nim-eth-p2p/ethp2p/rlpxcrypt.nim

241 lines
8.4 KiB
Nim
Raw Normal View History

#
# Ethereum P2P
# (c) Copyright 2018
# Status Research & Development GmbH
#
# Licensed under either of
# Apache License, version 2.0, (LICENSE-APACHEv2)
# MIT license (LICENSE-MIT)
#
## This module implements RLPx cryptography
import
ranges/stackarrays, rlp/types,
nimcrypto/[rijndael, bcmode, keccak, utils]
from auth import ConnectionSecret
const
RlpHeaderLength* = 16
RlpMacLength* = 16
maxUInt24 = (not uint32(0)) shl 8
type
SecretState* = object
## Object represents current encryption/decryption context.
aesenc*: CTR[aes256]
aesdec*: CTR[aes256]
macenc*: ECB[aes256]
emac*: keccak256
imac*: keccak256
RlpxStatus* = enum
Success, ## Operation was successful
IncorrectMac, ## MAC verification failed
BufferOverrun, ## Buffer overrun error
IncompleteError, ## Data incomplete error
IncorrectArgs ## Incorrect arguments
RlpxHeader* = array[16, byte]
proc roundup16*(x: int): int {.inline.} =
## Procedure aligns `x` to
let rem = x and 15
if rem != 0:
result = x + 16 - rem
else:
result = x
template toa(a, b, c: untyped): untyped =
toOpenArray((a), (b), (b) + (c) - 1)
proc sxor[T](a: var openarray[T], b: openarray[T]) {.inline.} =
assert(len(a) == len(b))
for i in 0 ..< len(a):
a[i] = a[i] xor b[i]
proc initSecretState*(secrets: ConnectionSecret, context: var SecretState) =
## Initialized `context` with values from `secrets`.
# FIXME: Yes, the encryption is insecure,
# see: https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/issues/32
# https://github.com/ethereum/py-evm/blob/master/p2p/peer.py#L159-L160
var iv: array[context.aesenc.sizeBlock, byte]
context.aesenc.init(secrets.aesKey, iv)
context.aesdec = context.aesenc
context.macenc.init(secrets.macKey)
context.emac = secrets.egressMac
context.imac = secrets.ingressMac
template encryptedLength*(size: int): int =
## Returns the number of bytes used by the entire frame of a
## message with size `size`:
RlpHeaderLength + roundup16(size) + 2 * RlpMacLength
template decryptedLength*(size: int): int =
## Returns size of decrypted message for body with length `size`.
roundup16(size)
proc encrypt*(c: var SecretState, header: openarray[byte],
frame: openarray[byte],
output: var openarray[byte]): RlpxStatus =
## Encrypts `header` and `frame` using SecretState `c` context and store
## result into `output`.
##
## `header` must be exactly `RlpHeaderLength` length.
## `frame` must not be zero length.
## `output` must be at least `encryptedLength(len(frame))` length.
var
tmpmac: keccak256
aes: array[RlpHeaderLength, byte]
let length = encryptedLength(len(frame))
let frameLength = roundup16(len(frame))
let headerMacPos = RlpHeaderLength
let framePos = RlpHeaderLength + RlpMacLength
let frameMacPos = RlpHeaderLength * 2 + frameLength
if len(header) != RlpHeaderLength or len(frame) == 0 or length != len(output):
return IncorrectArgs
# header_ciphertext = self.aes_enc.update(header)
c.aesenc.encrypt(header, toa(output, 0, RlpHeaderLength))
# mac_secret = self.egress_mac.digest()[:HEADER_LEN]
tmpmac = c.emac
var macsec = tmpmac.finish()
# self.egress_mac.update(sxor(self.mac_enc(mac_secret), header_ciphertext))
c.macenc.encrypt(toa(macsec.data, 0, RlpHeaderLength), aes)
sxor(aes, toa(output, 0, RlpHeaderLength))
c.emac.update(aes)
burnMem(aes)
# header_mac = self.egress_mac.digest()[:HEADER_LEN]
tmpmac = c.emac
var headerMac = tmpmac.finish()
# frame_ciphertext = self.aes_enc.update(frame)
copyMem(addr output[framePos], unsafeAddr frame[0], len(frame))
c.aesenc.encrypt(toa(output, 32, frameLength), toa(output, 32, frameLength))
# self.egress_mac.update(frame_ciphertext)
c.emac.update(toa(output, 32, frameLength))
# fmac_seed = self.egress_mac.digest()[:HEADER_LEN]
tmpmac = c.emac
var seed = tmpmac.finish()
# mac_secret = self.egress_mac.digest()[:HEADER_LEN]
macsec = seed
# self.egress_mac.update(sxor(self.mac_enc(mac_secret), fmac_seed))
c.macenc.encrypt(toa(macsec.data, 0, RlpHeaderLength), aes)
sxor(aes, toa(seed.data, 0, RlpHeaderLength))
c.emac.update(aes)
burnMem(aes)
# frame_mac = self.egress_mac.digest()[:HEADER_LEN]
tmpmac = c.emac
var frameMac = tmpmac.finish()
tmpmac.clear()
# return header_ciphertext + header_mac + frame_ciphertext + frame_mac
copyMem(addr output[headerMacPos], addr headerMac.data[0], RlpHeaderLength)
copyMem(addr output[frameMacPos], addr frameMac.data[0], RlpHeaderLength)
result = Success
template encryptMsg*(msg: BytesRange, secrets: SecretState): auto =
var header: RlpxHeader
if data.len > int(maxUInt24):
raise newException(OverflowError, "RLPx message size exceeds limit")
# write the frame size in the first 3 bytes of the header
header[0] = byte(msg.len shl 16)
header[1] = byte(msg.len shl 8)
header[2] = byte(msg.len)
# XXX:
# This would be safer if we use a thread-local sequ for the temporary buffer
var outCipherText = allocStackArray(byte, encryptedLength(msg.len))
let s = encrypt(secrets, header, msg.toOpenArray, outCipherText.toOpenArray)
assert s == Success
outCipherText
proc getBodySize*(a: RlpxHeader): int =
(int(a[0]) shl 16) or (int(a[1]) shl 8) or int(a[2])
proc decryptHeader*(c: var SecretState, data: openarray[byte],
output: var openarray[byte]): RlpxStatus =
## Decrypts header `data` using SecretState `c` context and store
## result into `output`.
##
## `header` must be exactly `RlpHeaderLength + RlpMacLength` length.
## `output` must be at least `RlpHeaderLength` length.
var
tmpmac: keccak256
aes: array[RlpHeaderLength, byte]
if len(data) != RlpHeaderLength + RlpMacLength:
return IncompleteError
if len(output) < RlpHeaderLength:
return IncorrectArgs
# mac_secret = self.ingress_mac.digest()[:HEADER_LEN]
tmpmac = c.imac
var macsec = tmpmac.finish()
# aes = self.mac_enc(mac_secret)[:HEADER_LEN]
c.macenc.encrypt(toa(macsec.data, 0, RlpHeaderLength), aes)
# self.ingress_mac.update(sxor(aes, header_ciphertext))
sxor(aes, toa(data, 0, RlpHeaderLength))
c.imac.update(aes)
burnMem(aes)
# expected_header_mac = self.ingress_mac.digest()[:HEADER_LEN]
tmpmac = c.imac
var expectMac = tmpmac.finish()
# if not bytes_eq(expected_header_mac, header_mac):
let headerMacPos = RlpHeaderLength
if not equalMem(cast[pointer](unsafeAddr data[headerMacPos]),
cast[pointer](addr expectMac.data[0]), RlpMacLength):
result = IncorrectMac
else:
# return self.aes_dec.update(header_ciphertext)
c.aesdec.decrypt(toa(data, 0, RlpHeaderLength), output)
result = Success
proc decryptHeaderAndGetMsgSize*(c: var SecretState,
encryptedHeader: openarray[byte],
outSize: var int): RlpxStatus =
var decryptedHeader: RlpxHeader
result = decryptHeader(c, encryptedHeader, decryptedHeader)
if result == Success:
outSize = decryptedHeader.getBodySize
proc decryptBody*(c: var SecretState, data: openarray[byte], bodysize: int,
output: var openarray[byte], outlen: var int): RlpxStatus =
## Decrypts body `data` using SecretState `c` context and store
## result into `output`.
##
## `data` must be at least `roundup16(bodysize) + RlpMacLength` length.
## `output` must be at least `roundup16(bodysize)` length.
##
## On success completion `outlen` will hold actual size of decrypted body.
var
tmpmac: keccak256
aes: array[RlpHeaderLength, byte]
outlen = 0
let rsize = roundup16(bodysize)
if len(data) < rsize + RlpMacLength:
return IncompleteError
if len(output) < rsize:
return IncorrectArgs
# self.ingress_mac.update(frame_ciphertext)
c.imac.update(toa(data, 0, rsize))
tmpmac = c.imac
# fmac_seed = self.ingress_mac.digest()[:MAC_LEN]
var seed = tmpmac.finish()
# self.ingress_mac.update(sxor(self.mac_enc(fmac_seed), fmac_seed))
c.macenc.encrypt(toa(seed.data, 0, RlpHeaderLength), aes)
sxor(aes, toa(seed.data, 0, RlpHeaderLength))
c.imac.update(aes)
# expected_frame_mac = self.ingress_mac.digest()[:MAC_LEN]
tmpmac = c.imac
var expectMac = tmpmac.finish()
let bodyMacPos = rsize
if not equalMem(cast[pointer](unsafeAddr data[bodyMacPos]),
cast[pointer](addr expectMac.data[0]), RlpMacLength):
result = IncorrectMac
else:
c.aesdec.decrypt(toa(data, 0, rsize), output)
outlen = bodysize
result = Success