nim-eth/eth/p2p/p2p_backends_helpers.nim

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var
gProtocols: seq[ProtocolInfo]
# The variables above are immutable RTTI information. We need to tell
# Nim to not consider them GcSafe violations:
template allProtocols*: auto = {.gcsafe.}: gProtocols
proc getState*(peer: Peer, proto: ProtocolInfo): RootRef =
peer.protocolStates[proto.index]
template state*(peer: Peer, Protocol: type): untyped =
## Returns the state object of a particular protocol for a
## particular connection.
mixin State
bind getState
cast[Protocol.State](getState(peer, Protocol.protocolInfo))
proc getNetworkState*(node: EthereumNode, proto: ProtocolInfo): RootRef =
node.protocolStates[proto.index]
template protocolState*(node: EthereumNode, Protocol: type): untyped =
mixin NetworkState
bind getNetworkState
cast[Protocol.NetworkState](getNetworkState(node, Protocol.protocolInfo))
template networkState*(connection: Peer, Protocol: type): untyped =
## Returns the network state object of a particular protocol for a
## particular connection.
protocolState(connection.network, Protocol)
proc initProtocolState*[T](state: T, x: Peer|EthereumNode) {.gcsafe.} = discard
proc initProtocolStates(peer: Peer, protocols: openarray[ProtocolInfo]) =
# Initialize all the active protocol states
newSeq(peer.protocolStates, allProtocols.len)
for protocol in protocols:
let peerStateInit = protocol.peerStateInitializer
if peerStateInit != nil:
peer.protocolStates[protocol.index] = peerStateInit(peer)
proc resolveFuture[MsgType](msg: pointer, future: FutureBase) {.gcsafe.} =
var f = Future[MsgType](future)
doAssert(not f.finished())
f.complete(cast[ptr MsgType](msg)[])
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proc requestResolver[MsgType](msg: pointer, future: FutureBase) {.gcsafe.} =
var f = Future[Option[MsgType]](future)
if not f.finished:
if msg != nil:
f.complete some(cast[ptr MsgType](msg)[])
else:
f.complete none(MsgType)
else:
# This future was already resolved, but let's do some sanity checks
# here. The only reasonable explanation is that the request should
# have timed out.
if msg != nil:
if f.read.isSome:
doAssert false, "trying to resolve a request twice"
else:
doAssert false, "trying to resolve a timed out request with a value"
else:
try:
if not f.read.isSome:
doAssert false, "a request timed out twice"
# This can except when the future still completes with an error.
# E.g. the `sendMsg` fails because of an already closed transport or a
# broken pipe
except TransportOsError as e:
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# E.g. broken pipe
trace "TransportOsError during request", err = e.msg
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except TransportError:
trace "Transport got closed during request"
except Exception as e:
debug "Exception in requestResolver()", exc = e.name, err = e.msg
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raise
proc linkSendFailureToReqFuture[S, R](sendFut: Future[S], resFut: Future[R]) =
sendFut.addCallback() do (arg: pointer):
if not sendFut.error.isNil:
resFut.fail(sendFut.error)
proc messagePrinter[MsgType](msg: pointer): string {.gcsafe.} =
result = ""
# TODO: uncommenting the line below increases the compile-time
# tremendously (for reasons not yet known)
# result = $(cast[ptr MsgType](msg)[])
proc disconnectAndRaise(peer: Peer,
reason: DisconnectionReason,
msg: string) {.async.}
proc handshakeImpl[T](peer: Peer,
sendFut: Future[void],
responseFut: Future[T],
timeout: Duration): Future[T] {.async.} =
sendFut.addCallback do (arg: pointer) {.gcsafe.}:
if sendFut.failed:
debug "Handshake message not delivered", peer
doAssert timeout.milliseconds > 0
yield responseFut or sleepAsync(timeout)
if not responseFut.finished:
await disconnectAndRaise(peer, HandshakeTimeout,
"Protocol handshake was not received in time.")
elif responseFut.failed:
raise responseFut.error
else:
return responseFut.read