(),
bindIp = IPv6_any(),
rng = newRng()): EthereumNode =
if rng == nil: # newRng could fail
@ -105,11 +104,6 @@ proc newEthereumNode*(
keys.seckey, address, bootstrapNodes, bindUdpPort, bindIp, rng)
result.rng = rng
when useSnappy:
result.protocolVersion = if useCompression: devp2pSnappyVersion
else: devp2pVersion
result.protocolStates.newSeq protocolCount()
result.peerPool = newPeerPool(

470
eth/p2p/auth.nim
View File

@ -8,7 +8,10 @@
# MIT license (LICENSE-MIT)
#
## This module implements Ethereum RLPx authentication
## This module implements Ethereum EIP-8 RLPx authentication - pre-EIP-8
## messages are not supported
## https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/5713591d0366da78a913a811c7502d9ca91d29a8/rlpx.md#initial-handshake
## https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/b479473414cf94445b450c266a9dedc079a12158/EIPS/eip-8.md
{.push raises: [].}
@ -25,57 +28,50 @@ export results
type keccak256 = keccak.keccak256
const
SupportedRlpxVersion* = 4'u8
# Auth message sizes
MsgLenLenEIP8* = 2
## auth-size = size of enc-auth-body, encoded as a big-endian 16-bit integer
## ack-size = size of enc-ack-body, encoded as a big-endian 16-bit integer
# Pre EIP8
PlainAuthMessageV4Length* = 194
AuthMessageV4Length* = 307
MinPadLenEIP8* = 100
MaxPadLenEIP8* = 300
## Padding makes message length unpredictable which makes packet filtering
## a tiny bit harder - although not necessary any more, we always add at
## least 100 bytes of padding to make the message distinguishable from
## pre-EIP8 and at most 200 to stay within recommendation
# EIP8
# signature + pubkey + nounce + version + rlp encoding overhead
# signature + pubkey + nonce + version + rlp encoding overhead
# 65 + 64 + 32 + 1 + 7 = 169
PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length = 169
PlainAuthMessageMaxEIP8* = PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length + 255 # with padding
PlainAuthMessageMaxEIP8 = PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length + MaxPadLenEIP8
# Min. encrypted message + size prefix = 284
AuthMessageEIP8Length* = PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length + eciesOverheadLength + 2
AuthMessageMaxEIP8* = AuthMessageEIP8Length + 255 # with padding
AuthMessageEIP8Length* =
eciesEncryptedLength(PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length) + MsgLenLenEIP8
AuthMessageMaxEIP8* = AuthMessageEIP8Length + MaxPadLenEIP8
## Minimal output buffer size to pass into `authMessage`
# Ack message sizes
# Pre EIP8
PlainAckMessageV4Length* = 97
AckMessageV4Length* = 210
# EIP 8
# pubkey + nounce + version + rlp encoding overhead
# 64 + 32 + 1 + 5 = 102
PlainAckMessageEIP8Length* = 102
PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8* = PlainAckMessageEIP8Length + 255 # with padding
PlainAckMessageEIP8Length = 102
PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8 = PlainAckMessageEIP8Length + MaxPadLenEIP8
# Min. encrypted message + size prefix = 217
AckMessageEIP8Length* = PlainAckMessageEIP8Length + eciesOverheadLength + 2
AckMessageMaxEIP8* = AckMessageEIP8Length + 255 # with padding
AckMessageEIP8Length* =
eciesEncryptedLength(PlainAckMessageEIP8Length) + MsgLenLenEIP8
AckMessageMaxEIP8* = AckMessageEIP8Length + MaxPadLenEIP8
## Minimal output buffer size to pass into `ackMessage`
Vsn = [byte 4]
## auth-vsn = 4
## ack-vsn = 4
type
Nonce* = array[KeyLength, byte]
AuthMessageV4* {.packed.} = object
signature: array[RawSignatureSize, byte]
keyhash: array[keccak256.sizeDigest, byte]
pubkey: array[RawPublicKeySize, byte]
nonce: array[keccak256.sizeDigest, byte]
flag: byte
AckMessageV4* {.packed.} = object
pubkey: array[RawPublicKeySize, byte]
nonce: array[keccak256.sizeDigest, byte]
flag: byte
HandshakeFlag* = enum
Initiator, ## `Handshake` owner is connection initiator
Responder, ## `Handshake` owner is connection responder
EIP8 ## Flag indicates that EIP-8 handshake is used
Initiator ## `Handshake` owner is connection initiator
Responder ## `Handshake` owner is connection responder
AuthError* = enum
EcdhError = "auth: ECDH shared secret could not be calculated"
@ -89,7 +85,6 @@ type
IncompleteError = "auth: data incomplete"
Handshake* = object
version*: uint8 ## protocol version
flags*: set[HandshakeFlag] ## handshake flags
host*: KeyPair ## host keypair
ephemeral*: KeyPair ## ephemeral host keypair
@ -97,7 +92,6 @@ type
remoteEPubkey*: PublicKey ## remote host ephemeral public key
initiatorNonce*: Nonce ## initiator nonce
responderNonce*: Nonce ## responder nonce
expectedLength*: int ## expected incoming message length
ConnectionSecret* = object
aesKey*: array[aes256.sizeKey, byte]
@ -111,291 +105,163 @@ template toa(a, b, c: untyped): untyped =
toOpenArray((a), (b), (b) + (c) - 1)
proc mapErrTo[T, E](r: Result[T, E], v: static AuthError): AuthResult[T] =
r.mapErr(proc (e: E): AuthError = v)
r.mapErr(
proc(e: E): AuthError =
v
)
proc init*(
T: type Handshake, rng: var HmacDrbgContext, host: KeyPair,
flags: set[HandshakeFlag] = {Initiator},
version: uint8 = SupportedRlpxVersion): T =
T: type Handshake,
rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
host: KeyPair,
flags: set[HandshakeFlag],
): T =
## Create new `Handshake` object.
var
initiatorNonce: Nonce
responderNonce: Nonce
expectedLength: int
ephemeral = KeyPair.random(rng)
if Initiator in flags:
expectedLength = AckMessageV4Length
rng.generate(initiatorNonce)
else:
expectedLength = AuthMessageV4Length
rng.generate(responderNonce)
return T(
version: version,
flags: flags,
host: host,
ephemeral: ephemeral,
initiatorNonce: initiatorNonce,
responderNonce: responderNonce,
expectedLength: expectedLength
)
proc authMessagePreEIP8(h: var Handshake,
proc authMessage*(
h: var Handshake,
rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
pubkey: PublicKey,
output: var openArray[byte],
outlen: var int,
flag: byte = 0,
encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
## Create plain pre-EIP8 authentication message.
var
buffer: array[PlainAuthMessageV4Length, byte]
outlen = 0
let header = cast[ptr AuthMessageV4](addr buffer[0])
var secret = ecdhSharedSecret(h.host.seckey, pubkey)
secret.data = secret.data xor h.initiatorNonce
let signature = sign(h.ephemeral.seckey, SkMessage(secret.data))
secret.clear()
h.remoteHPubkey = pubkey
header.signature = signature.toRaw()
header.keyhash = keccak256.digest(h.ephemeral.pubkey.toRaw()).data
header.pubkey = h.host.pubkey.toRaw()
header.nonce = h.initiatorNonce
header.flag = flag
if encrypt:
if len(output) < AuthMessageV4Length:
): AuthResult[int] =
## Create EIP8 authentication message - returns length of encoded message
## The output should be a buffer of AuthMessageMaxEIP8 bytes at least.
if len(output) < AuthMessageMaxEIP8:
return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
if eciesEncrypt(rng, buffer, output, h.remoteHPubkey).isErr:
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
outlen = AuthMessageV4Length
else:
if len(output) < PlainAuthMessageV4Length:
return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
copyMem(addr output[0], addr buffer[0], PlainAuthMessageV4Length)
outlen = PlainAuthMessageV4Length
ok()
proc authMessageEIP8(h: var Handshake,
rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
pubkey: PublicKey,
output: var openArray[byte],
outlen: var int,
flag: byte = 0,
encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
## Create EIP8 authentication message.
var
buffer: array[PlainAuthMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
doAssert(EIP8 in h.flags)
outlen = 0
var secret = ecdhSharedSecret(h.host.seckey, pubkey)
secret.data = secret.data xor h.initiatorNonce
let signature = sign(h.ephemeral.seckey, SkMessage(secret.data))
secret.clear()
h.remoteHPubkey = pubkey
var payload = rlp.encodeList(signature.toRaw(),
h.host.pubkey.toRaw(),
h.initiatorNonce,
[byte(h.version)])
doAssert(len(payload) == PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length)
let
pencsize = eciesEncryptedLength(len(payload))
var padsize = int(rng.generate(byte)) # aka rand(max)
while padsize <= (AuthMessageV4Length - (pencsize + 2)):
var padsize = int(rng.generate(byte))
while padsize > (MaxPadLenEIP8 - MinPadLenEIP8):
padsize = int(rng.generate(byte))
padsize += MinPadLenEIP8
# It is possible to make packet size constant by uncommenting this line
# padsize = 24
let
pencsize = eciesEncryptedLength(PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length)
wosize = pencsize + padsize
fullsize = wosize + 2
rng.generate(toa(buffer, PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length, padsize))
doAssert fullsize <= len(output), "We checked against max possible length above"
if encrypt:
if len(output) < fullsize:
return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
var secret = ecdhSharedSecret(h.host.seckey, pubkey)
secret.data = secret.data xor h.initiatorNonce
let signature = sign(h.ephemeral.seckey, SkMessage(secret.data))
secret.clear()
h.remoteHPubkey = pubkey
var payload =
rlp.encodeList(signature.toRaw(), h.host.pubkey.toRaw(), h.initiatorNonce, Vsn)
doAssert(len(payload) == PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length)
var buffer {.noinit.}: array[PlainAuthMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
copyMem(addr buffer[0], addr payload[0], len(payload))
rng.generate(toa(buffer, PlainAuthMessageEIP8Length, padsize))
let wosizeBE = uint16(wosize).toBytesBE()
output[0 ..< 2] = wosizeBE
if eciesEncrypt(rng, toa(buffer, 0, len(payload) + padsize),
toa(output, 2, wosize), pubkey,
toa(output, 0, 2)).isErr:
if eciesEncrypt(
rng,
toa(buffer, 0, len(payload) + padsize),
toa(output, 2, wosize),
pubkey,
toa(output, 0, 2),
).isErr:
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
outlen = fullsize
else:
let plainsize = len(payload) + padsize
if len(output) < plainsize:
ok(fullsize)
proc ackMessage*(
h: var Handshake, rng: var HmacDrbgContext, output: var openArray[byte]
): AuthResult[int] =
## Create EIP8 authentication ack message - returns length of encoded message
## The output should be a buffer of AckMessageMaxEIP8 bytes at least.
if len(output) < AckMessageMaxEIP8:
return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
copyMem(addr output[0], addr buffer[0], plainsize)
outlen = plainsize
ok()
proc ackMessagePreEIP8(h: var Handshake,
rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
output: var openArray[byte],
outlen: var int,
flag: byte = 0,
encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
## Create plain pre-EIP8 authentication ack message.
var buffer: array[PlainAckMessageV4Length, byte]
outlen = 0
let header = cast[ptr AckMessageV4](addr buffer[0])
header.pubkey = h.ephemeral.pubkey.toRaw()
header.nonce = h.responderNonce
header.flag = flag
if encrypt:
if len(output) < AckMessageV4Length:
return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
if eciesEncrypt(rng, buffer, output, h.remoteHPubkey).isErr:
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
outlen = AckMessageV4Length
else:
if len(output) < PlainAckMessageV4Length:
return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
copyMem(addr output[0], addr buffer[0], PlainAckMessageV4Length)
outlen = PlainAckMessageV4Length
ok()
proc ackMessageEIP8(h: var Handshake,
rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
output: var openArray[byte],
outlen: var int,
flag: byte = 0,
encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
## Create EIP8 authentication ack message.
var
buffer: array[PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
padsize: array[1, byte]
doAssert(EIP8 in h.flags)
var payload = rlp.encodeList(h.ephemeral.pubkey.toRaw(),
h.responderNonce,
[byte(h.version)])
doAssert(len(payload) == PlainAckMessageEIP8Length)
outlen = 0
let pencsize = eciesEncryptedLength(len(payload))
while true:
generate(rng, padsize)
if int(padsize[0]) > (AckMessageV4Length - (pencsize + 2)):
break
# It is possible to make packet size constant by uncommenting this line
# padsize = 0
let wosize = pencsize + int(padsize[0])
let fullsize = wosize + 2
if int(padsize[0]) > 0:
rng.generate(toa(buffer, PlainAckMessageEIP8Length, int(padsize[0])))
copyMem(addr buffer[0], addr payload[0], len(payload))
if encrypt:
if len(output) < fullsize:
return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
output[0..<2] = uint16(wosize).toBytesBE()
if eciesEncrypt(rng, toa(buffer, 0, len(payload) + int(padsize[0])),
toa(output, 2, wosize), h.remoteHPubkey,
toa(output, 0, 2)).isErr:
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
outlen = fullsize
else:
let plainsize = len(payload) + int(padsize[0])
if len(output) < plainsize:
return err(AuthError.BufferOverrun)
copyMem(addr output[0], addr buffer[0], plainsize)
outlen = plainsize
ok()
template authSize*(h: Handshake, encrypt: bool = true): int =
## Get number of bytes needed to store AuthMessage.
if EIP8 in h.flags:
if encrypt: (AuthMessageMaxEIP8) else: (PlainAuthMessageMaxEIP8)
else:
if encrypt: (AuthMessageV4Length) else: (PlainAuthMessageV4Length)
template ackSize*(h: Handshake, encrypt: bool = true): int =
## Get number of bytes needed to store AckMessage.
if EIP8 in h.flags:
if encrypt: (AckMessageMaxEIP8) else: (PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8)
else:
if encrypt: (AckMessageV4Length) else: (PlainAckMessageV4Length)
proc authMessage*(h: var Handshake, rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
pubkey: PublicKey,
output: var openArray[byte],
outlen: var int, flag: byte = 0,
encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
## Create new AuthMessage for specified `pubkey` and store it inside
## of `output`, size of generated AuthMessage will stored in `outlen`.
if EIP8 in h.flags:
authMessageEIP8(h, rng, pubkey, output, outlen, flag, encrypt)
else:
authMessagePreEIP8(h, rng, pubkey, output, outlen, flag, encrypt)
proc ackMessage*(h: var Handshake, rng: var HmacDrbgContext,
output: var openArray[byte],
outlen: var int, flag: byte = 0,
encrypt: bool = true): AuthResult[void] =
## Create new AckMessage and store it inside of `output`, size of generated
## AckMessage will stored in `outlen`.
if EIP8 in h.flags:
ackMessageEIP8(h, rng, output, outlen, flag, encrypt)
else:
ackMessagePreEIP8(h, rng, output, outlen, flag, encrypt)
proc decodeAuthMessageV4(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
## Decodes V4 AuthMessage.
var
buffer: array[PlainAuthMessageV4Length, byte]
doAssert(Responder in h.flags)
if eciesDecrypt(m, buffer, h.host.seckey).isErr:
return err(EciesError)
var padsize = int(rng.generate(byte))
while padsize > (MaxPadLenEIP8 - MinPadLenEIP8):
padsize = int(rng.generate(byte))
padsize += MinPadLenEIP8
let
header = cast[ptr AuthMessageV4](addr buffer[0])
pubkey = ? PublicKey.fromRaw(header.pubkey).mapErrTo(InvalidPubKey)
signature = ? Signature.fromRaw(header.signature).mapErrTo(SignatureError)
pencsize = eciesEncryptedLength(PlainAckMessageEIP8Length)
wosize = pencsize + padsize
fullsize = wosize + 2
var secret = ecdhSharedSecret(h.host.seckey, pubkey)
secret.data = secret.data xor header.nonce
doAssert fullsize <= len(output), "We checked against max possible length above"
var recovered = recover(signature, SkMessage(secret.data))
secret.clear()
var
buffer: array[PlainAckMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
payload = rlp.encodeList(h.ephemeral.pubkey.toRaw(), h.responderNonce, Vsn)
doAssert(len(payload) == PlainAckMessageEIP8Length)
h.remoteEPubkey = ? recovered.mapErrTo(SignatureError)
h.initiatorNonce = header.nonce
h.remoteHPubkey = pubkey
copyMem(addr buffer[0], addr payload[0], PlainAckMessageEIP8Length)
rng.generate(toa(buffer, PlainAckMessageEIP8Length, padsize))
ok()
output[0 ..< MsgLenLenEIP8] = uint16(wosize).toBytesBE()
proc decodeAuthMessageEIP8(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
if eciesEncrypt(
rng,
toa(buffer, 0, PlainAckMessageEIP8Length + padsize),
toa(output, MsgLenLenEIP8, wosize),
h.remoteHPubkey,
toa(output, 0, MsgLenLenEIP8),
).isErr:
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
ok(fullsize)
func decodeMsgLen(input: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[int] =
if input.len < 2:
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
ok(int(uint16.fromBytesBE(input)) + 2)
func decodeAuthMsgLen*(h: Handshake, input: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[int] =
let len = ?decodeMsgLen(input)
if len < AuthMessageEIP8Length:
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
ok(len)
func decodeAckMsgLen*(h: Handshake, input: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[int] =
let len = ?decodeMsgLen(input)
if len < AckMessageEIP8Length:
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
ok(len)
proc decodeAuthMessage*(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
## Decodes EIP-8 AuthMessage.
let size = uint16.fromBytesBE(m)
h.expectedLength = 2 + int(size)
let
expectedLength = ?h.decodeAuthMsgLen(m)
size = expectedLength - MsgLenLenEIP8
# Check if the prefixed size is => than the minimum
if h.expectedLength < AuthMessageEIP8Length:
if expectedLength < AuthMessageEIP8Length:
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
if h.expectedLength > len(m):
if expectedLength > len(m):
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
var buffer = newSeq[byte](eciesDecryptedLength(int(size)))
var buffer = newSeq[byte](eciesDecryptedLength(size))
if eciesDecrypt(
toa(m, 2, int(size)), buffer, h.host.seckey, toa(m, 0, 2)).isErr:
toa(m, MsgLenLenEIP8, int(size)), buffer, h.host.seckey, toa(m, 0, MsgLenLenEIP8)
).isErr:
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
try:
var reader = rlpFromBytes(buffer)
if not reader.isList() or reader.listLen() < 4:
@ -412,9 +278,7 @@ proc decodeAuthMessageEIP8(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[voi
signatureBr = reader.listElem(0).toBytes()
pubkeyBr = reader.listElem(1).toBytes()
nonceBr = reader.listElem(2).toBytes()
versionBr = reader.listElem(3).toBytes()
let
signature = ?Signature.fromRaw(signatureBr).mapErrTo(SignatureError)
pubkey = ?PublicKey.fromRaw(pubkeyBr).mapErrTo(InvalidPubKey)
nonce = toArray(KeyLength, nonceBr)
@ -428,97 +292,49 @@ proc decodeAuthMessageEIP8(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[voi
h.remoteEPubkey = ?recovered.mapErrTo(SignatureError)
h.initiatorNonce = nonce
h.remoteHPubkey = pubkey
h.version = versionBr[0]
ok()
except CatchableError:
err(AuthError.RlpError)
proc decodeAckMessageEIP8*(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
proc decodeAckMessage*(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
## Decodes EIP-8 AckMessage.
let size = uint16.fromBytesBE(m)
h.expectedLength = 2 + int(size)
let
expectedLength = ?h.decodeAckMsgLen(m)
size = expectedLength - MsgLenLenEIP8
# Check if the prefixed size is => than the minimum
if h.expectedLength < AckMessageEIP8Length:
if expectedLength > len(m):
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
if h.expectedLength > len(m):
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
var buffer = newSeq[byte](eciesDecryptedLength(int(size)))
var buffer = newSeq[byte](eciesDecryptedLength(size))
if eciesDecrypt(
toa(m, 2, int(size)), buffer, h.host.seckey, toa(m, 0, 2)).isErr:
toa(m, MsgLenLenEIP8, size), buffer, h.host.seckey, toa(m, 0, MsgLenLenEIP8)
).isErr:
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
try:
var reader = rlpFromBytes(buffer)
# The last element, the version, is ignored
if not reader.isList() or reader.listLen() < 3:
return err(AuthError.InvalidAck)
if reader.listElem(0).blobLen != RawPublicKeySize:
return err(AuthError.InvalidAck)
if reader.listElem(1).blobLen != KeyLength:
return err(AuthError.InvalidAck)
if reader.listElem(2).blobLen != 1:
return err(AuthError.InvalidAck)
let
pubkeyBr = reader.listElem(0).toBytes()
nonceBr = reader.listElem(1).toBytes()
versionBr = reader.listElem(2).toBytes()
h.remoteEPubkey = ?PublicKey.fromRaw(pubkeyBr).mapErrTo(InvalidPubKey)
h.responderNonce = toArray(KeyLength, nonceBr)
h.version = versionBr[0]
ok()
except CatchableError:
err(AuthError.RlpError)
proc decodeAckMessageV4(h: var Handshake, m: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
## Decodes V4 AckMessage.
var
buffer: array[PlainAckMessageV4Length, byte]
doAssert(Initiator in h.flags)
if eciesDecrypt(m, buffer, h.host.seckey).isErr:
return err(AuthError.EciesError)
var header = cast[ptr AckMessageV4](addr buffer[0])
h.remoteEPubkey = ? PublicKey.fromRaw(header.pubkey).mapErrTo(InvalidPubKey)
h.responderNonce = header.nonce
ok()
proc decodeAuthMessage*(h: var Handshake, input: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
## Decodes AuthMessage from `input`.
# Using the smallest min. message length of the two types
if len(input) < AuthMessageEIP8Length:
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
if len(input) == AuthMessageV4Length:
let res = h.decodeAuthMessageV4(input)
if res.isOk(): return res
let res = h.decodeAuthMessageEIP8(input)
if res.isOk():
h.flags.incl(EIP8)
res
proc decodeAckMessage*(h: var Handshake, input: openArray[byte]): AuthResult[void] =
## Decodes AckMessage from `input`.
# Using the smallest min. message length of the two types
if len(input) < AckMessageV4Length:
return err(AuthError.IncompleteError)
if len(input) == AckMessageV4Length:
let res = h.decodeAckMessageV4(input)
if res.isOk(): return res
let res = h.decodeAckMessageEIP8(input)
if res.isOk(): h.flags.incl(EIP8)
res
proc getSecrets*(
h: Handshake, authmsg: openArray[byte],
ackmsg: openArray[byte]): ConnectionSecret =
h: Handshake, authmsg: openArray[byte], ackmsg: openArray[byte]
): ConnectionSecret =
## Derive secrets from handshake `h` using encrypted AuthMessage `authmsg` and
## encrypted AckMessage `ackmsg`.
var

162
eth/p2p/discovery.nim
View File

@ -9,14 +9,17 @@
import
std/[times, net],
chronos, stint, nimcrypto/keccak, chronicles,
stew/objects, results,
chronos,
stint,
nimcrypto/keccak,
chronicles,
stew/objects,
results,
../rlp,
../common/keys,
"."/[kademlia, enode]
export
Node, results
export Node, results
logScope:
topics = "eth p2p discovery"
@ -55,9 +58,14 @@ proc append*(w: var RlpWriter, a: IpAddress) =
of IpAddressFamily.IPv4:
w.append(a.address_v4)
proc append(w: var RlpWriter, p: Port) = w.append(p.uint)
proc append(w: var RlpWriter, pk: PublicKey) = w.append(pk.toRaw())
proc append(w: var RlpWriter, h: MDigest[256]) = w.append(h.data)
proc append(w: var RlpWriter, p: Port) =
w.append(p.uint)
proc append(w: var RlpWriter, pk: PublicKey) =
w.append(pk.toRaw())
proc append(w: var RlpWriter, h: MDigest[256]) =
w.append(h.data)
proc pack(cmdId: CommandId, payload: openArray[byte], pk: PrivateKey): seq[byte] =
## Create and sign a UDP message to be sent to a remote node.
@ -65,11 +73,13 @@ proc pack(cmdId: CommandId, payload: openArray[byte], pk: PrivateKey): seq[byte]
## See https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#node-discovery for information on
## how UDP packets are structured.
# TODO: There is a lot of unneeded allocations here
let encodedData = @[cmdId.byte] & @payload
let signature = @(pk.sign(encodedData).toRaw())
let msgHash = keccak256.digest(signature & encodedData)
result = @(msgHash.data) & signature & encodedData
result = newSeq[byte](HEAD_SIZE + 1 + payload.len)
result[HEAD_SIZE] = cmdId.byte
result[HEAD_SIZE + 1 ..< result.len] = payload
result[MAC_SIZE ..< MAC_SIZE + SIG_SIZE] =
pk.sign(result.toOpenArray(HEAD_SIZE, result.high)).toRaw()
result[0 ..< MAC_SIZE] =
keccak256.digest(result.toOpenArray(MAC_SIZE, result.high)).data
proc validateMsgHash(msg: openArray[byte]): DiscResult[MDigest[256]] =
if msg.len > HEAD_SIZE:
@ -88,17 +98,17 @@ proc recoverMsgPublicKey(msg: openArray[byte]): DiscResult[PublicKey] =
let sig = ?Signature.fromRaw(msg.toOpenArray(MAC_SIZE, HEAD_SIZE))
recover(sig, msg.toOpenArray(HEAD_SIZE, msg.high))
proc unpack(msg: openArray[byte]): tuple[cmdId: CommandId, payload: seq[byte]]
{.raises: [DiscProtocolError].} =
proc unpack(
msg: openArray[byte]
): tuple[cmdId: CommandId, payload: seq[byte]] {.raises: [DiscProtocolError].} =
# Check against possible RangeDefect
if msg[HEAD_SIZE].int < CommandId.low.ord or
msg[HEAD_SIZE].int > CommandId.high.ord:
if msg[HEAD_SIZE].int < CommandId.low.ord or msg[HEAD_SIZE].int > CommandId.high.ord:
raise newException(DiscProtocolError, "Unsupported packet id")
result = (cmdId: msg[HEAD_SIZE].CommandId, payload: msg[HEAD_SIZE + 1 .. ^1])
(cmdId: msg[HEAD_SIZE].CommandId, payload: msg[HEAD_SIZE + 1 .. ^1])
proc expiration(): uint32 =
result = uint32(epochTime() + EXPIRATION)
proc expiration(): uint64 =
uint64(getTime().toUnix() + EXPIRATION)
# Wire protocol
@ -110,15 +120,16 @@ proc send(d: DiscoveryProtocol, n: Node, data: seq[byte]) =
when defined(chronicles_log_level):
try:
# readError will raise FutureError
debug "Discovery send failed", msg = f.readError.msg
debug "Discovery send failed",
msg = f.readError.msg, address = $n.node.address
except FutureError as exc:
error "Failed to get discovery send future error", msg = exc.msg
f.addCallback cb
proc sendPing*(d: DiscoveryProtocol, n: Node): seq[byte] =
let payload = rlp.encode((PROTO_VERSION.uint, d.address, n.node.address,
expiration()))
let payload =
rlp.encode((PROTO_VERSION.uint, d.address, n.node.address, expiration()))
let msg = pack(cmdPing, payload, d.privKey)
result = msg[0 ..< MAC_SIZE]
trace ">>> ping ", n
@ -152,18 +163,23 @@ proc sendNeighbours*(d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, neighbours: seq[Node]) =
nodes.setLen(0)
for i, n in neighbours:
nodes.add((n.node.address.ip, n.node.address.udpPort,
n.node.address.tcpPort, n.node.pubkey))
nodes.add(
(n.node.address.ip, n.node.address.udpPort, n.node.address.tcpPort, n.node.pubkey)
)
if nodes.len == MAX_NEIGHBOURS_PER_PACKET:
flush()
if nodes.len != 0: flush()
if nodes.len != 0:
flush()
proc newDiscoveryProtocol*(
privKey: PrivateKey, address: Address,
privKey: PrivateKey,
address: Address,
bootstrapNodes: openArray[ENode],
bindPort: Port, bindIp = IPv4_any(),
rng = newRng()): DiscoveryProtocol =
bindPort: Port,
bindIp = IPv6_any(),
rng = newRng(),
): DiscoveryProtocol =
let
localNode = newNode(privKey.toPublicKey(), address)
discovery = DiscoveryProtocol(
@ -171,27 +187,32 @@ proc newDiscoveryProtocol*(
address: address,
localNode: localNode,
bindIp: bindIp,
bindPort: bindPort)
bindPort: bindPort,
)
kademlia = newKademliaProtocol(localNode, discovery, rng = rng)
discovery.kademlia = kademlia
for n in bootstrapNodes: discovery.bootstrapNodes.add(newNode(n))
for n in bootstrapNodes:
discovery.bootstrapNodes.add(newNode(n))
discovery
proc recvPing(d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, msgHash: MDigest[256])
{.raises: [ValueError].} =
proc recvPing(
d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, msgHash: MDigest[256]
) {.raises: [ValueError].} =
d.kademlia.recvPing(node, msgHash)
proc recvPong(d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, payload: seq[byte])
{.raises: [RlpError].} =
proc recvPong(
d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, payload: seq[byte]
) {.raises: [RlpError].} =
let rlp = rlpFromBytes(payload)
let tok = rlp.listElem(1).toBytes()
d.kademlia.recvPong(node, tok)
proc recvNeighbours(d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, payload: seq[byte])
{.raises: [RlpError].} =
proc recvNeighbours(
d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, payload: seq[byte]
) {.raises: [RlpError].} =
let rlp = rlpFromBytes(payload)
let neighboursList = rlp.listElem(0)
let sz = neighboursList.listLen()
@ -203,11 +224,9 @@ proc recvNeighbours(d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, payload: seq[byte])
var ip: IpAddress
case ipBlob.len
of 4:
ip = IpAddress(
family: IpAddressFamily.IPv4, address_v4: toArray(4, ipBlob))
ip = IpAddress(family: IpAddressFamily.IPv4, address_v4: toArray(4, ipBlob))
of 16:
ip = IpAddress(
family: IpAddressFamily.IPv6, address_v6: toArray(16, ipBlob))
ip = IpAddress(family: IpAddressFamily.IPv6, address_v6: toArray(16, ipBlob))
else:
error "Wrong ip address length!"
continue
@ -222,8 +241,9 @@ proc recvNeighbours(d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, payload: seq[byte])
neighbours.add(newNode(pk[], Address(ip: ip, udpPort: udpPort, tcpPort: tcpPort)))
d.kademlia.recvNeighbours(node, neighbours)
proc recvFindNode(d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, payload: openArray[byte])
{.raises: [RlpError, ValueError].} =
proc recvFindNode(
d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, payload: openArray[byte]
) {.raises: [RlpError, ValueError].} =
let rlp = rlpFromBytes(payload)
trace "<<< find_node from ", node
let rng = rlp.listElem(0).toBytes
@ -234,8 +254,9 @@ proc recvFindNode(d: DiscoveryProtocol, node: Node, payload: openArray[byte])
else:
trace "Invalid target public key received"
proc expirationValid(cmdId: CommandId, rlpEncodedPayload: openArray[byte]):
bool {.raises: [DiscProtocolError, RlpError].} =
proc expirationValid(
cmdId: CommandId, rlpEncodedPayload: openArray[byte]
): bool {.raises: [DiscProtocolError, RlpError].} =
## Can only raise `DiscProtocolError` and all of `RlpError`
# Check if there is a payload
if rlpEncodedPayload.len <= 0:
@ -250,8 +271,9 @@ proc expirationValid(cmdId: CommandId, rlpEncodedPayload: openArray[byte]):
else:
raise newException(DiscProtocolError, "Invalid RLP list for this packet id")
proc receive*(d: DiscoveryProtocol, a: Address, msg: openArray[byte])
{.raises: [DiscProtocolError, RlpError, ValueError].} =
proc receive*(
d: DiscoveryProtocol, a: Address, msg: openArray[byte]
) {.raises: [DiscProtocolError, RlpError, ValueError].} =
# Note: export only needed for testing
let msgHash = validateMsgHash(msg)
if msgHash.isOk():
@ -280,10 +302,13 @@ proc receive*(d: DiscoveryProtocol, a: Address, msg: openArray[byte])
else:
notice "Wrong msg mac from ", a
proc processClient(transp: DatagramTransport, raddr: TransportAddress):
Future[void] {.async: (raises: []).} =
proc processClient(
transp: DatagramTransport, raddr: TransportAddress
): Future[void] {.async: (raises: []).} =
var proto = getUserData[DiscoveryProtocol](transp)
let buf = try: transp.getMessage()
let buf =
try:
transp.getMessage()
except TransportOsError as e:
# This is likely to be local network connection issues.
warn "Transport getMessage", exception = e.name, msg = e.msg
@ -326,26 +351,30 @@ proc randomNodes*(d: DiscoveryProtocol, count: int): seq[Node] =
d.kademlia.randomNodes(count)
when isMainModule:
import logging, stew/byteutils
const LOCAL_BOOTNODES = [
"enode://6456719e7267e061161c88720287a77b80718d2a3a4ff5daeba614d029dc77601b75e32190aed1c9b0b9ccb6fac3bcf000f48e54079fa79e339c25d8e9724226@127.0.0.1:30301"
]
addHandler(newConsoleLogger())
import stew/byteutils, ./bootnodes
block:
let m = hexToSeqByte"79664bff52ee17327b4a2d8f97d8fb32c9244d719e5038eb4f6b64da19ca6d271d659c3ad9ad7861a928ca85f8d8debfbe6b7ade26ad778f2ae2ba712567fcbd55bc09eb3e74a893d6b180370b266f6aaf3fe58a0ad95f7435bf3ddf1db940d20102f2cb842edbd4d182944382765da0ab56fb9e64a85a597e6bb27c656b4f1afb7e06b0fd4e41ccde6dba69a3c4a150845aaa4de2"
let m =
hexToSeqByte"79664bff52ee17327b4a2d8f97d8fb32c9244d719e5038eb4f6b64da19ca6d271d659c3ad9ad7861a928ca85f8d8debfbe6b7ade26ad778f2ae2ba712567fcbd55bc09eb3e74a893d6b180370b266f6aaf3fe58a0ad95f7435bf3ddf1db940d20102f2cb842edbd4d182944382765da0ab56fb9e64a85a597e6bb27c656b4f1afb7e06b0fd4e41ccde6dba69a3c4a150845aaa4de2"
discard validateMsgHash(m).expect("valid hash")
var remotePubkey = recoverMsgPublicKey(m).expect("valid key")
let (cmdId, payload) = unpack(m)
doAssert(payload == hexToSeqByte"f2cb842edbd4d182944382765da0ab56fb9e64a85a597e6bb27c656b4f1afb7e06b0fd4e41ccde6dba69a3c4a150845aaa4de2")
doAssert(
payload ==
hexToSeqByte"f2cb842edbd4d182944382765da0ab56fb9e64a85a597e6bb27c656b4f1afb7e06b0fd4e41ccde6dba69a3c4a150845aaa4de2"
)
doAssert(cmdId == cmdPong)
doAssert(remotePubkey == PublicKey.fromHex(
"78de8a0916848093c73790ead81d1928bec737d565119932b98c6b100d944b7a95e94f847f689fc723399d2e31129d182f7ef3863f2b4c820abbf3ab2722344d")[])
doAssert(
remotePubkey ==
PublicKey.fromHex(
"78de8a0916848093c73790ead81d1928bec737d565119932b98c6b100d944b7a95e94f847f689fc723399d2e31129d182f7ef3863f2b4c820abbf3ab2722344d"
)[]
)
let privKey = PrivateKey.fromHex("a2b50376a79b1a8c8a3296485572bdfbf54708bb46d3c25d73d2723aaaf6a617")[]
let privKey = PrivateKey.fromHex(
"a2b50376a79b1a8c8a3296485572bdfbf54708bb46d3c25d73d2723aaaf6a617"
)[]
# echo privKey
@ -355,14 +384,14 @@ when isMainModule:
# let (remotePubkey, cmdId, payload) = unpack(m)
# doAssert(remotePubkey.raw_key.toHex == privKey.public_key.raw_key.toHex)
var bootnodes = newSeq[ENode]()
for item in LOCAL_BOOTNODES:
bootnodes.add(ENode.fromString(item)[])
var nodes = newSeq[ENode]()
for item in MainnetBootnodes:
nodes.add(ENode.fromString(item)[])
let listenPort = Port(30310)
var address = Address(udpPort: listenPort, tcpPort: listenPort)
address.ip.family = IpAddressFamily.IPv4
let discovery = newDiscoveryProtocol(privkey, address, bootnodes, listenPort)
let discovery = newDiscoveryProtocol(privKey, address, nodes, bindPort = listenPort)
echo discovery.localNode.node.pubkey
echo "this_node.id: ", discovery.localNode.id.toHex()
@ -372,5 +401,6 @@ when isMainModule:
proc test() {.async.} =
{.gcsafe.}:
await discovery.bootstrap()
for node in discovery.randomNodes(discovery.kademlia.nodesDiscovered):
echo node
waitFor test()

3
eth/p2p/discoveryv5/routing_table.nim
View File

@ -545,7 +545,8 @@ proc randomNodes*(r: RoutingTable, maxAmount: int,
# while it will take less total time compared to e.g. an (async)
# randomLookup, the time might be wasted as all nodes are possibly seen
# already.
while len(seen) < maxAmount:
# We check against the number of nodes to avoid an infinite loop in case of a filter.
while len(result) < maxAmount and len(seen) < sz:
let bucket = r.rng[].sample(r.buckets)
if bucket.nodes.len != 0:
let node = r.rng[].sample(bucket.nodes)

2
eth/p2p/kademlia.nim
View File

@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ type
istart, iend: UInt256
nodes: seq[Node]
replacementCache: seq[Node]
lastUpdated: float # epochTime
CommandId* = enum
cmdPing = 1
@ -216,7 +215,6 @@ proc add(k: KBucket, n: Node): Node =
## If the bucket is full, we add the node to the bucket's replacement cache and return the
## node at the head of the list (i.e. the least recently seen), which should be evicted if it
## fails to respond to a ping.
k.lastUpdated = epochTime()
let nodeIdx = k.nodes.find(n)
if nodeIdx != -1:
k.nodes.delete(nodeIdx)

2
eth/p2p/p2p_backends_helpers.nim
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ let protocolManager = ProtocolManager()
proc registerProtocol*(proto: ProtocolInfo) {.gcsafe.} =
{.gcsafe.}:
proto.index = protocolManager.protocols.len
if proto.name == "p2p":
if proto.capability.name == "p2p":
doAssert(proto.index == 0)
protocolManager.protocols.add proto

146
eth/p2p/p2p_protocol_dsl.nim
View File

@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
import
std/[options, sequtils, macrocache],
results,
stew/shims/macros, chronos, faststreams/outputs
stew/shims/macros, chronos
type
MessageKind* = enum
@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ type
msgResponse
Message* = ref object
id*: Opt[uint64]
id*: uint64
ident*: NimNode
kind*: MessageKind
procDef*: NimNode
@ -351,15 +351,17 @@ proc init*(T: type P2PProtocol, backendFactory: BackendFactory,
if not result.backend.afterProtocolInit.isNil:
result.backend.afterProtocolInit(result)
proc augmentUserHandler(p: P2PProtocol, userHandlerProc: NimNode, msgId = Opt.none(uint64)) =
proc augmentUserHandler(p: P2PProtocol, userHandlerProc: NimNode, canRaise: bool, msgId = Opt.none(uint64)) =
## This procs adds a set of common helpers available in all messages handlers
## (e.g. `perProtocolMsgId`, `peer.state`, etc).
userHandlerProc.addPragma ident"gcsafe"
# we only take the pragma
let dummy = quote do:
proc dummy(): Future[void] {.async: (raises: [EthP2PError]).}
let dummy = if canRaise:
quote do:
proc dummy(): Future[void] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError, EthP2PError]).}
else:
quote do:
proc dummy(): Future[void] {.async: (raises: []).}
if p.isRlpx:
userHandlerProc.addPragma dummy.pragma[0]
@ -402,27 +404,16 @@ proc augmentUserHandler(p: P2PProtocol, userHandlerProc: NimNode, msgId = Opt.no
template networkState(`peerVar`: `PeerType`): `NetworkStateType` {.used.} =
`NetworkStateType`(`getNetworkState`(`peerVar`.network, `protocolInfo`))
proc addExceptionHandler(userHandlerProc: NimNode) =
let bodyTemp = userHandlerProc.body
userHandlerProc.body = quote do:
try:
`bodyTemp`
except CancelledError as exc:
raise newException(EthP2PError, exc.msg)
except CatchableError as exc:
raise newException(EthP2PError, exc.msg)
proc addPreludeDefs(userHandlerProc: NimNode, definitions: NimNode) =
userHandlerProc.body[0].add definitions
proc eventHandlerToProc(p: P2PProtocol, doBlock: NimNode, handlerName: string): NimNode =
proc eventHandlerToProc(p: P2PProtocol, doBlock: NimNode, handlerName: string, canRaise: bool): NimNode =
## Turns a "named" do block to a regular async proc
## (e.g. onPeerConnected do ...)
result = newTree(nnkProcDef)
doBlock.copyChildrenTo(result)
result.name = ident(p.name & handlerName) # genSym(nskProc, p.name & handlerName)
p.augmentUserHandler result
result.addExceptionHandler()
p.augmentUserHandler result, canRaise
proc addTimeoutParam(procDef: NimNode, defaultValue: int64) =
var
@ -477,7 +468,7 @@ proc newMsg(protocol: P2PProtocol, kind: MessageKind, msgId: uint64,
recBody = newTree(nnkDistinctTy, recName)
result = Message(protocol: protocol,
id: Opt.some(msgId),
id: msgId,
ident: msgIdent,
kind: kind,
procDef: procDef,
@ -489,7 +480,7 @@ proc newMsg(protocol: P2PProtocol, kind: MessageKind, msgId: uint64,
if procDef.body.kind != nnkEmpty:
var userHandler = copy procDef
protocol.augmentUserHandler userHandler, Opt.some(msgId)
protocol.augmentUserHandler userHandler, true, Opt.some(msgId)
userHandler.name = ident(msgName & "UserHandler")
# Request and Response handlers get an extra `reqId` parameter if the
@ -518,7 +509,6 @@ proc newMsg(protocol: P2PProtocol, kind: MessageKind, msgId: uint64,
of msgResponse: userHandler.applyDecorator protocol.incomingResponseDecorator
else: discard
userHandler.addExceptionHandler()
result.userHandler = userHandler
protocol.outRecvProcs.add result.userHandler
@ -543,7 +533,7 @@ proc addMsg(p: P2PProtocol, msgId: uint64, procDef: NimNode) =
let
responseIdent = ident($procDef.name & "Response")
response = Message(protocol: p,
id: Opt.none(uint64),
id: msgId,
ident: responseIdent,
kind: msgResponse,
recName: returnType,
@ -589,7 +579,10 @@ proc createSendProc*(msg: Message,
name = if nameSuffix.len == 0: msg.identWithExportMarker
else: ident($msg.ident & nameSuffix)
pragmas = if procType == nnkProcDef: newTree(nnkPragma, ident"gcsafe")
dummy = quote do:
proc dummy(): Future[void] {.async: (raises: [CancelledError, EthP2PError], raw: true).}
pragmas = if procType == nnkProcDef: dummy.pragma
else: newEmptyNode()
var def = newNimNode(procType).add(
@ -641,7 +634,7 @@ proc createSendProc*(msg: Message,
of msgNotification:
discard
def[3][0] = if procType == nnkMacroDef:
def[3][0] = if procType in [nnkMacroDef, nnkTemplateDef]:
ident "untyped"
elif msg.kind == msgRequest and not isRawSender:
Fut(msg.requestResultType)
@ -699,77 +692,6 @@ proc writeParamsAsRecord*(params: openArray[NimNode],
var `writer` = init(WriterType(`Format`), `outputStream`)
writeValue(`writer`, `param`)
proc useStandardBody*(sendProc: SendProc,
preSerializationStep: proc(stream: NimNode): NimNode,
postSerializationStep: proc(stream: NimNode): NimNode,
sendCallGenerator: proc (peer, bytes: NimNode): NimNode) =
let
msg = sendProc.msg
msgBytes = ident "msgBytes"
recipient = sendProc.peerParam
sendCall = sendCallGenerator(recipient, msgBytes)
if sendProc.msgParams.len == 0:
sendProc.setBody quote do:
var `msgBytes`: seq[byte]
`sendCall`
return
let
outputStream = ident "outputStream"
msgRecName = msg.recName
Format = msg.protocol.backend.SerializationFormat
preSerialization = if preSerializationStep.isNil: newStmtList()
else: preSerializationStep(outputStream)
serialization = writeParamsAsRecord(sendProc.msgParams,
outputStream, Format, msgRecName)
postSerialization = if postSerializationStep.isNil: newStmtList()
else: postSerializationStep(outputStream)
tracing = when not tracingEnabled:
newStmtList()
else:
logSentMsgFields(recipient,
msg.protocol.protocolInfo,
$msg.ident,
sendProc.msgParams)
sendProc.setBody quote do:
mixin init, WriterType, beginRecord, endRecord, getOutput
var `outputStream` = memoryOutput()
`preSerialization`
`serialization`
`postSerialization`
`tracing`
let `msgBytes` = getOutput(`outputStream`)
`sendCall`
proc correctSerializerProcParams(params: NimNode) =
# A serializer proc is just like a send proc, but:
# 1. it has a void return type
params[0] = ident "void"
# 2. The peer params is replaced with OutputStream
params[1] = newIdentDefs(streamVar, bindSym "OutputStream")
# 3. The timeout param is removed
params.del(params.len - 1)
proc createSerializer*(msg: Message, procType = nnkProcDef): NimNode =
var serializer = msg.createSendProc(procType, nameSuffix = "Serializer")
correctSerializerProcParams serializer.def.params
serializer.setBody writeParamsAsRecord(
serializer.msgParams,
streamVar,
msg.protocol.backend.SerializationFormat,
msg.recName)
return serializer.def
proc defineThunk*(msg: Message, thunk: NimNode) =
let protocol = msg.protocol
@ -822,9 +744,9 @@ proc netInit*(p: P2PProtocol): NimNode =
p.backend.NetworkType,
p.NetworkStateType)
proc createHandshakeTemplate*(msg: Message,
rawSendProc, handshakeImpl,
nextMsg: NimNode): SendProc =
proc createHandshakeTemplate*(
msg: Message, rawSendProc, handshakeImpl, nextMsg: NimNode
): SendProc =
let
handshakeExchanger = msg.createSendProc(procType = nnkTemplateDef)
forwardCall = newCall(rawSendProc).appendAllInputParams(handshakeExchanger.def)
@ -836,17 +758,11 @@ proc createHandshakeTemplate*(msg: Message,
let peerVar = genSym(nskLet, "peer")
handshakeExchanger.setBody quote do:
try:
let `peerVar` = `peerValue`
let sendingFuture = `forwardCall`
`handshakeImpl`(`peerVar`,
sendingFuture,
`nextMsg`(`peerVar`, `msgRecName`),
`timeoutVar`)
except PeerDisconnected as exc:
raise newException(EthP2PError, exc.msg)
except P2PInternalError as exc:
raise newException(EthP2PError, exc.msg)
`handshakeImpl`[`msgRecName`](
`peerVar`, sendingFuture, `nextMsg`(`peerVar`, `msgRecName`), `timeoutVar`
)
return handshakeExchanger
@ -915,10 +831,10 @@ proc processProtocolBody*(p: P2PProtocol, protocolBody: NimNode) =
inc nextId
elif eqIdent(n[0], "onPeerConnected"):
p.onPeerConnected = p.eventHandlerToProc(n[1], "PeerConnected")
p.onPeerConnected = p.eventHandlerToProc(n[1], "PeerConnected", true)
elif eqIdent(n[0], "onPeerDisconnected"):
p.onPeerDisconnected = p.eventHandlerToProc(n[1], "PeerDisconnected")
p.onPeerDisconnected = p.eventHandlerToProc(n[1], "PeerDisconnected", false)
else:
error(repr(n) & " is not a recognized call in P2P protocol definitions", n)
@ -965,11 +881,8 @@ proc genTypeSection*(p: P2PProtocol): NimNode =
if msg.procDef == nil:
continue
# FIXME: Can `msg.id` be missing, at all?
doAssert msg.id.isSome()
let
msgId = msg.id.value
msgId = msg.id
msgName = msg.ident
msgRecName = msg.recName
msgStrongRecName = msg.strongRecName
@ -1019,7 +932,7 @@ proc genCode*(p: P2PProtocol): NimNode =
regBody.add newCall(p.backend.registerProtocol, protocolVar)
result.add quote do:
proc `protocolReg`() {.raises: [RlpError].} =
proc `protocolReg`() =
let `protocolVar` = `protocolInit`
`regBody`
`protocolReg`()
@ -1054,7 +967,6 @@ macro emitForSingleBackend(
result = p.genCode()
when defined(p2pProtocolDebug):
try:
result.storeMacroResult true
except IOError:

43
eth/p2p/private/p2p_types.nim
View File

@ -15,12 +15,9 @@ import
chronos,
results,
".."/../[rlp], ../../common/[base, keys],
".."/[enode, kademlia, discovery, rlpxcrypt]
".."/[enode, kademlia, discovery, rlpxtransport]
export base.NetworkId
const
useSnappy* = defined(useSnappy)
export base.NetworkId, rlpxtransport, kademlia
type
EthereumNode* = ref object
@ -39,8 +36,6 @@ type
listeningServer*: StreamServer
protocolStates*: seq[RootRef]
discovery*: DiscoveryProtocol
when useSnappy:
protocolVersion*: uint64
rng*: ref HmacDrbgContext
Peer* = ref object
@ -48,16 +43,15 @@ type
network*: EthereumNode
# Private fields:
transport*: StreamTransport
transport*: RlpxTransport
dispatcher*: Dispatcher
lastReqId*: Opt[uint64]
secretsState*: SecretState
connectionState*: ConnectionState
protocolStates*: seq[RootRef]
outstandingRequests*: seq[Deque[OutstandingRequest]] # per `msgId` table
awaitedMessages*: seq[FutureBase] # per `msgId` table
when useSnappy:
snappyEnabled*: bool
clientId*: string
SeenNode* = object
nodeId*: NodeId
@ -111,8 +105,7 @@ type
protocols*: seq[ProtocolInfo]
ProtocolInfo* = ref object
name*: string
version*: uint64
capability*: Capability
messages*: seq[MessageInfo]
index*: int # the position of the protocol in the
# ordered list of supported protocols
@ -120,8 +113,9 @@ type
# Private fields:
peerStateInitializer*: PeerStateInitializer
networkStateInitializer*: NetworkStateInitializer
handshake*: HandshakeStep
disconnectHandler*: DisconnectionHandler
onPeerConnected*: OnPeerConnectedHandler
onPeerDisconnected*: OnPeerDisconnectedHandler
MessageInfo* = ref object
id*: uint64 # this is a `msgId` (as opposed to a `reqId`)
@ -132,6 +126,7 @@ type
printer*: MessageContentPrinter
requestResolver*: RequestResolver
nextMsgResolver*: NextMsgResolver
failResolver*: FailResolver
Dispatcher* = ref object # private
# The dispatcher stores the mapping of negotiated message IDs between
@ -157,13 +152,12 @@ type
OutstandingRequest* = object
id*: uint64 # a `reqId` that may be used for response
future*: FutureBase
timeoutAt*: Moment
# Private types:
MessageHandlerDecorator* = proc(msgId: uint64, n: NimNode): NimNode
ThunkProc* = proc(x: Peer, msgId: uint64, data: Rlp): Future[void]
{.gcsafe, async: (raises: [RlpError, EthP2PError]).}
ThunkProc* = proc(x: Peer, data: Rlp): Future[void]
{.async: (raises: [CancelledError, EthP2PError]).}
MessageContentPrinter* = proc(msg: pointer): string
{.gcsafe, raises: [].}
@ -174,17 +168,20 @@ type
NextMsgResolver* = proc(msgData: Rlp, future: FutureBase)
{.gcsafe, raises: [RlpError].}
FailResolver* = proc(reason: DisconnectionReason, future: FutureBase)
{.gcsafe, raises: [].}
PeerStateInitializer* = proc(peer: Peer): RootRef
{.gcsafe, raises: [].}
NetworkStateInitializer* = proc(network: EthereumNode): RootRef
{.gcsafe, raises: [].}
HandshakeStep* = proc(peer: Peer): Future[void]
{.gcsafe, async: (raises: [EthP2PError]).}
OnPeerConnectedHandler* = proc(peer: Peer): Future[void]
{.async: (raises: [CancelledError, EthP2PError]).}
DisconnectionHandler* = proc(peer: Peer, reason: DisconnectionReason):
Future[void] {.gcsafe, async: (raises: [EthP2PError]).}
OnPeerDisconnectedHandler* = proc(peer: Peer, reason: DisconnectionReason):
Future[void] {.async: (raises: []).}
ConnectionState* = enum
None,
@ -209,12 +206,14 @@ type
ClientQuitting = 0x08,
UnexpectedIdentity = 0x09,
SelfConnection = 0x0A,
MessageTimeout = 0x0B,
PingTimeout = 0x0B,
SubprotocolReason = 0x10
Address = enode.Address
proc `$`*(peer: Peer): string = $peer.remote
proc `$`*(v: Capability): string = v.name & "/" & $v.version
proc toENode*(v: EthereumNode): ENode =
ENode(pubkey: v.keys.pubkey, address: v.address)

1482
eth/p2p/rlpx.nim
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

59
eth/p2p/rlpxcrypt.nim
View File

@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ type
IncompleteError = "rlpx: data incomplete"
IncorrectArgs = "rlpx: incorrect arguments"
RlpxHeader* = array[16, byte]
RlpxEncryptedHeader* = array[RlpHeaderLength + RlpMacLength, byte]
RlpxHeader* = array[RlpHeaderLength, byte]
RlpxResult*[T] = Result[T, RlpxError]
@ -61,8 +62,8 @@ proc sxor[T](a: var openArray[T], b: openArray[T]) {.inline.} =
proc initSecretState*(secrets: ConnectionSecret, context: var SecretState) =
## Initialized `context` with values from `secrets`.
# FIXME: Yes, the encryption is insecure,
# see: https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/issues/32
# This scheme is insecure, see:
# https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/issues/32
# https://github.com/ethereum/py-evm/blob/master/p2p/peer.py#L159-L160
var iv: array[context.aesenc.sizeBlock, byte]
context.aesenc.init(secrets.aesKey, iv)
@ -132,8 +133,8 @@ proc encrypt*(c: var SecretState, header: openArray[byte],
var frameMac = tmpmac.finish()
tmpmac.clear()
# return header_ciphertext + header_mac + frame_ciphertext + frame_mac
copyMem(addr output[headerMacPos], addr headerMac.data[0], RlpHeaderLength)
copyMem(addr output[frameMacPos], addr frameMac.data[0], RlpHeaderLength)
copyMem(addr output[headerMacPos], addr headerMac.data[0], RlpMacLength)
copyMem(addr output[frameMacPos], addr frameMac.data[0], RlpMacLength)
ok()
proc encryptMsg*(msg: openArray[byte], secrets: var SecretState): seq[byte] =
@ -159,21 +160,19 @@ proc encryptMsg*(msg: openArray[byte], secrets: var SecretState): seq[byte] =
proc getBodySize*(a: RlpxHeader): int =
(int(a[0]) shl 16) or (int(a[1]) shl 8) or int(a[2])
proc decryptHeader*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte],
output: var openArray[byte]): RlpxResult[void] =
proc decryptHeader*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte]): RlpxResult[RlpxHeader] =
## Decrypts header `data` using SecretState `c` context and store
## result into `output`.
##
## `header` must be exactly `RlpHeaderLength + RlpMacLength` length.
## `output` must be at least `RlpHeaderLength` length.
## `header` must be at least `RlpHeaderLength + RlpMacLength` length.
var
tmpmac: keccak256
aes: array[RlpHeaderLength, byte]
if len(data) != RlpHeaderLength + RlpMacLength:
if len(data) < RlpHeaderLength + RlpMacLength:
return err(IncompleteError)
if len(output) < RlpHeaderLength:
return err(IncorrectArgs)
# mac_secret = self.ingress_mac.digest()[:HEADER_LEN]
tmpmac = c.imac
var macsec = tmpmac.finish()
@ -187,33 +186,17 @@ proc decryptHeader*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte],
tmpmac = c.imac
var expectMac = tmpmac.finish()
# if not bytes_eq(expected_header_mac, header_mac):
let headerMacPos = RlpHeaderLength
if not equalMem(cast[pointer](unsafeAddr data[headerMacPos]),
cast[pointer](addr expectMac.data[0]), RlpMacLength):
result = err(IncorrectMac)
else:
if not equalMem(unsafeAddr data[RlpHeaderLength],
addr expectMac.data[0], RlpMacLength):
return err(IncorrectMac)
# return self.aes_dec.update(header_ciphertext)
var output: RlpxHeader
c.aesdec.decrypt(toa(data, 0, RlpHeaderLength), output)
result = ok()
proc decryptHeaderAndGetMsgSize*(c: var SecretState,
encryptedHeader: openArray[byte],
outSize: var int,
outHeader: var RlpxHeader): RlpxResult[void] =
result = decryptHeader(c, encryptedHeader, outHeader)
if result.isOk():
outSize = outHeader.getBodySize
proc decryptHeaderAndGetMsgSize*(c: var SecretState,
encryptedHeader: openArray[byte],
outSize: var int): RlpxResult[void] =
var decryptedHeader: RlpxHeader
result = decryptHeader(c, encryptedHeader, decryptedHeader)
if result.isOk():
outSize = decryptedHeader.getBodySize
ok(output)
proc decryptBody*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte], bodysize: int,
output: var openArray[byte], outlen: var int): RlpxResult[void] =
output: var openArray[byte]): RlpxResult[void] =
## Decrypts body `data` using SecretState `c` context and store
## result into `output`.
##
@ -224,7 +207,6 @@ proc decryptBody*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte], bodysize: int,
var
tmpmac: keccak256
aes: array[RlpHeaderLength, byte]
outlen = 0
let rsize = roundup16(bodysize)
if len(data) < rsize + RlpMacLength:
return err(IncompleteError)
@ -245,8 +227,7 @@ proc decryptBody*(c: var SecretState, data: openArray[byte], bodysize: int,
let bodyMacPos = rsize
if not equalMem(cast[pointer](unsafeAddr data[bodyMacPos]),
cast[pointer](addr expectMac.data[0]), RlpMacLength):
result = err(IncorrectMac)
err(IncorrectMac)
else:
c.aesdec.decrypt(toa(data, 0, rsize), output)
outlen = bodysize
result = ok()
ok()

243
eth/p2p/rlpxtransport.nim Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
# nim-eth
# Copyright (c) 2018-2024 Status Research & Development GmbH
# Licensed and distributed under either of
# * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at
# https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
# * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at
# https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
# at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except
# according to those terms.
{.push raises: [], gcsafe.}
import results, chronos, ../common/keys, ./[auth, rlpxcrypt]
export results, keys
type
RlpxTransport* = ref object
stream: StreamTransport
state: SecretState
pubkey*: PublicKey
RlpxTransportError* = object of CatchableError
template `^`(arr): auto =
# passes a stack array with a matching `arrLen` variable as an open array
arr.toOpenArray(0, `arr Len` - 1)
proc initiatorHandshake(
rng: ref HmacDrbgContext,
keys: KeyPair,
stream: StreamTransport,
remotePubkey: PublicKey,
): Future[ConnectionSecret] {.
async: (raises: [CancelledError, TransportError, RlpxTransportError])
.} =
# https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/5713591d0366da78a913a811c7502d9ca91d29a8/rlpx.md#initial-handshake
var
handshake = Handshake.init(rng[], keys, {Initiator})
authMsg: array[AuthMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
let
authMsgLen = handshake.authMessage(rng[], remotePubkey, authMsg).expect(
"No errors with correctly sized buffer"
)
writeRes = await stream.write(addr authMsg[0], authMsgLen)
if writeRes != authMsgLen:
# TOOD raising a chronos error here is a hack - rework using something else
raise (ref TransportIncompleteError)(msg: "Could not write RLPx handshake header")
var ackMsg = newSeqOfCap[byte](1024)
ackMsg.setLen(MsgLenLenEIP8)
await stream.readExactly(addr ackMsg[0], len(ackMsg))
let ackMsgLen = handshake.decodeAckMsgLen(ackMsg).valueOr:
raise
(ref RlpxTransportError)(msg: "Could not decode handshake ack length: " & $error)
ackMsg.setLen(ackMsgLen)
await stream.readExactly(addr ackMsg[MsgLenLenEIP8], ackMsgLen - MsgLenLenEIP8)
handshake.decodeAckMessage(ackMsg).isOkOr:
raise (ref RlpxTransportError)(msg: "Could not decode handshake ack: " & $error)
handshake.getSecrets(^authMsg, ackMsg)
proc responderHandshake(
rng: ref HmacDrbgContext, keys: KeyPair, stream: StreamTransport
): Future[(ConnectionSecret, PublicKey)] {.
async: (raises: [CancelledError, TransportError, RlpxTransportError])
.} =
# https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/5713591d0366da78a913a811c7502d9ca91d29a8/rlpx.md#initial-handshake
var
handshake = Handshake.init(rng[], keys, {auth.Responder})
authMsg = newSeqOfCap[byte](1024)
authMsg.setLen(MsgLenLenEIP8)
await stream.readExactly(addr authMsg[0], len(authMsg))
let authMsgLen = handshake.decodeAuthMsgLen(authMsg).valueOr:
raise
(ref RlpxTransportError)(msg: "Could not decode handshake auth length: " & $error)
authMsg.setLen(authMsgLen)
await stream.readExactly(addr authMsg[MsgLenLenEIP8], authMsgLen - MsgLenLenEIP8)
handshake.decodeAuthMessage(authMsg).isOkOr:
raise (ref RlpxTransportError)(
msg: "Could not decode handshake auth message: " & $error
)
var ackMsg: array[AckMessageMaxEIP8, byte]
let ackMsgLen =
handshake.ackMessage(rng[], ackMsg).expect("no errors with correcly sized buffer")
var res = await stream.write(addr ackMsg[0], ackMsgLen)
if res != ackMsgLen:
# TOOD raising a chronos error here is a hack - rework using something else
raise (ref TransportIncompleteError)(msg: "Could not write RLPx ack message")
(handshake.getSecrets(authMsg, ^ackMsg), handshake.remoteHPubkey)
proc connect*(
_: type RlpxTransport,
rng: ref HmacDrbgContext,
keys: KeyPair,
address: TransportAddress,
remotePubkey: PublicKey,
): Future[RlpxTransport] {.
async: (raises: [CancelledError, TransportError, RlpxTransportError])
.} =
var stream = await connect(address)
try:
let secrets = await initiatorHandshake(rng, keys, stream, remotePubkey)
var res = RlpxTransport(stream: move(stream), pubkey: remotePubkey)
initSecretState(secrets, res.state)
res
finally:
if stream != nil:
stream.close()
proc accept*(
_: type RlpxTransport,
rng: ref HmacDrbgContext,
keys: KeyPair,
stream: StreamTransport,
): Future[RlpxTransport] {.
async: (raises: [CancelledError, TransportError, RlpxTransportError])
.} =
var stream = stream
try:
let (secrets, remotePubkey) = await responderHandshake(rng, keys, stream)
var res = RlpxTransport(stream: move(stream), pubkey: remotePubkey)
initSecretState(secrets, res.state)
res
finally:
if stream != nil:
stream.close()
proc recvMsg*(
transport: RlpxTransport
): Future[seq[byte]] {.
async: (raises: [CancelledError, TransportError, RlpxTransportError])
.} =
## Read an RLPx frame from the given peer
var msgHeaderEnc: RlpxEncryptedHeader
await transport.stream.readExactly(addr msgHeaderEnc[0], msgHeaderEnc.len)
let msgHeader = decryptHeader(transport.state, msgHeaderEnc).valueOr:
raise (ref RlpxTransportError)(msg: "Cannot decrypt RLPx frame header")
# The header has more fields than the size, but they are unused / obsolete.
# Although some clients set them, we don't check this in the spirit of EIP-8
# https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/5713591d0366da78a913a811c7502d9ca91d29a8/rlpx.md#framing
let msgSize = msgHeader.getBodySize()
let remainingBytes = encryptedLength(msgSize) - 32
var encryptedBytes = newSeq[byte](remainingBytes)
await transport.stream.readExactly(addr encryptedBytes[0], len(encryptedBytes))
let decryptedMaxLength = decryptedLength(msgSize) # Padded length
var msgBody = newSeq[byte](decryptedMaxLength)
if decryptBody(transport.state, encryptedBytes, msgSize, msgBody).isErr():
raise (ref RlpxTransportError)(msg: "Cannot decrypt message body")
reset(encryptedBytes) # Release memory (TODO: in-place decryption)
msgBody.setLen(msgSize) # Remove padding
msgBody
proc sendMsg*(
transport: RlpxTransport, data: seq[byte]
) {.async: (raises: [CancelledError, TransportError, RlpxTransportError]).} =
let cipherText = encryptMsg(data, transport.state)
var res = await transport.stream.write(cipherText)
if res != len(cipherText):
# TOOD raising a chronos error here is a hack - rework using something else
raise (ref TransportIncompleteError)(msg: "Could not complete writing message")
proc remoteAddress*(
transport: RlpxTransport
): TransportAddress {.raises: [TransportOsError].} =
transport.stream.remoteAddress()
proc closed*(transport: RlpxTransport): bool =
transport.stream != nil and transport.stream.closed
proc close*(transport: RlpxTransport) =
if transport.stream != nil:
transport.stream.close()
proc closeWait*(
transport: RlpxTransport
): Future[void] {.async: (raises: [], raw: true).} =
transport.stream.closeWait()
when isMainModule:
# Simple CLI application for negotiating an RLPx connection with a peer
import stew/byteutils, std/cmdline, std/strutils, eth/rlp
if paramCount() < 3:
echo "rlpxtransport ip port pubkey"
quit 1
let
rng = newRng()
kp = KeyPair.random(rng[])
echo "Local key: ", toHex(kp.pubkey.toRaw())
let client = waitFor RlpxTransport.connect(
rng,
kp,
initTAddress(paramStr(1), parseInt(paramStr(2))),
PublicKey.fromHex(paramStr(3))[],
)
proc encodeMsg(msgId: uint64, msg: auto): seq[byte] =
var rlpWriter = initRlpWriter()
rlpWriter.append msgId
rlpWriter.appendRecordType(msg, typeof(msg).rlpFieldsCount > 1)
rlpWriter.finish
waitFor client.sendMsg(
encodeMsg(
uint64 0, (uint64 4, "nimbus", @[("eth", uint64 68)], uint64 0, kp.pubkey.toRaw())
)
)
while true:
echo "Reading message"
var data = waitFor client.recvMsg()
var rlp = rlpFromBytes(data)
let msgId = rlp.read(uint64)
if msgId == 0:
echo "Hello: ",
rlp.read((uint64, string, seq[(string, uint64)], uint64, seq[byte]))
else:
echo "Unknown message ", msgId, " ", toHex(data)

13
eth/rlp.nim
View File

@ -448,9 +448,6 @@ func readImpl(
else:
rlp.bytes.len()
template getUnderlyingType[T](_: Option[T]): untyped =
T
template getUnderlyingType[T](_: Opt[T]): untyped =
T
@ -458,16 +455,6 @@ func readImpl(
type FieldType {.used.} = type field
when hasCustomPragmaFixed(RecordType, fieldName, rlpCustomSerialization):
field = rlp.read(result, FieldType)
elif field is Option:
# this works for optional fields at the end of an object/tuple
# if the optional field is followed by a mandatory field,
# custom serialization for a field or for the parent object
# will be better
type UT = getUnderlyingType(field)
if rlp.position < payloadEnd:
field = some(rlp.read(UT))
else:
field = none(UT)
elif field is Opt:
# this works for optional fields at the end of an object/tuple
# if the optional field is followed by a mandatory field,

17
eth/rlp/options.nim
View File

@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
import
std/options,
../rlp
proc read*[T](rlp: var Rlp, O: type Option[T]): O {.inline.} =
mixin read
if not rlp.isEmpty:
result = some read(rlp, T)
proc append*(writer: var RlpWriter, value: Option) =
if value.isSome:
writer.append value.get
else:
writer.append ""
export
options, rlp

22
eth/rlp/results.nim Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
import ../rlp
import writer
import pkg/results
export
rlp, results
proc append*[T](w: var RlpWriter, val: Opt[T]) =
mixin append
if val.isSome:
w.append(val.get())
else:
w.append("")
proc read*[T](rlp: var Rlp, val: var Opt[T]) {.raises: [RlpError].} =
mixin read
if rlp.blobLen != 0:
val = Opt.some(rlp.read(T))
else:
rlp.skipElem

162
eth/rlp/writer.nim
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import
std/options,
results,
pkg/results,
stew/[arraybuf, assign2, bitops2, shims/macros],
./priv/defs
@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ export arraybuf
type
RlpWriter* = object
pendingLists: seq[tuple[remainingItems, outBytes: int]]
pendingLists: seq[tuple[remainingItems, startPos: int]]
output: seq[byte]
RlpIntBuf* = ArrayBuf[9, byte]
@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ func writeCount(bytes: var auto, count: int, baseMarker: byte) =
origLen = bytes.len
lenPrefixBytes = uint64(count).bytesNeeded
bytes.setLen(origLen + int(lenPrefixBytes) + 1)
bytes.setLen(origLen + lenPrefixBytes + 1)
bytes[origLen] = baseMarker + (THRESHOLD_LIST_LEN - 1) + byte(lenPrefixBytes)
bytes.writeBigEndian(uint64(count), bytes.len - 1, lenPrefixBytes)
@ -60,17 +60,16 @@ proc initRlpWriter*: RlpWriter =
# expected to be short-lived, it doesn't hurt to allocate this buffer
result.output = newSeqOfCap[byte](2000)
proc decRet(n: var int, delta: int): int =
n -= delta
n
proc maybeClosePendingLists(self: var RlpWriter) =
while self.pendingLists.len > 0:
let lastListIdx = self.pendingLists.len - 1
doAssert self.pendingLists[lastListIdx].remainingItems >= 1
if decRet(self.pendingLists[lastListIdx].remainingItems, 1) == 0:
doAssert self.pendingLists[lastListIdx].remainingItems > 0
self.pendingLists[lastListIdx].remainingItems -= 1
# if one last item is remaining in the list
if self.pendingLists[lastListIdx].remainingItems == 0:
# A list have been just finished. It was started in `startList`.
let listStartPos = self.pendingLists[lastListIdx].outBytes
let listStartPos = self.pendingLists[lastListIdx].startPos
self.pendingLists.setLen lastListIdx
# How many bytes were written since the start?
@ -104,33 +103,21 @@ proc appendRawBytes*(self: var RlpWriter, bytes: openArray[byte]) =
self.output.len - bytes.len, self.output.len - 1), bytes)
self.maybeClosePendingLists()
proc appendRawList(self: var RlpWriter, bytes: openArray[byte]) =
self.output.writeCount(bytes.len, LIST_START_MARKER)
self.appendRawBytes(bytes)
proc startList*(self: var RlpWriter, listSize: int) =
if listSize == 0:
self.appendRawList([])
self.output.writeCount(0, LIST_START_MARKER)
self.appendRawBytes([])
else:
self.pendingLists.add((listSize, self.output.len))
proc appendBlob(self: var RlpWriter, data: openArray[byte], startMarker: byte) =
proc appendBlob(self: var RlpWriter, data: openArray[byte]) =
if data.len == 1 and byte(data[0]) < BLOB_START_MARKER:
self.output.add byte(data[0])
self.maybeClosePendingLists()
else:
self.output.writeCount(data.len, startMarker)
self.output.writeCount(data.len, BLOB_START_MARKER)
self.appendRawBytes(data)
proc appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, data: string) =
appendBlob(self, data.toOpenArrayByte(0, data.high), BLOB_START_MARKER)
proc appendBlob(self: var RlpWriter, data: openArray[byte]) =
appendBlob(self, data, BLOB_START_MARKER)
proc appendBlob(self: var RlpWriter, data: openArray[char]) =
appendBlob(self, data.toOpenArrayByte(0, data.high), BLOB_START_MARKER)
proc appendInt(self: var RlpWriter, i: SomeUnsignedInt) =
# this is created as a separate proc as an extra precaution against
# any overloading resolution problems when matching the IntLike concept.
@ -138,64 +125,47 @@ proc appendInt(self: var RlpWriter, i: SomeUnsignedInt) =
self.maybeClosePendingLists()
template appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, data: openArray[byte]) =
self.appendBlob(data)
template appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, data: openArray[char]) =
self.appendBlob(data.toOpenArrayByte(0, data.high))
template appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, data: string) =
self.appendBlob(data.toOpenArrayByte(0, data.high))
template appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, i: SomeUnsignedInt) =
appendInt(self, i)
self.appendInt(i)
template appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, e: enum) =
appendImpl(self, int(e))
# TODO: check for negative enums
self.appendInt(uint64(e))
template appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, b: bool) =
appendImpl(self, int(b))
self.appendInt(uint64(b))
proc appendImpl[T](self: var RlpWriter, listOrBlob: openArray[T]) =
proc appendImpl[T](self: var RlpWriter, list: openArray[T]) =
mixin append
# TODO: This append proc should be overloaded by `openArray[byte]` after
# nim bug #7416 is fixed.
when T is (byte or char):
self.appendBlob(listOrBlob)
else:
self.startList listOrBlob.len
for i in 0 ..< listOrBlob.len:
self.append listOrBlob[i]
self.startList list.len
for i in 0 ..< list.len:
self.append list[i]
proc hasOptionalFields(T: type): bool =
proc countOptionalFields(T: type): int {.compileTime.} =
mixin enumerateRlpFields
proc helper: bool =
var dummy: T
result = false
template detectOptionalField(RT, n, x) {.used.} =
when x is Option or x is Opt:
return true
enumerateRlpFields(dummy, detectOptionalField)
const res = helper()
return res
proc optionalFieldsNum(x: openArray[bool]): int =
# count optional fields backward
for i in countdown(x.len-1, 0):
if x[i]: inc result
else: break
proc checkedOptionalFields(T: type, FC: static[int]): int =
mixin enumerateRlpFields
var
i = 0
dummy: T
res: array[FC, bool]
# closure signature matches the one in object_serialization.nim
template op(RT, fN, f) =
res[i] = f is Option or f is Opt
inc i
when f is Option or f is Opt:
inc result
else: # this will count only optional fields at the end
result = 0
enumerateRlpFields(dummy, op)
# ignoring first optional fields
optionalFieldsNum(res) - 1
proc genPrevFields(obj: NimNode, fd: openArray[FieldDescription], hi, lo: int): NimNode =
result = newStmtList()
for i in countdown(hi, lo):
@ -230,32 +200,21 @@ macro genOptionalFieldsValidation(obj: untyped, T: type, num: static[int]): unty
doAssert obj.blobGasUsed.isSome == obj.excessBlobGas.isSome,
"blobGasUsed and excessBlobGas must both be present or absent"
macro countFieldsRuntimeImpl(obj: untyped, T: type, num: static[int]): untyped =
let
Tresolved = getType(T)[1]
fd = recordFields(Tresolved.getImpl)
res = ident("result")
mlen = fd.len - num
result = newStmtList()
result.add quote do:
`res` = `mlen`
for i in countdown(fd.high, fd.len-num):
let fieldName = fd[i].name
result.add quote do:
`res` += `obj`.`fieldName`.isSome.ord
proc countFieldsRuntime(obj: object|tuple): int =
# count mandatory fields and non empty optional fields
type ObjType = type obj
mixin enumerateRlpFields
const
fieldsCount = ObjType.rlpFieldsCount
# include first optional fields
cof = checkedOptionalFields(ObjType, fieldsCount) + 1
var numOptionals: int = 0
countFieldsRuntimeImpl(obj, ObjType, cof)
template op(RT, fN, f) {.used.} =
when f is Option or f is Opt:
if f.isSome: # if optional and non empty
inc numOptionals
else: # if mandatory field
inc result
numOptionals = 0 # count only optionals at the end (after mandatory)
enumerateRlpFields(obj, op)
result += numOptionals
proc appendRecordType*(self: var RlpWriter, obj: object|tuple, wrapInList = wrapObjsInList) =
mixin enumerateRlpFields, append
@ -263,25 +222,22 @@ proc appendRecordType*(self: var RlpWriter, obj: object|tuple, wrapInList = wrap
type ObjType = type obj
const
hasOptional = hasOptionalFields(ObjType)
fieldsCount = ObjType.rlpFieldsCount
cof = countOptionalFields(ObjType)
when hasOptional:
const
cof = checkedOptionalFields(ObjType, fieldsCount)
when cof > 0:
genOptionalFieldsValidation(obj, ObjType, cof)
# ignoring first optional fields
genOptionalFieldsValidation(obj, ObjType, cof - 1)
if wrapInList:
when hasOptional:
when cof > 0:
self.startList(obj.countFieldsRuntime)
else:
self.startList(fieldsCount)
self.startList(ObjType.rlpFieldsCount)
template op(RecordType, fieldName, field) {.used.} =
when hasCustomPragmaFixed(RecordType, fieldName, rlpCustomSerialization):
append(self, obj, field)
elif (field is Option or field is Opt) and hasOptional:
elif (field is Option or field is Opt) and cof > 0:
# this works for optional fields at the end of an object/tuple
# if the optional field is followed by a mandatory field,
# custom serialization for a field or for the parent object
@ -293,19 +249,15 @@ proc appendRecordType*(self: var RlpWriter, obj: object|tuple, wrapInList = wrap
enumerateRlpFields(obj, op)
proc appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, data: object) {.inline.} =
template appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, data: object) =
self.appendRecordType(data)
proc appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, data: tuple) {.inline.} =
template appendImpl(self: var RlpWriter, data: tuple) =
self.appendRecordType(data)
# We define a single `append` template with a pretty low specificity
# score in order to facilitate easier overloading with user types:
template append*[T](w: var RlpWriter; data: T) =
when data is (enum|bool):
# TODO detect negative enum values at compile time?
appendImpl(w, uint64(data))
else:
appendImpl(w, data)
template append*(w: var RlpWriter; data: SomeSignedInt) =

50
tests/common/test_eth_types_rlp.nim
View File

@ -246,53 +246,3 @@ template genTestOpt(TT) =
genTestOpt(BlockBodyOpt)
genTestOpt(EthBlockOpt)
suite "EIP-7865 tests":
const reqs = [
Request(
requestType: DepositRequestType,
deposit: DepositRequest(
pubkey : bytes48"0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
withdrawalCredentials: bytes32"0xBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB",
amount : 1,
signature : bytes96"0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
index : 3,
)
),
Request(
requestType: WithdrawalRequestType,
withdrawal: WithdrawalRequest(
sourceAddress : address"0xDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD",
validatorPubkey: bytes48"0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
amount : 7,
)
),
Request(
requestType: ConsolidationRequestType,
consolidation: ConsolidationRequest(
sourceAddress: address"0xEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE",
sourcePubkey : bytes48"0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
targetPubkey : bytes48"0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
)
)
]
test "rlp roundtrip":
let
body = BlockBody(
withdrawals: Opt.some(@[Withdrawal()]),
requests: Opt.some(@reqs)
)
blk = EthBlock(
withdrawals: Opt.some(@[Withdrawal()]),
requests: Opt.some(@reqs)
)
encodedBody = rlp.encode(body)
encodedBlock = rlp.encode(blk)
decodedBody = rlp.decode(encodedBody, BlockBody)
decodedBlk = rlp.decode(encodedBlock, EthBlock)
check decodedBody == body
check decodedBlk == blk

1
tests/p2p/all_tests.nim
View File

@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ import
./test_ecies,
./test_enode,
./test_rlpx_thunk,
./test_rlpxtransport,
./test_protocol_handlers

277
tests/p2p/test_auth.nim
View File

@ -14,87 +14,6 @@ import
nimcrypto/[utils, keccak],
../../eth/common/keys, ../../eth/p2p/auth
# This was generated by `print` actual auth message generated by
# https://github.com/ethereum/py-evm/blob/master/tests/p2p/test_auth.py
const pyevmAuth = """
22034ad2e7545e2b0bf02ecb1e40db478dfbbf7aeecc834aec2523eb2b7e74ee
77ba40c70a83bfe9f2ab91f0131546dcf92c3ee8282d9907fee093017fd0302d
0034fdb5419558137e0d44cd13d319afe5629eeccb47fd9dfe55cc6089426e46
cc762dd8a0636e07a54b31169eba0c7a20a1ac1ef68596f1f283b5c676bae406
4abfcce24799d09f67e392632d3ffdc12e3d6430dcb0ea19c318343ffa7aae74
d4cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb
1100"""
# This data comes from https://gist.github.com/fjl/3a78780d17c755d22df2
const data = [
("initiator_private_key",
"5e173f6ac3c669587538e7727cf19b782a4f2fda07c1eaa662c593e5e85e3051"),
("receiver_private_key",
"c45f950382d542169ea207959ee0220ec1491755abe405cd7498d6b16adb6df8"),
("initiator_ephemeral_private_key",
"19c2185f4f40634926ebed3af09070ca9e029f2edd5fae6253074896205f5f6c"),
("receiver_ephemeral_private_key",
"d25688cf0ab10afa1a0e2dba7853ed5f1e5bf1c631757ed4e103b593ff3f5620"),
("auth_plaintext",
"""884c36f7ae6b406637c1f61b2f57e1d2cab813d24c6559aaf843c3f48962f32f
46662c066d39669b7b2e3ba14781477417600e7728399278b1b5d801a519aa57
0034fdb5419558137e0d44cd13d319afe5629eeccb47fd9dfe55cc6089426e46
cc762dd8a0636e07a54b31169eba0c7a20a1ac1ef68596f1f283b5c676bae406
4abfcce24799d09f67e392632d3ffdc12e3d6430dcb0ea19c318343ffa7aae74
d4cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb
1100"""),
("authresp_plaintext",
"""802b052f8b066640bba94a4fc39d63815c377fced6fcb84d27f791c9921ddf3e
9bf0108e298f490812847109cbd778fae393e80323fd643209841a3b7f110397
f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a7
00"""),
("auth_ciphertext",
"""04a0274c5951e32132e7f088c9bdfdc76c9d91f0dc6078e848f8e3361193dbdc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"""),
("authresp_ciphertext",
"""049934a7b2d7f9af8fd9db941d9da281ac9381b5740e1f64f7092f3588d4f87f
5ce55191a6653e5e80c1c5dd538169aa123e70dc6ffc5af1827e546c0e958e42
dad355bcc1fcb9cdf2cf47ff524d2ad98cbf275e661bf4cf00960e74b5956b79
9771334f426df007350b46049adb21a6e78ab1408d5e6ccde6fb5e69f0f4c92b
b9c725c02f99fa72b9cdc8dd53cff089e0e73317f61cc5abf6152513cb7d833f
09d2851603919bf0fbe44d79a09245c6e8338eb502083dc84b846f2fee1cc310
d2cc8b1b9334728f97220bb799376233e113"""),
("ecdhe_shared_secret",
"e3f407f83fc012470c26a93fdff534100f2c6f736439ce0ca90e9914f7d1c381"),
("initiator_nonce",
"cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb11"),
("receiver_nonce",
"f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a7"),
("aes_secret",
"c0458fa97a5230830e05f4f20b7c755c1d4e54b1ce5cf43260bb191eef4e418d"),
("mac_secret",
"48c938884d5067a1598272fcddaa4b833cd5e7d92e8228c0ecdfabbe68aef7f1"),
("token",
"3f9ec2592d1554852b1f54d228f042ed0a9310ea86d038dc2b401ba8cd7fdac4"),
("initial_egress_MAC",
"09771e93b1a6109e97074cbe2d2b0cf3d3878efafe68f53c41bb60c0ec49097e"),
("initial_ingress_MAC",
"75823d96e23136c89666ee025fb21a432be906512b3dd4a3049e898adb433847"),
("initiator_hello_packet",
"""6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63b550cdb8517fefd8dd398fc2acd1d935e
6e0434a2b96769078477637347b7b01924fff9ff1c06df2f804df3b0402bbb9f
87365b3c6856b45e1e2b6470986813c3816a71bff9d69dd297a5dbd935ab578f
6e5d7e93e4506a44f307c332d95e8a4b102585fd8ef9fc9e3e055537a5cec2e9"""),
("receiver_hello_packet",
"""6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63be36a1cdd1b19179146019984f3625d4a
6e0434a2b96769050577657247b7b02bc6c314470eca7e3ef650b98c83e9d7dd
4830b3f718ff562349aead2530a8d28a8484604f92e5fced2c6183f304344ab0
e7c301a0c05559f4c25db65e36820b4b909a226171a60ac6cb7beea09376d6d8""")
]
# These test vectors were copied from EIP8 specification
# https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-8.md
const eip8data = [
@ -110,17 +29,6 @@ const eip8data = [
"7e968bba13b6c50e2c4cd7f241cc0d64d1ac25c7f5952df231ac6a2bda8ee5d6"),
("receiver_nonce",
"559aead08264d5795d3909718cdd05abd49572e84fe55590eef31a88a08fdffd"),
("auth_ciphertext_v4",
"""048ca79ad18e4b0659fab4853fe5bc58eb83992980f4c9cc147d2aa31532efd29
a3d3dc6a3d89eaf913150cfc777ce0ce4af2758bf4810235f6e6ceccfee1acc6b
22c005e9e3a49d6448610a58e98744ba3ac0399e82692d67c1f58849050b3024e
21a52c9d3b01d871ff5f210817912773e610443a9ef142e91cdba0bd77b5fdf07
69b05671fc35f83d83e4d3b0b000c6b2a1b1bba89e0fc51bf4e460df3105c444f
14be226458940d6061c296350937ffd5e3acaceeaaefd3c6f74be8e23e0f45163
cc7ebd76220f0128410fd05250273156d548a414444ae2f7dea4dfca2d43c057a
db701a715bf59f6fb66b2d1d20f2c703f851cbf5ac47396d9ca65b6260bd141ac
4d53e2de585a73d1750780db4c9ee4cd4d225173a4592ee77e2bd94d0be3691f3
b406f9bba9b591fc63facc016bfa8"""),
("auth_ciphertext_eip8",
"""01b304ab7578555167be8154d5cc456f567d5ba302662433674222360f08d5f15
34499d3678b513b0fca474f3a514b18e75683032eb63fccb16c156dc6eb2c0b15
@ -151,14 +59,6 @@ const eip8data = [
f37407ac044b55be0908ecb94d4ed172ece66fd31bfdadf2b97a8bc690163ee11
f5b575a4b44e36e2bfb2f0fce91676fd64c7773bac6a003f481fddd0bae0a1f31
aa27504e2a533af4cef3b623f4791b2cca6d490"""),
("authack_ciphertext_v4",
"""049f8abcfa9c0dc65b982e98af921bc0ba6e4243169348a236abe9df5f93aa69d
99cadddaa387662b0ff2c08e9006d5a11a278b1b3331e5aaabf0a32f01281b6f4
ede0e09a2d5f585b26513cb794d9635a57563921c04a9090b4f14ee42be1a5461
049af4ea7a7f49bf4c97a352d39c8d02ee4acc416388c1c66cec761d2bc1c72da
6ba143477f049c9d2dde846c252c111b904f630ac98e51609b3b1f58168ddca65
05b7196532e5f85b259a20c45e1979491683fee108e9660edbf38f3add489ae73
e3dda2c71bd1497113d5c755e942d1"""),
("authack_ciphertext_eip8",
"""01ea0451958701280a56482929d3b0757da8f7fbe5286784beead59d95089c217
c9b917788989470b0e330cc6e4fb383c0340ed85fab836ec9fb8a49672712aeab
@ -204,12 +104,6 @@ const eip8data = [
let rng = newRng()
proc testValue(s: string): string =
for item in data:
if item[0] == s:
result = item[1]
break
proc testE8Value(s: string): string =
for item in eip8data:
if item[0] == s:
@ -217,118 +111,6 @@ proc testE8Value(s: string): string =
break
suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
block:
proc newTestHandshake(flags: set[HandshakeFlag]): Handshake =
if Initiator in flags:
let pk = PrivateKey.fromHex(testValue("initiator_private_key"))[]
result = Handshake.init(rng[], pk.toKeyPair(), flags)
let epki = testValue("initiator_ephemeral_private_key")
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromHex(epki)[].toKeyPair()
let nonce = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("initiator_nonce")))
result.initiatorNonce[0..^1] = nonce[0..^1]
elif Responder in flags:
let pk = PrivateKey.fromHex(testValue("receiver_private_key"))[]
result = Handshake.init(rng[], pk.toKeyPair(), flags)
let epkr = testValue("receiver_ephemeral_private_key")
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromHex(epkr)[].toKeyPair()
let nonce = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("receiver_nonce")))
result.responderNonce[0..^1] = nonce[0..^1]
test "Create plain auth message":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize(false))
var k0 = 0
initiator.authMessage(
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0, 0, false).expect("auth success")
var expect1 = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("auth_plaintext")))
var expect2 = fromHex(stripSpaces(pyevmAuth))
check:
m0[65..^1] == expect1[65..^1]
m0[0..^1] == expect2[0..^1]
test "Auth message decoding":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
var k0 = 0
let remoteEPubkey0 = initiator.ephemeral.pubkey
let remoteHPubkey0 = initiator.host.pubkey
initiator.authMessage(
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0).expect("auth success")
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("decode success")
check:
responder.initiatorNonce[0..^1] == initiator.initiatorNonce[0..^1]
responder.remoteEPubkey == remoteEPubkey0
responder.remoteHPubkey == remoteHPubkey0
test "ACK message expectation":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
var m1 = newSeq[byte](responder.ackSize(false))
var k0 = 0
var k1 = 0
var expect0 = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("authresp_plaintext")))
initiator.authMessage(
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0).expect("auth success")
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("decode success")
responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1, k1, 0, false).expect("ack success")
check:
m1 == expect0
responder.initiatorNonce == initiator.initiatorNonce
test "ACK message decoding":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
var m1 = newSeq[byte](responder.ackSize())
var k0 = 0
var k1 = 0
initiator.authMessage(
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0).expect("auth success")
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("decode success")
responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1, k1).expect("ack success")
initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).expect("decode success")
let remoteEPubkey0 = responder.ephemeral.pubkey
let remoteHPubkey0 = responder.host.pubkey
check:
initiator.remoteEPubkey == remoteEPubkey0
initiator.remoteHPubkey == remoteHPubkey0
initiator.responderNonce == responder.responderNonce
test "Check derived secrets":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
var authm = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("auth_ciphertext")))
var ackm = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("authresp_ciphertext")))
var taes = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("aes_secret")))
var tmac = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("mac_secret")))
var temac = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("initial_egress_MAC")))
var timac = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("initial_ingress_MAC")))
responder.decodeAuthMessage(authm).expect("decode success")
initiator.decodeAckMessage(ackm).expect("ack success")
var csecInitiator = initiator.getSecrets(authm, ackm)
var csecResponder = responder.getSecrets(authm, ackm)
check:
csecInitiator.aesKey == csecResponder.aesKey
csecInitiator.macKey == csecResponder.macKey
taes[0..^1] == csecInitiator.aesKey[0..^1]
tmac[0..^1] == csecInitiator.macKey[0..^1]
let iemac = csecInitiator.egressMac.finish()
let iimac = csecInitiator.ingressMac.finish()
let remac = csecResponder.egressMac.finish()
let rimac = csecResponder.ingressMac.finish()
check:
iemac.data[0..^1] == temac[0..^1]
iimac.data[0..^1] == timac[0..^1]
remac.data[0..^1] == timac[0..^1]
rimac.data[0..^1] == temac[0..^1]
block:
proc newTestHandshake(flags: set[HandshakeFlag]): Handshake =
if Initiator in flags:
@ -348,25 +130,6 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
let nonce = fromHex(stripSpaces(testE8Value("receiver_nonce")))
result.responderNonce[0..^1] = nonce[0..^1]
test "AUTH/ACK v4 test vectors": # auth/ack v4
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
var m0 = fromHex(stripSpaces(testE8Value("auth_ciphertext_v4")))
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("decode success")
check:
responder.initiatorNonce[0..^1] == initiator.initiatorNonce[0..^1]
let remoteEPubkey0 = initiator.ephemeral.pubkey
let remoteHPubkey0 = initiator.host.pubkey
check:
responder.remoteEPubkey == remoteEPubkey0
responder.remoteHPubkey == remoteHPubkey0
var m1 = fromHex(stripSpaces(testE8Value("authack_ciphertext_v4")))
initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).expect("decode success")
let remoteEPubkey1 = responder.ephemeral.pubkey
check:
initiator.remoteEPubkey == remoteEPubkey1
initiator.responderNonce[0..^1] == responder.responderNonce[0..^1]
test "AUTH/ACK EIP-8 test vectors":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
@ -390,8 +153,6 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
var csecInitiator = initiator.getSecrets(m0, m1)
var csecResponder = responder.getSecrets(m0, m1)
check:
int(initiator.version) == 4
int(responder.version) == 4
csecInitiator.aesKey == csecResponder.aesKey
csecInitiator.macKey == csecResponder.macKey
taes[0..^1] == csecInitiator.aesKey[0..^1]
@ -418,25 +179,21 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).expect("decode success")
let remoteEPubkey1 = responder.ephemeral.pubkey
check:
int(initiator.version) == 57
int(responder.version) == 56
initiator.remoteEPubkey == remoteEPubkey1
initiator.responderNonce[0..^1] == responder.responderNonce[0..^1]
test "100 AUTH/ACK EIP-8 handshakes":
for i in 1..100:
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator, EIP8})
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
var k0 = 0
var k1 = 0
initiator.authMessage(
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0).expect("auth success")
var m0 = newSeq[byte](AuthMessageMaxEIP8)
let k0 = initiator.authMessage(
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0).expect("auth success")
m0.setLen(k0)
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("decode success")
check (EIP8 in responder.flags) == true
var m1 = newSeq[byte](responder.ackSize())
responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1, k1).expect("ack success")
var m1 = newSeq[byte](AckMessageMaxEIP8)
let k1 = responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1).expect("ack success")
m1.setLen(k1)
initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).expect("decode success")
var csecInitiator = initiator.getSecrets(m0, m1)
@ -449,15 +206,13 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
for i in 1..100:
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
var k0 = 0
var k1 = 0
initiator.authMessage(
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0, k0).expect("auth success")
var m0 = newSeq[byte](AuthMessageMaxEIP8)
let k0 = initiator.authMessage(
rng[], responder.host.pubkey, m0).expect("auth success")
m0.setLen(k0)
responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).expect("auth success")
var m1 = newSeq[byte](responder.ackSize())
responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1, k1).expect("ack success")
var m1 = newSeq[byte](AckMessageMaxEIP8)
let k1 = responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1).expect("ack success")
m1.setLen(k1)
initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).expect("ack success")
@ -507,10 +262,10 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
res.error == AuthError.IncompleteError
test "Invalid AckMessage - Minimum input size":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator, EIP8})
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator,})
# 1 byte short on minimum size
let m = newSeq[byte](AckMessageV4Length - 1)
let m = newSeq[byte](AckMessageEIP8Length - 1)
let res = initiator.decodeAckMessage(m)
check:
@ -518,7 +273,7 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
res.error == AuthError.IncompleteError
test "Invalid AckMessage - Minimum size prefix":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator, EIP8})
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
# Minimum size for EIP8 AckMessage
var m = newSeq[byte](AckMessageEIP8Length)
@ -532,7 +287,7 @@ suite "Ethereum P2P handshake test suite":
res.error == AuthError.IncompleteError
test "Invalid AckMessage - Size prefix bigger than input":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator, EIP8})
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
# Minimum size for EIP8 AckMessage
var m = newSeq[byte](AckMessageEIP8Length)

288
tests/p2p/test_crypt.nim
View File

@ -11,176 +11,147 @@
import
unittest2,
nimcrypto/[utils, sysrand],
nimcrypto/[utils, keccak, sysrand],
../../eth/common/keys, ../../eth/p2p/[auth, rlpxcrypt]
const data = [
("initiator_private_key",
"5e173f6ac3c669587538e7727cf19b782a4f2fda07c1eaa662c593e5e85e3051"),
("receiver_private_key",
"c45f950382d542169ea207959ee0220ec1491755abe405cd7498d6b16adb6df8"),
("initiator_ephemeral_private_key",
"19c2185f4f40634926ebed3af09070ca9e029f2edd5fae6253074896205f5f6c"),
("receiver_ephemeral_private_key",
"d25688cf0ab10afa1a0e2dba7853ed5f1e5bf1c631757ed4e103b593ff3f5620"),
("auth_plaintext",
"""884c36f7ae6b406637c1f61b2f57e1d2cab813d24c6559aaf843c3f48962f32f
46662c066d39669b7b2e3ba14781477417600e7728399278b1b5d801a519aa57
0034fdb5419558137e0d44cd13d319afe5629eeccb47fd9dfe55cc6089426e46
cc762dd8a0636e07a54b31169eba0c7a20a1ac1ef68596f1f283b5c676bae406
4abfcce24799d09f67e392632d3ffdc12e3d6430dcb0ea19c318343ffa7aae74
d4cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb
1100"""),
("authresp_plaintext",
"""802b052f8b066640bba94a4fc39d63815c377fced6fcb84d27f791c9921ddf3e
9bf0108e298f490812847109cbd778fae393e80323fd643209841a3b7f110397
f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a7
00"""),
("auth_ciphertext",
"""04a0274c5951e32132e7f088c9bdfdc76c9d91f0dc6078e848f8e3361193dbdc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"""),
("authresp_ciphertext",
"""049934a7b2d7f9af8fd9db941d9da281ac9381b5740e1f64f7092f3588d4f87f
5ce55191a6653e5e80c1c5dd538169aa123e70dc6ffc5af1827e546c0e958e42
dad355bcc1fcb9cdf2cf47ff524d2ad98cbf275e661bf4cf00960e74b5956b79
9771334f426df007350b46049adb21a6e78ab1408d5e6ccde6fb5e69f0f4c92b
b9c725c02f99fa72b9cdc8dd53cff089e0e73317f61cc5abf6152513cb7d833f
09d2851603919bf0fbe44d79a09245c6e8338eb502083dc84b846f2fee1cc310
d2cc8b1b9334728f97220bb799376233e113"""),
("ecdhe_shared_secret",
"e3f407f83fc012470c26a93fdff534100f2c6f736439ce0ca90e9914f7d1c381"),
("initiator_nonce",
"cd26fecb93657d1cd9e9eaf4f8be720b56dd1d39f190c4e1c6b7ec66f077bb11"),
("receiver_nonce",
"f37ec61d84cea03dcc5e8385db93248584e8af4b4d1c832d8c7453c0089687a7"),
("aes_secret",
"c0458fa97a5230830e05f4f20b7c755c1d4e54b1ce5cf43260bb191eef4e418d"),
("mac_secret",
"48c938884d5067a1598272fcddaa4b833cd5e7d92e8228c0ecdfabbe68aef7f1"),
("token",
"3f9ec2592d1554852b1f54d228f042ed0a9310ea86d038dc2b401ba8cd7fdac4"),
("initial_egress_MAC",
"09771e93b1a6109e97074cbe2d2b0cf3d3878efafe68f53c41bb60c0ec49097e"),
("initial_ingress_MAC",
"75823d96e23136c89666ee025fb21a432be906512b3dd4a3049e898adb433847"),
("initiator_hello_packet",
"""6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63b550cdb8517fefd8dd398fc2acd1d935e
6e0434a2b96769078477637347b7b01924fff9ff1c06df2f804df3b0402bbb9f
87365b3c6856b45e1e2b6470986813c3816a71bff9d69dd297a5dbd935ab578f
6e5d7e93e4506a44f307c332d95e8a4b102585fd8ef9fc9e3e055537a5cec2e9"""),
("receiver_hello_packet",
"""6ef23fcf1cec7312df623f9ae701e63be36a1cdd1b19179146019984f3625d4a
6e0434a2b96769050577657247b7b02bc6c314470eca7e3ef650b98c83e9d7dd
4830b3f718ff562349aead2530a8d28a8484604f92e5fced2c6183f304344ab0
e7c301a0c05559f4c25db65e36820b4b909a226171a60ac6cb7beea09376d6d8""")
]
# EIP-8 test case
# https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-8.md#rlpx-handshake
const
staticKeyA = fromHex("49a7b37aa6f6645917e7b807e9d1c00d4fa71f18343b0d4122a4d2df64dd6fee")
staticKeyB = fromHex("b71c71a67e1177ad4e901695e1b4b9ee17ae16c6668d313eac2f96dbcda3f291")
ephemeralKeyA = fromHex("869d6ecf5211f1cc60418a13b9d870b22959d0c16f02bec714c960dd2298a32d")
ephemeralKeyB = fromHex("e238eb8e04fee6511ab04c6dd3c89ce097b11f25d584863ac2b6d5b35b1847e4")
nonceA = fromHex("7e968bba13b6c50e2c4cd7f241cc0d64d1ac25c7f5952df231ac6a2bda8ee5d6")
nonceB = fromHex("559aead08264d5795d3909718cdd05abd49572e84fe55590eef31a88a08fdffd")
auth1 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
048ca79ad18e4b0659fab4853fe5bc58eb83992980f4c9cc147d2aa31532efd29a3d3dc6a3d89eaf
913150cfc777ce0ce4af2758bf4810235f6e6ceccfee1acc6b22c005e9e3a49d6448610a58e98744
ba3ac0399e82692d67c1f58849050b3024e21a52c9d3b01d871ff5f210817912773e610443a9ef14
2e91cdba0bd77b5fdf0769b05671fc35f83d83e4d3b0b000c6b2a1b1bba89e0fc51bf4e460df3105
c444f14be226458940d6061c296350937ffd5e3acaceeaaefd3c6f74be8e23e0f45163cc7ebd7622
0f0128410fd05250273156d548a414444ae2f7dea4dfca2d43c057adb701a715bf59f6fb66b2d1d2
0f2c703f851cbf5ac47396d9ca65b6260bd141ac4d53e2de585a73d1750780db4c9ee4cd4d225173
a4592ee77e2bd94d0be3691f3b406f9bba9b591fc63facc016bfa8"""))
auth2 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
01b304ab7578555167be8154d5cc456f567d5ba302662433674222360f08d5f1534499d3678b513b
0fca474f3a514b18e75683032eb63fccb16c156dc6eb2c0b1593f0d84ac74f6e475f1b8d56116b84
9634a8c458705bf83a626ea0384d4d7341aae591fae42ce6bd5c850bfe0b999a694a49bbbaf3ef6c
da61110601d3b4c02ab6c30437257a6e0117792631a4b47c1d52fc0f8f89caadeb7d02770bf999cc
147d2df3b62e1ffb2c9d8c125a3984865356266bca11ce7d3a688663a51d82defaa8aad69da39ab6
d5470e81ec5f2a7a47fb865ff7cca21516f9299a07b1bc63ba56c7a1a892112841ca44b6e0034dee
70c9adabc15d76a54f443593fafdc3b27af8059703f88928e199cb122362a4b35f62386da7caad09
c001edaeb5f8a06d2b26fb6cb93c52a9fca51853b68193916982358fe1e5369e249875bb8d0d0ec3
6f917bc5e1eafd5896d46bd61ff23f1a863a8a8dcd54c7b109b771c8e61ec9c8908c733c0263440e
2aa067241aaa433f0bb053c7b31a838504b148f570c0ad62837129e547678c5190341e4f1693956c
3bf7678318e2d5b5340c9e488eefea198576344afbdf66db5f51204a6961a63ce072c8926c"""))
auth3 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
01b8044c6c312173685d1edd268aa95e1d495474c6959bcdd10067ba4c9013df9e40ff45f5bfd6f7
2471f93a91b493f8e00abc4b80f682973de715d77ba3a005a242eb859f9a211d93a347fa64b597bf
280a6b88e26299cf263b01b8dfdb712278464fd1c25840b995e84d367d743f66c0e54a586725b7bb
f12acca27170ae3283c1073adda4b6d79f27656993aefccf16e0d0409fe07db2dc398a1b7e8ee93b
cd181485fd332f381d6a050fba4c7641a5112ac1b0b61168d20f01b479e19adf7fdbfa0905f63352
bfc7e23cf3357657455119d879c78d3cf8c8c06375f3f7d4861aa02a122467e069acaf513025ff19
6641f6d2810ce493f51bee9c966b15c5043505350392b57645385a18c78f14669cc4d960446c1757
1b7c5d725021babbcd786957f3d17089c084907bda22c2b2675b4378b114c601d858802a55345a15
116bc61da4193996187ed70d16730e9ae6b3bb8787ebcaea1871d850997ddc08b4f4ea668fbf3740
7ac044b55be0908ecb94d4ed172ece66fd31bfdadf2b97a8bc690163ee11f5b575a4b44e36e2bfb2
f0fce91676fd64c7773bac6a003f481fddd0bae0a1f31aa27504e2a533af4cef3b623f4791b2cca6
d490"""))
ack1 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
049f8abcfa9c0dc65b982e98af921bc0ba6e4243169348a236abe9df5f93aa69d99cadddaa387662
b0ff2c08e9006d5a11a278b1b3331e5aaabf0a32f01281b6f4ede0e09a2d5f585b26513cb794d963
5a57563921c04a9090b4f14ee42be1a5461049af4ea7a7f49bf4c97a352d39c8d02ee4acc416388c
1c66cec761d2bc1c72da6ba143477f049c9d2dde846c252c111b904f630ac98e51609b3b1f58168d
dca6505b7196532e5f85b259a20c45e1979491683fee108e9660edbf38f3add489ae73e3dda2c71b
d1497113d5c755e942d1"""))
ack2 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
01ea0451958701280a56482929d3b0757da8f7fbe5286784beead59d95089c217c9b917788989470
b0e330cc6e4fb383c0340ed85fab836ec9fb8a49672712aeabbdfd1e837c1ff4cace34311cd7f4de
05d59279e3524ab26ef753a0095637ac88f2b499b9914b5f64e143eae548a1066e14cd2f4bd7f814
c4652f11b254f8a2d0191e2f5546fae6055694aed14d906df79ad3b407d94692694e259191cde171
ad542fc588fa2b7333313d82a9f887332f1dfc36cea03f831cb9a23fea05b33deb999e85489e645f
6aab1872475d488d7bd6c7c120caf28dbfc5d6833888155ed69d34dbdc39c1f299be1057810f34fb
e754d021bfca14dc989753d61c413d261934e1a9c67ee060a25eefb54e81a4d14baff922180c395d
3f998d70f46f6b58306f969627ae364497e73fc27f6d17ae45a413d322cb8814276be6ddd13b885b
201b943213656cde498fa0e9ddc8e0b8f8a53824fbd82254f3e2c17e8eaea009c38b4aa0a3f306e8
797db43c25d68e86f262e564086f59a2fc60511c42abfb3057c247a8a8fe4fb3ccbadde17514b7ac
8000cdb6a912778426260c47f38919a91f25f4b5ffb455d6aaaf150f7e5529c100ce62d6d92826a7
1778d809bdf60232ae21ce8a437eca8223f45ac37f6487452ce626f549b3b5fdee26afd2072e4bc7
5833c2464c805246155289f4"""))
ack3 = fromHex(stripSpaces("""
01f004076e58aae772bb101ab1a8e64e01ee96e64857ce82b1113817c6cdd52c09d26f7b90981cd7
ae835aeac72e1573b8a0225dd56d157a010846d888dac7464baf53f2ad4e3d584531fa203658fab0
3a06c9fd5e35737e417bc28c1cbf5e5dfc666de7090f69c3b29754725f84f75382891c561040ea1d
dc0d8f381ed1b9d0d4ad2a0ec021421d847820d6fa0ba66eaf58175f1b235e851c7e2124069fbc20
2888ddb3ac4d56bcbd1b9b7eab59e78f2e2d400905050f4a92dec1c4bdf797b3fc9b2f8e84a482f3
d800386186712dae00d5c386ec9387a5e9c9a1aca5a573ca91082c7d68421f388e79127a5177d4f8
590237364fd348c9611fa39f78dcdceee3f390f07991b7b47e1daa3ebcb6ccc9607811cb17ce51f1
c8c2c5098dbdd28fca547b3f58c01a424ac05f869f49c6a34672ea2cbbc558428aa1fe48bbfd6115
8b1b735a65d99f21e70dbc020bfdface9f724a0d1fb5895db971cc81aa7608baa0920abb0a565c9c
436e2fd13323428296c86385f2384e408a31e104670df0791d93e743a3a5194ee6b076fb6323ca59
3011b7348c16cf58f66b9633906ba54a2ee803187344b394f75dd2e663a57b956cb830dd7a908d4f
39a2336a61ef9fda549180d4ccde21514d117b6c6fd07a9102b5efe710a32af4eeacae2cb3b1dec0
35b9593b48b9d3ca4c13d245d5f04169b0b1"""))
aesSecret2 = fromHex("80e8632c05fed6fc2a13b0f8d31a3cf645366239170ea067065aba8e28bac487")
macSecret2 = fromHex("2ea74ec5dae199227dff1af715362700e989d889d7a493cb0639691efb8e5f98")
let rng = newRng()
proc testValue(s: string): string =
for item in data:
if item[0] == s:
result = item[1]
break
suite "Ethereum RLPx encryption/decryption test suite":
proc newTestHandshake(flags: set[HandshakeFlag]): Handshake =
if Initiator in flags:
let pk = PrivateKey.fromHex(testValue("initiator_private_key"))[]
let pk = PrivateKey.fromRaw(staticKeyA)[]
result = Handshake.init(rng[], pk.toKeyPair(), flags)
let epki = testValue("initiator_ephemeral_private_key")
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromHex(epki)[].toKeyPair()
let nonce = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("initiator_nonce")))
result.initiatorNonce[0..^1] = nonce[0..^1]
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromRaw(ephemeralKeyA)[].toKeyPair()
result.initiatorNonce[0..^1] = nonceA
elif Responder in flags:
let pk = PrivateKey.fromHex(testValue("receiver_private_key"))[]
let pk = PrivateKey.fromRaw(staticKeyB)[]
result = Handshake.init(rng[], pk.toKeyPair(), flags)
let epkr = testValue("receiver_ephemeral_private_key")
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromHex(epkr)[].toKeyPair()
let nonce = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("receiver_nonce")))
result.responderNonce[0..^1] = nonce[0..^1]
result.ephemeral = PrivateKey.fromRaw(ephemeralKeyB)[].toKeyPair()
result.responderNonce[0..^1] = nonceB
test "Encrypt/Decrypt Hello packet test vectors":
test "Fail on pre-EIP8 messages":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
var authm = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("auth_ciphertext")))
var ackm = fromHex(stripSpaces(testValue("authresp_ciphertext")))
var stateInitiator0, stateInitiator1: SecretState
var stateResponder0, stateResponder1: SecretState
responder.decodeAuthMessage(authm).expect("success")
initiator.decodeAckMessage(ackm).expect("success")
check: responder.decodeAuthMessage(auth1).isErr()
check: initiator.decodeAckMessage(ack1).isErr()
var csecInitiator = initiator.getSecrets(authm, ackm)
var csecResponder = responder.getSecrets(authm, ackm)
initSecretState(csecInitiator, stateInitiator0)
initSecretState(csecResponder, stateResponder0)
initSecretState(csecInitiator, stateInitiator1)
initSecretState(csecResponder, stateResponder1)
var packet0 = testValue("initiator_hello_packet")
var initiatorHello = fromHex(stripSpaces(packet0))
var packet1 = testValue("receiver_hello_packet")
var responderHello = fromHex(stripSpaces(packet1))
var header: array[RlpHeaderLength, byte]
test "Correct shared EIP-8 secret":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
check: responder.decodeAuthMessage(auth2).isOk()
check: initiator.decodeAckMessage(ack2).isOk()
var csecResponder = responder.getSecrets(auth2, ack2)
block:
check stateResponder0.decryptHeader(toOpenArray(initiatorHello, 0, 31),
header).isOk()
let bodysize = getBodySize(header)
check bodysize == 79
# we need body size to be rounded to 16 bytes boundary to properly
# encrypt/decrypt it.
var body = newSeq[byte](decryptedLength(bodysize))
var decrsize = 0
check:
stateResponder0.decryptBody(
toOpenArray(initiatorHello, 32, len(initiatorHello) - 1),
getBodySize(header), body, decrsize).isOk()
decrsize == 79
body.setLen(decrsize)
var hello = newSeq[byte](encryptedLength(bodysize))
csecResponder.aesKey == aesSecret2
csecResponder.macKey == macSecret2
var tmpMac = csecResponder.ingressMac
tmpMac.update("foo".toOpenArrayByte(0, 2))
check:
stateInitiator1.encrypt(header, body, hello).isOk()
hello == initiatorHello
block:
check stateInitiator0.decryptHeader(toOpenArray(responderHello, 0, 31),
header).isOk()
let bodysize = getBodySize(header)
check bodysize == 79
# we need body size to be rounded to 16 bytes boundary to properly
# encrypt/decrypt it.
var body = newSeq[byte](decryptedLength(bodysize))
var decrsize = 0
check:
stateInitiator0.decryptBody(
toOpenArray(responderHello, 32, len(initiatorHello) - 1),
getBodySize(header), body, decrsize).isOk()
decrsize == 79
body.setLen(decrsize)
var hello = newSeq[byte](encryptedLength(bodysize))
check:
stateResponder1.encrypt(header, body, hello).isOk()
hello == responderHello
tmpMac.finish().data == fromHex("0c7ec6340062cc46f5e9f1e3cf86f8c8c403c5a0964f5df0ebd34a75ddc86db5")
test "Can parse auth/ack with extra bytes":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
check: responder.decodeAuthMessage(auth3).isOk()
check: initiator.decodeAckMessage(ack3).isOk()
test "Continuous stream of different lengths (1000 times)":
var initiator = newTestHandshake({Initiator})
var responder = newTestHandshake({Responder})
var m0 = newSeq[byte](initiator.authSize())
var k0 = 0
var k1 = 0
check initiator.authMessage(rng[], responder.host.pubkey,
m0, k0).isOk
var m0 = newSeq[byte](AuthMessageMaxEIP8)
let k0 = initiator.authMessage(rng[], responder.host.pubkey,
m0).expect("correct buf size")
m0.setLen(k0)
check responder.decodeAuthMessage(m0).isOk
var m1 = newSeq[byte](responder.ackSize())
check responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1, k1).isOk
var m1 = newSeq[byte](AckMessageMaxEIP8)
let k1 = responder.ackMessage(rng[], m1).expect("correct buf size")
m1.setLen(k1)
check initiator.decodeAckMessage(m1).isOk
@ -188,11 +159,9 @@ suite "Ethereum RLPx encryption/decryption test suite":
var csecResponder = responder.getSecrets(m0, m1)
var stateInitiator: SecretState
var stateResponder: SecretState
var iheader, rheader: array[16, byte]
var iheader: array[16, byte]
initSecretState(csecInitiator, stateInitiator)
initSecretState(csecResponder, stateResponder)
burnMem(iheader)
burnMem(rheader)
for i in 1..1000:
# initiator -> responder
block:
@ -205,23 +174,21 @@ suite "Ethereum RLPx encryption/decryption test suite":
randomBytes(ibody) == len(ibody)
stateInitiator.encrypt(iheader, ibody,
encrypted).isOk()
stateResponder.decryptHeader(toOpenArray(encrypted, 0, 31),
rheader).isOk()
let rheader = stateResponder.decryptHeader(
toOpenArray(encrypted, 0, 31)).expect("valid data")
var length = getBodySize(rheader)
check length == len(ibody)
var rbody = newSeq[byte](decryptedLength(length))
var decrsize = 0
check:
stateResponder.decryptBody(
toOpenArray(encrypted, 32, len(encrypted) - 1),
length, rbody, decrsize).isOk()
decrsize == length
rbody.setLen(decrsize)
length, rbody).isOk()
rbody.setLen(length)
check:
iheader == rheader
ibody == rbody
burnMem(iheader)
burnMem(rheader)
# responder -> initiator
block:
var ibody = newSeq[byte](i * 3)
@ -233,20 +200,17 @@ suite "Ethereum RLPx encryption/decryption test suite":
randomBytes(ibody) == len(ibody)
stateResponder.encrypt(iheader, ibody,
encrypted).isOk()
stateInitiator.decryptHeader(toOpenArray(encrypted, 0, 31),
rheader).isOk()
let rheader = stateInitiator.decryptHeader(
toOpenArray(encrypted, 0, 31)).expect("valid data")
var length = getBodySize(rheader)
check length == len(ibody)
var rbody = newSeq[byte](decryptedLength(length))
var decrsize = 0
check:
stateInitiator.decryptBody(
toOpenArray(encrypted, 32, len(encrypted) - 1),
length, rbody, decrsize).isOk()
decrsize == length
length, rbody).isOk()
rbody.setLen(length)
check:
iheader == rheader
ibody == rbody
burnMem(iheader)
burnMem(rheader)

3
tests/p2p/test_discoveryv5.nim
View File

@ -417,6 +417,9 @@ suite "Discovery v5 Tests":
let discoveredFiltered = lookupNode.randomNodes(10,
("test", @[byte 1,2,3,4]))
check discoveredFiltered.len == 1 and discoveredFiltered.contains(targetNode)
let discoveredEmpty = lookupNode.randomNodes(10,
proc(n: Node) : bool = false)
check discoveredEmpty.len == 0
await lookupNode.closeWait()

9
tests/p2p/test_protocol_handlers.nim
View File

@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ p2pProtocol abc(version = 1,
onPeerDisconnected do (peer: Peer, reason: DisconnectionReason) {.gcsafe.}:
peer.networkState.count -= 1
if true:
raise newException(CatchableError, "Fake abc exception")
p2pProtocol xyz(version = 1,
rlpxName = "xyz",
@ -45,8 +43,6 @@ p2pProtocol xyz(version = 1,
onPeerDisconnected do (peer: Peer, reason: DisconnectionReason) {.gcsafe.}:
peer.networkState.count -= 1
if true:
raise newException(CatchableError, "Fake xyz exception")
peer.state.status = "disconnected"
p2pProtocol hah(version = 1,
@ -77,11 +73,10 @@ suite "Testing protocol handlers":
await peer.disconnect(SubprotocolReason, true)
check:
# we want to check that even though the exceptions in the disconnect
# handlers, each handler still ran
# all disconnection handlers are called
node1.protocolState(abc).count == 0
node1.protocolState(xyz).count == 0
peer.state(xyz).status == "connected"
peer.state(xyz).status == "disconnected"
asyncTest "Failing connection handler":
let rng = newRng()

26
tests/p2p/test_rlpx_thunk.json
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"Invalid list when decoding for object": {
"payload": "03",
"error": "MalformedRlpError",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "Object parameters are expected to be encoded in an RLP list"
},
"Message id that is not supported": {
@ -21,62 +21,62 @@
},
"No Hash nor Status, but empty list": {
"payload": "20c1c0",
"error": "RlpTypeMismatch",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "Decoding to HashOrStatus expects blob of size 1 or 32"
},
"No Hash nor Status, list instead of blob": {
"payload": "20c2c1c0",
"error": "RlpTypeMismatch",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "Decoding to HashOrStatus expects blob of size 1 or 32"
},
"No Hash nor Status, blob of 2 bytes": {
"payload": "20c4c3820011",
"error": "RlpTypeMismatch",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "Decoding to HashOrStatus expects blob of size 1 or 32"
},
"No Hash nor Status, blob of 33 bytes": {
"payload": "20e3e2a100112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbcceeddff33",
"error": "RlpTypeMismatch",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "Decoding to HashOrStatus expects blob of size 1 or 32"
},
"Listing elements when no data": {
"payload": "01e1",
"error": "MalformedRlpError",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "listElem to error on empty list"
},
"Listing elements when invalid length": {
"payload": "01ffdada",
"error": "MalformedRlpError",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "listElem to error on invalid size encoding"
},
"Listing single element list when having more entries": {
"payload": "01c20420",
"error": "RlpTypeMismatch",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "listElem to assert on not a single entry list"
},
"Listing single element list when having empty list": {
"payload": "01c0",
"error": "RlpTypeMismatch",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "listElem to assert on not a single entry list"
},
"DisconnectReason: single element list with entry out off enum range": {
"payload": "01c111",
"error": "RlpTypeMismatch",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "Disconnect reason code out of bounds 0..16 (got: 17)"
},
"DisconnectReason: single element out off enum range": {
"payload": "0111",
"error": "RlpTypeMismatch",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "Disconnect reason code out of bounds 0..16 (got: 17)"
},
"DisconnectReason: single element list with enum hole value": {
"payload": "01c10C",
"error": "RlpTypeMismatch",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "Error on Disconnect reason with enum hole value"
},
"DisconnectReason: single element with enum hole value": {
"payload": "010C",
"error": "RlpTypeMismatch",
"error": "PeerDisconnected",
"description": "Error on Disconnect reason with enum hole value"
},
"devp2p hello packet version 22 + additional list elements for EIP-8": {

60
tests/p2p/test_rlpxtransport.nim Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
{.used.}
import
unittest2,
chronos/unittest2/asynctests,
../../eth/common/keys,
../../eth/p2p/rlpxtransport
suite "RLPx transport":
setup:
let
rng = newRng()
keys1 = KeyPair.random(rng[])
keys2 = KeyPair.random(rng[])
server = createStreamServer(initTAddress("127.0.0.1:0"), {ReuseAddr})
teardown:
waitFor server.closeWait()
asyncTest "Connect/accept":
const msg = @[byte 0, 1, 2, 3]
proc serveClient(server: StreamServer) {.async.} =
let transp = await server.accept()
let a = await RlpxTransport.accept(rng, keys1, transp)
await a.sendMsg(msg)
await a.closeWait()
let serverFut = server.serveClient()
defer:
await serverFut.wait(1.seconds)
let client =
await RlpxTransport.connect(rng, keys2, server.localAddress(), keys1.pubkey)
defer:
await client.closeWait()
let rmsg = await client.recvMsg().wait(1.seconds)
check:
msg == rmsg
await serverFut
asyncTest "Detect invalid pubkey":
proc serveClient(server: StreamServer) {.async.} =
let transp = await server.accept()
discard await RlpxTransport.accept(rng, keys1, transp)
raiseAssert "should fail to accept due to pubkey error"
let serverFut = server.serveClient()
defer:
expect(RlpxTransportError):
await serverFut.wait(1.seconds)
let keys3 = KeyPair.random(rng[])
# accept side should close connections
expect(TransportError):
discard
await RlpxTransport.connect(rng, keys2, server.localAddress(), keys3.pubkey)

3
tests/rlp/all_tests.nim
View File

@ -2,4 +2,5 @@ import
./test_api_usage,
./test_json_suite,
./test_empty_string,
./test_object_serialization
./test_object_serialization,
./test_optional_fields

3
tests/rlp/test_api_usage.nim
View File

@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ proc test_blockBodyTranscode() =
transactions: @[
Transaction(nonce: 1)]),
BlockBody(
uncles: @[
BlockHeader(nonce: BlockNonce([0x20u8,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]))]),
uncles: @[Header(nonce: Bytes8([0x20u8,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]))]),
BlockBody(),
BlockBody(
transactions: @[

68
tests/rlp/test_optional_fields.nim Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
{.used.}
import
../../eth/[rlp, common],
unittest2
# Optionals in between mandatory fields for the convenience of
# implementation. According to the spec all optionals appear
# after mandatory fields. Moreover, an empty optional field
# cannot and will not appear before a non-empty optional field
type ObjectWithOptionals = object
a* : uint64
b* : uint64
c* : Opt[uint64] # should not count this as optional
d* : Opt[uint64] # should not count this as optional
e* : uint64
f* : uint64
g* : uint64
h* : Opt[uint64] # should not count this as optional
i* : Opt[uint64] # should not count this as optional
j* : Opt[uint64] # should not count this as optional
k* : uint64
l* : Opt[uint64] # should count this as an optional
m* : Opt[uint64] # should count this as an optional
n* : Opt[uint64] # should count this as an optional
var
objWithEmptyOptional: ObjectWithOptionals
objWithNonEmptyOptional: ObjectWithOptionals
objWithNonEmptyTrailingOptionals: ObjectWithOptionals
objWithEmptyTrailingOptionals: ObjectWithOptionals
objWithNonEmptyOptional.c = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithNonEmptyOptional.d = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithNonEmptyOptional.h = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithNonEmptyOptional.i = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithNonEmptyOptional.j = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithNonEmptyOptional.l = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithNonEmptyOptional.m = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithNonEmptyOptional.n = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithNonEmptyTrailingOptionals.l = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithNonEmptyTrailingOptionals.m = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithNonEmptyTrailingOptionals.n = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithEmptyTrailingOptionals.c = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithEmptyTrailingOptionals.d = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithEmptyTrailingOptionals.h = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithEmptyTrailingOptionals.i = Opt.some(0'u64)
objWithEmptyTrailingOptionals.j = Opt.some(0'u64)
suite "test optional fields":
test "all optionals are empty":
let bytes = rlp.encode(objWithEmptyOptional)
check: bytes.len == 7 # 6 mandatory fields + prefix byte
test "all optionals are non empty":
let bytes = rlp.encode(objWithNonEmptyOptional)
check: bytes.len == 15 # 6 mandatory + 8 optional + prefix
test "Only trailing optionals are non empty":
let bytes = rlp.encode(objWithNonEmptyTrailingOptionals)
check: bytes.len == 10 # 6 mandatory + 3 trailing optional + prefix
test "Only trailing optionals are empty":
let bytes = rlp.encode(objWithEmptyTrailingOptionals)
check: bytes.len == 12 # 6 mandatory + 5 non trailing + prefix