mirror of https://github.com/status-im/nim-eth.git
Introduce more constants and type aliases
This commit is contained in:
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ad99b96e12
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1fab56f894
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@ -4,11 +4,18 @@ import
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const
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idNoncePrefix = "discovery-id-nonce"
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gcmNonceSize* = 12
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keyAgreementPrefix = "discovery v5 key agreement"
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authSchemeName* = "gcm"
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gcmNonceSize* = 12
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gcmTagSize = 16
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aesKeySize* = 128 div 8
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tagSize* = 32 ## size of the tag where each message (except whoareyou) starts
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## with
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type
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AesKey = array[aesKeySize, byte]
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PacketTag = array[tagSize, byte]
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AuthResponse = object
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version: int
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signature: array[64, byte]
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@ -21,13 +28,13 @@ type
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handshakes*: Table[string, Whoareyou] # TODO: Implement hash for NodeID
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HandshakeSecrets = object
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writeKey: array[16, byte]
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readKey: array[16, byte]
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authRespKey: array[16, byte]
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writeKey: AesKey
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readKey: AesKey
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authRespKey: AesKey
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AuthHeader* = object
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auth*: array[12, byte]
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idNonce*: array[32, byte]
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auth*: AuthTag
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idNonce*: IdNonce
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scheme*: string
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ephemeralKey*: array[64, byte]
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response*: seq[byte]
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@ -39,9 +46,6 @@ type
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HandshakeError,
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PacketError
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const
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gcmTagSize = 16
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proc randomBytes*(v: var openarray[byte]) =
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if nimcrypto.randomBytes(v) != v.len:
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raise newException(RandomSourceDepleted, "Could not randomize bytes")
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@ -72,7 +76,7 @@ proc deriveKeys(n1, n2: NodeID, priv: PrivateKey, pub: PublicKey,
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# echo "EPH: ", eph.data.toHex, " idNonce: ", challenge.idNonce.toHex, "info: ", info.toHex
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static: assert(sizeof(result) == 16 * 3)
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static: assert(sizeof(result) == aesKeySize * 3)
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var res = cast[ptr UncheckedArray[byte]](addr result)
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hkdf(sha256, eph.data, idNonce, info, toOpenArray(res, 0, sizeof(result) - 1))
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@ -114,22 +118,26 @@ proc `xor`[N: static[int], T](a, b: array[N, T]): array[N, T] =
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for i in 0 .. a.high:
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result[i] = a[i] xor b[i]
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proc packetTag(destNode, srcNode: NodeID): array[32, byte] =
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proc packetTag(destNode, srcNode: NodeID): PacketTag =
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let destId = destNode.toByteArrayBE()
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let srcId = srcNode.toByteArrayBE()
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let destidHash = sha256.digest(destId)
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result = srcId xor destidHash.data
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proc encodeEncrypted*(c: Codec, toNode: Node, packetData: seq[byte], challenge: Whoareyou): (seq[byte], array[gcmNonceSize, byte]) =
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proc encodeEncrypted*(c: Codec,
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toNode: Node,
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packetData: seq[byte],
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challenge: Whoareyou):
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(seq[byte], array[gcmNonceSize, byte]) =
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var nonce: array[gcmNonceSize, byte]
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randomBytes(nonce)
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var headEnc: seq[byte]
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var writeKey: array[16, byte]
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var writeKey: AesKey
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if challenge.isNil:
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headEnc = rlp.encode(nonce)
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var readKey: array[16, byte]
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var readKey: AesKey
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# We might not have the node's keys if the handshake hasn't been performed
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# yet. That's fine, we will be responded with whoareyou.
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@ -152,7 +160,7 @@ proc encodeEncrypted*(c: Codec, toNode: Node, packetData: seq[byte], challenge:
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headBuf.add(encryptGCM(writeKey, nonce, body, tag))
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return (headBuf, nonce)
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proc decryptGCM(key: array[16, byte], nonce, ct, authData: openarray[byte]): seq[byte] =
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proc decryptGCM(key: AesKey, nonce, ct, authData: openarray[byte]): seq[byte] =
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var dctx: GCM[aes128]
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dctx.init(key, nonce, authData)
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result = newSeq[byte](ct.len - gcmTagSize)
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@ -224,13 +232,14 @@ proc decodeEncrypted*(c: var Codec,
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fromId: NodeID,
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fromAddr: Address,
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input: seq[byte],
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authTag: var array[12, byte],
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authTag: var AuthTag,
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newNode: var Node,
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packet: var Packet): DecodeStatus =
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let input = input.toRange
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var r = rlpFromBytes(input[32 .. ^1])
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var r = rlpFromBytes(input[tagSize .. ^1])
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var auth: AuthHeader
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var readKey: array[16, byte]
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var readKey: AesKey
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logScope: sender = $fromAddr
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if r.isList:
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@ -261,19 +270,19 @@ proc decodeEncrypted*(c: var Codec,
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else:
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# Message packet or random packet - rlp bytes (size 12) indicates auth-tag
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authTag = r.read(array[12, byte])
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authTag = r.read(AuthTag)
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auth.auth = authTag
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var writeKey: array[16, byte]
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var writeKey: array[aesKeySize, byte]
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if not c.db.loadKeys(fromId, fromAddr, readKey, writeKey):
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trace "Decoding failed (no keys)"
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return PacketError
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# doAssert(false, "TODO: HANDLE ME!")
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let headSize = 32 + r.position
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let headSize = tagSize + r.position
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let bodyEnc = input[headSize .. ^1]
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let body = decryptGCM(readKey, auth.auth, bodyEnc.toOpenArray,
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input[0 .. 31].toOpenArray)
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input[0 .. tagSize - 1].toOpenArray)
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if body.len > 1:
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let status = decodePacketBody(body[0], body.toOpenArray(1, body.high), packet)
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if status == decodingSuccessful:
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@ -8,14 +8,29 @@ import nimcrypto except toHex
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logScope:
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topics = "discv5"
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const
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alpha = 3 ## Kademlia concurrency factor
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lookupRequestLimit = 3
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findNodeResultLimit = 15 # applies in FINDNODE handler
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maxNodesPerPacket = 3
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lookupInterval = 60.seconds ## Interval of launching a random lookup to
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## populate the routing table. go-ethereum seems to do 3 runs every 30
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## minutes. Trinity starts one every minute.
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handshakeTimeout* = 2.seconds ## timeout for the reply on the
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## whoareyou message
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responseTimeout* = 2.seconds ## timeout for the response of a request-response
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## call
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magicSize = 32 ## size of the magic which is the start of the whoareyou
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## message
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type
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Protocol* = ref object
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transp: DatagramTransport
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localNode*: Node
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privateKey: PrivateKey
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whoareyouMagic: array[32, byte]
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whoareyouMagic: array[magicSize, byte]
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idHash: array[32, byte]
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pendingRequests: Table[array[12, byte], PendingRequest]
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pendingRequests: Table[AuthTag, PendingRequest]
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db: Database
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routingTable: RoutingTable
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codec*: Codec
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@ -27,18 +42,7 @@ type
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node: Node
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packet: seq[byte]
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const
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lookupRequestLimit = 3
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findNodeResultLimit = 15 # applies in FINDNODE handler
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lookupInterval = 60.seconds ## Interval of launching a random lookup to
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## populate the routing table. go-ethereum seems to do 3 runs every 30
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## minutes. Trinity starts one every minute.
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handshakeTimeout* = 2.seconds ## timeout for the reply on the
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## whoareyou message
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responseTimeout* = 2.seconds ## timeout for the response of a request-response
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## call
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proc whoareyouMagic(toNode: NodeId): array[32, byte] =
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proc whoareyouMagic(toNode: NodeId): array[magicSize, byte] =
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const prefix = "WHOAREYOU"
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var data: array[prefix.len + sizeof(toNode), byte]
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data[0 .. sizeof(toNode) - 1] = toNode.toByteArrayBE()
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@ -80,13 +84,13 @@ proc `xor`[N: static[int], T](a, b: array[N, T]): array[N, T] =
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proc isWhoAreYou(d: Protocol, msg: Bytes): bool =
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if msg.len > d.whoareyouMagic.len:
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result = d.whoareyouMagic == msg.toOpenArray(0, 31)
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result = d.whoareyouMagic == msg.toOpenArray(0, magicSize - 1)
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proc decodeWhoAreYou(d: Protocol, msg: Bytes): Whoareyou =
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result = Whoareyou()
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result[] = rlp.decode(msg.toRange[32 .. ^1], WhoareyouObj)
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result[] = rlp.decode(msg.toRange[magicSize .. ^1], WhoareyouObj)
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proc sendWhoareyou(d: Protocol, address: Address, toNode: NodeId, authTag: array[12, byte]) =
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proc sendWhoareyou(d: Protocol, address: Address, toNode: NodeId, authTag: AuthTag) =
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trace "sending who are you", to = $toNode, toAddress = $address
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let challenge = Whoareyou(authTag: authTag, recordSeq: 1)
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encoding.randomBytes(challenge.idNonce)
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@ -111,8 +115,6 @@ proc sendNodes(d: Protocol, toNode: Node, reqId: RequestId, nodes: openarray[Nod
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let (data, _) = d.codec.encodeEncrypted(toNode, encodePacket(packet, reqId), challenge = nil)
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d.send(toNode, data)
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const maxNodesPerPacket = 3
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var packet: NodesPacket
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packet.total = ceil(nodes.len / maxNodesPerPacket).uint32
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@ -156,7 +158,7 @@ proc receive*(d: Protocol, a: Address, msg: Bytes) {.gcsafe,
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EthKeysException,
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Secp256k1Exception,
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].} =
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if msg.len < 32:
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if msg.len < tagSize: # or magicSize, can be either
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return # Invalid msg
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# debug "Packet received: ", length = msg.len
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@ -175,12 +177,12 @@ proc receive*(d: Protocol, a: Address, msg: Bytes) {.gcsafe,
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"due to randomness source depletion."
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else:
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var tag: array[32, byte]
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tag[0 .. ^1] = msg.toOpenArray(0, 31)
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var tag: array[tagSize, byte]
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tag[0 .. ^1] = msg.toOpenArray(0, tagSize - 1)
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let senderData = tag xor d.idHash
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let sender = readUintBE[256](senderData)
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var authTag: array[12, byte]
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var authTag: AuthTag
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var node: Node
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var packet: Packet
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let decoded = d.codec.decodeEncrypted(sender, a, msg, authTag, node, packet)
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@ -278,8 +280,6 @@ proc lookup*(p: Protocol, target: NodeId): Future[seq[Node]] {.async.} =
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for node in result:
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seen.incl(node.id)
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const alpha = 3 # Kademlia concurrency factor
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var pendingQueries = newSeqOfCap[Future[seq[Node]]](alpha)
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while true:
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@ -2,12 +2,18 @@ import
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hashes, stint,
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../enode, enr
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const
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authTagSize* = 12
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idNonceSize* = 32
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type
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NodeId* = UInt256
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AuthTag* = array[authTagSize, byte]
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IdNonce* = array[idNonceSize, byte]
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WhoareyouObj* = object
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authTag*: array[12, byte]
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idNonce*: array[32, byte]
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authTag*: AuthTag
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idNonce*: IdNonce
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recordSeq*: uint64
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Whoareyou* = ref WhoareyouObj
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@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ suite "Discovery v5 Packet Encodings":
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randomPacketRlp = "0x01010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018c0202020202020202020202020404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404"
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var data: seq[byte]
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data.add(hexToByteArray[32](tag))
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data.add(rlp.encode(hexToByteArray[12](authTag)))
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data.add(hexToByteArray[tagSize](tag))
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data.add(rlp.encode(hexToByteArray[authTagSize](authTag)))
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data.add(hexToSeqByte(randomData))
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check data == hexToSeqByte(randomPacketRlp)
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@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ suite "Discovery v5 Packet Encodings":
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# expected output
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whoareyouPacketRlp = "0x0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101ef8c020202020202020202020202a0030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030301"
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let challenge = Whoareyou(authTag: hexToByteArray[12](token),
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idNonce: hexToByteArray[32](idNonce),
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let challenge = Whoareyou(authTag: hexToByteArray[authTagSize](token),
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idNonce: hexToByteArray[idNonceSize](idNonce),
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recordSeq: enrSeq)
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var data = hexToSeqByte(magic)
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data.add(rlp.encode(challenge[]))
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@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ suite "Discovery v5 Packet Encodings":
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# expected output
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authMessageRlp = "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"
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let authHeader = AuthHeader(auth: hexToByteArray[12](authTag),
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idNonce: hexToByteArray[32](idNonce),
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let authHeader = AuthHeader(auth: hexToByteArray[authTagSize](authTag),
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idNonce: hexToByteArray[idNonceSize](idNonce),
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scheme: authSchemeName,
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ephemeralKey: hexToByteArray[64](ephemeralPubkey),
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response: hexToSeqByte(authRespCiphertext))
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@ -78,8 +78,8 @@ suite "Discovery v5 Packet Encodings":
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messageRlp = "0x93a7400fa0d6a694ebc24d5cf570f65d04215b6ac00757875e3f3a5f421079038c27b5af763c446acd2749fe8ea5d12a2d94b8ccb3ba55558229867dc13bfa3648"
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var data: seq[byte]
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data.add(hexToByteArray[32](tag))
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data.add(rlp.encode(hexToByteArray[12](authTag)))
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data.add(hexToByteArray[tagSize](tag))
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data.add(rlp.encode(hexToByteArray[authTagSize](authTag)))
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data.add(hexToSeqByte(randomData))
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check data == hexToSeqByte(messageRlp)
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@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ suite "Discovery v5 Cryptographic Primitives":
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let
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c = Codec(privKey: initPrivateKey(localSecretKey))
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signature = signIDNonce(c, hexToByteArray[32](idNonce),
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signature = signIDNonce(c, hexToByteArray[idNonceSize](idNonce),
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hexToByteArray[64](ephemeralKey))
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check signature.getRaw() == hexToByteArray[64](idNonceSig)
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@ -182,10 +182,10 @@ suite "Discovery v5 Cryptographic Primitives":
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# expected output
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messageCiphertext = "0xa5d12a2d94b8ccb3ba55558229867dc13bfa3648"
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let encrypted = encryptGCM(hexToByteArray[16](encryptionKey),
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hexToByteArray[12](nonce),
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let encrypted = encryptGCM(hexToByteArray[aesKeySize](encryptionKey),
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hexToByteArray[authTagSize](nonce),
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hexToSeqByte(pt),
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hexToByteArray[32](ad))
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hexToByteArray[tagSize](ad))
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check encrypted == hexToSeqByte(messageCiphertext)
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test "Authentication Header and Encrypted Message Generation":
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